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Spatial and Labor Market
Contributions to Earnings Inequality
Although the increase in earnings inequality in the 1980s and 1990s has been well docu-
mented, its causes are still being studied and debated. Some explanations revolve
around changes in job skills, job requirements, and labor market institutions. Other
explanations focus on the deteriorating quality of many urban neighborhoods and the
increasing economic isolation of their residents. A symposium at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston on November 17, 1995, brought together experts from labor and urban
economics to address the extent to which changes in labor markets and location have
contributed to rising inequality. Participants also discussed the effectiveness of policies
that may help overcome the problem.Contents
Spatial and Labor Market Contributions to Earnings
Inecluality: An Overview
Katha~ne L. Bradbury, Yolanda K. Kodrzycki, and Christopher J. Mayer
Summary of Issues and Current Knowledge
The papers in this session summarize recent research on how labor markets and location contribute
to earnings inequality, in order to provide a context for the papers to follow.




The Role of Neighborhood and Job Location in Employment/
Hiring and Earnings
How important are neighborhood externalities, physical access to jobs, race, and the concentration
of poverty in explaining the severe problems in many urba~ neighborhoods? What is the relative
importance of each of these factors? What policies might help?
Spatial Effects upon Employment Outcomes: The Case of New Jersey Teenagers
Katherine M. O’Regan and John M. Quigley
Discussion: Edward L. Glaeser
Spatial Factors and the Employment of Blacks at the Firm Level
Harry J. Holzer and Keith R. Ihlanfeldt
Discussion: James E. Rosenbaum
The Role of Schools and the Changing Quality of Labor in
Earnings Inequality
To what extent do students have equal access to educational opportunity? Are their educational
choices responsive to the relative earnings for different types of jobs? Is inequality likely to increase






83Equality of Educational Opportunity Revisited
John F. Kain and Kraig Singleton
Discussion: Eric A. Hanushek
Is the Market for College Graduates Headed for a Bust? Demand and Supply
Responses to Rising College Wage Premiums
John H. Bishop
Discussion: Richard Jo Murnane
The Role of Organizational Change and Labor Market
Institutions in Earnings Inequality
What are the characteristics of technology or work organization that are contributing to changes in
skill requirements and relative earnings? To what extent has the decline of institutions such as
collective bargaining and the minimum wage contributed to rising inequality? What scope is there
for the United States to develop institutions and work environments to reduce inequality?















Panel Discussion on Policy Implications
What have we learned from the papers presented at this Symposium? What are the implications of
rising earnings inequality for economic growth? What are the appropriate roles (if any) of employers
and federal, state, and local governments in addressing the problems posed by earnings inequality?
To what extent are small-scale socioeconomic experiments generalizable? How urgent is the problem
and what are the prospects for action?
Anita A. Summers, Moderator; Ann B. Schnare, Frank Levy, and Lawrence F. Katz
173Correction Correction, May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviezo
In the article "Technology and Skill Requirements: Implications for
Establishment Wage StTuctures," by Peter Cappelli, incorrect summary
statistics were given for Tables 2, 3, and 4. The correct figures are as
follows:
Table 2, on page 149i R2 = .47, R--2 = .45, F = 20.849
Table 3, on page 149: R2 = .40, R2 = .38, F = 16.001
Table 4, on page 150: R2 = .12, R2 = .08, F = 3.12
Please enter these corrections on your copy of the May/June 1996 issue.
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Yolanda K. Kodrzycki, and
Christopher J. Mayer
Vice President and Economist, Senior
Economist, and Economist, respec-
tively, at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston. The authors are very grateful
to Joan Poskanzer and Rebecca Heller-
stein for their excellent editing of the
symposiu~n papers and panelists’ re-
marks for publication.
E
arnings inequality has increased markedly in the United States in
recent decades. In 1979, full-time workers at the 90th percentile of
the wage distribution earned about three times as much as those
at the 10th percentile. By 1992, high earners were being paid about four
times as much as low earners. Inequality has risen along various
dimensions--by education, by age group, and among similarly educated
workers with similar length of experience. Moreover, the trend toward
greater earnings inequality looks more pronounced when one takes
account of persons who work less than full-time or less than year-round.
And the degree to which inequality has risen has been greater in the
United States than in other advanced economies.
Increasing inequality has occurred against a backdrop of increasing
economic segregation. In the 1960s, middle-class and wealthy Americans
began to move out of central city neighborhoods to the suburbs in greater
numbers, leaving poor Americans increasingly isolated h~ poverty-
stricken urban areas. Although segregation by race remains at very high
levels, the exodus of middle- and upper-income blacks from central cities
has accelerated. This growth in segregation by income has left many poor
(and often minority) households living in neighborhoods that lack
positive role models or established job networks, have high crime rates,
and are isolated from fast-growing suburban employers.
Some economists have explained trends in earnings inequality by
looking exclusively at changes in job skills, job requirements, and labor
market institutions. Others focus on the deteriorating quality of many
urban neighborhoods and the increash~g economic isolation of~ their
residents that inhibits the accumulation of skills by youth and reduces
their access to jobs. In November 1995, the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston convened a symposium of experts representing these alternative
perspectives, with the goal of fostering a more integrated understanding
of the causes of inequality and generating fresh insights into possible
policy responses.The symposium began with t;vo overviews of the
largely separate literatures on labor market and spatial
contributions to earnh~gs h~equality, written by Yolanda
Kodrzycki and Christopher Mayer. A consensus ap-
pears to be growing within each of these bodies of
research that the rise in inequality has been multifac-
eted. Discussions at the symposium expanded on this
theme and, appropriately, considered a broad array of
potential remedies.
The participants generally agreed that increases
in earnings inequality during recent decades are a
source of concern. They also indicated that the distri-
bution of earnings is likely to become even less equal
in the future. Although some experts (particularly
those specializing in labor economics) expressed sup-
port for measures that would have the effect of re-
ducing inequality in the upper half of the income
distribution, most policy proposals appeared moti-
vated by a specific concern for low earners. One
prominent focus of such efforts would be to reduce
concentrations of poverty, both by reducing barriers to
residential mobility for the urban poor and by enhanc-
ing their educational opportunities.
I. Spatial Contributions to
Earnings Inequality
For years, economists have recognized that resi-
dential location plays an important role in the labor
market outcomes of individual workers, but have
debated about which specific locational factors are
most relevant.
How Residential Location Matters
Katherine O’Regan and John Quigley analyze
employment and "idleness" (not employed and not
in school) outcomes for a large sample of "at-home"
urban youth. They find evidence in favor of two broad
explanations for ~vhy location is so important. First,
the "spatial mismatch hypothesis," developed in the
1970s by John Kain, posits that racial segregation of
minorities in inner-city neighborhoods and increasing
job suburbanization have reduced the incomes and
employment opportunities of blacks. More recently,
William Julius Wilson’s work on the "urban under-
class" suggests that the social isolation resulting from
the concentration of minorities has a negative effect on
individuals generally, and on their labor market per-
formance specifically.
The authors’ analysis is based upon an unusually
rich sample of 28,000 youths in four New Jersey
metropolitan areas, matched to detailed census tract
demographic information and specially constructed
measures of access to employment. Even after control-
ling for a variety of human capital characteristics,
O’Regan and Quigley find that neighborhood factors
matter consistently in explaining both "idleness"
and employment, although they cannot distinguish
whether the effect is due to informal job networks, role
models, or peer influence. Measures of access to jobs,
while not consistently significant across metropolitan
areas, are positively related to employment in some
areas, especially for minority youth. Access to jobs
appears to play essentially no role in determining
youth idleness.
O’Regan and Quigley find that
neighborhood factors matter
consistently in explaining both
youth "idleness" and
employment, although they cannot
distinguish whether the effect is
due to informal job networks, role
models, or peer influence.
Simulations using these results demonstrate quite
clearly that the constellation of factors that distinguish
"good" from "bad" neighborhoods affects teenage
employment in profound ways. For example, pre-
dicted employment rates for a neighborhood with
characteristics encountered by the average white
youth are up to one-third higher than for the average
black youth’s neighborhood.
In his discussion, Edward Glaeser comments that
O’Regan and Quigley have made significant improve-
ments in distinguishing the impact of proximity to
employment from that of neighborhood characteris-
tics on employment outcomes. Nonetheless, the paper
still faces possible problems of interpretation because
attributes of the neighborhood may be related to
unobserved individual characteristics, and individu-
als might choose a neighborhood based on the produc-
tivity of that neighborhood for that specific person.
Glaeser notes that the reliability of O’Regan and
Quigley’s results depends critically on two assump-
tions: first, that parents of at-home youth choose a
neighborhood based on their own job concerns rather
2 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewthan the employment prospects of their children; and
second, that these two factors are independent of each
other. On the policy front, Glaeser suggests that the
role of neighborhood factors h~ influencing individual
outcomes could provide an efficiency argument for
government policy intervention since individuals can-
not directly control the actions of others. He warns,
however, that government may exacerbate rather than
improve existing market failures.
Glaeser concludes that policies designed to pro-
mote and subsidize human capital accumulation and
alter the patterns of family responsibility are most
likely to be successful, while enterprise zones, subsi-
dized transportation, or mobility strategies are un-
likely to provide many long-lasting benefits. He draws
this conclusion by noting that measures of job access
are less significant in the O’Regan and Quigley paper
than the measures of neighborhood COlnposition.
Glaeser agrees with the authors, however, that it is
difficult if not impossible to separate out specific
neighborhood influences (such as the crime rate, the
percentage of poor residents, or the employment rate).
Nonetheless, identifyh~g such specifics is a necessary
first step in designh~g govermnent policies to address
neighborhood externalities.
Employers and Location
Much of the empirical evidence and theoretical
support for spatial mismatch comes from studying
individuals, but Harry Holzer and Keith Ihlanfeldt
argue that an investigation of firm behavior is also
important. Previous studies have found strong evi-
dence that access to jobs affects labor market outcomes
for minorities, and many researchers have proposed
policies to improve access from predominantly minor-
ity urban areas to suburban job locations or to en-
courage minority households to move to the suburbs.
Yet, if the newly located minority households do not
have the skills that firms demand, or if firms discrim-
inate in the hiring process, such policies are doomed
to failure.
Holzer and Ihlanfeldt use data from a new survey
of over 3,000 employers in four major metropolitan
areas to investigate the determinants of black employ-
ment and ~vages at the firm level. While considering a
wide variety of other factors that might affect black
employment, including employers’ skill needs, the
race of customers, and the race of the person respon-
sible for hiring, the authors find that employers’
proximity to black residences and to public transit
increases the likelihood of hiring black workers. They
also find that ;vages are lower at employers located
close to the black population. Holzer and Ihlanfeldt
argue that such results are consistent with the predi-
cates of spatial mismatch in which labor demand
shifts away from black areas, but the labor supply
response is limited.by housing segregation.
Holzer and Ihlanfeldt conclude that policies de-
signed to encourage the mobility of minority house-
holds or to subsidize reverse comlnuting would likely
raise employment levels and wages for black workers.
The authors support programs to improve the skills of
minority workers, but they view such programs as
complements rather than substitutes for transporta-
tion programs, because one type of policy enhances
the effectiveness of the other.
Holzer and Ihlanfeldt find that
employers" proximity to
black residences and to public
transit increases the likelihood
of hiring black workers. They
also find that wages are lower
at employers located close
to the black population.
The discussant, James Rosenbaum, accepts Hol-
zer and Ihlanfeldt’s empirical fh~dings, but takes issue
with their policy recommendations. In assessing the
empirical findings, Rosenbaum notes that sample se-
lection is still a potential problem--that is, black
workers hired h~ white suburbs might somehow be
different from other black workers in ways that are not
captured by the controls. Yet Rosenbaum goes on to
present evidence supporting Holzer m~d Ihla~ffeldt from
the Gautreaux experiments in Chicago, in which low-
income black applicants to public housing were ran-
domly allocated to the city or the suburbs. In a sub-
sequent study of 300 adults, movers to the suburbs
had significantly higher employment rates than those
who moved within the city, while employed members
of the t~vo groups had similar wages and hours of work.
In developing policy recommendations, Rosen-
baum is less optimistic than Holzer and Ihlanfeldt
about transportation policies unless they are com-
bined with some programs to equip black workers
with the attributes that many employers seek. He cites
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with personality issues in addition to directly mea-
sured skills, using such imperfect indicators as a firm
handshake or a traditional hairstyle. In fact, employers
often use residential location as another signal of
whether job candidates will be "good" workers, a
practice that casts doubt on the possible success of
transportation programs. Programs must be devel-
oped to give employers more accurate signals of a
potential worker’s quality. One advantage of residen-
tial mobility programs like Gautreaux is that they
allow potential workers to tap into informal job net-
works through local schools or churches, which pro-
vide signals that employers trust. Rosenbaum con-
cludes by describing the significant long-term
advantages of encouraging the residential mobility of
blacks: The largest benefits of mobility occur in the
second generation.
Inequality in Local Schools
John Kain and Kraig Singleton focus on differ-
ences in the access to educational inputs among chil-
dren in five racial and ethnic groups. The authors
pattern their paper after the Coleman Report, a path-
breaking study prepared nearly 30 years ago, which
found that the nation’s schools were highly segregated
by race but that schools of various racial composition
had quite similar access to direct school inputs. Kain
and Singleton focus on schools in Texas, where they
have collected enrollment data and assessment test
scores for 1.8 million students during the five-year
period between 1990 and 1994.
The authors find that important changes have
taken place since the Coleman report was published.
The most obvious change has been a significant reduc-
tion in the severest types of racial and ethnic segrega-
tion. In fact, only 16 percent of Anglo students in
Texas attend schools that are more than 90 percent
Anglo, with similar results for other groups. While
segregation may have diminished, Kain and Singleton
showy that test scores for black and Hispanic students
are significantly lower than for Anglo and Asian-
American students, even controlling for school fixed
effects and the family’s poverty status. Finally, the
authors find significant differences in the within-dis-
trict provision of several important school inputs.
Teacher ability, as measured by proficiency test scores,
is inversely related to a school’s percentage of black
and Hispanic students. In addition, teachers employed
in schools with a high percentage of disadvantaged
minority students have fewer years of education and
less experience than average, although they also have
slightly smaller classes.
Kain and Singleton view their paper as a first step
in a longer-term project of quantifying the impact of
educational inputs on student performance. However,
even if policymakers acknowledge only a limited
relationship between inputs and performance, the
results in this paper suggest additional opportunities
to equalize inputs across schools. Texas educators
appear to have narrowed differences in class size at
schools within a district, but they have yet to equalize
teacher quality.
Eric Hanushek reviews the Kain and Singleton
paper with few criticisms, but a different interpreta-
tion of the results. He considers the most important
finding in the paper to be that estimated racial and
ethnic differences in student performance appear to be
independent of school inputs. Even if school inputs do
vary by a school’s race and ethnicity, such differences
will neither harm nor help the performance of minor-
ity students. This conclusion supports Hanushek’s
views (formulated from previous research) that mea-
sured school inputs are, for the most part, unrelated to
student performance.
Nonetheless, Hanushek concedes that many stud-
ies have found that teacher test scores are positively
correlated with student performance, suggesting the
possibility that differences in teacher quality could
have some measurable effect. He also notes that the
racially biased distribution of inputs that conventional
wisdom links to student performance could imply
systemic racial discrimination.
II. Labor Market Contributions to
Ea~,ffngs Inequality
The labor market studies presented at the sympo-
sium concentrated on three themes: demand and
supply trends for college-educated workers, the effect
of workplace innovations on wage structures, and
institutional influences on earnings inequality.
Responses to the Rising College Wage Premium
The earnings of college graduates and non-grad-
uates diverged sharply in the 1980s and early 1990s,
after showing little relative change during the 1970s.
John Bishop’s paper explores whether the earnings
premium associated with a college education wil!
increase, given likely labor market trends and
demographic and institutional constraints. He con-
4 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewcludes that opportunities for college-educated work-
ers will conth~ue to expand and ~vill lead to a contin-
uation of recent trends in their relative earnings.
Bishop criticizes U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) calculations that appear to predict rising under-
employment among BAs. The BLS derives projections
of the demand for college-educated workers from
forecasts of industry output, using data on occupa-
tional staffing ratios by industry and on the prevalence
of college graduates witl-fin occupations. This method-
ology historically has produced poor forecasts of the
direction of the college job market. According to
Bishop, the BLS attempt to divide jobs into some that
Bishop concludes that
opportunities for college-educated
workers will continue to
expand and will lead to a
continuation of recent trends
in their relative earnings.
require a bachelor’s degree and others that do not is
fla~ved conceptually. In many occupations that do not
require a B.A., productivity nevertheless rises with
academic skills. Furthermore, over time many sectors
of the U.S. economy have been increasing their de-
mand for professional, technical, and managerial
;vorkers, so historical relationships between industrial
composition and occupational mix provide an tmreli-
able basis for making forecasts.
Bishop proposes an alternative, regression-based
model of the demand for different occupations. This
model, which has been more accurate than the BLS
methodology in the past, now projects that profes-
sional, technical, and managerial jobs will account for
60 percent of total job growth between 1990 and 2005.
Although Bishop believes that college enrollments will
respond to these work opportunities, he foresees a
decline in the ratio of BAs awarded to total employ-
ment because relatively few individuals will be in the
age group that typically attends college. Thus, govern-
ment should intervene to improve access to colleges
and universities. To this end, Bishop suggests raising
high school standards, increasing student financial
aid, making tuition tax-deductible, and halth~g tuition
increases at public h~stitutions.
Discussant Richard Murnane agrees with Bish-
op’s prediction that college will continue to be a good
investment in the years ahead. He explores possible
reasons for the observed anxiety over the fate of
college-educated workers, despite the considerable
evidence that this group has done and will continue to
do better relative to their less-educated counterparts.
One observation relates to successive cohorts of BAs.
Recent male college graduates are not earnh~g any
more, adjusted for inflation, than men of similar age
and educational background 15 },ears ago. (The grow-
ing earnings premium of male college graduates re-
sults from a decline in the real earnings of high school
graduates rather than any increase in their own earn-
ings.) And because of real tuition increases, the recent
BAs have a higher debt burden than their predeces-
sors. Second, an increasing proportion of older male
college graduates are now in low-payh~g jobs, com-
pared to the situation in the late !970s. This trend
presumably relates to earnings patterns for workers
who lose their jobs in corporate restructurings and
other layoffs. Finally, Murnane indicates that highly
educated workers often spend a couple of years in
low-paying jobs immediately after graduation. The
popular image of college graduates wasting their
education working in coffee bars and the like is based
largely on such temporary employment.
Murnane shares Bishop’s concern about improv-
ing access to higher education, but differs SOlnewhat in
how to achieve this goal. He argues that states should
allow tuition at public institutions to continue to rise,
but they shottld allocate more funds to need-based
financial aid.
Technology in the Worlcplace
A number of studies have argued that technolog-
ical change has been raising the demand for highly
educated and otherwise skilled workers, while lower-
ing the demand for the less educated and the less
skilled. Some of these studies do not measure technol-
ogy directly but attribute unexplained trends in wage
patterns to technological change. Others include only
very general measures of technology, such as capital
intensity or computer investments by industry. In
contrast, Peter Cappelli’s paper uses the responses to
a national survey of about 3,000 employers to take
a closer look at the influence of technology on ski!l
requirements and relative wages for production work-
ers and their supervisors. He uses the term "technol-
ogy" to encompass changes in workplace organiza-
tion, such as changes in how jobs are defined and who
controls their content.
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sciences disciplines on how technology alters skill
requirements. In line with the themes of these earlier
studies, his regression analysis indicates that work-
places with more widespread computer usage, higher
capital intensity, a research and development center,
and a total quality lnanagement (TQM) program are
more likely to require upgraded skills among produc-
tion workers.
Cappelli then examines the links between tech-
nology and wage structures by comparing pay at
establishments that make intensive use of the new
Cappelli’s analysis indicates that
workplaces with more widespread
computer usage, higher capital
intensity, an R&D center, and a
TQM program are more likely to
require upgraded skills among
production workers.
technologies with others that do not. The introduction
of computers and new work practices appears to
h~crease h~equality withh~ occupations. At the same
time, more advanced technologies tend to reduce
inequality within establishments, as indicated by the
relative pay of production workers and their super-
visors.
Cappelli warns that these findings do not provide
clear guidance on future wage or employment pat-
terns for the economy as a whole. If employers have
difficulty hiring skilled workers (or if wage require-
ments for these positions become too high), they may
take compensating actions, such as redesigning jobs
to have lower skill requirements. Because they lack
knowledge of what measures employers are likely to
take, government policymakers cannot know what
interventions are needed to achieve societal earnings
distribution goals.
In lzis discussion, John Bound questions the abil-
ity of largely cross-sectional studies of work establish-
ments such as Cappelli’s to shed light on trends in
inequality. Despite isolated examples to the contrary,
technological cl~ange undoubtedly has increased the
demand for skills over the past two decades. This
conclusion is based on indirect, but irrefutable, evi-
dence that the relative utilization of ski!led labor has
been rising despite increases in its relative cost. Fur-
thermore, a focus on the skills and wages of produc-
tion workers ignores the decline h~ the fraction of the
work force in production jobs. This shift in the com-
position of jobs is an important component of the skill
upgrading that has been taking place.
Bound acknowledges, however, that Cappelli’s
examination of production workers results in some
new insights. The paper is the first to find that
computer usage and workplace innovations such as
TQM raise the pay of these employees. Bound calls for
a more detailed examination of exactly how these
capital investments and human resources manage-
ment practices affect skill requirements.
h~fluences of Labor Market h~stitutions
The trends toward a higher share of professional,
technical, and managerial employees in the work
force, and toward the adoption of new technologies,
are common across a number of countries. Yet the
United States has experienced a greater increase in
earnings inequality, and a greater declh~e in the earn-
ings of low-end workers, than other industrialized
countries. Richard Freeman’s paper explores the de-
gree to which international differences are due to
differences in labor market institutions, notably col-
lective bargaining and the mandated minimum wage.
He fh~ds that the effects of institutional factors are at
least as strong and arguably stronger than the effects
of more commonly cited market factors.
A higher degree of inequality in the United States
than in other countries is sometimes attributed to our
greater degree of ethnic and cultural diversity. Free-
man disputes tlzis allegation by comparing workers of
different backgrounds in the United States and Swe-
den. Americans of Swedish descent and Swedes of
non-Nordic descent have earnings distributions simi-
lar to those prevailing in their country of residence--
not their country of ancestry. Freeman concludes that
cross-country differences are due to institutional fac-
tors, which he describes.
Freeman cites several studies showing that de-
clinh~g unionization has accounted for about one-fifth
of the increase in U.S. earnings inequality over the
past two decades. He notes the remarkable unanhnity
in the findings despite considerable diversity in meth-
odologies, but argues that the studies underestimate
the true impact to the degree that union wage set-
tlements have spillover effects to nonunionized sec-
tors. Freeman’s own regressions, which explain earn-
6 May/June 1996 New England Economic Re~,iewings inequality in 12 OECD countries as a function of
collective bargaining coverage and unionization, sug-
gest that as much as one-half to two-thirds of U.S.-
European differences in the degree of inequality can
be traced to these institutions. Finally, Freeman finds
that countries with the largest declines in collective
bargaining coverage generally had the largest in-
creases in inequality.
Freeman emphasizes that the cures for problems
do not have to be linked directly to the causes. Thus,
a more progressive fiscal policy or measures to in-
crease the access of poor children to technology are
solutions worth considering. But in light of the seri-
ousness of the rise in inequality in the United States,
Freeman believes that institutional interventions such
as a rise in the minimum wage should not be ruled
out. Expansions in collective bargaining coverage may
have nnique benefits, such as increasing the degree
of worker influence in workplaces, which in turn has
the potential to raise workplace efficiency.
In his comments, Peter Gottschalk agrees that
institutions matter; one cannot hope to explain U.S.-
European differences in inequality by market forces
alone. But he calls for a more rigorous assessment of
the relative role of institutions and markets in deter-
mining changes in inequality over time. Gottschalk
finds that roughly one-half of the countries with
centralized wage-setting insti~ltions also experienced
education- or age-related changes in labor supplies
that are consistent with earnings patterns. By not
including explicit tests of the role of markets in
earuings inequality, Freeman’s analyses offer only
upper-bound estimates of the role of institutions.
Turning to policy, Gottschalk argues that regard-
less of whether labor market institutions were or
were not an important cause of the increase in inequal-
ity, the United States could have done more to offset
this trend. He urges consideration of an expanded




The panelists were asked to reflect on three broad
issues:
¯ the nature of the "problem" posed by rising
inequality and, in particular, its implications for
economic growth;
¯ the urgency of the problem; and
¯ the appropriate policy actions to take.
Anita Summers observes that development of
appropriate policies can occur only when consensus
is reached that inequality has risen to unacceptable
levels. In her view, inequality is currently too high
because of its consequences for those at the bottom of
the incolne distribution--the poor--and it is the poor
on whom policy concern should focus. Comprehen-
sive policy programs, not single-pronged strategies,
are needed to address the problems of those at the
bottom. Such programs must deal with the spatial
concentration of the poor as well as with their low
incomes per se.
Any consideration of policy must recognize the
ongoing devolution of responsibility from the federal
govermnent to state and local governments, Summers
points out. Increased emphasis on sub-federal govern-
ments’ decision-making wil! complicate developlnent
or implementation of policies focused on labor mar-
kets and transportation, and especially any policies
aimed at spatial dispersion of the poor, because they
may cross the relevant jurisdictions’ borders. For
example, analysts are already concerned about inter-
state competition in pursuit of welfare reform. In the
context of devolution, the biggest U.S. cities--in which
the poor are highly concentrated--may lose out be-
cause they are outvoted in their states by suburban
and rural interests.
Ann Schnare carries forward the theme of "peo-
ple versus place," focusing on the housing market.
After rising rapidly in preceding decades, home own-
ership rates have held steady in the last two decades
as a result of income stagnation among the middle
class. And income declines at the bottom have made
well-maintained rental housing unaffordable for
many, resulting in physical decay in those residential
areas in which low-income renters are concentrated--
central cities. This decay has, in turn, increased the
impetus for those who have a choice to live elsewhere,
further augmenting spatial segregation by income.
Discussing mortgage programs of Freddie Mac as
well as housing policies of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), Schnare reports
some discouraging developments. Special low-equity
mortgage programs aimed at low-income potential
home-buyers have a weak record because many poor
individuals cannot maintain payments on their prop-
erties. For mainstream mortgage programs, by con-
trast, loans to low-income individuals appear to be no
riskier than loans to middle-income borrowers, but
neighborhood income exerts a strong independent
effect: Loans on properties in distressed inner-city
neighborhoods are noticeably riskier, regardless of the
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argues, HUD programs have become less successful as
they have attempted to allocate their increasingly
limited budgets to both providing housing assistance
to very poor individuals and addressing the commu-
nity development needs of distressed neighborhoods.
She suggests that policies centered around vouchers
and mixed-income developments would suffer less
Summers observes that comprehensive policy
programs, not single-pronged strategies, are needed
to address the problems of the poor.
Schnare suggests that policies centered around
vouchers and mixed-income developments might
help to reduce the negative neighborhood
externalities that plague current subsidized
housing programs.
Levy argues that in the short run we need
"emergency" policies to ease the impact of economic
adjustments such as restructuring on those hardest
hit. In the long run, the supply of well-qualified
workers must increase via education.
Katz notes that our experience with training and
wage subsidy programs shozos that early
intervention pays off, and the returns to higher
education are particularly large for those from
disadvantaged backgrounds.
from, and indeed might help to reduce, the negative
neighborhood externalities that plague current subsi-
dized housing programs.
Frank Levy focuses on the potential responsive-
hess of labor supply--via education and human cap-
ital development--to the sizable shifts in labor de-
mand that underlie much of the recent increase in U.S.
earnings inequality. While he believes that in the long
run rising inequality slows the nation’s economic
growth, in the shorter run the causation runs in the
opposite direction. Restructuring in the manufactur-
ing and services sectors has raised the education
premium, and thereby increased inequality, by reduc-
ing the demand for semi-skilled labor much faster
than these workers can acquire new skills. The policy
challenges are twofold: In the short run, he argues, we
need "emergency" policies to ease the hnpact of these
economic adjustments on those hardest hit. In the long
run, the supply of well-qualified workers must in-
crease via education, particularly elementary and sec-
ondary schooling because it is difficult for mature
workers to upgrade their educational attainment later.
Spatial issues enter the labor policy discussion
because of the local character of public schooling in
the United States. Schools should adjust their curricula
and their teaching routines to provide a better fit
between what they teach and what graduates will
need when entering the labor market, Levy argues.
The need for these adjustments is greatest in the
communities that have historically prepared children
for the jobs that are in decline. Moreover, parents in
these communities have often been on the wrong side
of the rising educational wage premium. Thus, be-
cause of increased geographic homogeneity by in-
come, the communities needing the greatest school
adjustments are generally those with the fewest re-
sources to explore and finance them. Information
about labor market opportunities and skill needs is
critical: even as we keep upgrading educational stan-
dards, we also need to disseminate information to
children and parents early enough to influence track-
ing and other educational decisions.
Larry Katz also focuses on the shrinking demand
for disadvantaged workers, defined as those with
lhnited education or skills, or from poor families or
impoverished neighborhoods. Neither this labor de-
mand shift, nor the reinforcing changes in other sup-
ply and demand factors that have accompanied it,
show any signs of abating, he notes. While strong
macroeconomic growth improves disadvantaged
workers’ prospects, the recent "t~vist" in the wage
structure has been so massive that specific i~itiatives
are needed to address the structural barriers prevent-
ing a speedy supply response. In addition, because the
supply response takes time, the government may
want to intervene in the short run on the demand side
of the market (via wage subsidies, expansion of the
earned income tax credit, or raising the minimum
wage, for example) to ensure that work pays.
A number of lessons can be drawn from our
experience with training and wage subsidy programs,
Katz says. One is that early intervention pays off; once
a student drops out, it is difficult to turn things
around. And mature workers are much less likely than
those still in school to continue their schooling. Thus,
8 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewprovision of mentoring and more general information
to improve the matching of skills and demands, as
well as the possibility of financial support for higher
education, must be in place early enough to provide
young students with a realistic expectation of realizing
the payoff to further education. The returns to higher
education are particularly large for those from disad-
vantaged backgrounds, suggesting that borrowing
constraints are binding in some cases. Financial con-
straints also keep many poor families in public hous-
ing, where access to jobs is poor and where they feel
their children’s futures are threatened by crime and
poor schooling. To overcome the particular difficulties
of the poor who are spatially concentrated, the gov-
ernment should try "place-based people policies,"
which would target training and human resource
funds on the areas with the greatest needs.
IV. Overall Themes and Policy Conclusions
A key issue that both motivated the symposium
and animated much of the discussion is the question
of what current trends imply about future patterns of
earnings inequality in the United States. Virtually all
participants agreed that the increase in inequality in
recent decades is a source of concern, even where
consensus is lacking about "appropriate" or "accept-
able" levels of inequality. Thus, a critical question is
whether the forces that caused the recent rise in
inequality are likely to reverse themselves, or be offset
by other equalizing forces, without policy intervention.
Space Matters
One basic conclusion that emerged from the con-
ference is that "space matters." This is not a very
encouraging message when evaluated in the context
of future inequality trends. Access to jobs is critical to
any individua!’s labor market success. And access has
a geographic aspect--the length of the commute to
employment opportunities--as well as an individual
job preparation (education/skills) aspect.
In a generally suburbanizing economy, residents
of core parts of many of the nation’s largest cities have
become increasingly isolated from the functioning
of the broader economy. Neighborhood externalities
cause this isolation to foster further isolation, both
cultural and geographic, as employers make location
decisions considering the availability of the existing
work force, for example, and children pattern their
behavior and aspirations on what they observe in their
own neighborhoods. Transportation policy could help
to overcome some spatial barriers to equal job access,
but effective policies do not appear to be operating
today. And transportation policies cannot offset the
broader isolating forces operating in the markets for
housing and schooling.
The Labor Supply "Problem"
Individuals have begun responding to the incen-
tives offered by the rising educational premium by
obtaining more education. But these investments take
time, and for some students they may be limited by
financial constraints. Therefore, demand for educated
workers may continue to grow faster than supply for
a considerable period. Policy interventions may be
needed in the near term to enhance the supply adjust-
ments.
Critical to the demand for educated workers is
how technology influences skill requirements. In this
regard, the symposium highlighted changes in the
structure of work relationships, in addition to the
investments in computers and research and develop-
ment that are more typically thought of as "technolo-
gy." Despite evidence that selected changes have
served to equalize pay within workplaces, most par-
ticipants appeared skeptical that technological ad-
vances or employer actions would reverse the trend to
greater inequality.
Changes in the Policy Context
A recurring theme in the policy discussions was
the prospect of a change in the U.S. system of feder-
alism. Partly as a result of initiatives designed to
encourage competition and innovation among sub-
national jurisdictions, the federal government is de-
volving responsibility for policy development and
implementation in a number of functional areas to-
ward states and localities. As responsibility moves to
smaller geographic entities, direct redistribution or
indirect policies targeted at improving specific geo-
graphic areas become more difficult to implement.
This difficulty happens virtually by definition, and
also because increased residential sorting is likely to
occur as revenue-raising and service provision are
made more dependent on geographic location. Thus,
existing federal policies that may have helped reduce
inequality in the past cannot be expected to have
greater redistributional effects in coming years. Future
policy initiatives must be evaluated in light of this
shift in the decision-making locus.
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Both because "space matters" and because labor
supply and demand forces show no signs of turning
the tide, the trend toward increased earnings inequal-
ity is very likely to continue. Most participants view
government policy as having an important role to
play in alleviating some of the perceived market
failures that contribute to this trend. While the sym-
posium did not develop a consensus regarding which
policies should be adopted, it did raise some useful
One key question is the degree to
which concern should focus on the
bottom of the income distribution
rather than on inequality across
the entire income distribution.
questions and--by spelling out where we are, how
we got here, and where we seem to be headed--it
provided a context in which to consider policy pro-
posals.
One key question is the degree to which concern
should focus on the bottom of the income distribution
rather than on inequality across the entire income
distribution. Broad policy interventions are not
needed, for example, if market-responsive shifts h~ the
supply of labor can be counted on to shrink the
educational ~vage premium over the longer term.
Some labor economists at the symposium indicated
that a decrease in the relative pay of high earners
would improve the international competitiveness of
the U.S. economy. But a range of participants noted
that market failures pose obstacles to those at the
bottom. Thus, most of the policy interventions pro-
posed at the symposium focused on raising incomes at
the bottom of the income distribution.
Institutional arrangelnents and traditions have
limited the extent to which U.S. governments inter-
vene in labor markets. A few participants expressed
support for a greater role for government or labor
unions in setting pay, more supported at least stopgap
measures that would help to ensure that "work pays"
at the bottom, but most assigned highest priority to
education, housing, or general fiscal measures.
Several participants recommended policies that
would encourage residents of poor and minority inner
city neighborhoods to move to the suburbs. As a
decentralized, democratic society, the United States
has not historically undertaken policies to disperse
the residents of urban neighborhoods (and some gov-
ernment policies may even have helped to create these
neighborhoods). Anti-discrimination statutes, how-
ever, have been enacted to provide more equal access
to housing and credit markets. While mobility strate-
gies patterned after the Gautreaux program in Chi-
cago can provide some hope for a few residents of
disadvantaged neighborhoods, such programs are
likely to leave many remah~ing residents of poor
neighborhoods facing even more severe neighborhood
conditions (especially in the absence of alternative
programs designed to encourage reverse migration by
middle-class households). This discussion suggests an
important role for policies designed to reduce the
broader consequences of neighborhood isolation, such
as gover~zment efforts to raise the quality of schools in
poor districts or to directly improve neighborhood
conditions or the skills of existing residents.
Education emerged as a critical arena for policy,
especially since a significant governmental role al-
ready exists. Symposium participants generally ap-
peared to view schools as the most appropriate place
for providing students with information about work-
place technologies and labor markets, in addition to
teaching them traditional academic skills. Increases
in residential sorting make the equalization of educa-
tional opportunity at the elementary and secondary
level a difficult task. In addition, rising real student
costs and declining real incomes have reduced access
to lzigher education for students from lower and
middle-income households. While addressing the
causes and consequences of inequality is difficult
enough for the generation currently in the labor mar-
ket, the problems of inequality will become even more
intractable if not addressed for future generations.
Viewed in this context, redoubled efforts to assure all
children access to good-quality schools makes sense as
an early intervention strategy.
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E
arnings inequality has increased dramatically in the United States
over the last decade and a half. Take, for exalnple, average weekly
earnings for adults who work full-time (Figure 1). The U.S.
Department of Labor (1994) has calculated that in 1979, a man at the 90th
percentile of the wage distribution earned 3.2 times as much as a man
at the 10th percentile. In 1992, a man at the 90th percentile earned 4.1
times as much. For women, the disparity increased from 3.1 to 3.7 over
this same time period. Men at the bottom of the earnings distribution fell
behind not only in relative but also in absolute terms, as average earnings
for all full-time male earners fell by about 3 percent from 1979 to 1992.
For women, average earnings increased by about 15 percent, so the rise in
inequality was less likely to be associated with declining real earnings.
While these particular calculations focus on only two points in the income
distribution, the conclusion that inequality has risen markedly over the
past decade and a half is supported by a large body of evidenceA
Earnings inequality has risen along various dimensions. Highly
educated workers have gained relative to less educated workers. Expe-
rienced workers have earned increasingly more than inexperienced
workers. And pay for similarly educated workers with similar length
of experience has become more unequal. The only significant contrary
trend is that the earnings of women have become more similar to those of
men.2 Recent evidence also shows that the increase in inequality during
the 1980s was greater in the United States than abroad, and that the
distribution of earnings here is much more dispersed than in other
industrialized countries.
Much of the literature on earnings inequality was reviewed in a
landmark survey by Frank Levy and Richard Murnane (1992). The
current paper provides an overview of our present knowledge, concen-
trating for the most part on contributions since the publication of the
Levy-Murnane study. It summarizes explanations for trends in inequality
by educational attainment, by experience, within education-experienceFigure 1
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor (1994).
categories, and in general. A remarkably diverse array
of economic factors (rather than a single dominant
force) have caused the rise in earnings inequality in
the United States. And although the rising education
wage premium has received considerably more atten-
tion than the other aspects of inequality, new evidence
suggests that growing inequality is traceable at least as
much to other aspects of work skills.
This survey briefly examines the sig~ificance of
two refinements to the measure of earnings--the role
of unemployment and underemployment on the
one hand, and the role of earnings variability on the
other. Individuals with a low earnings capacity are
increasingly likely to be out of work or working fewer
hours, relative to those with a high earnings capacity.
Therefore the trend toward greater earnings inequal-
ity looks more pronounced when one takes account
of persons who work less than full-time or less than
year-round.
The paper assesses how additional social and
political influences have interacted with labor markets
in determining inequality. Changes in taxes and trans-
~ For a comparison of alternative measures, see, for example,
Karoly (1993).
2 See Blau and Kahn (1994). Bradbury (1996) finds that inequal-
ity rose for men and women combh~ed during the 1980s, despite the
growing similarity in the earnings of men and women who worked
full-time and year-round.
fers have served to aggravate earnh~gs disparities in
the United States over the last decade and a half, as
has the increased prevalence of single-parent families.
The paper concludes with some observations on past
and future research themes.
Changing Returns to Education
The earnings of college graduates and non-college
graduates diverged sharply in the 1980s and early
1990s, after showing little relative change during the
1970s (Figure 2). According to the U.S. Department
of Labor (1994), between 1979 and 1992, real earnings
of full-time year-round male workers rose 5.2 percent
for those with a college degree, while failing for those
with less education. In 1992, male college graduates
earned 74 percent more than high school graduates
and 133 percent more than high school dropouts. In
1979, these differentials had been only 37 and 70
percent, respectively. The premium paid for education
also rose for women during the 1980s and early 1990s,
although all categories of full-time women workers
except ttigh school dropouts experienced at least some
increase in real earnings. As noted in Levy and Mur-
nane (1992), these trends have been explained by a
combination of ongoing increases in demand for col-
Figure 2
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor {1994). Annual figures computed for
year-round, full-time workers.
12 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewlege-educated workers and shifting rates of growth of
different grottps in the labor force.
The Supply of Highly Educated l/Vorkers
In the United States, the supply of college-edu-
cated workers slowed in the 1980s as compared to the
1970s, thereby helping to boost the return to higher
education. This swing in the rate of increase in the
number of college graduates was largely the result of
demographic influences, as most of the baby boom
generation came of age in the 1970s. hnmigration
patterns also played a role in changing the educational
composition of the work force. Borjas (1995) reports
that in 1990, nearly a quarter of high school dropouts
in the United States were foreign-born, compared to
only about one-eighth in 1980.3
Variation in the supply of labor also has been
helpful in explaining international differences in the
relative earnings of college graduates and non-college
graduates. For example, slower increases in the supply
The education of the average
American worker increased from
about 9 years in 1940 to about
13 years in 1990, while the
returns to education increased.
of college graduates during the 1980s contributed to
higher education-related earxzings differentials in the
United Kingdom and Japan (Katz, Loveman, and
Blanchflower 1995). On the other hand, a greater
expansion in the supply of college graduates in Can-
ada helps to explain a more modest rise in educational
earnings differentials, as compared with the United
States.
An important question looking forward is
whether the current large premktm for college-edu-
cated workers will prompt higher college enrolhnents,
thereby diminishing the premium in the future. A
recent paper by Mincer (1994) finds that educational
attainment does respond to wages, and that this
response will mitigate the trend toward higher wage
premia for college-educated workers. Mincer con-
cludes, however, that the premium is not likely to fall
from its current level. For one thing, the demand for
college-educated labor is likely to keep rising. More-
over, "lags in the educational pipeline, grooving costs
[of education], and perverse demographics represent
delays and impediments to timely supply effects."
Mincer also notes that the recent poor performance of
elementary and secondary school students, as mea-
sured by the high proportion with poor reading and
mathematics skills, may represent a bottleneck for the
supply adjustment. John Bishop’s paper for this sym-
posium further examines how demand and supply
responses are likely to influence the wage premium
for college-educated workers.
The Demand for Highly Educated Workers
Demand for more highly educated workers has
been increasing for many years. The edttcation of the
average American worker increased from about 9
years in 1940 to about 13 years in 1990, while the
returns to education increased (Murphy and Welch
1993c).4 The Levy-Murnane survey noted that "there
is a consensus on the hnportance of shifts in relative
demand, and there is no shortage of potential factors
to account for the demand shifts. But to date we have
an incomplete picture of the relative importance of
these factors." A vigorous debate on this topic con-
tinues.
Several hypotheses have emerged concerning de-
mand shifts. The first explanation is that the mix of
jobs has changed because industries such as manufac-
turing are a less important part of the economy than
they once were, while service-producing sectors have
increased in importance. Recent studies appear to be
in agreement that the growing inequality between
highly educated workers and others is due in part to
a changing industrial structm’e. However, they also
indicate that growing inequality is a phenomenon
common to many ind~tstries, and therefore industrial
mix cannot be the dominant factor in explaining
trends in inequality.
3 Immigration may also help to explain different wage trends in
regions within the United States. Topel (1994) found that those parts
of the country with the greatest increase in wage inequality were
those with the smallest improvements in labor-force qnality. In
particular, he indicated that immigration of low-level Asian and
Hispanic workers reduced the wages for non-immigrant ~vorkers in
the West by about 10 percent. However, Topel measured labor
quality according to the distribution of workers by wage categories,
which would take account of other factors in addition to education
levels.
~ Murphy and Welch estimate that increases in the returns to
education h~ the 1950s, 1960s, and 1980s more than offset decreases
in the 1940s and 1970s.
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has caused the wages of less educated workers to fall,
as the United States competes with countries where
wages are much lower. Although some studies have
found evidence indicating that international competi-
tion is an important explanation for growing inequal-
ity, the literature on the effects of trade is particularly
contentious.
A third explanation is non-neutral technological
change. The argument is that American industry has
invested in technologies that reduce the demand for
low-end workers, wltile increasing the productivity
(and wages) of high-end workers. This hypothesis
finds support in correlations between the extent of
investment in computers and other high-technology
Several hypotheses have emerged
concerning the demand for more
highly educated workers: a
changing industrial structure,
international trade, and non-
neutral technological change.
equipment by an industry, on the one hand, and the
growth in inequality in its wage structure on the other.
This hypothesis is appealing in that it potentially can
explain earnings trends across a wide spectrum of
industries.
The remainder of this section briefly reviews
some of the recent studies of the shifting demand for
highly educated workers. It divides the literature into
studies of industrial 1nix, international competition,
and technological change; studies dealing with more
than one theme also are noted under these headings.
h~dustriaI mix. Two recent studies decompose the
increased demand for education into "between indus-
try" and "within industry" effects. Murphy and
Welch (1993a) find that only 19 percent of the in-
creased demand for highly educated workers between
1968 and 1990 was due to the growing importance of
industries such as professional services, finance, and
education that traditionally employ a relatively high
proportion of college graduates and to the shrinkage
of industries such as agriculture, mining, and low- and
medium-skilled manufacturing that employ a rela-
tively low proportion. The remaining 81 percent was
due to higher demand for college-educated workers
among industries across the board.
Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) perform a
similar decomposition within manufacturing and also
attempt to explain the between- and within-industry
shifts. They estimate that less than one-third of the
shift in employment from production (that is, less
educated) to nonproduction (more highly educated)
workers during the 1980s can be accounted for by
shifting employment across industries, and that these
industrial shifts in turn are attributable largely to
changes in defense-related demand and international
trade. Berman, Bound, and Griliches find that the
degree of shift toward nonproduction workers within
industries was correlated with industry investment in
computers and expenditures on research and devel-
opment. The authors interpret this latter finding as
indicative of the role of non-neutral technological
change in causing rising inequality.
Several studies examine the role of industrial
structure for middle- and lower-earners. Jul~m (1994)
notes that the 1980s were distinguished from the
previous four decades by the contraction of industries
and occupations that predominantly employ moder-
ately educated males. Declining opportunities in the
middle of the earnings distribution tended to increase
the competition for low-wage jobs. In cross-state re-
gressions, Juhn finds that the decline in the manufac-
turing sector had an effect on inequality precisely
because that is where many moderately educated
male workers have traditionally worked.
Acs and Danziger (1993) study men with earnings
below a level needed to keep a family of four out of
poverty. They conclude that the change in industrial
structure during the 1980s had little effect on the
earnings of white men in this category. Black men, on
the other hand, were adversely affected by the loss of
opportunities in manufacturing and in lower-paid
h~dustries. The shifts in industrial structure more than
offset the benefit of higher educational attainment for
black men.
Hutchens (1993) compares paths to success for 18-
and 19-year-old men without a high school diploma in
1966 and 1979. He finds that the nature of jobs within
certain key industries and occupations changed over
time. The earlier cohort could rely on construction and
clerical work to provide incomes that would keep
them out of poverty; these types of jobs provided less
attractive earnings for the later cohort.
Looking forward, the industrial mix of jobs is
expected to continue to change. The U.S. Department
of Labor projects that service-producing sectors will
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2005, as manufacturing and mining jobs continue to
disappear and construction jobs grow only modestly
(U.S. Department of Labor 1994). Whatever the effects
of a changing job mix in the past, however, one recent
study suggests that further changes may have only a
negligible effect on earnings inequality. Schweitzer
and Dupuy (1995) examine the distribution of earn-
ings in the goods-producing and service-producing
sectors for full-time workers between 1969 and 1993.
They find that the earnings distributions in these two
sectors have been converging since 1980 and are now
quite similar.
International competition. Among the studies most
forcefully setting out a substantial role for interna-
tional trade are Borjas and Ramey (1994a, 1994b) and
Wood (1994). Borjas and Ramey find that U.S. durable
goods manufacturing industries involved in interna-
tional trade traditionally have been more highly con-
centrated and have paid higher wages (adjusting for
observable characteristics of workers) than other in-
dustries. Increased competition from imports since
the early 1980s lowered the rents earned in these
industries as well as the wage bill paid to workers. The
decrease in employment opportunities, in turn, has
forced more workers into competitive sectors, which
has pushed average wages down. Borjas and Ramey
examine the ratio of earnings of college graduates to
less educated workers, comparing it with a list of
potential explanatory variables. Using cointegration
analysis for the period 1963-88, they show that the
only variable that consistently shares the same long-
term trend with the wage inequality series is the
durable goods trade deficit as a percentage of GDP.
(The level of research and development expenditures
per worker appears in a graphical comparison to be
correlated with wage inequality, but does not pass
muster in a formal statistical test.)
Wood performs a detailed analysis of the eco-
nomic effects of North-South (that is, developed coun-
try-developing country) trade. He concludes that in-
creased trade with developing countries is the main
cause of the relative shift in demand for more
"skilled" (that is, educated) labor in the developed
countries. He notes that not only the magnitude of the
effects but also their timing supports the trade hypoth-
esis, and that cross-country variation indicates that
countries with larger increases in Southern import
competition have experienced a decline in the relative
position of unskilled workers.
Wood bases these conclusions on a comparison of
the observed demand for labor in developed countries
to what it would have been had developing countries
not become the site of production for an increased
share of manufactured goods consumed in developed
countries.5 He estimates that the cumulative effect of
manufacturing trade patterns through 1990 was to
increase the demand for skilled (educated) labor in the
North, relative to unskilled labor, by 5.5 percent. But
two factors omitted from the analysis could quadruple
this estimate, according to Wood. First, manufacturers
in developed countries have reacted to foreign com-
petition by devising production techniques that use
less unskilled labor. Second, trade has also reduced
the demand for unskilled labor in service-producing
sectors, both because they supply intermediate inputs
to domestic manufacturers and because they partici-
pate directly in international trade.
The manufacturing sector is
relatively small--less than 20
percent of U.S. employment in
recent years--and only a subset
of these jobs have been
directly threatened by trade.
Other writers acknowledge that international
competition has reduced the demand for manufactur-
ing production workers in the United States, and that
the timing of international trade patterns accords well
with the rise in earnings inequality. (For example, see
Sachs and Shatz 1994.) But generally they hesitate to
attribute a major role to international trade in explain-
ing trends in earnings inequality. The recent literature
on this topic has been summarized in thoughtful
(albeit somewhat skeptical) reviews by Burtless (1995),
Fieleke (1994), and Freeman (1995).6
One issue is that the manufacturing sector is
relatively small, accounting for less than 20 percent
of U.S. employment in recent years. Only a subset
s Wood starts by examining the skill and labor content of the
imported goods, but then modifies the estimates in light of the fact
that different relative prices in developed countries would lead
them to use a different mix of inputs, and because a higher price for
these goods (were they produced in developed countries) would
lead to a reduction in demand for them.
6 These reviews also cover recent volumes edited by Bhagwati
and Kosters (1994) and Bergstrand, Cosimano, Houck, and Sheehan
(1994).
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Moreover, at least some of the increase in international
trade has been with developed countries with high
wages, limiting the extent to which one would expect
U.S. wages to adjust downward.
Second, the theory predicts that trade should
change the relative output prices of low-skill and
high-skill manufactured goods. That is, in the United
States, we should expect to see a decline in the rela-
tive price of non-skill-intensive, import-competing
goods. (In fact, it is this price decline that would cause
a drop in U.S. wages.) The evidence on this prediction
is mixed. Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) do not find
that relative prices of goods that use production labor
relatively intensively have declined in the United
States. (Instead, their study tends to support the
technology hypothesis, as they find that total factor
productivity--their proxy for technology--rose more
rapidly in industries that used nonproduction workers
more intensively.) On the other hand, Sachs and Shatz
(1994) use an alternative price series to show support
for the trade theory.
Another issue concerns trends in other industries.
The release of manufacturing production workers to
other sectors should not only have lowered the earn-
ings of other, relatively less educated workers (as it
did), but also caused other sectors to increase their use
of such workers. Instead, they reduced their demand.
Technological change. A third explanation for the
rising earnings premium for college-educated workers
is that there has been a general shift in demand in
favor of workers with relatively high intellectual as
opposed to manual ability. The growing use of com-
puters is thought to have contributed to this phenom-
enon. To a large degree, the conclusion that technol-
ogy matters is the result of observing that the earnings
distribution has widened in a broad range of indus-
tries, and that investment in technology across indus-
tries appears correlated with earnings premia for
college graduates.
The Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) and
Lawrence aud Slaughter (1993) studies mentioned
above are examples of recent research supporting a
role for technology. In addition, Brauer and Hickok
(1994) examine average pay changes for workers with
different levels of educational attainment in 46 indus-
tries for the period 1979-89. According to Brauer and
Hickok, industry investment in high tech capital such
as computers and communication equipment plus
overall capital deepening accounted for 60 percent of
the explained variation in pay trends for college
graduates versus high school dropouts. In agreement
with the general findings of Murphy and Welch
(1993a) and Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994),
shifts in the demand for the output of different indus-
tries was the next most important factor, accounting
for about 30 percent of the explained variation. Inter-
national trade was found to play a lesser role, and
contrary to the usual argument, trade with developed
countries appeared to play as much of a role as trade
with developing countries. Brauer (1995) has extended
this mode of analysis to trends across states. This
research also indicates a greater role for technology
than for trade in explah~ing the growing premium for
a college degree, particularly when the regressions are
extended to include the early 1990s.
Employer decisions with respect to training may
have exacerbated the tendency of technology to cause
incomes to become less equal over time. Most of the
workers who receive employer-provided trah~ing are
technical and managerial workers who have a college
degree. Lynch (1994) has estimated that only 4 percent
of young workers without a college degree receive
formal training at their workplace, and this fraction is
lower than in other industrialized countries.
While a growing body of research suggests that
technology has caused an increase in the relative pay
for college graduates, some questions remain. Howell
(1993, 1994) finds that the demand for high-end work-
ers rose before computer usage became widespread
in the workplace, and he concludes that institutional
and organizational changes have been more influen-
tial than technology in affecting relative earnings.
More generally, further research is needed on the
ramifications of specific types of technological change,
as the studies mentioned thus far mostly use very
general measures of the state of technology. Some
further discussion of preliminary microeconomic in-
vestigations is found in a later section.
h~stitutional h~fluences on Relative
Ea~,ffngs by Educational Attainment
Aside from shifts in labor supply and labor de-
mand, the more competitive and more conservative
social attitudes of the 1980s may have contributed to
inequality. To lend support to this argument, research-
ers have pointed to changes in the role of wage-setting
institutions that traditionally have protected the
wages of lower-paid (and, typically, less educated)
workers. Recent studies have focused on declines in
the real value of the minimum wage and in unioniza-
tion. Institutional differences in how wages are deter-
mined may help to explain why h~equality has in-
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other industrialized countries, since demand-side ex-
planations apply similarly across countries.
The U.S. minimum wage remained unchanged in
nominal terms throughout most of the 1980s. Horrigan
and Mincy (1993) simulate what would have hap-
pened to earnings inequality had the minimum wage
kept pace with inflation. They find only modest effects
for workers with different levels of education (and
slightly more noticeable effects on the earnings differ-
ences between older and younger workers, and on
workers in high- and low-status occupations). They
Aside from shifts in labor supply
and labor demand, the more
competitive and more conservative
social attitudes of the 1980s may
have contributed to inequality.
caution, moreover, that the adjustment of the mini-
mum wage would have had virtually no effect on
inequality as measured by family income, because
of the attenuated relationship between low wages
and low family income. That is, some minimum wage
earners live in poor families while others live in
well-to-do families.
From 1969 to 1978, the share of the nonagricul-
tural work force organized in unions in the United
States fell from 29 to 25 percent; over the 1980s, the
share plummeted to 16 percent. The drop-off in union-
ization was particularly sharp among younger (that is,
25- to 34-year-old) men ~vho had only a high school
education or held blue-collar jobs. Freeman (1993)
examines pay differentials between unionized and
non-unionized workers, as well as pay changes for
workers who changed union status during the 1980s.
He concludes that the decline in unionization explains
at least 15 percent, and perhaps as much as 40 percent,
of the growing disparity bet~veen wages for college-
educated and tzigh school-educated workers. In a
similar vein, Card (1992) finds that changes in union-
ization account for one-fifth of the increase in the
between-quintile variance of adult male ~vages be-
tween 1973 and 1987. His study controls for education,
experience, and race, as well as considering whether
workers joining unions are similar in "ability" to their
nonunionized peers.
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1995) consider the
influence of both the minimum wage and unioniza-
tion, as well as supply and demand factors, during the
1980s. They generally find that institutions are quite
important for younger workers. For young men (that
is, those with less than 10 years of experience), the
minimun~ wage and unionization in combination ex-
plain 32 percent of the growing disparity in earnings
for college versus high-school graduates--compared
to 42 percent for supply and demand (with the re-
mainder unexplained). For young women, the institu-
tional factors (mostly the minimum wage) explain 16
percent. For older men and women, institutions be-
come relatively less important in explaining educa-
tion-based wage differences, although for men with at
least 20 years of work experience unions continue to
explain 18 percent of differential earnings trends.
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux emphasize that, what-
ever the explanatory power of institutions in the
aggregate, they are important for particular subcate-
gories within the earnings distribution. For example,
the lack of indexing of the minimum wage had a
sizable impact on lo~v earners. Moreover, they stress
that the effects are greater ~vhen earnings of part-time
workers are also considered.
A growing body of research examines institutions
from an international perspective. Most, if not all,
advanced countries have been subject to sin~ilar influ-
ences in terms of sectoral shifts, globalization, and
technological change. Gottschalk and Joyce (1992), for
example, estimate that a remarkably similar redistri-
bution of employment across sectors has occurred in a
number of industrialized countries. Yet the mecha-
nisms by ~vlzich wages get set differ greatly (Freeman
and Katz 1994). In general, wage-setting systems in
Continental Europe are far more centralized than in
the United States. Freeman and Katz provide the
following examples: "In Austria and Sweden... peak-
level union confederations and employer federations
have historically bargained for national wage settle-
ments that cover much of the work force but allow
local employers and unions to increase wages above
the national settlement through ’wage drift.’ In Ger-
many industry or regional collective bargaining deter-
mines basic wages for an area and the Ministry of
Labor often extends those to all workers. In France the
minimum wage is important in determining the over-
all level of wages, and the French Mi~zistry of Labor
also extends contracts. In Italy the Scala Mobile, a form
of negotiated wage increase designed to compensate
for inflation and which applied effectively to all Ital-
ians, increased the pay of low-paid workers faster
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(pp. 51-52). Furthermore, the United States--along
with the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and
France--experienced a more precipitous drop in
tmionization during the 1980s than other advanced
countries.
In light of these institutional patterns, it is not
surprising that the largest overall increases in inequal-
ity occurred in the United States and the United
Kh~gdom. In addition, Freeman and Katz note that the
largest relative decline in the position of low-wage
workers occurred in the United States.
These findings are not without controversy, how-
ever. Gottschalk and Smeeding (1995) offer two criti-
cisms. First, it is hard to quantify the extent to which
wages are set by institutions. Different measures rank
countries somewhat differently, depending on which
characteristics of the wage-setting mechanisms receive
greater weight. Second, studies err on the side of
explaining wage trends by institutions because they
do not distinguish between levels and changes. In
particular, in a country with strong but weakening
institutions, these institutions could be used to ratio-
nalize either stability or greater dispersion in wages.
Alternative Explanations: Some Further Thoughts
Most analysts now concede that no one factor is
responsible for the rising education wage premium.
At a Federal Reserve Bmxk of New York conference on
this topic, the participants h~dicated in a vote that they
believed 60 percent of rish~g inequality among educa-
tional attainment categories has been due to technol-
ogy, 10 percent to international trade, and 30 percent
to other factors--including immigration, a low mini-
mum wage, and changes in wage-setth~g institutions
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York 1995). Indeed, it is
striking that so many factors have apparently com-
bined to stretch out the distribution of earnings.
Furthermore, it is diffficult--if not impossible--to
determine exactly how important a single explanation
is because the various explanations are to some extent
interlinked. International competition and technolog-
ical change have caused some industries to decline
and others to expand in relative importance. More-
over, technological change and union strength are not
entirely exogenous; some investments undoubtedly
have taken place under the threat of international
competition, and international competition may have
been responsible for the changing influence of unions.
When different explanations are correlated in an
econometric study, their relative effects may be
masked. On the other hand, a study that examines
only one explanation may exaggerate its influence, to
the extent that other relevant (and correlated) factors
are omitted.
Changing Returns to Experience
Along with higher returns to education, recent
research has found evidence of higher returns to work
experience. That is, older workers are being paid
relatively more compared to yom~ger workers (Figure
3). The trends vary somewhat between men and
women, however, and they seem not to apply as
clearly to the oldest workers. According to the U.S.
Department of Labor (1994), men with less than 20
years of potential experience in the work force suf-
fered a real decline h~ average earnings of close to 7
percent between 1979 and 1992.7 Men with at least 30
years of potential experience averaged a decline of less
Along with higher returns to
education, recent research
has found evidence of higher
returns to work experience.
than 3 percent, while those with 20 to 29 years of
potential experience had no decline. Among women,
the earnings of middle-aged workers (that is, women
with 10 to 29 years of potential experience) rose by
much more than those of younger or older workers.
As noted above, it appears that institutional sto-
ries apply more strongly to younger workers--that
is, their relative wages have fallen as a result of a
reduction in the real value of the minimum wage and
in unionization. But, in contrast to the proliferation of
studies on education, research on the changing returns
to experience is not all that extensive.
One important preliminary question is the degree
to ~vhich the observed wage trends for older and
younger workers reflect a cohort effect rather than
experience. That is, if the quality of education has
fallen over time (as declining college board scores
7 Potential experience is defined as age minus years of school-
ing minus six. The statistics refer to annual earnings of full-time
year-round workers.
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would tend to indicate), younger workers would be
expected to fall behind, even if the marginal return to
experience remained constant. Juhn, Murphy, and
Pierce (1993) tend to discount this theory, since they
fh~d that the rise in the education premium has been
age neutral. Still, this remains an area for further
research. For one thing, to the extent that rapid
technological change has been important in driving
wages, older workers might be expected to be disad-
vantaged. The rising premium paid to older workers
could conceivably be the net outcome of offsetting
cohort and technology effects.
Changing Returns to Skill and Other
Aspects of Earnings Inequality
The distribution of earnings of persons with sim-
ilar educational backgrounds and years of experience
also has widened. The literature on inequality has
dubbed tlzis the "within-group" trend. Juhn, Murphy,
and Pierce (1993) estimate that within-group inequal-
ity has been increasing since 1970--well before the
rising returns to education and experience. They also
find that within-group inequal-
ity is highly significant. Over the
1964-89 period, 44 percent of
the overall rise in inequality as
measured by the difference be-
t~veen incomes at the 90th and
10th percentiles is due to trends
across education and experience
groups and 56 percent to trends
within groups.
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce
conclude that the trend in ~vith-
in-group inequality reflects a ris-
ing demand for skills that are
possessed to different degrees
by different workers, since em-
ployment has shifted toward in-
dustries and occupations that
employ skilled workers even in
the face of rising relative wages.
By contrast, they find little evi-
dence that the rise in inequality
is due to grooving diversity in
the extent of skills possessed by
different workers. These skills,
which presumably are observ-
able to individual employers,
are not yet well understood by
researchers. Nor are the reasons for the increased
returns to skill. The Levy-Murnane (1992) assessment
that within-group inequality is the "most important
unresolved puzzle" about earnings trends remains
valid, even though we now know more than we did
then.
This section reviews studies that attempt specifi-
cally to explain the rise in within-group inequality,
as well as some more general studies of inequality that
do not focus specifically on differences by education
and experience. As in Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, the
term "skill" is used here to refer to ability that is not
measured by years of education and experience, even
though some authors use "skill" either synonymously
with these other aspects of ability (particularly educa-
tion) or as a catchall for all aspects of ability (such as
when higher wages are taken as evidence of higher
skills). In an attempt to expand our knowledge be-
yond the studies reviewed here, Peter Cappelli’s pa-
per for this symposium explores the characteristics of
technology or work organization that are contributing
to rising skill requirements for individual employers,
and then examines how these skill requirements are
reflected in ;vages paid. Richard Freeman’s paper
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are responsible for greater earnings inequality.
Uneven Impacts of Structural Change
A possible reason for increased within-group
inequality is that broad changes in the mix of indus-
tries or occupations inevitably have a more direct
effect on some workers than others. For example,
workers who are laid off during a period of structural
change find it difficult to obtain comparably paid jobs,
which would tend to increase differences within a
given gronp in the work force. Or if the number of
"bad jobs" is expanding rapidly, a growing number of
recent college graduates may be working in positions
for which they are overeducated (while others in this
education category are more fortunate in their job
search). Tyler, Murnane, and Levy (1995) address
these topics by asking whether growing numbers of
college graduates are taking jobs that pay high school
A frequently mentioned
hypothesis about within-group
inequality is that technological
change is increasing the
dernand for skill.
wages. In general, they dispel this hypothesis. The
percentage of college graduates with "high-school
jobs" fell during the 1980s. By exception, however, the
authors estimate that almost 18 percent of college-
educated men aged 45 to 54 were in "high-school
jobs" in 1989, up from less than 15 percent in 1979.8
Thus business restructuring appears to have contrib-
uted to greater earnings disparities for this group.
Another aspect of the same theme is that struc-
tural change is more pervasive for minority groups or
for individuals in certain geograplzic locations. Bound
and Freeman (1991) examine the rising gap in earnings
between young black and young white men with
similar educational backgrounds from the mid 1970s
through the 1980s. The authors find that different
economic forces affected different groups of young
blacks. In addition to declines in the minimum wage,
unionization, and manufacturing jobs, the economic
decline in inner cities was found to affect blacks with
a high school degree or less--particularly in the Mid-
west. College graduates, however, did not appear to
be affected by geographic factors. By contrast with the
Bound-Freeman study, Acs and Danziger (1993) find
that low-earning blacks were harmed by a loss of
manufacturing jobs, regardless of whether they lived
in Northern inner cities or in other locations.9
Technology and Workplace Organization
As indicated above, a frequently mentioned hy-
pothesis about within-group h~equality is that techno-
logical change is increasing the demand for skill.
Research by Cappelli (1993) suggests that the relation-
ship between technology and skills may be quite
complicated, however. Cappelli examined production
workers in a variety of industries using a sample of
employers from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. He
measured skill requirements using an evaluation sys-
tem developed by Hay Associates that attempts to
capture the autonomy and complexity of jobs. The
study found mixed results concerning the role of
technology. In manufacturing, individual production
jobs required more skill over time, and the mix shifted
toward jobs with higher skill requirements. If these
changes did not systematically favor production
workers with more (or less) education or experience,
Cappelli’s findings are consistent with rising within-
group inequality.~o
Cappelli found that so-called upskilling of man-
ufacturing jobs was not driven prhnarily by the im-
plementation of specific technologies such as numeri-
cally controlled machines. Rather it seemed to be
related to new management views concerning how
jobs should be redesigned, as well as to a decline in
union power that made their implementation possible.
For clerical work, by contrast, changes in skill require-
ments were related to the introduction of new office
technologies, such as word processors and personal
computers. Technology had idiosyncratic effects on
job requirements, increasing the skill requirements for
some and decreasing them for others.
In another study, Scott, O’Shaughnessy, and Cap-
pelli (1994) find that insurance companies have been
8 Note that this finding conflicts with the generally reported
increase in returns to work experience.
9 Several papers in today’s symposium address the role of
spatial determinants of inequality within a metropolitan area, with
a subset of these also indicating how employment opportunities
vary by location.
~0 If the favored workers were more highly educated or more
experienced, the results are consistent with the above-noted cross-
group trends. Cappelli did not specifically address the issue of
whether skills are correlated with education or experience.
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level managerial jobs are becoming more scarce, but
managers’ span of control is becoming greater (since a
higher fraction of jobs are at lower levels). As a
consequence, the payoff to attaining a high-level job
has increased.
Research by Osterman (1995) indicates that train-
ing practices vary substantially across workplaces.
Business establistm~ents that introduce so-called high
performance work organizations, that have more "hu-
manistic" values, and whose employees have union
representation are relatively more likely to provide
training for their workers. While Osterman’s research
stops short of examining the link between training and
Training practices vary
substantially across workplaces,




pay over time, it does indicate that employers do not
react uniformly to economywide influences such as
technological change. Future studies of earnings in-
equality may profitably continue to examine the di-
versity in employer decision-making.
Wage-Setting hlstitutions
Research on the role of labor market institutions
suggests that the declining roles of centralized bar-
gaining and of the minimum wage have given em-
ployers more freedom to adjust wages in light of the
demands of the workplace. Employers may also have
become more inclined in recent years to vary pay to
reflect performance for their nonunionized workers.
Freeman (1993) found that, in addition to boost-
ing the wages of their members relative to nonunion-
ized workers, unions tend to reduce the dispersion of
earnings within workplaces. Therefore, a declh~e in
unionization could lead to greater within-group in-
equality. The evidence indicates, however, that in-
equality of earnings rose roughly as rapidly among
union as among nonunion workers between 1978 and
1988. Freeman indicates that this is the result of
diminished power of unions in the 1980s, as evidenced
by the breakdown of pattern bargaining and the
frequency of wage concessions.
Examining almost the same time period as Free-
man, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1995) concur that
unionization is of very limited significance in explain-
ing rising within-group inequality. But they attribute
24 percent of the increase in within-group inequality
among men, and 34 percent among women, to the
drop in the real minimum wage.
Evidence of a link between changing pay prac-
tices for professional and managerial workers and
increased inequality is still unavailable. Groshen
(1993) examines increasing inequality among nonpro-
duction workers, using a Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland survey of employers in its district. She finds
that changes in human resource management prac-
tices, such as linking pay more closely to performance,
were not helpful in explaining growing salary differ-
ences in the 1980s.
The Relationship between Unemployment,
Underemployment, and Inequality
Virtually all of the studies cited so far are limited
to individuals with positive earnings. Many of them
are restricted to full-time workers or those working
a certain number of hours or weeks per year. These
adjustments make sense in order to help isolate the
causes of growing inequality. But if different groups in
the population have different trends with respect to
hours worked, these differences could serve to rein-
force or offset inequality based on rates of pay.
The evidence suggests that the secular decline
in demand for less-skilled workers has resulted in a
decrease in both their relative rate of pay and their
relative number of hours worked. Topel (1993) finds
that the largest declines in wage rates between 1967
and 1989 have occurred for groups for which unem-
ployment and nonparticipation in the work force have
increased the most. Furthermore, virtually all of the
long-term increase in joblessness has occurred among
low-wage men. Havelnan and Buron (1994) conclude
that the decline in horn’s worked by low earners
(which includes working part-year, part-time, or not
at all) plays a large role in the increase in earnings
inequality.1~
~ The authors indicate that some previous studies underesti-
mated the role of hours worked by choosing a business cycle peak
as the starting date for their analysis.
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institutions in many European countries effectively
put a floor on the income earned by those with
relatively low wages. If such constraints were intro-
duced in the United States, economic theory suggests
that unemployment and underemployment of low
earners would increase even more. Indeed, empirical
work indicates that unemployment is highest in Euro-
pean countries among low earners. But income in-
equality is smaller than in the United States because of
social welfare programs (Freeman 1994).
The Issue of Permanent Earnings Inequality
The findings on inequality have been interpreted
as showing that the poor have become relatively
poorer over thne, while the rich have gotten richer.
But, in fact, the data come from cross sections of
workers, rather than tracking of individuals over time.
If everyone’s income merely became more variable
over time, then the data would show greater inequal-
ity, but it would not be true that low earners were
falling farther behind high earners.
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) use panel data for
the 1970s and 1980s to distinguish trends in mean
income.from variation around mean income for indi-
vidual workers. They find that the permanent and the
transitory components of the variance of earnings
each increased by 40 percent. Therefore the perception
of the poor getting poorer and the rich getting richer
is correct--although the change may not be quite as
dramatic as had been thought. As for the transitory
component, which heretofore had not been studied,
Gottschalk and Moffitt find tliat earnings of union
workers and those employed h~ manufacturing fluc-
tuate less than earnings of nonunion workers and
those in service-producing industries. However, de-
unionization and industrial shifts together explain
only 12 percent of the increase in wage instability from
the 1970s to the 1980s. Thus, the authors conclude that
further research is needed on the sources of transitory
income variability.
From h~equality in Ea~,~ings to
Inequality in Living Standards
Rising inequality in earnings might be viewed as
a relatively minor issue if other factors acted to
equalize living standards. But, to the contrary, re-
search has shown decisively that in the United States
additional influences generally served to reinforce the
growing inequality in earnings. Some of these factors
are related to the labor market, while others relate to
social trends and the role of government.
In contrast to six other major industrialized coun-
tries (Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom), the United States
had a greater increase in family income inequality
than in earnings inequality during the 1980s (Gott-
schalk 1993). For example, the extent of increase in
earnings inequality among prime-aged males in the
United States and Canada was about the same, but
Canada experienced no clear trend in family income
inequality as the Lorenz curve shifted in for lower
quhatiles and out for upper quintiles (Blackburn and
Bloom 1993).
One reason for the difference may relate to family
structure and associated changes in family work effort.
We have evidence on how these factors influenced
inequality in the United States without a parallel
understanding for other countries. In a comprehensive
examination of disparities in the United States, Brad-
bury (1996) finds that the number of workers per
family and hours per worker fell for the poorest
quintile and rose for the richest quintile between 1979
and 1993.~2 The United States experienced an increase
in female-headed families and ha individuals living
alone during the 1980s, but Blackburn and Bloom
report that Canada did not. Finally, men and women
with high earnings in the United States increasingly
have tended to marry someone in a similar, rather
than a lower, earnings bracket (Murphy and Welch
1993b).~3
The second reason for the particularly sharp in-
crease in family income inequality in the United States
is that decreasing transfer payments and a change in
tax structure reinforced the growing disparities in
earnings. In Canada, by contrast, public assistance
and general social expenditures increased in the 1980s
(Blackburn and Bloom 1993; Gramlich, Kasten, and
Sammartino 1993; Gottschalk 1993).
~2 As was true for individuals, earnings per hour fell for
the poorest quintile and rose for the richest quintile of familiies.
Bradbu~T (1996) indicates this was the most important factor
explaining the trend in fanLily income inequality.
The a~a~lable studies d~sagree abont the effect of the in-
creased tendency of wives to participate in the paid labor force.
Murphy and Welch suggest that this trend has led to greater
disparities among family incomes since the wife’s income is no
longer inversely related to that of her husband. However, Cancian,
Danziger, and Gottschalk (1993) find that family income inequality
in the United States WotLld have increased to an even greater extent
over the past 20 years were it not for the increased earnings of
wives--especially among black families.
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United States are provided largely at the discretion of
individual employers rather than being universal.
Little (1995) finds that benefit coverage became less
equal in the 1980s.
Finally, looking at the trends of the past several
decades in the United States, the 1980s were unique in
the relative gains of the rich (Karoly 1993). Presum-
ably, this trend relates to growth in income from
capital relative to other sources.
Historically, growth has increased job opportuni-
ties for the poor more than for the rich. Given strong
macroeconomic growth during much of the decade,
the 1980s should have been a period of declining
poverty in the United States, all else equal. Instead, the
poverty rate rose from 13.6 percent in 1989 to 15.2
percent in 1991. Blank and Card (1993) attribute this
increase in poverty to the fact that rising wage in-
equality and other trends more than offset positive
macroeconomic developments. Bradbury (1996) finds
that New England, which experienced an economic
boom of unusual proportions in the 1980s, was the
only region of the country in which the average
income of the bottom fifth of families rose during the
1980s, thus indicating that sufficiently strong growth is
still able to help the poor.
Conclusions
As studies have increasingly demonstrated the
pervasive nature of the rise in earnings inequality,
researchers have become more willing to acknowl-
edge that many aspects of labor markets have contrib-
uted to the observed trends in the United States. On
the supply side, a decrease in the rate of growth of
college graduates and an influx of relatively unedu-
cated immigrants help to explain higher returns to
education. On the demand side, changes in industrial
structure, international trade, and technology all ap-
pear to play a role. In addition, wage-setting institu-
tions may cause certain workers to be paid more or
less than what the market would indicate. These
institutions have changed over tin~e, in ways that have
accentuated inequality. Distinguishing the individual
effects of different influences remains problematic,
however, and may vary with the time period exam-
ined and the particular aspect of earnings inequality
trader examination.
Even as a consensus appears to be building that
the rise in inequality has been multi-faceted, some
puzzles remain. The papers and discussions at this
symposium address such gaps in our knowledge, and
their findings are particularly relevant as discussions
of inequality turn to possible remedies.
One important question is whether the return to
education will continue to increase in the future, given
the widespread perception that the U.S. economy is
generating many low-quality jobs. If the wage pre-
mium for college graduates is expected to hold con-
stant or rise further, then discussions of new policies
One important question is
whether the return to education
will continue to increase in
the flzture, given the widespread
perception that the U.S.
economy is generating many
low-quality jobs.
to augment the supply of educated workers take on
greater urgency than if market forces (such as higher
college enrollments in response to observed higher
earnings) cause the wage premium to decline.
An increasing body of evidence indicates that
new workplace technologies are resulting in higher
wages for skilled workers (where the concept of skills
goes beyond what can be measured by years of
education or experience), and that this phenomenon
has played an hnportant role in creating wider wage
disparities. Yet relatively little is known about how
technology influences skill requirements and what can
be done to raise the average skill levels of the work
force.
Another outstanding puzzle is the extent to which
the trend toward inequality can be reversed through
reform of U.S. wage-setting insfitutions. The role of
unions and the real value of the minimum wage have
been allowed to erode over time. Furthermore, start-
ing in the 1980s reforms of taxes and transfers have
tended to reinforce rather than offset the impact of
labor market contributions to inequality. If the tradi-
tional tools to redistribute income have been neglected
in the United States, what can this country learn from
foreign experiences and what new institutional op-
tions are available?
A final issue is the cost of earnings inequality.
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consequences inequality has for macroeconomic per-
formance. Evidence suggests that greater equality in
Europe, as compared with the United States, has come
at the expense of employment growth. On the other
hand, concern is mounting that the United States
cannot remain competitive if college-educated work-
ers continue to command higher and higher pay, and
if labor skills demanded at high-teclmology work-
places are in short supply.
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I
n recent years, much attention has been paid to the growing gap
between the earnings of Americans at the top and at the bottom of the
income distribution, as reviewed by Kodrzycki (1996). As the earn-
ings of poor Americans have fallen behind, these households have also
become increasingly isolated from the places where middle-class and
wealthy Americans live. The growth in inequality by location, however,
has received much less attention than inequality by earnings, despite the
fact that many neighborhoods in America’s inner cities have become
crime-ridden areas where few households of any race or income class
would choose to live.
As segregation by income has increased, racial segregation has
declined only modestly, suggesting that poor black children still grow up
in locations that give them little chance to succeed. One study of
Washington, D.C., found some particularly striking results. As compared
to whites under the age of 14, black youth in the District of Columbia live
in neighborhoods that have 11 times the rate of AFDC use, seven times
the rate of illegitimacy, six times the rate of drug use and arrests, twice
the rate of high school dropouts and long commutes, and a slightly higher
rate of violent crime (Galster and Mikelsons 1995). While Washington,
D.C., may be an extreme example, blacks in many other cities suffer from
similar problems.
In the academic literature, the importance of location in labor market
outcomes was first recognized in a series of articles and books that looked
at the impact of racial discrimination in the housing market on the
earnings of blacks. Developed by Kain (1968), the concept of "spatial
mismatch" argues that housing discrimination confines blacks to a few
central city neighborhoods where jobs have become increasingly scarce
because employers have relocated to the suburbs. Written almost 30 years
ago, Kain’s article describes conditions that still exist today: growing
suburbanization, continuing evidence of differential treatment in the
housing market (see Fix and Struyk 1992; Turner 1992), and racialsegregation that, while declining, is still extraordinar-
ily high (Farley and Frey 1993; Harrison and Weinberg
1992).
Researchers have also contended that the segre-
gation of the poor h~ inner-city ghettos has other
serious consequences for residents beyond lack of
access to jobs, including the lack of positive role
models, concentration of crime, negative peer effects,
and poor schools. Wilson (1987) has argued that
reduced discrimination against blacks in the housing
market has had devastating consequences for the
remaining residents of inner-city ghettos, as middle-
class blacks increasingly have gone to the suburbs,
leaving behind neighborhoods with fewer and fewer
positive role models. Wilson and others attribute
As the earnings of poor
Americans have fallen behind,
these households have also
become increasingly isolated
from the places where
middle-class and wealthy
Americans live.
much of the initial decline in many inner-city neigh-
borhoods to the reduction in urban manufacturing
jobs, which previously provided good-paying jobs to
low-skilled workers.
This paper will discuss evidence from a variety of
sources exploring the impact of location on the earn-
ings of American households. Although many of
the studies have flaws, the preponderance of evi-
dence suggests that location does matter. In particular,
spatial segregation by income is having an increas-
ingly detrimental effect on those at the bottom of the
income distribution. The Gautreaux program in Chi-
cago provides especially strong evidence on this sub-
ject. As a result of a Supreme Court consent decree
in 1976, families on the waiting list for public hous-
ing were assigned randomly to apartments in primar-
ily white, middle-class suburbs or to units in the
city of Chicago. Subsequent tracking of a sample of
the Gautreaux participants indicates that those who
moved to the suburbs were more likely to be em-
ployed than those assigned to city homes. Further-
more, the children of movers to the suburbs per-
formed better in school and had a higher rate of
college enrolhnent (Rosenbaum and Popkin 1991;
Rosenbaum 1995).
This paper begins by summarizing recent trends
in segregation by race and income, including data
from the Current Population Survey showing that the
relative concentration in central cities of residents in
the bottom quintile of the income distribution contin-
ues to grow, while the relative proportion of minori-
ties in the inner cities remains flat or is modestly
declining. Next, the paper explores reasons for the
continuing racial and income segregation, noting that
recent evidence shows that racial discrimination con-
tinues, but that such discrimination is not a complete
explanation of recent trends.
The second part of the paper explores the impact
of spatial isolation on residents of poor neighbor-
hoods. The summary focuses on the most influential
articles and most recent evidence on this subject. Some
of the literature provides general evidence on the
impact of location; other studies are more targeted,
testing for the existence of spatial mismatch or neigh-
borhood and peer effects. The final section of this
paper offers some conclusions.
I. Changes in Segregation by
Race and h~come
For more than 30 years, researchers have docu-
mented that blacks live in significantly more segre-
gated locations than most ethnic groups. Taeuber and
Taeuber (1965) and Duncan and Duncan (1955, 1957)
showed that blacks lived in cities with severe segre-
gation during the 1950s and 1960s, and that many
neighborhoods were transformed from white to black
in a relatively short period of time. After the riots of
the late 1960s, the Kerner Commission warned that
the nation was becoming divided "into two societies;
one largely Negro and poor, located in the central
cities; the other, predominantly white and affluent,
located in the suburbs .... " (See Farley and Frey 1993
for a more complete description of the historical
context of discrimination.)
Because of the history of racial discrimination in
the United States, most research in the past 30 years
has looked at segregation by race, as opposed to
segregation by income. More recently, however, re-
searchers have recognized that some of the problems
associated with segregation (peer and neighborhood
effects, for example) are more closely related to pov-
erty than to race. Most of the research summarized
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segregation by race.
However, the inclusion
of a smaller number of
papers on income segre-
gation does not imply
that segregation by in-
come is unimportant;
it is just less well re-
searched. This point is
particularly relevant be-
cause of the evidence
from the last two de-
cades that income segre-
gation is rising, while
racial segregation is de-
clining.
Linkiltg Segregation
by Income and Race
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Changes in segre-
gation by income and by
race can be linked to the
well-documented trend
of rising income inequality. Figure 1 displays the ratio
of the median incomes of families in the highest and
lowest quintiles of the income distribution (that is, the
90th and 10th percentiles) from 1964 to 1994.~ The
figure shows that income inequality began to rise in
the mid-1970s.
At the same time that income inequality has
increased, poor families (those in the bottom quintile)
continue to be disproportionately located in central
cities. Figure 2 looks at U.S. families living in metro-
politan statistical areas (MSAs) and compares the
central city concentration of families in each income
quintile to the central city concentration of all fami-
lies.-~ In 1964, an American family in the bottom
quintile of the income distribution was about 1.2 times
as likely to be living in the central city as the average
~ These data were obtained from the March Supplement of the
Current Population Survey. The definition of families used here
differs slightly from that of the Census Bureau in that the family
data in this section include siugle individuals as well as traditional
families (two or more related persons living together).
2 Since the 1960s, the perceutage of families living in an MSA
has beeu rising, while the percentage of MSA families living in the
central city has been steadily declining.
family. That number has risen steadily over time, to a
high of ahnost 1.4 by 1994. By comparison, families in
the highest two quintiles have been moving out of
central city locations.
While urban families at the bottom of the income
distribution have always disproportionately resided
in central cities, this pattern has become more pro-
nounced in the last three decades. Spatial segregation
by income has trended upward since the 1960s, well
before the aggregate income distribution began wid-
ening. This suggests that changes in the income dis-
tribution explain only a part of the trend towards
greater segregation by income. Indeed, the timing is
consistent with causation running from spatial income
segregation to increasing income inequality rather
than the reverse. To the extent that the harmful effects
of concentrated poverty have a lagged response or a
minimum threshold (Crane 1991), rising income seg-
regation may well have a role to play in explaining
growing income inequality. Alternatively, changes in
underlying factors such as the loss of manufacturing
jobs (particularly in the inner city) may have an effect
on both rising income inequality and spatial segrega-
tion by income.
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Figure 3 presents similar data on the central city
concentration of blacks. After an initial rise in the
1960s, the relative concentration of blacks in the
central city showed no consistent trend throughout
most of the 1970s and fell slightly in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. This pattern suggests that blacks
have been moving out of the central city at roughly
the same rate as all households. However, black
families are still very heavily concentrated in the
central city. The average ratio of concentration of
blacks (between 1.6 and 1.7) is much higher than the
average ratio of concentration for families in the
bottom quintile of the income distribution (less than
1.4), although the ratios are moving closer together.
The locational pattern of black families is described
in more detail in Figure 4, which shows the change
over time in central city concentration of blacks, by
income quintile. Consistent with the observations of
Wilson (1987), high-income blacks have been leaving
the central cities at above average rates since the
late 1960s. Even so, the relative concentration of high-
income blacks in the central city remains about 30






tration of blacks in the
central city is not sur-
prising given the high
degree of racial discrim-
ination that has per-
sisted in the housing
market for a long time.
In prior decades, much
of the discrimination
was codified into law.
Before the Congress
passed the Fair Housing
Act of 1968, local rules
effectively restricted blacks
from locating in many
communities. Prior case
law even allowed de-
velopers or owners to
write deed restrictions
that prohibited blacks
or other minorities from
living in particular de-
velopments or proper-
ties for as long as 99 years. Kah~ and Quigley (1975)
showed that as a result of such discrimination, blacks
actually paid lnore than whites for equivalent rental
housing units, despite living in significantly worse
neighborhoods.
Researchers have developed a variety of mea-
sures to quantify differences in the segregation of
racial or income groups. The most common are the
index of dissimilarity--which measures the evenness
of the distribution of a particular racial or income
group--and the index of isolation--which measures
the extent to which members of a particular group are
exposed to other members of the same group. (See
Massey and Denton (1988) for a further discussion of
these measures.) Because most data come from the
decennial censuses, these measures are usually de-
fined based on differences in the racial or poverty
makeup of census tracts (areas of approximately 4,000
residents).3
3 To the extent that census tract boundaries cross actual neigh-
borhood boundaries, these indexes could underestilnate the extent
of segregation, by nsing data for tracts that are more racially mixed
than the underlying neighborhoods.
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The passage of fair housing laws in the 1960s and
the growth of the black middle class, which has been
ongoing shace the end of World War II, led to a modest
decline in the extent of racial segregation (measured
by the index of disshnilarity) in the 1970s and 1980s.
For example, Jakubs (1986) fotmd that segregation
fell in a majority of all 318 SMSAs in the 1970s, al-
though Massey and Denton (1993) have observed that
segregation remained high in the metro areas with the
largest black populations. The data unambiguously
support the conclusion of modestly declining racial
segregation in the 1980s. Farley and Frey (1993) note
that between 1980 and 1990 the average index of
dissimilarity in 232 metropolitan areas with significant
black populations fell from 69 to 65, with the index
declining in 194 of those metro areas. Harrison and
Weinberg (1992) and Massey and Denton (1993) find
similar results for that decade.
Even though the Fair Housing Act of 1968 has
been on the books for more than 25 years, various
recent sh_~dies have found evidence that minorities
are still treated differently when acquiring housing.
Evidence of discrimination includes studies of lend-
ing patterns (redlining), mortgage approval, and the
search process for buying or renting a home. The bulk
1991
of these studies support
the hypothesis that dis-
crimination limits the
mobility of minorities
and in many cases re-
stricts their choice of
locations and makes
search more costly. (See
Fix, Galster, and Struyk
1992 and Yinger 1993
for an overview of this
literature.) Such dis-
crimination could ex-
plain the observed high





ment of mh~orities comes
from a pair of national
housing audits con-
ducted in 1977 and 1989.
(Turner 1992 and Yinger
1992 present a more
detailed description of
these audits.) In both
audits, pairs of testers, one minority, the other white,
were sent to investigate randomly chosen housing
units that were advertised in major newspapers. The
testers were given identical backgrounds and incomes
(in some cases the minority testers were actually given
slightly higher incomes) and sent out to look for
shnilar units. The testers recorded whether or not they
were shown the advertised unit, as well as the number
of other similar units they were offered. In the 1989
study, testers also documented the neighborhood
characteristics of the units they were offered.
The 1989 audit showed that blacks receive some
type of differeutia! treatment in buying or renting a
home more than one-half of the time (Turner 1992).
The incidence for Hispanics was about one-third
lower than for blacks. While the most extreme type of
discrimination--the refusal of the agent to do business
with the minority home seeker when units were
available for the white tester--was experienced by the
minorities in less than 10 percent of the cases, less
severe adverse treatment was more common. For
example, black testers were shown between 20 and 25
percent fewer units for sale or rent than white testers
(Yinger 1992). In addition, blacks often received fewer
credit offers on sales units and worse terms and
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including a higher rent
or security deposit and
fewer offers of special
terms (such as one
month’s free rent). In
more than 20 percent of
the audits, blacks and
Hispanics were shown
houses in neighbor-
hoods with a higher
percentage of minority
residents, lower house
values, or lower in-
comes, although the
magnitude of the differ-
ences was fairly small.
Finally, units for sale in
minority areas were less
likely to be advertised
in major newspapers.
Although the 1989
results are striking, they
appear to be less severe
than those found in the
1977 national audit and
in a smaller 1981 audit
Figure 4
Central City Concentrations of Black Families
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conducted in Boston. In particular, blacks were much
more likely to be told that the unit they were inquiring
about was unavailable in 1977 than in 1989 (Turner
1992). In the 1981 Boston audit, blacks were shown 30
percent fewer units than comparable whites (Yinger
1986).
In addition to discrimination in the search pro-
cess, blacks also face impediments to getting credit.
Munnell et al. (1996) gathered data on a large number
of 1990 mortgage applications in Boston, including
virtually all of the information from the mortgage
application. Even controlling for differences in ob-
served personal attributes, residence location, and
lender, the authors still found that a black applicant
with average attributes would face a rejection proba-
bility 8 percentage points higher than a white appli-
cant with otherwise identical attributes. While Yezer,
Phillips, and Trost (1994) have criticized the conclu-
sions of Munnell et al. because of the specification
used in the analysis, their criticism is a theoretical
point that cannot be resolved with the existing data.
Thus, the Munnell study is the most complete look
to date at racial disparities in the mortgage accept-
ance process, and it provides convincing evidence
that minorities are treated differently when seeking
a mortgage. (See Yinger 1993, Berkovec et al. 1994, and
Browne and Tootell 1995 for more detailed discus-
sions of the evidence relating to mortgage discrimina-
tion.)
The net conclusion from most of this literature is
that minorities continue to face discrhnination in the
housing market, although disparate treatment appears
to be lessening. The recent reduction in discrimination
is likely linked to the modest decline in racial segre-
gation noted in the previous section.
Segregation by Income
More recently, researchers have begun to mea-
sure spatial segregation by income as well as by race.
While racial segregation in the nation’s largest cities
has decreased since 1970, income segregation has
grown, as middle-class households of all races con-
tinue to leave the central cities to live in the suburbs.
Abramson, Tobin, and VanderGoot (1995) show that
the mean value of the index of dissimilarity for the
poor (calculated for census tracts within the MSA) in
the largest 100 MSAs rose from 32.9 in 1970 to 34.8 in
1980 to 36.4 in 1990, an increase of 11 percent over the
two decades. Massey and Eggers (1990) use a larger
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index values for the 1970s, but a similar rate of change.
Of particular interest to researchers exploring
increased sorting by income is the possibility that the
exodus of middle-class households from the inner
cities has left the remaining poor residents "socially
isolated" (Wilson 1987) with fewer positive influences
(successful peers and role models, access to i~fformal
employment networks, and so on) and more social
problems (such as crime and drugs). In fact, tlie
evidence suggests that an increasing number of poor
residents have indeed become isolated in areas with a
very high percentage of poor neighbors. Using a
The exodus of middle-class
households from the inner cities
may have left the remaining poor
residents "socially isolated"
~vith fewer positive influences
and more social problems.
sample of the 100 largest cities, Kasarda (1993) shows
that the share of the poor living in tracts with a
poverty rate over 40 percent increased from 16 to 28
percent between 1970 and 1990, while the percentage
living in tracts with a poverty rate exceeding 20
percent rose from 55 to 69 percent. Jargowsky and
Bane (1991) found slightly lower increases in the
1970s, using a smaller sample of cities.
II. Does Location Matter? And If So, Why?
The overall trends described in the previous sec-
tion suggest that poor Americans have suffered a
double blow in the last two decades: decreased rela-
tive incomes combined with rising segregation. Poli-
cy-makers might wonder, however, whether the in-
crease in segregation by income presents an additional
barrier to raising the living standards of those at the
bottom of the income distribution. This section sum-
marizes research considering the implications of in-
come and racial segregation. The first subsection pre-
sents evidence suggesting that segregation does
matter for the labor market outcomes of individuals,
while the next two subsections present evidence re-
garding the specific hypotheses of spatial mismatch
and peer and neighborhood effects.
The Relationship bet~veen Income Segregation
and Labor Market Outcomes
Probably the most provocative evidence suggest-
ing that location matters comes from the Gautreaux
program in Chicago. As a result of a Supreme Court
consent decree in 1976, families on the waiting list for
public housing were given vouchers and assigned
randomly to apartments in primarily white, middle-
class suburbs or to nnits in "revitalized" neighbor-
hoods within the city of Chicago. Program participa-
tion ~vas mostly a matter of luck, although families
with more than four children, large debts, a history of
late rent payments, or apartments showing evidence
of physical abuse were excluded. Such exclusion cri-
teria never affected more than 30 percent of otherwise
eligible residents. Once relocated, participants re-
ceived little special support to help them adjust to
their new communities.
Subsequent tracking of a sample of tlie Gautreaux
participants shows that the suburban movers fared
better than city movers in many dimensions (Rosen-
baum and Popkin 1991; Rosenbaum 1995). For exam-
pie, 74 percent of suburban movers who were em-
ployed pre-move were also employed post-move,
compared to 64 percent for movers to a city location.
In addition, 46 percent of previously unemployed
suburban movers found jobs, versus 30 percent of city
movers. Living in the suburbs had little effect on
average hours or wages. More striking, however, was
the impact of moving to the suburbs on the children of
Gautreaux participants. A 1982 survey found that
Gautreaux children had managed to achieve similar
grades in suburban schools, despite higher standards.
A follow-up survey in 1988 found that 94 percent of
the children of suburban movers attended college or
were on a college track, compared to 45 percent of city
movers’ kids. Of those not in college, 41 percent of
city-mover children were employed full-time, versus
75 percent of suburban-mover children.*
Although the Gautreaux program was fairly
large, placing over 5,000 families since 1976, the sam-
ples used in these studies of the program were small
(342 adults and 98 children), leading to the possibility
of selection bias, particularly because researchers were
4 The differences in means between city and suburban children
were significantly different from each other with a p-value of at least
0.90,
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domly selected households. Nonetheless, the Gaut-
reaux evidence is the closest that social scientists have
come to an experiment that randomly allocates house-
holds to different neighborhoods.
Nelson and Edwards (1993) explore the hypothe-
sis that to the extent that minorities face discrimina-
tion in finding and acquiring housing in better neigh-
borhoods, they should be less likely to move out of
ghettos. They use data from the American Housing
Survey to examine flows of households to and from
poor zones in 10 cities. They find that blacks are less
likely to move out of poor areas than whites, even
controlling for other h:dividual characteristics. In Chi-
cago, for example, about 70 percent of blacks who
lived in a poor zone remained in a poor zone five
years later, while the comparable figure for whites
was only 50 percent. In addition to race, however,
income and neighborhood of origin were important in
predicting mobility, suggesting that factors other than
racial discrimination are also important in under-
standing neighborhood composition. Furthermore,
the zones in this study were about 25 times larger than
census tracts, so these result may understate barriers
to mobility. Nonetheless, Nelson and Ed~vards’ find-
ings suggest that poor minorities face significant bar-
riers to moving, even when the potential gains are
substantial.
Most of the research that looks at the problems
associated with racial segregation does so within a
single metropolitan area, and Cutler and Glaeser
(1995) argue that such studies suffer from serious
biases if they do not control for the endogeneity of
location within the MSA. By looking at the impact of
MSA-level variables on individual outcomes across
MSAs, Cutler and Glaeser claim that they can better
test the hypothesis that the reduction in housing
choice associated with discrimination hurts all minor-
ities, regardless of where they live. In particular, with
the exception of Gautreaux, most existing within-city
studies do not control for sorting (rich people live
together by choice, rather than becoming rich because
of their neighbors), within-MSA mobility (suburban
minorities may be a selected sample of all minorities),
or between-MSA mobility (talented minorities avoid
segregated MSAs). To address these problems, Cutler
and Glaeser use youth observations from the 1990
Census Public Use Micro Sample to estimate whether
blacks fare worse in segregated MSAs. They present
both OLS and 2SLS estimates, instrumenting for the
degree of segregation within a MSA and for the
residential locafion,s
They find that blacks in metropolitan areas with
more segregation are less likely to graduate from high
school, while they are more likely to be idle or to be a
teenage mother and to have lower earnings. (Galster
1987 also estimates a simultaneous equations model
and finds that segregation has a negative impact on
various measures of black welfare.) These results hold
eve:: when controlling for whether the individual
lives in a central city, suggesting that segregation
hurts all blacks in a metropolitan area, regardless of
whether they live in the city or suburbs. Cutler and
Glaeser also included some specific measures of
neighborhood spatial isolation and peer influences,
but these measures did not explain a large part of the
segregation effect, possibly because of the large size of
the "neighborhoods" involved (approximately 100,000
residents).
O’Regan and Quigley (1995) also find evidence of
adverse effects of spatial isolation on teenage elnploy-
ment using a sample of at-home youth from the 1980
and 1990 Public Use Micro Samples. In the first stage,
the authors estimate a logit model of employment on
individual characteristics (except race), including the
type of household, whether a parent is working, and
whether the individual lives in a central city. The
second stage involves regressing the predicted em-
ployment probability on individual race dummies and
on MSA measures of economic activity, employment
composition, and indexes of exposure to whites and
the poor. Both exposure measures are highly signifi-
cant. The coefficients suggest that reduced segregation
by race or poverty would have a positive hnpact on
black and Hispanic youth employment, but a negative
effect on white employment. The latter result is ex-
plained by the fact that reduced segregation ~vill result
in whites having increased exposure to the poor and
to minorities who have fewer jobs and thus worse peer
effects.
Another set of provocative findings showing the
importance of location involves the labor market per-
formance of recent immigrants into the United States.
Previous evidence had suggested that the perfor-
mance of children of recent immigrants depends not
only on their parents’ skills, but also on the average
skill levels of their ethnic group (Borjas 1992 and
5 The set of instruments includes variables relating to the MSA
of previous residence, plus the degree of segregation and the
number of governments in 1962, the percent of local revenue
received from intergovernmental transfers, and the number of
rivers between and within the MSA. Cntler and Glaeser suggest that
the latter instrument is correlated with segregation because a larger
number of communities likely leads to greater sorting.
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highly segregated neighborhoods, so the effect attrib-
uted to ethnic capital might actually be a neighbor-
hood effect. Borjas (1995) tests for separate neighbor-
hood and ethnic capital effects using data from the
public use file of the 1970 U.S. Census and the Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth. He finds evi-
dence of very strong neighborhood effects, even con-
trollh~g for other factors, but a much smaller impact
of ethnicity. In fact, ethnicity matters only for persons
who live in segregated neighborhoods with a large
percentage of persons from the same ethnic back-
ground.
The above results provide significant evidence
that segregation continues to affect the labor market
outcomes of minorities and immigrants and that mi-
norities face impedhnents to moving, but these results
do not help to identify the mechanism through which
segregation has these effects. The next subsections
explore specific hypotheses about the impact of segre-
gation, including spatial mismatch and peer and
neighborhood effects.
Spatial Mismatch and Jobs
Kain’s original paper on spatial mismatch (1968)
began a long literature that has explored the labor
market implications of racial discrimination in the
housing market. (The spatial mismatch hypothesis
states that housing discrimination confines blacks to
living in a few central city neighborhoods, where jobs
have become increasingly scarce because employers
have relocated to the suburbs.) Using data from De-
troit and Chicago in 1952 and 1956, Kain found that
restrictions on the residential choice of African-Amer-
icans reduced non-white employment in these cities
by 9,000 and 24,600 jobs, respectively. Over the next 22
years, more than two dozen papers were written in
support of, or arguing against, spatial mismatch.
While research on this topic slowed in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, interest has recently grown more
intense as America’s urban problems receive greater
attention.
Several recent papers have surveyed the literature
on spatial mismatch and come to very different con-
clusions. Jencks and Mayer (1990b), for example, find
that the evidence against spatial mismatch is as com-
pelling as the supportive evidence, suggesting that
"support [for the idea that job proximity increases the
supply of black workers] is so mixed that no prudent
policy analyst should rely on it." Kain (1992), Holzer
(1991), and Ihlanfeldt (1992), on the other hand, find
significant support for spatial mismatch, relying on
more up-to-date research as well as taking a more
critical view of previous papers. As Ihlanfeldt (1992)
notes, Kain’s spatial mismatch theory is actually three
separate hypotheses: 1) residential segregation affects
the location of jobs that blacks obtain; 2) segregation
decreases aggregate black employment; and 3) the
decentralization/suburbanization of jobs magnifies
the effect of residential segregation.
Much of the subsequent empirical debate over
spatial mismatch turns on measurement issues, which
The spatial mismatch hypothesis
states that housing discrimination
confines blacks to living in a few
central city neighborhoods, where
jobs have become increasingly
scarce because employers have
relocated to the suburbs.
are briefly summarized here. For example, many pa-
pers compare the earnings of blacks in urban and
suburban neighborhoods, despite the possibility that
suburban blacks are a selected salnple of all blacks in
the metropolitan area (even controlling for observable
individual characteristics). In fact, the endogeneity of
location is a problem that few authors address di-
rectly. Several recent papers attempt to avoid the
problem by restricting their samples to at-home youth,
arguing that a youth’s residence is likely chosen by
older members of the household. Such papers, how-
ever, suffer from the additional problem that, for
youth, the choice between work and school is also
endogenous. In addition, many researchers treat all
suburban locations the same, despite the observation
that suburbs with large black populations in many
MSAs are significantly different from white suburbs
and have poorer access to jobs. Most papers also use
a general measure of residential segregation, as op-
posed to a more complicated lneasure that takes into
account the relative locations of black residents and
potential employers.
Probably the most well-known and controversial
paper that finds evidence against spatial mismatch is
Ellwood’s (1986) study of Chicago youth employment.
Ellwood presents several different types of evidence,
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black employment rates. First, he regresses census
tract employment rates on the tract’s racial make-up
plus three measures of job access, finding that the
access variables are insignificant and have little effect
on the significant negative coefficient for percent black
in tract. Even including neighborhood fixed effects
does not change the coefficient on percent black. Other
evidence against spatial mismatch comes from Ell-
wood’s finding that the "labor market outcomes for
blacks on the West Side ghetto are remarkably similar
to those in the South Side, in spite of the dramatic
Interest in the spatial mismatch
hypothesis has recently grown
more intense as America’s
urban problems receive greater
attention. Much of the debate
turns on measurement issues.
differences in the proximity to jobs." Finally, he shows
that differences in employment rates for blacks and
whites within the same neighborhood are the same as
the relative job differences by race for youth living
across town. Ellwood concludes that racial discrimi-
nation in the labor market, rather than residential
location, explains differences in employment across
different neighborhoods. ("Race, not space, remains
the key explanatory variable.")
Several authors have criticized Ellwood’s findings
on a variety of grounds. Leonard (1986) suggests that
Ellwood’s measures of job accessibility are unreliable
because of the small sample sizes in the Chicago Area
Transportation Study. Ihlanfeldt (1992) notes that the
use of aggregate census tract data, rather than indi-
vidual observations, might bias the coefficients on
accessibility towards zero. Kasarda (1989) presents
evidence that job accessibility really does not differ
between the South Side and the West Side ghetto. He
also makes the argument that the similarity of relative
black-white employment patterns in different neigh-
borhoods can be explained by differences in the timing
of job losses in the two neighborhoods.
More recently, Engberg and Kim (1995) present
evidence suggesting that place effects are minimal for
workers of all education levels, using a sample of
white men in Pittsburgh. They use a non-parametric
selection lnodel to try to separate place and person
effects and assume that highly educated white men
face no barriers to moving. Their results suggest that
the increased segregation by income may have little
effect on the labor market outcomes of white low-skill
workers. The study does not address employment
outcomes for black workers, who may face greater
barriers to moving.
On the other side, several recent papers have
found evidence in favor of spatial mismatch, lhlan-
feldt and Sjoquist, together and separately, have writ-
ten a series of papers that combine data on black and
white youth from the 1980 Census Public Use Micro
Sample with local measures of job accessibility, to
show that job accessibility is strongly correlated with
black youth employment prospects. In the Philadel-
phia MSA, they show that mean travel time for white
and black youth in 26 regions is related to the proba-
bility of employment for these groups (Ihlanfeldt and
Sjoquist 1990). In addition, the authors show that
relative differences in mean travel times explain a
significant portion of the difference between white and
black employment rates. Other regressions extend
these results to Chicago and Los Angeles, although the
data are not as good.
Ihlanfeldt (1992, 1993) expands on this research
by creating separate estimates for Hispanics, as well
as for youth in various other income and location
categories in 50 MSAs. Among other things, he finds
that the relationship between job access and employ-
ment probability is stronger for centTal city than
suburban youth. In fact, employment access had a
significant effect on job probability for all groups
except for youth located in smaller MSAs. Finally,
Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1991) study 43 SMSAs using
data from youth living at home in the central city (to
control for endogenous location), and once again find
that mean travel time has a significant effect on the
probability of youth employment.
While Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist’s research strongly
suggests that proximity to jobs matters, the authors do
not fully control for endogenous location and do not
allow for neighborhood effects that might be corre-
lated with access to employment. To address the latter
issue, Gabriel and Rosenthal (1995) estimate a fixed-
effects model of commuting fimes, using data from the
1985 and 1989 American Housing Surveys. They find
that black workers with a high school or college
degree have longer commutes than similarly educated
Asian or white workers, even after controlling for
neighborhood fixed effects and income. Surprisingly,
for workers with less than a high school degree,
May/June 1996 New England Economic Review 35comn-tutes are similar for all races. The latter finding
contradicts the observations of the lnany other authors
who argue that low-skilled minority workers are the
group most likely to suffer from long commutes
because of barriers to mobility and the loss of inner-
city manufacturing jobs.
The results from Gabriel and Rosenthal indicate
that neighborhood effects matter and that not control-
ling for neighborhood fixed effects biases upward the
race coefficient in the commuting time regressions.6
(The coefficient on the black dummy variable in the
commuting time regressions was about one-third
higher in the specifications that did not include the
neighborhood fixed effects.) Finally, Gabriel and
Rosenthal find that blacks are less likely than members
of other racial groups to move after four years, even
controlling for other factors including the potential
gains associated with moving.
In contrast to lnuch of the previous literature,
which generates variation in commuting times based
on cross-sectional data, Zax and Kain (1995) take a
natural experiment approach and still find that job
access has a differential impact on black workers. They
study worker quit behavior in response to the move of
a large services industry employer from the Detroit
central business district to the predominantly white
suburb of Dearborn. The authors divided employees
into "winners" (workers whose new commute was
shorter) and "losers" (workers with a longer com-
mute). While few, if any, white "losers" quit their jobs
in the three years following the move, many black
"losers" left the company. As a result of the move, at
least 11 percent of the blacks who had worked at the
previous location quit.
Neighborhood and Peer Effects
While the spatial mismatch literature posits a
well-defined hypothesis, neighborhood and peer ef-
fects are more difficult to identify. Wilson (1987), for
example, argnes that low-income blacks have been
negatively affected by the exodus of middle-class
blacks from ghettos since the 1970s. The loss of em-
ployed households may hurt remah3ing residents of a
poor urban neighborhood, through the loss of infor-
mal job networks (Holzer 1987) and positive adult role
models and a deterioration in peer influences. Because
of the high correlations among these factors within
individual neighborhoods, their effects are very hard
to identify separately. In addition, becanse individuals
tend to locate in neighborhoods inhabited by people
with similar characteristics, the direction of causality
between individual outcomes and neighborhood char-
acteristics is unclear. Because of these problems, many
fewer papers have looked for separate evidence of
neighborhood and peer effects, and the evidence that
is available is much weaker than for spatial mis-
match.7
Jencks and Mayer (1990a) survey the literature on
the impact of neighborhoods on five outcomes for
children, including educational attainment, cognitive
skills, criminal activity, sexual behavior, and economic
success. They conclude that "there is no general pat-
tern of neighborhood or school effects that recurs
across all outcomes." Jencks and Mayer found only
five papers on labor market success and none had
results that were reliable.
More recently, Crane (1991) finds evidence in
favor of an "epidemic" theory of ghettos in which the
individual outcomes are related to neighborhood
quality, particularly for very distressed neighbor-
hoods. Using data from the 1970 Census Public Use
Micro Sample, he shows that as the percentage of
"high status" residents (persons with a professional
or managerial job) decreases below a threshold of 10
percent, the probability of a young person having a
baby or dropping out of school increases sharply, even
controlling for other individual characteristics. To
control for endogeneity of residence location, he re-
stricts the sample to at-home youth.~ One problem
with the study is that Crane tested 15 measures of
neighborhood quality (which presumably were less
strongly associated with social problems) before us-
ing the percentage of "high status" residents. In addi-
tion, correlations between neighborhood characteris-
tics and personal and parental attributes could further
bias the results. (See Borjas 1995.)
Corcoran et al. (1991) do a better job of controlling
for family characteristics h~ their study of men’s eco-
nomic status, finding that parental income, race, and
participation in welfare programs play an important
role in a son’s earnings. They obtain parental informa-
tion from the intergenerational data in the Panel
Survey of Income Dynamics. Once parental attributes
6 The authors attribute the impact of the fixed effects on
commuting times to unobserved compensating differentials in
neighborhood house prices and amenities.
7 This section reviews only papers that relate directly or indi-
rectly to the impact of neighborhood factors on labor market
outcomes. See Jencks and Mayer (1990a) for a survey of the much
larger literature that explores the determinants of social problems
such as teenage pregnancy, illegitimacy, and crime.
a These results are consistent across most racial groups and
locations, although the mean levels of the dropout and fertility rates
were much lower for whites in the sample than for blacks.
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hood characteristics is significant--percent on welfare.
The neighborhood characteristics are measured at the
zip code level, and even the authors concede that zip
code level data are inadequate for this task. (See Borjas
(1995) for evidence about the imprecision of zip code
level neighborhood controls.)
Because individuals tend to
locate in neighborhoods inhabited
by people zoith similar




Several recent papers have attempted to use an
instrumental variables approach to control for the
simultaneity between neighborhood and peer charac-
teristics and (tmobserved) household attributes. Evans,
Oates, and Schwab (1992) show the problem ~vith
ignoring the endogeneity of location and peers. Using
data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth,
they estimate the probability of pregnancy and school
dropout for teenage women as a function of individ-
ual and household variables, including the percentage
of students in school who are disadvantaged. In a
single equation model, they find that the percentage
disadvantaged variable is highly significant and has a
positive impact on the probability of pregnancy and
a negative impact on the probability of staying in
school. Next the authors use a simultaneous equations
approach, in which the percentage of disadvantaged
students is estimated as a function of instruments that
include metropolitan area economic conditions.9 The
coefficient on percentage disadvantaged becolnes in-
significant h~ the pregnancy and dropout equations
when run in the simultaneous equations framework.
While the study can be criticized for its exact choice of
instruments and a single peer variable, the results
strongly hint at the problem associated with the en-
dogeneity of peers and neighborhoods.
Others find that neighborhood and peer effects do
not disappear with suitable instruments for neighbor-
hood effects. Duncan, Connell, and Klebanov (1994)
argue that endogenous neighborhood choice could
actually lead researchers to underestimate neighbor-
hood effects, if households with motivated parents
choose poor neighborhoods because of low house
prices. They use data from the Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics to estimate the impact of individual and
neighborhood characteristics on the probability of
high school graduation, using the future neighbor-
hood choice of the mother as an instrument for the
neighborhood that the parents occupy while the chil-
dren live at home. Such an instrument should avoid
the problem that parents may choose a neighborhood
in order to provide their children with better peers.
The authors find a strong and significant neighbor-
hood effect, which increases iu magnitude when they
use instrumental variables.
Case and Katz (1991) use targeted survey data to
separate the effects of neighborhood and family at-
tributes; they find strong evidence that both of these
factors have an impact on the behavior of inner-city
youths consistent with an epidemic model of neigh-
borhood effects. They use data from a 1989 NBER
survey of youths living in low-income neighborhoods
that reports a variety of outcolne measures, including
labor force/school status, criminal activity and drug
use, church attendance, and parental status. The sur-
vey also asks about the presence and demographic
background of the parents and siblings, as well as the
respondent’s current living arrangements. The esti-
mated neighborhood effects are especially convincing
because Case and Katz use a novel approach to control
for the potential endogeneity of location. For example,
if the dependent variable was whether or not a youth
committed a crime last year, Case and Katz include
the predicted probability that the youth’s neighbors
committed a crime in the last year as an independent
variable. The predicted value is generated from the
individual characteristics of neighboring youths.
As suggested by the conflicting results listed
above, Aaronson (1995) shows that instrumental vari-
able equations are very sensitive to the choice of
reasonable instruments. Instead, he uses data from
siblings who differ in age by at least three years, and
whose families move at least once, to estimate a model
of educational attainment in which family influences
are controlled for using fixed effects. The results show
that neighborhood effects remain ilnportant in predict-
ing high school graduation even when family-specific
fixed effects are included in the equation.
9 The authors show that the included instruments are corre-
lated with percentage disadvantaged, but uncorrelated with the
dependent variables in the second stage equations.
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research on neighborhood and peer effects is less
developed than that for spatial mismatch, and the
results are more ambiguous. In particular, few authors
have been able to identify the exact neighborhood
or peer variables that matter most. Recent research
shows promise, however, in controlling for the endog-
enous choice of location, and a number of working
papers suggest that neighborhoods and peers do mat-
ter in explaining educational outcomes.
Even if parents make the choice of location for youth,
the parents’ choice of location may be correlated with
attributes of the parent that can have an independent
effect on the youth’s behavior. (For example, parents
who use drugs may live in neighborhoods with other
drug users, but also have children who are drug users.
Without controlling for parental drug use, researchers
cannot separately identify the impact of neighbors’
drug use on a youth’s drug use.) Finally, results for
at-home youth may be difficult to generalize for the
larger population.
IlL Conclusions
Despite the attention paid to segregation over the
past 30 years, low-income and black households con-
tinue to live in neighborhoods that are highly segre-
gated. Trends in the 1970s and 1980s show that the
type of segregation is slowly changing, with segrega-
tion by race gradually falling while income segrega-
tion is rising. Racial segregation remains more pro-
nounced than income segregation, and recent studies
have found that racial discrimination in the housing
market continues to exist, although the types of dis-
crimination are less severe than in the past.
The evidence presented in this survey strongly
supports the proposition that location matters in terms
of labor market outcomes, particularly for households
who live in distressed inner-city neighborhoods. In
addition to the Gautreaux results, several studies
show that minorities do worse in MSAs with more
segregation (or spatial isolation) and that ethnic neigh-
borhoods play an important role in transmitting ethnic
capital. The research is less clear, however, in identi-
fying the exact mechanism through which location
affects labor market outcomes. Commuting times ap-
pear to be an important factor in explaining reduced
employment for black and Hispanic youth, and sev-
eral authors have found that minority families face
significant barriers to mobility. Neighborhood and
peer effects are harder to identify, especially because
of the endogeneity of location and the strong correla-
tions between various kinds of neighborhood prob-
lems and individual and family characteristics.
Despite the large body of evidence, significant
research questions remain unanswered. Future re-
search should continue to look for better methods of
identifying neighborhood and peer effects. Focusing
exclusively on at-home youth presents several prob-
lems yet to be addressed, including the choice of work
versus school (which presumably depends on the
availability of jobs and the quality of local schools).
Trends in the 1970s and
1980s show that the type of
segregation is slowly changing,
with segregation by race
gradually falling while income
segregation is rising.
While many studies have explored the reasons for
and negative implications of segregation by race,
significantly fewer papers have focused on segrega-
tion by income. Very little evidence has been devel-
oped about why this type of sorting has been rising
for the past 25 years. Given this trend, however, the
problems associated with the concentration of pov-
erty, including access to education, neighborhood and
peer effects, and mobility, should receive significantly
more attention in the future.
Finally, most of the evidence regarding spatial
mismatch comes from studying individuals, not firms.
Even if individuals face barriers to mobility (such as
housing market discrimination and information prob-
lems), firms could choose to locate closer to minority
or impoverished neighborhoods if employers per-
ceived profitable opportunities. Yet the establishment
of enterprise zones to provide tax breaks for employ-
ers who move to distressed inner city areas has
apparently failed to induce significant numbers of
employers to respond. Research on the reasons that
employers choose not to locate in inner cities might
suggest policies that could help improve the coudi-
tions for residents of the inner city.
Given current high levels of segregation, Ameri-
ca’s urban problems are not going to disappear, and
38 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewh~stead they appear to be worsening. The research
presented at this symposium will add to our under-
standing of the problems associated with location. The
challenge for policy-makers is to use this research to
design policies that address the needs of the inner
cities. Solutions to the problem of growing income
ineqnality must also address the problems posed by
location.
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T
wo related bodies of research link the intra-metropolitan distribu-
tion of households to labor market outcomes. These distinct
perspectives extend the standard human capital model of labor
markets to consider the effect of space on labor market operations, each
presuming a somewhat different mechanism of causation. Research
addressing the well-known "spatial mismatch hypothesis" focuses on the
impact of job decentralization on the employment prospects of minority
households who, through constraints on housing choices, are left behind.
In tlzis work, space affects the level and distribution of minority employ-
ment through proximity to jobs. As jobs increasingly decentralize and
minorities remain concentrated in central cities, minority access to jobs
declines, lowering their employment rates and earnings. While the
evidence on the importance of the mismatch in jobs is not definitive, it
continues to be a focus of scientific and policy interest. (See Kain 1992 and
Holzer 1991 for recent reviews.)
Another and distinct hypothesis, associated with William Julius
Wilson’s (1987) work on the so-called "urban m~derclass," suggests that
the social isolation resulting from the concentration of mh~orities has a
negative effect on individuals more generally, and on their labor market
performance specifically. Wlzile the empirical evidence on this mecha-
nism is ambiguous (see Jencks and Mayers 1990 for a review and Manski
1993 for a critique), several recent empirical studies support some version
of this hypothesis, Using different data but sin~ilar approaches, Brooks-
Gunn et al. (1993), Clark (1992), and Crane (1991) each found evidence of
effects of neighborhood composition on youth high school dropout rates.~
More directly related to labor market concerns, Case and Katz (1991)
analyzed data on poor neighborhoods within Boston, concluding that
neighborhood peers substantially influence a variety of youth behaviors,
including propensity to work. A neighborhood might affect labor markets
through several mechanisms--for example, the absence of positive role
models, the lack of informal job contacts, the presence of disruptiveinfluences. These differ from the presumed mecha-
nism underlying the spatial mismatch hypothesis.
According to this latter research, it is the internal
composition of a neighborhood that matters, rather
than the relationship of that neighborhood to external
employment opportunities.
A unifying theme in all this research is that urban
labor market outcomes are influenced by more than
the individual characteristics recognized in the stan-
dard human capital model. Even beyond characteris-
tics of the local labor market, this work suggests that
information about the local residential enviromnent may
improve our models of ttrban labor market outcomes.
This paper provides tests of the relative impor-
tance of spatial factors. We develop and apply a
standardized approach to measuring job access, one
that can be duplicated for a large number of metro-
politan areas. Using a unique data set created and
analyzed within the U.S. Bureau of the Census, we
estimate a series of employment probability models
based on a standard human capital model. We then
expand this model to include information on proxim-
ity to jobs and various neighborhood characteristics.
This permits us to examine the importance of these
spatial attributes, frequently omitted from other mod-
els. It also permits us to examine the relative impor-
tance of these spatial variables.
Throughout our analysis, we find strong evidence
of the importance of spatial factors in determining
youth employment outcomes. As for which factors
matter most, our results suggest that they differ both
by the outcome examined and by the city.
I. Methodology
The Data
Through arrangements with the U.S. Bureau of
the Census, we have created a data set containing all
records of non-Hispanic white (white), non-Hispanic
black (black), and Hispanic youth aged 16 to 19,
residing with at least one parent and located in one of
the 73 largest U.S. metropolitan areas. In this paper,
we report on an analysis of the urban labor markets in
the state of New Jersey. We have all records, rather
than just the 1/10 or 1/100 publicly available samples.
Thus, even lhniting the analysis to one state, the
sample contains more than 28,000 youth who reside
in one of New Jersey’s four largest metropolitan
areas (Newark, Bergen-Passaic, Middlesex, and Mon-
mouth). The most important aspect of the data set is
that each record in our 1990 extract is coded by census
tract. We have matched this data set with aggregate
census tract characteristics, such as the percentage
of the census tract population that is poor, lives in a
female-headed household, is employed, is black, and
so on. This generates, a large sample of observations on
youth and their labor market outcomes matched to a
distinctly rich neighborhood context. (Results are
shown below in text Tables 1A and 1B and in Appen-
dix Table A1.)
Throughout our analysis, we find
strong evidence of the importance
of spatial factors in determining
youth employment outcomes.
The second portion of the data is compiled from
the transportation subsample of the 1990 Census,
available at the tract level through the Census Trans-
portation Planning Package (CTPP) for large Metro-
politan Statistical Areas (MSAs). The CTPP provides
direct information about commuting patterns and
proximity to jobs at the census tract level. The raw
data provided by the CTPP, matrices of zone-to-zone
commuting patterns and peak commute times, are
sufficient to create a variety of well-defined tract level
measures of employment access. (The derivation of
these measures is discussed in Appendix B.) These
job proximity measures are linked to the individual
record through tract identifiers, providing us with
both neighborhood and job access information for all
youth in the sample. As described in Appendix B, we
have created several measures of employment access
for each census tract in the four metropolitan areas. It
is worth noting that these access measures are based
on travel time, so they incorporate information on
both spatial distance and transportation ease.
77~e Statistical Model
~ Crane’s results have been questioned by Clark’s failure at
replication using similar data (Clark 1992) and by the methodolog-
ical criticism of Manski (1993).
The first step of the analysis is based on a logit
model relating youth employment probabilities to
individual and family characteristics:
42 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewlog [pi/(1 - Pi)] = c~ Xi, (1)
where Xi is a vector of those individual and family
characteristics found by previous research to be rele-
vant for youth employment outcomes.2 We then con-
trast results froln this model with an expanded statis-
tical model that includes both job proximity and
neighborhood characteristics:
log [pi/(1 - Pi)] = ~ Xi + /3 Ai + -y Ni, (2)
where Ai is a measure of employment access, and Ni is
a vector of neighborhood (CellSUS tract) characteristics
found to be important through previous empirical
work.3
H. Results
We estimate equations (1) and (2) for the Newark
MSA, examinh~g probabilities of both employment and
"idleness" (that is, not-in-school-and-not-employed).
First we analyze all youth, then white, black, and
Hispanic youth separately. We then present the results
of these models for all four metropolitan areas, inves-
tigating consistency in the effects of neighborhood and
accessibility upon labor market outcomes.
Newark
Table 1A presents esthnates of the youth employ-
ment model, equation (1), for all Newark youth, and
for white, black, and Hispanic youth separately. Most
results confirm previous findings. Females and older
youth are more likely to be working. School enroll-
ment decreases the likelihood of working, as does the
birth of a child for teenaged girls. Youth in female-
headed hottseholds are somewhat less likely to be
working, while those in a family with at least one
parent working are also more likely to be working.
Differences in the intercepts by race reveal lower
employment probabilities for minority youths, partic-
ularly for black youth.
Some variation in results is present across demo-
graphic groups. Racial groups differ somewhat in the
specific measure of education that is most important
2 See O’Regan and Quigley (1996) for a full description of such
a model, and Freeman (1982) for a full description of relevant
characteristics.
3 For examples of such characteristics, see Plotnick and Hoff-
man (1995) and Duucan (1994). For examples of work similar to this
study that have incorporated either job proximity or neighborhood
characterisfics in this fashion--but not both--see Ihlanfeldt and
Sjoquist (1990), Case and Katz (1991), aud Duncau (1994).
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Coefficient Youth White Black Hispanic
Sex .353 .351 .273    .399
(1 = Female)          (8.08} (6.85) (2,75) (2.47)
Age                     .305 .315 .279    .415
(years) (t0.82) (8.77) (5.04) (4.47)
Education .123 .182 .030 .075
(years) (5.73) (6.16) (.84) (1.24)
HS graduate -.107 -.398 .408 ,175
(1 = yes) (1.55} (4.50) (3.13} (.76)
Female-headed household -.134 -.014 -.138 -.493
(1 = yes) (2.18) (.17) (1.26) (2.15}
Head of household’s -,030 -.031 -.008 .039
education (years) (4.29) (3.89) (.40) (1.91)
Parent worldng .818 .616 .836 .863
(1 = yes) (8.63) (4.34) (5.51)
Youth in school -.845 -.945 -.762 -.505
(1 = yes) (13.19) (11.27) (6.54) (2,36)
Family size -.011 .012 -.003 -.173
(persoes) (.72) (.53) (. 11) (2.97)
Children ever born - 1.010 -.679 - 1.048 - 1.076
(1 = yes) (5,59) (1.89) (4.46) (1.69)
Other household income -.002 -.002 .001 ,003
(000 dollars) (5.02) (5.49) (.73) (1,65)
White - 6.548 - 7.140
(1 = yes) (13.04) (11.37)
Black - 7.420 - 6.515
(1 = yes) (14.64) (6.25}
Hispanic -7.015 -8.091
(1 = yes) (13.90) (4.81)
Number of observalions 10245 6900 2529    816
Chi-squared 1728 759 846 201
-21ogL _ 1_2475 8807 266~0 .. ~931
in affecting employment outcomes.4 While the coeffi-
cient of the head of the household’s education is
always negative, it is not significant for blacks. The
effect of household income (excluding the youth’s
4 In models in which years of educafion is the only measure of
a youth’s education, this variable is significantly positive for all four
models. However, when high school completion is also included,
this latter measure significantly (and positively) affects black youth
employment rates, while neither is significant for Hispanic youth.
New England Economic Review 43earnings) on employment follows a similar pattern.
Increased family resources reduce youth employment.
Measuring the effect of family socioeconomic
characteristics is complicated by the relationship be-
tween youth work and school decisions. While some
interdependence clearly is present in these outcomes,
we have simplified our estimation by treating school
status as an exogenous control. In terms of family
socioeconomic status, higher status decreases the like-
lihood of in-school youth working, while increasing
the likelihood of working for out-of-school youth.
Table 1 B





Coelficient Youth White Black Hispanic
Sex -.322 -.262 -.308 -.604
(1 = Female)           (3.68) (2.04) (2.30) (2.19)
Age                   .636 .618 .626    .702
{years~ (13.45) (7.95) (9.29) (5.07)
Education -.315 -.406 -.259 -.273
lyearsl (11.48} (8.70) (6.75) (3.71}
HS graduate .362 .632 .225 .381
(1 = yes) (3.15) (3.29) (1.38} (1.08)
Female-headed household .364 .382 .265 .611
(1 = yesl (3.54) (2.24) (1.83) (1.83)
Head ol household’s -.062 -.065 -.098 -.017
education (years) (4.77) (3.66) (3.79) (.52)
Parent working -.416 -.484 -.513 .532
(1 = yes~ (3.54) (2.09) 3.37 (1.34)
Family size .037 -.038 .039 .158
Ipersons! (1 .a8} (.70) (1.25) (2.24)
Children ever born 1.666 1.702 1.618 1.8S1
!1 = yes~ !9.81! (4.12) (7.95) (3.20)
Other household ~ncome -.004 -.003 -.005 -.008
(000 dollarsl (2.97) 2,06 (1.79) (1.28)
White - 9.246 - 7.607
I1 = yes~ {10.70! (5.29)
Black -8.-463 -8.276
!1 = yes! (9.75~ (6.731
Hispanic -8.943 - 12.274
il = yes~ i10.34) (4,81)
I,lumber of obsewations 10245 6900 2529 816
Chi-squared 9749 7399 1684 694
21ogL 4454 2166 1822 438
To eliminate this problem, we have also estimated
this model using "idleness" (not-working-and-not-in-
school) as the dependent variable. Table 1B reports
the results of identical models (except that the school-
status variable is omitted). We expect that all variables
indicating higher family socioeconomic status will
decrease youth idleness. This expectation is borne
out. The two sets of results are quite comparable.
We include both outcome measures in our analysis, as
spatial factors are likely to affect school and work
decisions differently.
In the next step of the analysis, the logit model is
expanded to include neighborhood information. We
examine two categories: employment access and mea-
sures of "social access." Employment access is mea-
sured by an index of employment "potential" derived
from the assumption that work-trip destinations are
generated by a Poisson process,s A lack of social access
is indicated by various measures of neighborhood
composition.
Prelimh~ary analysis with a larger set of neigh-
borhood variables6 established that one measure of
racial composition (percent white) and four measures
of tract poverty or employment levels (percent poor,
on public assistance, unemployed, and adults work-
ing) are consistently hnportant in affecting outcomes.
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients of the
relevant variables for Newark. Neighborhood demo-
graphic measures are highly correlated in Newark;
with only one exception the correlation coefficients
among these measures exceed 0.76. The job access
measure is only weakly correlated with the demo-
graphic characteristics of neighborhoods, however.
The appropriate functional form for these vari-
ables is not known a priori. Indeed, it is possible that
neighborhood effects matter only after some threshold
is reached, affecting the logit of employment in a
nonlinear fashion. We estimated a series of models to
test for nonlinearities, and while there is some evi-
dence that the relationship may be complicated, no
nonlinear representation seemed superior to simple
~ As explained in Appendix B, the relative accessibility of
census tracts within each metropolitan area is quite insensitive to
assumptions about the trip generation process. Results using the
assumption of a Poisson process are similar to those based upon a
more general assumption of a negative binomial process. In fact, for
these metropolitan areas, the standard gravity model provides job
access measures that are correlated with these more sophisticated
measures at greater than 0.98.
6 These included, for example, percent black, Hispanic, in
owner-occupied home, and in female-headed household, and tract
median income.
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Percent Poor .783 .927
Percent Unemployment -.818 .896
Percent Adults Not
at Work -.572 .776
Job Access .318 -.433
Percent:
Public
White Assistance Poor Unemployed
1.000
1.000







for the separate samples of
white and black youth,s
The high correlation among
many of the neighborhood vari-
ables means that the relative
importance of neighborhood
measures cannot be determined
with precision. While employ-
ment access is not particularly
highly correlated with the other
tract variables, the correlations
among the other variables are
quite high. The effect of this is
illustrated in the results of mod-
els VII to X for white youth
continuous measures of neighborhood attributes.7 We
report results using continuous measures.
We estimated a variety of models of youth em-
ployment probabilities with these neighborhood vari-
ables. The results for the individual and family-level
variables were essentially unchanged, with the ex-
ception that fan-dly background variables generally
decrease slightly in magnitude and statistical signifi-
cance. This suggests that, while neighborhood charac-
teristics may spuriously capture omitted family influ-
ences (Corcoran et al. 1992), the reverse is also the case.
Empirical work that does not include information
about neighborhoods likely overstates the (direct) influ-
ence of family characteristics on employment outcomes.
Results for the neighborhood variables are pre-
sented in Tables 3A and 3B. Panel A presents results
for all youth, and Panels B through D present results
separately for white, black, and Hispanic youth. In
Model I of each panel and table, employment access is
the sole neighborhood variable included. In the case of
youth employment, improved job access has a signif-
icant and positive effect for all youth and for black
youth. For youth idleness, job access is highly signif-
icant for all youth and for black youth.
The independent effect of access does not persist
when other neighborhood characteristics are added,
singly (Models II to VI) and in pairs (Models VII to X).
In almost every case, the measure of access to jobs is
insignificant when measures of neighborhood racial
composition or neighborhood poverty/employment
are included. In the sample of all Newark youth, each
neighborhood variable, when entered individually, is
significant and is of the expected sign. This is also true
employment (Table 3A, Panel
B). Each neighborhood composi-
tion measure is significant when
included separately. However,
when pairs of variables are included, generally neither
neighborhood variable is significant. Note, however,
that according to a standard likelihood ratio test, the
set of measures is significantly different from zero. In
the aggregate for youth employment and for black
youth separately (both employment and idleness), it
does appear that neighborhood poverty/employment
characteristics have a stronger effect than does the
racial composition of the neighborhood. However,
idleness of Hispanic youth appears more strongly
influenced by neighborhood racial composition.
Some caution is in order in evaluating these
results. Several recent papers have highlighted the
difficulty of controlling adequately for family charac-
teristics and choice when identifying neighborhood
and other potential influences on social outcomes
(Corcoran et al. 1992, Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1992,
and Plotnick and Hoffman 1995). Other work has
emphasized the circumstances in which the logic of
the identification of peer influences is problematic
(Manski 1993). The potential endogeneity of neighbor-
hoods is also a source of concern in this .empirical
work. Endogeneity may be manifest in several ways.
Ottr empirical analysis is more successful in dealh~g with
some of the sources of this simtfltaneity than others.
The most obvious source of statistical problems in
the interpretation of fh~dings about youth employ-
7 We were especially concerned with measuring threshold
effects for racial composition and the fraction of the population in
poverty.
s For Hispanic youth, several ,~eighborhood variables are sig-
nificant, but not all. In part, this reflects the smaller sample sizes of
Hispanic youth.
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Neighborhood Determinants of Employment for Newark Youth~
t-ratios in parentheses
I    II III IV V Vl VII VIII IX
A. All Teenagers (10245 observations)
Chi-squared 1732 1757 1772 1772 1772 1835 1775 1775 1774 1839
-21ogL 12471 12445 12431 12430 12431 12367 12428 12457 12429 12364
Access .006 .004 .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000 .001
(2.10) (1.36) (.06) (.10) (.04) (.66) (.05) (.18) (.14) (.47)
Percent White .608 .266 .252 .237 .249
(5.05) (1.83) (1.71) (1.57) (1.96)
Percent Poor -2.687 -2.153
(6.20)                    (4.14)
Percent on Public Assistance                              -2.567                         -2.074
(6.24)                    (4.15)
Percent Unemployment                                          - 4.130                         - 3.343
(6.21)                    (4.03)
Percent Adulls Not at Work -3.400 -3.184
(9.96) (8.88)
B. White Teenagers (6900 observations)
Chi-squared 759 763 766 765 767 822 766 765 767 822
-21ogL 8807 8802 8799 8801 8798 8744 8799 8800 8798 8744
Access .000 .000 -.001 -.001 -.002 .002 -.001 -.001 -.002 .002
(.02) (.02) (.46) (.33) (.58) (.62) (.40) (.24) (.53) (.62)
Percent White .393 .087 .179 .060 .005
(2.14) (.35) (.74) (.24) (.03)
Percent Poor -2.495 -2.210
(2.78)                    (1.82)
Percent on Public Assistance                             -2.093                         -1.548
(2.42)                    (1.37)
Percent Unemployment                                          -3.469                         -3.209
(2.91)                   (2.00)
Percent Adults Not at Work -3.808 -3.804
(7.87) (7.60)
"Logi! models include household level variables reporled in Table 1A.
ment is the omission of individual or family charac-
teristics. In particular, family variables have been
shown to be very important determinants of youth
outcomes (Corcoran et al. 1992), yet are frequently
omitted from empirical work. Since family character-
istics are likely to be correlated with neighborhood
characteristics, it is possible that measures of neigh-
borhood characteristics are merely proxies for family
effects. By using only at-home youth, we have access
to the range of census information on the youth’s
family. These attributes really "matter" in the empir-
ical results.
A second source of concern is the youth’s choice
of neighborhood. Here again, by limiting attention to
at-home youth, we can presume that this choice is
made by the parent(s), using the standard transpor-
tation-housing cost calculus. Household choice is
exogenous to the transport demands of youth. Of
course, to the extent that household choices about
residential location are influenced by the impact of
neighborhood characteristics on youth employment, a
focus on at-home youth will not eliminate this source
of simultaneity.
A third source of concern is the definition and
computation of the accessibility measure itself. We
should emphasize that tl*ds measure is not computed
from the observed commuting patterns of teenagers.
Nor is it computed with reference to the location of
jobs that might be "suitable" for teenagers (Ihlanfeldt
and Sjoquist 1990). It is merely the "standard" acces-
46 May/June 1996 New England Economic ReviewTable 3A continued
Neighborhood Determinants of Employlnent for Newark Youth"
t-ratios in parentheses
I II III IV V V! VII VIII IX X
C. Black Teenagers {2529 observations)
Chi-squared 854 860 866 869 867 875
-21ogL 2652 2646 2640 2637 2639 2631
Access .018 .013 .003 .002 .006 .001





Percent on Public Assistance -2.402
(3.77)
Percent Unemployment                                         -3.518
(3.55)
Percent Adults Not at Work -2.908
(4.47)
D. Hispanic Teenagers (816 observations)
Chi-squared 206 209 209 208 208 210
-21ogL 925 922 922 923 923 921
Access -.010 .037 .027 .022 .017 -.005





Percent on Public Assistance 5.474
(3.75)
Percent Unemployment                                          6.860
(2.41)
Percent Adults Not at Work 1.033
(.07)
867 869 868 877
2639 2637 2638 2629
.003 .002 .005 -.001
(.38) (.20) (.76) (.19)
.236 .150 .154 .299









210 210 210 211
921 922 922 920
.043 .041 .034 .032
(2.01) (1.98) (1.59) (1.51)
-2.548 -2.448 -2.955 -2.923









aLogit models include household level variables reported in Table 1 A.
sibility measure calculated from observations on the
work-trip patterns of all workers--adults and teenag-
ers of all races--within the urban area.
This attention to specification does not, of course,
eliminate all sources of simultaneity. To the extent that
omitted family or individual characteristics exist that
are more strongly correlated with neighborhood vari-
ables than with other included controls, the results
may be spurious. It is also possible that the residence
choices of others in a neighborhood are influenced by
youth employment outcomes, affecting the character-
istics of the neighborhood indirectly. In Appendix C,
we present direct tests for the existence of this indirect
relationship for Newark youth. We find little evidence
of such a spurious relationship.
May/June 1996
The high correlation among the various neighbor-
hood characteristics raises a second issue in interpret-
ing these results. Given the high correlation among
neighborhood characteristics, it is difficult to separate
the effects of various dimensions of related neighbor-
hood characteristics with any precision. For models in
which we include one neighborhood characteristic,
this measure acts as a proxy for a collection of char-
acteristics, and the results should be interpreted in
that light.
New Jersey Cities
In this section, we expand the sample to include
all four metropolitan areas in New Jersey. We estimate
New England Economic Review 47Table 3B
Neighborhood Determinants of Idleness for Newark Youth"
t-ratios in parentheses





9756 9784 9781 9788 9784
4447 4418 4421 4414 4418
-.013 -.007 .000 .001 -.001





Vl VII VIII IX X
Percent on Public Assistance
Percent Unemployment
Percent Adults Not at Work






Percent on Public Assistance
Percent Unemployment





9777 9793 9797 9793 9794
4425 4410 4406 4409 4408
-.004 .000 .001 -.001 -.001
(.69.} (.04) (. 15) (.20) (.25)
-.792 -.695 -.734 -.901





7399 7405 7411 7408 7406
2166 2161 2155 2157 2159
-.004 -.OO4 .000 -.001 .000
(.54) (.50) (.06) (.11) (.01)
-.008
(2.38)







7406 7411 7408 7407 7408
2160 2155 2157 2159 2157
-.004 .000 -.001 -.001 -.004
(.58) (.05) (.16) (.11) (.52)
.-.031 -.222 -.322 .562









similar statistical models, but with larger samples and
somewhat lower levels of intercorrelation of neighbor-
hood demographic measures. Table 4 presents a sub-
set of tlie results for all metropolitan New Jersey
youth, which conveys the main findings. Panel A
includes results for the estimation of employment
probabilities, Panel B summarizes resttlts for the esti-
mation of idleness probabilities.
Model I reports estimates of youth employment
probabilities as a function of neighborhood access
measures and of individual and household character-
istics. The cardinal values of the access measure are
hardly comparable across MSAs (see Appendix B and
Table 5), so we permit the coefficient on access to vary
by MSA. Employment access has a highly significant,
positive effect on youth employment in each of the
four MSAs.
The other five models include access, but intro-
duce other neighborhood characteristics. Models II to
IV include the percent white, the percent on public
assistance, and the percent of adults not at work,
respectively, in the census tract of residence. Each of
these neighborhood composition variables is signifi-
cant and is of the expected sign. h~cluding these charac-
teristics has little impact on the access coefficients. In
Models V and VI, which include the access measttres,
percent white, and one of the two poverty/employment
measures, the results are comparable. Both neighbor-
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Neighborhood Determinants of Idleness for Newark Youth"
t-ratios in parentheses
I II Ill IV V Vl VII VIII IX
C. Black Teenagers (2529 observations)
Chi-squared 1696 1703 1703
-21ogL 1810 1803 1803






Percent on Public Assistance
Percent Unemployment
Percent Adults Not at Work
















Percent Adults Not at Work



























































hood composition variables are significant, and the
access measure is important h~ each of the four cities.
In Panel B, the results for predicting teenage
idleness differ slightly. The access meastu:e is signifi-
cant in the simplest model (Model I), but in more
complex specifications, access appears to be less im-
portant. Individually, and in pairs, other neighbor-
hood measures have important effects upon the prob-
ability of idleness of urban youth.
It is certainly possible that the effect of neighbor-
hood composition differs across metropolitan areas.
We have investigated models of this general specifi-
cation (see Appendix Table A1). On purely statistical
grounds, the complete disaggregation of neighbor-
May~une 1996
hood measures across MSAs does improve the em-
ployment probability model, but does not improve the
idleness results.9 The magnitudes, however, are essen-
tially the same.~°
9 The ~2s for the fully interacted models, compared to those
without MSA-specific coefficients, are as follows:
Degrees of
lvlodel Employment X~ Idleness X2 Freedom
lI 24 2 3
III 16 2 3
IV 31 4 3
V 31 3 6
VI 39 3 6
~0 In addition, we have estimated these models separately for
New England Economic Review 49Table 4
Neighborhood Determinants of E~nployment Outcomes for New Jersey Youth"
28191 Observations, t-ratios in parentheses
A. Employment
Chi-squared 3838 3874 3891 3963
-21ogL 35243 35207 35190 35118
Access:
Bergen-Passaic .030 ,024 ,017 .025
(3.47) (2.78) (1.96) (2.92)
Middlesex .041 .036 .031 .026
(6.56)      (5.72)       (4.84)       (4.01)
Monmouth .010 .008 .007 .010
(5.15) (4.08) (3.80) (5.35)
Newark .006 .006 .004 .004
(3.57) (3.26) (2.23) (2.37)
Percent White .491
(5.99)
Percent on Public Assistance -2.208
(7.14)
Percent Adults Not at Work -2.242
(11.02)
B. Idleness
Chi-squared 27909 27952 27958 27938
-21ogL 11172 11129 11123 11143
Access:
Bergen-Passaic - .034 -.013 .007 - .015
(1.96) (.74) (.40) (.84)
Middlesex -.038 -.018 -.005 - .015
(2.82) (1.33) (.37) (1.08)
Monmouth -.005 .002 .004 -.002
(1.17) (.57) (1.06) (.50)
Newark -.008 - .006 .000 - .004
(2.29) (1.58) {. 12) (.98)
Percent White -.916
(6.58)
Percent on Public Assistance 2.951
(7.12)



































aLogit models include household level variables reported in Tables 1A and 1 B. Each model also includes separate intercepts for tile dilferent metropolitan
areas.
white, black, and Hispanic youth. For white youth, results reported
in Table 4 and Appendix Table 1 are confirmed. The results are more
fragile when the sample is confined to minority youth. Many of the
variables that are significant for all specifications with the larger
samples are insignificant for the minority samples. The pattern of
results suggests that the samples of minority youth are too small to
permit estimation of MSA-specific and race-specific coefficients. For
that reason, we focus on the all-youth estimates.
IlL Implications
The statistical results for this sample of New
Jersey youth suggest that neighborhood composition
and employment access affect labor market outcomes,
although the quantitative estimates differ by area and
by outcome. The character of urban neighborhoods
and the effect of neighborhood composition on out-
50 May/June 1996 New England Economic ReviewTable 5
Average Characteristics of Neighborhoods in New Jersey
MSAs
Fraction:
MSA Sample Job Public Adults Not
Residences of Size Access White    Assistance at Work
Newark
All Youth 10245 27.037 .704 .357 .071
White Youth 6900 28.444 .910 .331 .032
Black Youth 2529 23.491 .194 .416 .164
Hispanic Youlh 816 26.129 .536 .395 ,116
Bergen-Passaic
All Yoult~ 6227 5.971 .852 .355 .043
White Youth 5164 6.060 .934 .350 .030
Black Youth 528 5.463 .295 .385 .130
Hispanic Youth 535 5.609 .608 .379 .084
Middlesex
All Youth 5713 8.136 .899 .309 .033
White Youth 5064 8.105 .929 .307 .029
Black Youth 367 8.836 .661 .319 .060
Hispanic Youth 282 7.799 .688 .342 .068
Monmoutl~
All Youth 6006 26,191 .925 .370 .040
White Youth 5446 26.494 .948 .368 .036
Black Youth 352 22.540 .608 .390 .087
Hispanic Youth 208 24.431 .866 .375 .056
comes vary across metropolitan areas. This accounts
for some of the observed differences in youth employ-
ment outcomes. Moreover, withh~ metropolitan areas,
large differences are found in the average characteris-
tics of neighborhoods in which youth of different races
and ethnicities reside. For example, in Newark, 81.5
percent of white youth live h~ census tracts in which 90
percent or more of the population is white. In contrast,
slightly less than 20 percent of Hispanic youth, and
only 4 percent of black youth, live in such tracts. Table
5 summarizes the average characteristics of neighbor-
hoods in which youth of different races reside. These
differences may lead to large differences in employ-
ment outcomes for youth.
Table 6 indicates the importance of these differ-
ences in employment access and neighborhood demo-
graphics h~ affecting employment outcomes by race
and ethnicity.]~ The first column in the table presents
H These probabilities are computed relying upon the coeffi-
cients from Model VI in Appendix Table A1. The coefficients of the
individual and household demographic variables (not presented)
and the average characteristics of the sample of youth are used,
together with the coefficients reported in Appendix Table A1 and
the average neighborhood characteristics in each MSA.
the employment probability esti-
mated for the "average" youth in
each of these four metropolitan ar-
eas. The second column presents
the employment probability of the
same "average" youth living in the
neighborhood in which the aver-
age white youth resides, in each
metropolitan area. The third and
fourth columns present the em-
ployment probabilities estimated
for the same youth living in the
neighborhood h~habited by the av-
erage black and Hispanic youths,
respectively. Panel B presents the
same simulation using idleness in-
stead of employment. Many of
these differences are quite large.
In Bergen-Passaic, residence in
the neighborhood in which the av-
erage white youth lives (compared
to that in which the average black
lives) increases youth employment
rates by 2.3 percentage points, from
39.9 to 42.2 percent. A similar com-
parison of employment rates for
those living in the average white
and average Hispanic neighbor-
hoods shows a smaller difference. In Middlesex, the
differences are approximately of the same magnitude
Table 6
Employment Outcomes for Youth with
Average Capital Characteristics in
D!fiferen t Neighborhoods
Percent
Ali White Black Hispanic
Youth Youth Youth Youth
Employment
Newark 37.45 43.46 32.76 36.84
Bergen-Passaic 41.77 42.15 39.85 40.02
Middlesex 46.99 47.37 44.61 43.46
Monmouth 44.97 45.00 44.87 44.50
All White Black Hispanic
Youth Youti~ Youth Youth
B. Idleness
Newark 4.66 3.83 7.44 5.63
Bergen-Passaic 4.19 3.98 5.92 4.92
Ivliddlesex 3.50 3.41 4.27 4.33
Monmouth 4.29 4.22 5.39 4.56
May/June 1996 New England Economic Review 51(a 2.8 percentage point increase for white-black com-
parisons, and a 3.9 percentage point increase for the
white-Hispanic comparison). In Monmouth, located
on the New Jersey shore, differences in average neigh-
borhood characteristics have much smaller effects on
youth employment rates, while in Newark, the effect
is strikingly large. In Newark, predicted employment
rates for the average white neighborhood are almost
one-third higher than for the average black neighbor-
hood.
Results for youth idleness are comparable. In
general, the largest disparities are between probabili-
ties for the average white and the average black
neighborhoods. Across these MSAs, the effect varies,
and the difference is greatest for the largest and most
urban metropolitan area in our sample, Newark.
IV. Conclusion
This paper analyzes employment and "idleness"
outcomes for a large sample of urban youth. The
analysis is based upon observations on at-home youth
and their families, the employment access of the
neighborhood in which they reside, and the socioeco-
nomic character of those neighborhoods.
The analysis documents the importance of human
capital and family attributes in conditioning the labor
market outcomes for youth living at home. In addition
to individual-level determinants, we find evidence of
substantial spatial linkages to employment outcomes.
While not consistently significant across metropolitan
areas, measures of access to jobs are important in
affecting employment in some areas, especially for
minority youth. Access appears to play essentially no
role in determining youth idleness, an outcome dom-
inated by youth school-enrolhnent status. Further-
more, whether as a measure of social access, role
models, or peer influence, neighborhood composition
matters consistently. Measures of the presence of
employed and non-poor individuals (prestm~ably those
with knowledge of and contact with jobs) affect youth
employment. Even with large samples of data, how-
ever, we are less successful in distinguishing among
these distinct, but closely related, potential causes.
Simulations using these results demonstrate quite
clearly that the constellation of factors that distinguish
"good" from "bad" neighborhoods affects teenage
employment in profound ways.
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Neighborhood Determinants of Employment Outcomes for New Jersey Youth"
28191 Observations, toratios in parentheses
I II III IV V VI
A. Employment
Chi-squared 3848 3904 3913 4002 3931 4021
-21ogL 35233 35177 35168 35079 35150 35060
Access
Bergen-Passaic .066 .068 .069 .070 .069 .071
(3,45) (3.49) (3.52) (3.63) (3.51) (3.65)
Middlesex .026 .276 .023 .017 .028 .021
(2,17)        (2,34)         (1.99)         I1.39)         (2.38)         (1,74)
Monmouth ,006 .007 .006 .007 .008 .008
(1.86) (2.25) (1.96) (2.07) (2.38) (2.35)
Newark .004 .002 .001 .001 .001 .001
(3,37) (1.88) (.45) (.99) (.51) (.71)
Percent White
Bergen-Passaic .156 .229
















Bergen-Passaic - .269 .443
(.42) (.42)
Middlesex - 2.798 .521
(2.48) (.32)
Monmouth - .760 -2.7"85
(.87) (2.38)
Newark - .753 -2.248
(7.62) (4.58)
Percent Adults Not at Work
Bergen-Passaic -2.049 -2. t 40
(3,58) (3.60)
Middlesex - 1.536 - 1.261
(3.25) (2.62)




aLog~t models include household-level variables reported in Tables 1A and 1B. Each model also includes separate intercepts for the di~erent metropolitan
areas.
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Neighborhood Determinants of Employment Outcomes for New Jersey Youth"
28191 Observations. t-ratios in parentheses
I II III IV V VI
27913 27955 27960 27944 27970 27969
11167 11126 11121 11137 11110 11111
-.026 -.011 -.004 -.026 -.005 -.010
(3.58) (.27~ (.10) (.66) (.11i (.25i
-.003 -.001 .003 .010 .004 .011
(.11~ (.04) (.12) (.35~ (.16) /.39)
.001 .002 .002 .000 .001 .001
(.14i (.25) (.26) (.03) (.21) (.21)
-.007 -.003 .000 -.002 .000 -.001









































(1.36)                   (1.33~
Newark 2.400 1.590
(4.88) (2.94)
"Logit models include household-level variables reported in Tables 1A and 1B. Each model also includes separate intercepts lot the different metropolitan
areas.
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Spatial Access
In the text, we employ a measure of
the accessibility of each census tract to
employment locations. This measure is
derived from the "potential access" mea-
sures widely used by transport planners.
(See Isard (1960) for an early review or
Smith (1984) for a more recent treatment.) A. Negative Binomial
These measures are derived from observa-
tions on the ~vork-trip patterns of corn- /3
muters and the transport linkages in an T
urban area.
The accessibility measures are based
upon the data available through the Cen- Io9 likelihood
sus Transportation Planning Package B. Poisson
(CTPP) for large metropolitan areas. The
CTPP data are obtained from the Trans-
portation Supplement of the 1990 Census. /3
Each metropolitan area is divided into T
Traffic Analysis Zones (TAZs). Zone-to-
zone peak commute flows (Tij) as well as
log likelihood
peak travel times (dij) are reported. From G. Gravity Model
the elements of the matrix, the number
of workers resident in each TAZ (Ri)
can be estimated (Ri = Ej T~i). Similarly, T
tbe number of individuals working in 6
each zone (Wi) can be estimated (Wi =
R~
Ti~i~e~ most widely used empirical
model of the accessibility of particular
resideutial locations is based upon the
gravity concept:
Table B1
Parameter Estimates of Negative Binomial, Poissou,
and Gravity Models o~ Transport Access
Asymptotic t ratios in parentheses
Bergen-
Newark Passaic Middlesex lvlonmoutt]
1.249 ,529 .073 .793
.342 .474 .545 .421
.341 .378 .384 .445
,705 ,842 ,856 .872
.555 .587 .527 .608
-116818 -71835 -63415 -56296
-.187 -1,557 -1,327 -.991
.511 .718 .666 ,530
.424 .474 .465 .598
.806 .967 .894 ,918
-296466 -209995 -174066 -156235
.601 -.371 -.337 -.796
.307 .427 .473 .486
.274 .325 .313 .358
.485 .569 .622 .593
.225 .245 .280 .293
Number of Observations 32157 18419 16760 15009
where Greek letters denote parameters. Isard (1960) pro-
vides a number of physical and social scientific justifications
for the formulation. Flows between i and j are positively
related to the "masses" of residences and workplaces and
inversely related to the "distance" (travel time) between i
and j.
Estimates of the parameters yield a measure of the
accessibility of each residence zone to the workplaces, which
are distributed throughout the region (Isard 1960, p. 510),
(B2)
where ~" is computed from the parameters estimated by
statistical means.
More sophisticated measures of access recognize that
the transport flows to each destination are count variables.
The Poisson distribution is often a reasonable description for
counts of events that occur randomly.
Assuming the count follows a Poisson distribution, the
probability of obtaining a commuting flow Tij is
pr(Tij) = e-;XiJ ,~ii/Tij! (B3)
where 3.~j is the Poisson parameter. Assuming further that
exp[~j] = c~R~W~Y/d~          (B4)
yields an estimable form of the count model (since E(T~j) =
~i). See Smith (1987) for a discussion. Estimates of the
parameters similarly yield a measure of the accessibility of
each residence zone to workplaces in the region,
Ai = ~ ~.ii/I{~. (BS)
A more general model of the flow count between i and
j relaxes the Poisson assumption that the mean and variance
are identical. For example, following Greenwood and Yule
(1920), Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984, p. 922) assume
that the parameter ’\~i follows a gamma distribution G(~o~j)
with parameters (:Oij. They show that, under these circum-
stances, the probability distribution of the count is negative
binomial with parameters ~oii and
G(~oii+Tii) ( "~/ )~’’
pr(Tii) - G(~ii~ 1) 1~ (1 + "q) w,.
(B6)
Again, assuming that
exp[o~j] = c~R~ W~’/d~ (B7)
yields an estimable form of the count model and the
resulth~g accessibility index for each residence zone.
The count models are clearly nested. If "q is infinitely
large, then equations (B6) and (B7) specialize to (B3) and
May/June 1996 New England Economic Review 55Table B2
Simple Correlation Coefficients among
Census Tract Access-to-Employment
M~a~" ~m’~ Derived from Negative Binomial,
Poisson, and Gravity Models
Gravity vs. Gravity vs. Binomial vs.
Po~sson Binomial Poisson
Newark .980 .994 .988
Bergen-Passaic .982 .993 .995
Middlesex .973 .989 .976
Monmouth .909 .989 .954
(B4). If -q is finite, then the mean and the variance of the
count variables are not identical (as assumed by the Poisson
representation).
The accessibility measure derived from the gravity
model, equations (B1) and (B2), may be interpreted as a
simple linear approximation to either of these theoretical
count models. (Smith (1987) provides a thorough discussion
of the link between gravity and Poisson models.)
Table B1 presents parameter estimates of the three
models for four metropolitan areas in New Jersey. The
models are estimated using the CTPP data from the 1990
Census. For each of these metropolitan areas, the TAZs are
coterminous with census tracts. The lnatrices of tract-to-tract
commuting flows are sparse, with many zeros. For example,
the Newark lnetropolitan area has 448 census tracts. Of the
200,704 possible commuting patterns (448 times 448),
168,547 of them are zero. (In part, this reflects the fact that
the underlying counts and transportation times are gathered
from a sample of about 15 percent of the population.) The
estimates of the negative binomial and Poisson models are
obtained by maxin~um likelihood methods, adjusting the
likelihood function for this truncation.~2 In contrast, the
gravity model is estimated in the most straightforward
manner--by applying ordinary least squares to equation
(B1) in logarithmic form using the non-zero observationsJ~
As the table indicates, the hypothesis of Poisson flows is
rejected in favor of the negative binomiaM~ In each case, the
estimate of "O is rather precise, and it implies that the ratio
of the variance to the mean ([1 + ~1]/’0) is on the order of 2.5
or 3.
Table B2 presents the correlations among the census
tract accessibility measures derived from the three models.
Although the negative binomial model fits the data better
than the Poisson model, the differences in the accessibility
~-~ The coefficients are estimated using the programs STATA
and TSP. The refinement to recognize the truncated character of the
data is more or less irrelevant, empirically. The coefficients are quite
similar when this subtlety is simply ignored.
~3 More elaborate treatments are readily available. See, for
example, Weber and Sen (1985).
~4This finding parallels that obtained by Raphael (1995) for San
Francisco Bay Area teenagers.
measures computed from them are very small. Similarly, the
table shows that, for each of the four New Jersey metropol-
itan areas, the gravity model yields an almost identical
measure of census tract access to employment.
Appendix C: Explicit Tests for Endogeneity
As noted in the text, a major concern in designing and
interpreting the statistical models of labor market outcomes
is the exogeneity of the neighborhood variables that have
been lneasured. The statistical models have been designed to
guard against the possibility that these geographic indica-
tors are endogenous to labor market choices. We address the
simultaneity issue by considering the decisions of "at home"
youth, whose residence choices have been made by parents,
and by relying upon extensive measures of household
demographics. Despite this, the possibility remains that
some unobserved characteristics of households affect both
neighborhood choices and youth employment choices.
This appendix provides further evidence on the exoge-
neity of neighborhood characteristics based upon the Haus-
man specification test.
In the text, four variables are used to measure aspects of
urban neighborhoods: percent white (X~), percent receiving
public assistance (X2), percent of adults not at work (X3), and
the census tract access measure (X4). These variables are
used in a variety of logit specifications. The most general of
these are t~vo logit models including three of the measures:
(Xu X2, and X4) and (Xu X3, and X4). We construct instruments for each of these four vari-
ables. We then include the instruments, together with the
Table C1
Tests of Exogeneity qf Neighborhood





Age Group Youth Youth All Youth
A. Neighbori~ood Influences: Percent White. Access.
Percent on Public Assistance
Ages 16-20 8.045 3.669 7.513
Ages 16-19 8.596 2.347 6.027
Ages 17-20 9.397 4.014 7.343
Ages 17-19 10.146 3.908 5.395
B. Neighborhood Influences: Percent White. Access,
Percent Adults Not at Work
Ages 16-20 4.536 3.895 5.114
Ages 16-19 4.303 2.364 3.294
Ages 17-20 5.846 4.529 5.169
Ages 17-19 5.616 4.439 2.772
"The critical values of ,\’- with 3 degrees of freedom are 7.810 and 11.300
respectively at the 0.05 and 0.0! levels of confidence
56 May/June 1996 New England Economic Revieworiginal variables in the logit model, and finally test the joint
significance of the instruments. The hypothesis that the
neighborhood variables are jointly exogenous can be tested
using standard likelihood ratios.
As instruments, we use census tract measures corre-
lated with each of these four neighborhood indicators but
not themselves determinants of employment choice. For
percent white, we use as an instrument the tenure of the
household and the percentage of housing of that tenure type
in the tract. (There is abundant evidence that, for reasons of
permanent income, racial discrimination, and so on, minor-
ity households, other things equal, differ systematically in
tenure type from white households. But, practically no one
would argue that homeownership causes higher levels of
employment.)
For the percent receiving public assistance and the
percent of adults not at work, we use a measure of the
availability of appropriately sized units, conditioning on
household size.~-~
For the access measure, we employ the fraction of
workers of common industry and occupation h~ the MSA
is We can use the same instrument for both ueighborhood
measures because we never use these variables together in any logit
estimation. The housing availability measure weights the fraction of
the housing stock in the census tract of each size (number of rooms)
residing in the tract. This is a measure of the heterogeneity
of industry or occupation of any household member.
Table C1 reports the results of the Hausman specifica-
tion test for Newark youth in differing age groups. The tests
are constructed separately for in-school and out-of-school
youth and for al! youth.
As the table indicates, in no case can we reject the
hypothesis of the exogeneity of the neighborhood influences
at the 0.01 level. At the 0.05 level, we can reject the
hypothesis of exogeneity for in-school youth of one of the
models, but not the other.
As shown in the table, when the model includes a
variable measuring the percent on public assistance, the ,~ is
significant for one subsample, in-school youth. However,
when the model includes a variable measuring the percent
of adults not at work--perhaps a superior measure of the
availability of informal information about employment op-
portunities-each of the three measures of neighborhood
effects upon teenage elnployment is shown to be exogenous,
according to conventional statistical criteria.
by the relative frequency in the MSA that a household of that size
(number of individuals) lives in that sized unit. This is a probabi-
listic measure of residence based on the availability of "typical"
housing.
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K
atherine O’Regan and John Quigley have writ-
ten an excellent paper, using intra-urban spa-
tial variation to try to isolate the connection
between neighborhood and employment and school-
ing outcomes for teenagers. They find strong effects of
neighborhood poverty and unemployment on teenage
employment and idleness (not being at school or at
work). They also find that actual physical access to
jobs is relatively unimportant. It seems like another
victory for the loose form of the spatial mismatch
hypothesis (segregation by race and income affects
employment outcomes), although something of a loss
for the strict form of the spatial mismatch hypothesis
(location matters because of transportation distance
to work).~ The paper is clear and well done, and it is
truly "state of the art" in using cross-neighborhood
variation within cities to identify the effects of neigh-
borhood on outcomes.
My thoughts on this topic will be arranged in two
categories: (1) discussion of the implications of these
results for policy and for future research, and (2)
discussion of the basic approach of using intra-urban
variation to identify neighborhood effects. The first
section accepts O’Regan and Quigley’s results and
discusses what they mean for policy; the second
section discusses the perils of using within-city data
for these purposes and how one might eliminate some
of those dangers.
The Implications of O’Regan and
Quigley" s Results
The empirical issues involved in estimating the
importance of space are extremely dense and often
daunting. Issues of omitted variables, endogeneity,
and measurement error plague the research in this
area (including, of course, my own work). O’Regan
and Quigley’s research represents a superb effort, but
there can be no doubt that we are still far from being
able to establish conclusively (1) a firm connection
between neighborhood and outcomes, or (2) the
neighborhood mechanisms that really matter, or (3)
the way these neighborhood mechanisms influence
childhood development and employment outcomes.
However, these issues are so important, and they
extend to so much of the work in social science and to
such a wide range of policy-making, that we must
welcome truly significant contributions like that of
O’Regan and Quigley quite warmly. We also must
hope that this conference represents a renewed com-
mitment to continue the quest for more understanding
and better methods for dealing with these problems.
This first section of my comments presents a brief
description of why these issues are so important and
what O’Regan and Quigley’s results in particular
mean, both for policy and for social science.
~ Kain (1968) is the father of the spatial mismatch hypothesis. I
have taken to splitting the hypothesis into strong and weak forms,
where the strong form states that minority problems are related to
distance from jobs and the fact that minorities are constrained to live
in their neighborhoods, whereas the weak form argues that segre-
gation, which is a result of discrimination, leads to poor minority
outcomes.
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Neighborhood and Outcomes
The very existence of a strong causal connection
between neighborhood and individual outcomes im-
mediately implies the existence of strong, spatially
related externalities, especially if that connection does
not work through the provision of local public goods.
If a person’s identity hffluences, to even a small degree,
the outcomes of his entire neighborhood, then private,
free market outcomes there may be not only inequita-
ble but also, quite possibly, highly inefficient. A classic
externality exists, because an individual’s skill level
and work habits influence his neighbors’ outcomes in
a way that is not regulated through the market.
Location-specific spillovers stemming from the
effects of concentration of poverty may suggest,
among other things, a need for strongly subsidized
education for the poor. As the education of one
member of the neighborhood will benefit all of his
neighbors, that person’s education choice will not
If we believe in neighborhood
effects, then by altering where the
poor live or who their neighbors
are, we can improve their lives.
internalize all of the neighbors’ benefits, and that
person will underinvest in education relative to the
social optimum. Individual migration decisions will
also fail to internalize effects on local neighborhoods.
In principle, such results could provide a rationale
for a federal government role in reducing white flight,
for example, or subsidizing other migration decisions.
Once we have clearly established the connection be-
tween neighborhood attributes and outcomes, the
floodgates have been opened for justifying a myriad of
governmental policies. Of course, the standard cau-
tions (which this author believes strongly) about the
tendencies of governmental policies to exacerbate
rather than improve existing market failures also
apply in this case.
A particular example of this last point occurs
when local governments take actions that change the
neighborhood composition of adjoirting areas. One
locality may create attractive zoning regulations that
draw the ~vealthy from another area and thus impose
significant externalities on the poor remaining in the
other area. Wliile I believe strongly in the benevolent
effects in many cases of local competition among
governments, just as I believe in the benefits of local
competition among firms, the presence of substantial
externalities may limit the extent to which we want to
decentralize certain types of power to local hands. In
particular, local control over redistributional activities
is known to lead to sorting by income classes. If
neighborhood effects are real, then this income sorting
may be highly inefficient and socially costly in a way
that ~vill not be internalized by local governments.
Of course, these are primarily efficiency issues,
and much of the discussion in this area relies on equity
concerns. If neighborhood effects are clearly estab-
lished, then it becomes tempting to ask whether we
cannot use these neighborhood effects to achieve eq-
uity goals of redistribution between races or between
income groups. In other words, if we believe in
neighborhood effects, then by altering where the poor
live or who their neighbors are, we can improve their
lives. Of course, it is still a matter of debate whether
space-based redistributional methods (which lnight
include programs helping minorities relocate or com-
munity-based redevelopment projects) are particu-
larly efficient means of achieving equity goals. It
may well be that cash or simple in-kind transfers are
cheaper and more effective means of achieving equity
goals than attempts to guide which neighborhood
people choose to live in. Naturally, even the most
recalcitrant opponent of space-based programs would
be forced to accept that it would be of clear social
benefit to elimh~ate spatial distortions created by
govermnent policies, such as greater availability of or
more access to AFDC payments in high poverty areas,
or police discrimination in white neighborhoods.
Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning that docu-
menting the kinds of neighborhood connections that
operate is of huge relevance to economics and other
social sciences. Much of modern growth theory hinges
on externalities in the production of knowledge. Issues
in labor economics and macroeconomics are also pos-
sibly related to the presence of spillovers across work-
ers in the accumulation and use of human capital. This
type of research is invaluable in helping us to docu-
ment the presence or absence of such forces.
hnplications of How Neighborhoods
Change Outco~nes
One of the strongest implications of O’Regan and
Quigley’s work is that local poverty matters, while
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much. The authors do not really try to distinguish
between different forms of poverty or joblessness, but
rather restrict themselves to distinguishing between
the two fairly different hypotheses. They make a
strong case for the importance of local poverty, rela-
tive to local job access.
Ideally, we would be able to sort out which types
of poverty matter most in creating neighborhood
effects. Do neighborhood effects work through the
percentage of the population relying on the govern-
ment? In that case, the admittedly odd implication
would be to eliminate all social programs. Is the
important attribute the raw income level of the neigh-
borhood? Then, the implication might be to hand out
cash. Is the important attribute the concentration of
the adult idle? In this case, the goal of policy should be
getting people to work. Alternatively, racial composi-
tion or some other variable might represent the crucial
neighborhood effect.
As pleasant as it might be to believe that we can
simply use multiple variable regressions to distin-
guish among these hypotheses, I am dubious at best
about the possibilities for this type of work (O’Regan
-and Quigley are, too). These poverty-related neighbor-
hood characteristics are tightly correlated in the data.
Distinguishing between the effects of unemployment
versus poverty versus single-parent families is enor-
mously difficult. The selection and endogeneity prob-
lems differ for each one of these variables and further
complicate the analysis, and I am not sure that we ever
will believe anything we see that differentiates be-
tween these forces.
Given these problems, I believe that Quigley and
O’Regan adopt the right approach. They basically look
at two hypotheses: Is it neighborhood composition
that is the major difficulty in poor neighborhoods? Or
is it the lack of proximity to employment? These two
variables, neighborhood composifion and physical
location of employment, are not tightly connected,
and the authors do seem to be able to effectively
distinguish between them. They reject the idea that the
lack of proximity to jobs is the major problem. My
own work in this area (Cutler and Glaeser 1995) has
also found that proxilnity to jobs is not a particularly
large determinant of neighborhood effects. It does
seem that the problem of poorer neighborhoods is not
the absence of local employment but rather the pres-
ence of broader social problems that leave lasting scars
on youths growing up in poverty-stricken areas.
The most straightforward interpretation of
O’Regan and Quigley’s work is that job access, the
variable that relates to immediate benefits from legal-
sector employment, is relatively unin-tportant. The
variable that appears related to a culture of poverty
and its effect on long-term human capital develop-
ment is important, however. The findings suggest that
we should not expect that an individual who is
whisked away from a poor neighborhood and
dropped into a high-employment neighborhood will
immediately see an improvement. More likely, the
children of this individual will have better peers and
better role models and will eventually learn from the
new location. The implication is that neighborhoods
are about long-term accumulation of skills or at-
tributes and not about an immediate return to paid
work.
Such a policy conclusion casts doubts on the
effectiveness of employment zones, enterprise zones,
improvements in transportation for inner-city resi-
dents, or any policy focused primarily on cutting the
costs of moving between ghettos and jobs. While such
programs surely will not hurt, and may even be of
some benefit, they will not address the primary prob-
lems of inner-city neighborhoods. The benefits of
these programs will show up only gradually, and
through an indirect effect of employment levels on
long-run human capital accumulation. Neighbor-
hoods will change, if the O’Regan and Quigley results
are right, only if the cycles of poverty are broken and
if their residents become employed and acquire hu-
man capital. Unfortunately, this type of policy impli-
cation goes against any kind of quick fix. Urban policy
must be about changing long-run human capital ac-
cumulation and altering the patterns of family respon-
sibility.
hnplications of Hozo These Mechanisms Work
Quigley and O’Regan do not really begin to tell us
how locational unemployment levels actually drive
youth idleness. The reader can immediately imagine
several mechanisms by which th~s effect could work
through the public sector or the provision of locational
services. For example, even when different census
tracts are part of the same school district, they may not
have access to the same schools, and it may be school
quality that is driving this effect.
Are crime levels higher in these poverty areas?
The number of poorer youths involved in some form
of crime is quite high: About 35 percent of the Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth’s 20-year-olds
have committed crimes recently. Are these young
adults just avoiding the legal sector? Is drug use and
60 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewavailability important for this group? Is gang mem-
bership important?
Are the poverty effects working through an ab-
sence of role models? An easy way to test this is to see
whether neighborhood effects become important for
children who have both parents present and "success-
ful," where successful may just mean employed. These
mechanisms should not be seen as alternatives to a
basic poverty effect; rather, analysis should first doc-
ument the role of poverty and then try to decompose
the ways that poverty drives poor outcomes.
It would also be helpful to know if neighborhood
effects are seen for younger children, and at what age
these forces start to be important. When do we begin
to see school dropout rates respond to local area
attributes? Naturally, all of these questions form an
agenda for many future papers and go far beyond the
scope of this work, but they are important if we are to
formulate policy on the basis of these types of results.
For example, if we found that all the neighborhood
effects worked completely through school quality, and
school quality was a function of spendh~g, then it
would make sense to consider equalizing school
spending. If neighborhood effects worked through
school quality, but the relevant school quality effect
worked through peer interactions at the school, then
busing or, alternatively, a measure for paying children
with high human capital to go to school with children
with low human capital might be preferable. If neigh-
borhood effects worked through high crime rates, and
these crime rates discouraged legal activities and
encouraged illegal activities, then altering the policing
structure might be appropriate.
The point is not that a clear mandate exists on
what should be done, but rather that determining how
neighborhoods affect outcomes, if indeed neighbor-
hoods do affect outcomes, is critically important for
determining our overall policy approach. We cannot
even begin to think about the right steps to take to
eliminate the problems of the inner city without first
being convinced that neighborhoods, rather than in-
dividuals, are important factors in creating social
problems; without knowing which types of neighbor-
hood characteristics drive poor outcomes; or without
understanding the mechanisms by which they drive
these outcomes.
A Discussion of the h, tra-Urban Approach
As I have argued elsewhere (Cutler and Glaeser
1995), using intra-urban variation to identify the ef-
fects of neighborhood characteristics on individual
outcomes poses two major problems. O’Regan and
Quigley are aware of both, but it is worthwhile dis-
cussing the assumptions needed to avoid these prob-
lems and whether or not we think that these assulnp-
tions are palatable.
The first probleln is that omitted family and child
characteristics surely are highly correlated with neigh-
borhood choice. Neighborhoods are endogenously
chosen, and individuals select into different locations
based on their characteristics. Some of these charac-
teristics will be the observables that O’Regan and
Quigley do use in their work. Other relevant charac-
teristics relating to neighborhood choice might be
the willingness to sacrifice for future benefit (pa-
tience), unobserved human capital and skills, or con-
nections with and attitudes toward mainstream soci-
ety. If negative attributes are correlated with choices
to live in poorer neighborhoods, then our estimates
The price of going to inter-urban
variation is a tremendous loss of
the variation found in
neighborhood differences.
of neighborhood effects will be biased upward, since
neighborhood characteristics will be correlated with
omitted variables that work in the same direction (as
long as bad neighborhoods attract low-potential indi-
viduals).
The second problem, which also stems ultimately
from the endogeneity of neighborhood choice, is that
identical individuals must in equilibrium be indiffer-
ent between neighborhoods. Thus, the marginal indi-
vidual making the decision about neighborhood loca-
tion must be indifferent between living in a poor
neighborhood and living in a rich neighborhood.
(Housing prices surely go a major part of the way to
induce this indifference.) This effect will mean that we
should not see neighborhood differences in utility
levels of the decision-makers, if we are able to control
for all individual attributes.
My approach to these problems has been sheer
cowardice. David Cutler and I avoided using intra-
urban variation entirely and identified neighborhood
effects from inter-urban variation. We were able to use
governmental and topographic features of different
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tion within the area. Unfortunately, we had only weak
methods of dealh~g with inter-urban mobility, which
is also endogenous. More important, the price of going
to inter-urban variation (also the approach used in
O’Regan and Quigley 1995b), is a tremendous loss of
variation. In the extreme case, where every urban area
was identical but had huge neighborhood differences,
inter-urban variation would yield no evidence what-
soever. While the world is less extreme than that, all
researchers lose a large amount of information when
they give up the information contained in within-city
data, and a huge cost is attached to adopting that type
of strategy. I think that in the long run we will be
better off figuring out ways to use the h~tra-urban data
than we are relying solely on inter-urban variation.
However, using intra-urban variation requires
dealing seriously with all the potential biases that such
data create. Consider the following earnings equation:
E; = X~[3 + Z;(O(Z) + 0;) + c~i + ~; (1)
where E reflects some outcome variable (perhaps
earnings, or some propensity towards idleness), X
represents observed individual characteristics, /3 the
returns to those characteristics, Z observed neighbor-
hood characteristics, O(Z) the average returns to those
characteristics, 0i the individual specific returns to
those characteristics, ~i omitted ability, and ~i an inde-
pendently distributed error term. The potential prob-
lems with using ordinary least squares to estimate the
equation, and the possible solutions, are discussed
below.
Case One--Garden Variety Omitted Variables
In this case, O(Z) = O, 0i = 0, and the covariance of
~i and Z is not equal to zero. Ordinary least squares
will yield biased coefficients, because neighborhoods
are correlated with unobserved attributes. O’Regan
and Quigley (1995a) are aware of this probleln and
handle it by implicitly asguming that parental job
attributes determine location and that these attributes
are orthogonal to teenage attributes. In their words,
household choice is "made by the parent(s), using
the standard transportation-housing costs calculus.
Household choice is exogenous to the transport de-
mands of youth." As the equation illustrates, the
necessary condition for unbiased estimates is not the
exogeneity of location choice with respect to youth’s
employment concerns, but rather the orthogonality of
location with respect to youth’s employment concerns.
The authors assert, perhaps correctly, that house-
holds do not choose location based on what will make
employlnent more probable for their children. I am
skeptical of this comment in many cases, especially
given what we know about how sensitive parents are
to school quality in their location choice. Nevertheless,
even accepting this assertion, the parental factors that
induce parents to locate in high-poverty areas are
surely correlated with the characteristics of youth
that determine employment probabilities. Indeed,
O’Regan and Quigley assert that, in their data, family
characteristics "really ’matter’ in the empirical re-
sults." If the observables matter so lnuch, surely the
unobservables matter too, and the results are biased.
How can we work to improve this problem? First
and most classical is the instrumental variables ap-
proach. The goal is to find a parental characteristic that
determines location but is clearly orthogonal to omit-
ted youth characteristics that drive location. One pos-
sibility is that the industrial or occupational training
of parents might influence locational choice.
Naturally, we would have to control for the
overall quality of industry or occupation as well. The
method would involve creating a location measure for
each industry/occupation pair and also an average
wage and average skill measure for each industry/
occupation pair. The location measures (where the
industry/occupation employment is located h~ the
city) might be clean instruments if the industry/
occupation quality measures are also included in the
regression. Alternatively, in data samples where we
know when the parents came to the city, we could use
the areas of the city being built then to get a sense of
where the parent would have been attracted to ini-
tially, and use that as an instrument. Ideally, we could
use randomized data (such as the Gautreaux or Mov-
ing to Opportunity experiments) to get better instru-
ments as well.
A second approach is to get a sense of how big the
selection problems are. How much is sorting by pa-
rental observables? How strong is the correlation
between parents and children? How big would the
unobservables need to be, relative to observables, to
invalidate the results? These kinds of sensitivity anal-
yses are lnade possible by Quigley and O’Regan’s use
of Census variables with a battery of parental back-
ground data, and I believe that the authors should
exploit this information as much as possible.
In a final approach, the authors could separate
individuals into long-term and short-term residents of
the community. Presumably location choice would be
less of an issue for long-term residents. If the data
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long-term residents, this would lead us to believe that
it is neighborhood that drives outcomes. If neighbor-
hood is more important for short-term residents, then
we would have to believe that outcomes drive neigh-
borhood choice.
Case Two--Random Coeff!’cie~ts
In this case, O(Z) = 0, and 0i ~ O, but ~i = 0, and
the covariance of Oi and the Z variables is not equal
to zero. This is a version of the standard Roy model,
where individuals have different returns to different
neighborhoods and will select into the neighborhoods
that give them higher returns. While the relative
returns may be parental returns, so long as they are
parental returns, ordinary least squares will yield
biased coefficients, because neighborhoods are corre-
lated with unobserved attributes. The problem here is
not that omitted variables are present that positively
affect employment and are also correlated with neigh-
borhood, but rather that the returns to neighborhood
location itself differ across neighborhoods. A particu-
lar, real world example of this concern is the fact that
the minorities who have selected to live in rich neigh-
borhoods are minorities for whom that neighborhood
is particularly valuable, so that it is impossible to
translate from information about those people to gen-
eral results about the importance of location for mi-
norities.
This version of the problem has two approaches.
The first tends to be highly parametric and involves
assumptions about the distribution of the returns to
neighborhood. Luckily a large literature exists on this
topic, stemming from Heckman’s work in the 1970s,
and well-worked-out techniques are available for
dealing with this problem parametrically. However,
while the robustness of the neighborhood results to
Heckman-type corrections would be an extremely
pleasant thing to see, I am not sure that skeptical
readers would be completely convinced by this type of
approach.
A second approach to this topic examines
whether the returns to neighborhood location differ
much, using observable characteristics. This type of
test is readily performable and amounts to looking at
the cross-effects between individual and neighbor-
hood characteristics. These cross-effects are in fact
intrh~sically interesting, as well as useful in providing
evidence about the extent to which returns to neigh-
borhood differ over varying types of people. Of
course, it is worthwhile remembering that even if little
difference is found in the returns to neighborhood
variables by observables, significant differences still
might exist in the returns to neighborhood by unob-
servables.
Case Three--Endogenous Average Returns
In this case, O(Z) = 0(Z), Oi = 0, and c~i = 0. Here
the returns to different neighborhoods are the function
of market forces, and in equilibrium the same people
will be indifferent between neighborhoods; that is, the
distributions of populations will select to the point
where individuals are indifferent between different
neighborhoods. In part, this issue is the most easily
resolved by O’Regan and Quigley’s argument that
parents select on the basis of their own needs, not the
needs of their children. If they are right, then parents
will be indifferent but children need not be, and
identification still makes sense. In this case, it is
enough that location be exogenous, and we are not
concerned about the correlation of location with un-
observables.
While the argument that they use is both techni-
cally correct and quite possibly true, the authors could
take this issue much more seriously. It would help to
show the factors that parents select on and try and
predict what determines the parent’s choice of loca-
tion, and to show that it has little to do with variables
that affect children’s outcomes. More generally, to the
extent that the authors are able to indicate compensat-
ing differentials in other areas--high housing costs in
the areas where children benefit most--it will be more
plausible to believe that the equilibrium does not rely
completely on children being indifferent. Indeed, in
some ways this problem is the least troublesome,
because it does not involve any estimation bias. In-
stead, what is involved here is the question of why we
would expect to find neighborhood effects, if the
ability to migrate between neighborhoods exists.
Much of the answer assuredly lies in the nature of the
equilibrium and of the forces that equilibrate the
system.
These three problems with intra-urban data are
potentially quite serious. I have presented them sepa-
rately, but further problems arise if all three problems
occur at once. However, approaches to these problems
can be developed and O’Regan and Quigley have
made invaluable steps forward, both by formalizing
some of their responses to these criticisms and by
using such a rich, strong data source.
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T
he notion tliat the employment and earnings of blacks might be
adversely affected by housing discrimination that limits their
residential choices, and by employer decisions to locate away from
black neighborhoods, has long been embodied in the "spatial mismatch
hypothesis." This hypothesis has been heavily debated over the past 25 to
30 years, and the most recent evidence seems to support the hypothesis.
These results also suggest that the negative effects of spatial factors on
black employment may have grown more serious over thne, as more and
more employers relocate away from central city areas where low-income
minorities continue to be concentrated.~
Still, important questions remain about the magnitude and nature
of these spatial effects. For instance, what are the specific mechanisms
or processes that lhnit black access to employment in suburban areas? To
what extent is it because blacks frequently lack low-cost and direct
transportation to many suburban employers, especially when they do not
own their own cars? Do they lack information about these jobs, especially
by not having access to informal networks that frequently link workers
and jobs? Or are there other factors at work here as well (for example,
perceptions of hiring discrimination or local hostility)?2
A better understanding of the underlying mechanisms through
which spatial factors operate is a precondition for developing appropriate
policy responses to the mismatch problem. For instance, many urban
areas have developed public transit lines to specifically aid "reverse
commuters" who are traveling from central city residences to suburban
job sites; but these are likely to be ineffective if firms’ proximity to public
transit has little effect on their likelihood of hiring blacks.
A variety of other "job mobility" strategies, emphasizing more
flexible types of transportation (such as van pools) and job placement
services, also are based on the notion that transportation and hfformation
are the key barriers to suburban employment for inner-city residents.
Alternatively, proponents of "residential mobility" (through improvedenforcement of antidiscrimination statutes in housing,
rental housh~g vouchers for inner-city low-income
residents, and the like) often argue that these other
methods are likely to be insufficient, and that elimi-
nath~g barriers to mh~ority residential locations in
suburban areas must be the top priority.3
More generally, all of these approaches assume
that si~atial factors per se are major h~dependent de-
terminants of black employment and earnh~gs. But a
variety of other barriers on the demand side of the labor
market seem to limit black employment prospects as
well, such as the demand among employers for skilled
labor and discrhnination agah~st black applicants. The
first of these factors clearly seems to be growing more
serious over time, thereby reducing the relative earn-
ings and employment of blacks and of the less-edu-
cated more generally as overall labor market h~equal-
ity grows.4
Thus, it is possible that improvh~g the access of
~ The strongest recent evidence in favor of "spatial mismatch"
has been provided by Iltlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1990, 1991), while
Kasarda (1995) presents data on employer relocations away from
central-city areas and the declining employment rates of less-
educated blacks in these areas over time. For various reviews of tliis
literature see Holzer (1991), Jencks and. Mayer (1989), and Kain
(1992). Spatial factors can also affect black employment and earnings
more indirectly, tltrough "neighborhood" effects that limit the
acquisition over time of human capital and social contacts among
blacks; see, for instance, O’Regan and Quigley (1996). The more
general notion that segregation adversely affects black economic
outcomes (for either of the above reasons) is forcefully argued in
Massey and Denton (1992) and is supported recently in Cutler and
Glaeser (1995). Clear evidence of housing market discrimination
against blacks has also been fotmd in a variety of studies--for
example, Turner (1992) and Yinger (1995).
2 Holzer, Ililanfeldt, and Sjoquist (1994) provide evidence that
black workers experience higher travel costs than whites, at least
partly because of lower automobile usage; but this factor does not
appear to account fully for spatial effects on black employment
rates. For evidence on disadvantages for blacks in gaining employ-
ment through informal networks see Holzer (1987).
B See Hughes and Sternberg (1992) for arguments in favor of
providing "job mobility" through transportation and job placement
services. They describe a variety of these programs at the local level,
though none has ever been formally evaluated. Kain (1992) is more
skeptical about traditional public transit and newer placement
approaclies, and instead argues forcefully for "residential mobility"
approaches. For evidence that the latter approach can successfully
increase the earnings or employment of inner-city minorities see
Rosenbaum and Popkin (1991) on the Gautreaux.housing program
in Chicago.
~ The recent deterioration in the earnings and employment of
blacks is analyzed by Bound and Freeman (1992); Moss and Tilly
(1992) and Holzer (1994) review the recent evidence on demand-
side barriers facing blacks. The argument that blacks have been
particularly disadvantaged by growing employer demand for skills
has been made by Julm, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) but is somewhat
disputed by Card and Lemieux (1994); and evidence of hiring
discrimination against blacks can most clearly be found in the audit
studies reviewed in Fix and Struyk (1994).
central city black workers to suburban employers
might do little to improve their employment and
earnings, if they continue to face these additional
barriers to employment. This would especially be
the case if the employers who are the least accessible
to central city blacks (for spatial reasons) also have
relatively high skill demands or relatively strong
preferences for whites (or for other nonblack minori-
ties).5 Yet, few studies of spatial effects have taken
account of these other demand-side factors in the
labor market.
The negative effects of spatial
factors on black employment may
have grown more serious over
time, as more employers relocate
azoay ~’om central city areas.
This study uses data from a new survey of over
3,000 employers in four large metropolitan areas to
analyze the determinants of black employment and
wages at the firm level. We focus specifically on two
factors likely to influence the spatial distribution of
black employment: the proximity of firms to the
residential locations of various racial groups and the
proximity of firms to public transit.
By ush~g firm-level data, we can control for many
of the demand-side barriers that allegedly limit the
employment of blacks. These include the skill require-
ments of new jobs and the racial preferences of em-
ployers. As is generally the case, we do not have a
direct measure of preferences, but we should be able
to capture mucli of this effect through an extensive set
of proxy variables: the racial composition of the firms’
customers; the race of the person responsible for
hiring; the use of Affirmative Action in hiring; and the
size of the establishment.6
s The claim that suburban employment of blacks is limited by
"race, not space" (Ellwood 1986) becomes more valid if employer
locational decisions are driven at least partly by their racial prefer-
ences, so that those who locate farthest away from blacks do so
specifically to avoid hiring them; see, for instance, Mieszkowski and
Mills (1992).
~ The effects of customers’ racial composition on discrimination
by employers was first suggested by Becker (1971). Empirical
evidence to date has been limited, though some has been found by
Nardinelli and Simon (1990), Ihlanfeldt and Young (1996) and
Carrington and Troske (1995). The best known studies of Affirma-
66 May/June 1996 New England Economic ReviewIn the next section we describe the survey of
employers that generated these data and some of the
emph’ical evidence we will present. The evidence itself
is described in the follo~ving section, and then we
conclude with a summary of our findings and theh"
implications for public policy.
I. Data and Estimation Issues
The survey from which the data in this paper are
drawn was admhfistered to 800 employers in each of
four metropolitan areas: Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and
Los Angeles.7 The survey was administered between
June 1992 and May 1994.
Interviews were done over the phone with "the
individual responsible for hiring" at the establishment
and averaged roughly 35 minutes in length. Questions
focused on overall employer and employee character-
istics (for example, establishment size, presence of
collective bargai~ing, recent hiring and turnover be-
havior, and composition of current employees by race
and gender); the numbers and characteristics of all
currently vacant jobs; and the characteristics of the
most recently filled job in the establishment and of
the worker hired into that job.
The sample of firms was drawn from two sources:
1) a random sample of firms and their phone numbers
provided by Survey Sampling Inc. (SSI), stratified by
establishment size; and 2) the employers of respon-
dents in the household surveys that were also admin-
istered in each of these four metropolitan areas.~ The
SSI samples were drawn across establishment size
categories so as to reproduce the distribution of em-
ployment across these categories in the work force; the
household-generated sample implicitly weights firms
in the same way.9 No additional size-weighting of
tive Action effects on minority employment are summarized in
Leonard (1990). Firm-size effects on the l~ring of blacks might occur
because large firms use more formal human resource activities or
because they feel more susceptible to legal pressnre or bad public-
ity; and such effects have been found in Carrington, McC, ue, and
Pierce (1995). See also Holzer (1995, 1996a, 1996b) for more evidence
on these factors using these employer data.
7 The survey is part of a broader project known as the Multi-
City Study of Urban Inequality, which consists of liousebold sur-
veys and an in-depth, qualitative study of a small sample of
employers in each of these four metropolitan areas. The overall
project has been financed by the Ford and Russell Sage Foundations.
s Roughly 1,000 fhms were generated from the household
surveys, while the rest were generated from SSI.
9 SSI firms were questioned about the most recent job that they
had filled that did not require a college degree, whereas the
household-generated firms were asked about the same occupations
as were held by household respondents. Sample weights were
observatious is therefore necessary when analyzing
the data; and the sample of recently filled jobs at these
firms should reasonably represent the universe of new
jobs that are currently available to jobseekers.~°
The overall response rate for the survey was
roughly 67 percent among firms that were successfl_flly
screened. This response rate compares favorably with
other recent surveys of employers that have been
administered over the phone.1~ In addition, because
we have some measured characteristics (for example,
establishment size, industry, and location) of firms in
the SSI sample that did not complete the survey, we
could check for differences in response rates across
these observable categories that might indicate sample
selection bias. Few significant differences were found
in response rates across the categories measured by
these variables.12
As a further check on the representativeness of
the smnple, we performed comparisons of the industries
m~d sizes of finns in otu" sample with those in Counhj
Business Patterns and with Census data on occupations
for the relevant ~eas. These comparisons also indicated
that our sampling procedures generated representative
samples of firms and jobs in these areas.~3
In this study we analyze the effects of various firm
characteristics on the tendency to hire blacks and pay
them a certain wage. Ottr data contain two variables
for black employment at the firm: the percentage of
non-college employees at the firm who are black, and
whether or not the last worker hired is black. These
are the primary dependent variables in our analysis.14
constructed to correct for the m~dersampling of college jobs in the
SSI sample, as xvell as for other sources of nonrandomness in the
sample of households that generated employers.
~o Establisbments tbat do a lot of hiring will be heavily repre-
sented in this sample of new hires if they are large, but not if their
hiring rates are driven by high turnover or net new emplo~qnent
growth. The lack of extra weigbt for high tttrnover firms seems
appropriate, given that the stock of jobs they represeut at any point
in time may not be large.
~ See, for instance, Kling (1995) for data on surveys recently
administered to employers.
~2 For more information on these tests for selection on observ-
ables see Holzer (1996b).
~B Holzer (1996b). Comparisons of the occupational, educa-
tional, and race distributions between the last filled jobs and
e~hployees overall at these firms also indicated relatively small
differences between "marginal" and "average" employees, and
little effect of any overrepresentation of high-turnover jobs within
the firms.
~4 The equations we estimate are in the spirit of Kain (1968),
Leonard (1987), and others wbo analyzed the effect of location on
where people are employed rather than xvhether they are employed.
These equations attempt to measure the effects of employer location
on the supply of black labor to firms and implicitly on the demand for
labor faced by black workers. The effects of demand shifts associ-
ated with employer locations on the employment and wages of
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the flow of black applicants to a firm (rather than the
tendency of fh’ms to hire from the pool of black
applicants), equations were also esthnated in which
the dependent variable is the fraction of a firm’s
applicants who are black. Evidence is therefore pro-
vided on the extent to which locational variables
influence black employment through their effects on
the race of applicants. We also estimated equations
in which the dependent variable is the log of hourly
wages for the last worker hired, to see whether
location affects earnings as well as employment.
The primary independent variables of interest are
the distance of the firm from the closest public transit
stop (asked of respondents in the survey and then
recoded as a series of dummy variables) and the firm’s
average distance from the black, white, or Hispanic
populations h~ the Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA).~ To compute the latter variable, we fh’st had
to "geocode" ore" firms--that is, match each one to a
census tract on the basis of its address.16 We then
computed weighted averages of the distances from
the centroid of the firm’s own census tract to each
other census tract in the relevant metropolitan area,
weighted by the fraction of each group’s local popu-
lation that resides in each of these tracts. The dummy
variable that defines each firm’s location in either the
central city or the suburbs is also defined on the basis
of its census tract.~7
Additional control variables are primarily de-
signed to capture other effects on firms’ demand for
black labor that operate through their need for skills
and their racial preferences. The former are measured
only for the most recently filled job. They include
dummy variables for hiring requirements into that
job--whether firms required the applicants to have
college or high school diplomas, general or specific
experience, references, and previous trainingl8--and
dummies for whether each of a set of tasks is per-
formed on a daily basis--direct customer contact,
blacks then depend on the relevant elasticities of labor supply and
demand, the presence of wage rigidities in the relevant markets, and
so on; see Freeman (1977).
~s The question on proximity to public transit did not differen-
tiate across different modes of transit, such as subway versus bus.
16 In each MSA, 80 to 90 percent of the firms were successfully
geocoded. The program MAPINFO was used in tlffs procedure.
~7 "Central cit}~’ here refers only to the prhnary central city in
each metro area: the cities of Atlanta, Boston, and so on. The Census
Bureau de~es other cities as "central cities" within each area
(based on the ratios of jobs to residents, size, and the like) but we
include these other municipalities in our "suburban" category.
~s The variables for hiring requirements take on a value of
"one" if they are "absolutely necessary" or "strongly preferred."
reading or writing paragraphs, arithmetic calcula-
tions, and computer use.19
As noted above, the endogeneity of employer
location with respect to desired racial employment
may cause us to incorrectly attribute effects of em-
ployer preferences to location.R° We therefore try to
control for these preferences through a variety of
measures; namely, the percentages of the customers
who are members~bf each racial group, dummies for
the race of the respondent to the survey (since the
respondent is generally the person responsible for
new l~iring at the firm), establishment size (measured
as a series of dummy variables), use of Affirmative
Action in eitlier recruitment or hiring,~ and controls
for 1-digit industry and collective bargaining at the
establishment.2R
H. Estimation Results
Table 1 presents stunmary data on employment
outcomes by race and on a variety of their determi-
nants. All means are sample-weighted. Part A of
the table gives these measures for the overall sample
and separately for central city and suburban firms,
using the pooled sample of MSAs. Part B presents the
data separately by MSA, broken down by central city
versus suburban location.
Results of Summary Measures
The results show that blacks account for roughly
27 percent of the applicants in these firms, 20 percent
~9 For more evidence on the effects of these skill measures on
employment and wage differences across race/gender groups, see
Holzer (1995).
~0 While a number of studies have dealt with the endogeneity
of household location (Hughes and Madden 1991; Cutler and
Glaeser 1995), none have explicitly treated the possible endogeneity
of employer location.
~The Affirmative Action variable is self-reported, and not
based on federal contractor status, as was the case in Leonard (1990).
Though it may be measured with some error, tiffs variable should
also capture ~’ms who engage in Affirmative Action for voluntary
reasons or because of state/local regulations.
=2 In Holzer (1996b), we analyze a much wider range of survey
questions on employer hiring procedures (for example, the use of
tests, interviews, and reference checks) and attitudes towards vai’i-
ous types of applicants (for example, welfare recipients or those
with criminal records). We limit ourselves here to the set of skill and
racial preference variables that had the most explanatory power in
that analysis and are most directly related to the issues of concern
here. We have also included occupational dummies in many of our
estimated equations, which reduce the estin~ated effects of hiring
requirements on racial outcomes but have little effect on the
estimated effects of location.
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Means (Standard Deviations) of Key Variables Related to Employment Outcomes
Total Sample Central City Suburbs
A: Pooled Sample Across Metro Areas
Outcome Variables
Last hired is black                             15.7 (39.4) 23.4 (43.3) 15.3 (40.0)
Percent workers black 19.5 (25.0) 27.1 (30.0) 14.3 (22.6)
Percent applicants black 26.8 (32.3) 34.8 (34.1) 24.6 (31.5)
Log hourly wage
Black 2.02 (.39) 2.07 (.37) 2.00 (.41)
White 2.28 (.58) 2.42 (.56) 2.25 (.59)
Distance and Transit Measures
Mean distance (miles) to:
Whites 22.4 (5.8) 19.8 (2.7) 23.4 (6.5)
Blacks 17.6 (8.2) 12.7 (5.0) 19.4 (8.4)
Hispanics 20.5 (7.7) 16.5 (4.5) 22.1 (8.1)
Distance blacWDistance white .76 (.20) .62 (.16) .81 (.18)
Distance blacWDistance Hispanic .86 (.25) .77 (.20) .89 (.26)
Transit distance (miles):
0 33.5 (51.1) 46.0 (50.9) 33.8 (52.5)
.01 to .25 23.4 (45.8) 37,5 (49.0) 19.3 (43.8)
.26 to .50 6.2 (26.2) 6.2 (24.7) 7.2 (28.6)
.51 to 1.00 6.2 (26.2) 3.6 (18.9) 7.3 (28.8)
Greater than 1.00 22.7 (45.3) 6.6 (25.4) 32.5 (52.0)
Distance to CBD center (miles) 14.2 (9.5) 6.6 (6.1) 17.7 (8.7)
Racial Measures
Percent customers:
Black 12.6 (19.8) 23.1 (23.8) 16.5 (20.4)
Hispanic 13.5 (21.5) 17.8 (25.0) 11.4 (19.2)
Respondent’s race:
Black 5,8 (25.3) 10.9 (31.8) 3.7 {21.1)
Hispanic 3.6 (21.1) 6.4 (24.9) 3.2 (19.5)
A~rmative Action used 61.8 (52.7) 67.6 (47.6) 58.3 (54.7)
62.7 (49.2) 70.1 (50.8)
59.7 (50.0) 55.3 (55.1)
73.0 (45.0) 72.7 (49.4)
68.3 (47.4) 67.7 (51.9)
21.8 (42.0) 24.7 (47.8)
79.0 (41.4) 77.0 (46.6)
75.2 (43.9) 69.2 (51.2)
72.2 (45.6) 61.8 (53.9)
76.3 (43.3) 75.5 (47.7)
45.2 (50.6) 40.2 (54.3)
15.1 (36.5) 21.0 (45.3)
55.0 (50.7) 46.9 (55.5)
Skills
Math performed dally 67.7 (50.8)
Computer performed daily 56.4 (53.8)
Talk to customers daily 72.9 (48.2)
Read/Write daily 68.4 (50.4)
Requirements for hiring
College diploma 24.6 (46.6)
High school diploma 78.4 (44.6)
General experience 70.0 (49.7)
Specific experience 64,2 (57.0)
Reference 75.9 (46.4)




of the non-college employees, and somewhat smaller
percentages of new hires. Unadjusted hottrly wages
are roughly 25 percent less for blacks than whites,
even though these are starting wages and therefore
do not reflect racial differences in job tenure or wage
growth over time.
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Means (Standard Deviations) of Key Variables Related to Employment Outcomes
Atlanta Detroit Boston Los Angeles
City Suburbs City Suburbs City Suburbs City Suburbs
B: By Metropolitan Area
Outcome Variables
Last hired is black               38,0 26.9 45.0 18.5 15.4 4.9 9.4 9.7
Percent workers black 43.9 26.2 44.3 14,2 22.6 5.6 13,2 9,5
Percent applicants black 52.6 35,1 52,1 27.5 33.4 11.7 17.1 24.4
Log hourly wage
Black 2.00 1.99 2.07 1.90 2.17 2.06 2.20 2.25
White 2,35 2.20 2.37 2.11 2.29 2.39 2,66 2,39
Distance and Transit Variables
Mean distance (miles) to:
White 20.9 25.5 18.9 20.5 17.1 23.7 20.6 23,9
Blacks 13.6 27.5 9.5 17.4 7.6 19.5 15,4 17.9
Hispanics 15.5 21.5 19.7 26.3 13.5 21.0 17.4 18.6
Distance blacWDistance white ,65 .88 .50 .83 .45 .78 .73 .73
Distance blacWDistance Hispanic .89 1.07 .48 .65 .57 .91 ,88 ,96
Transit distance (miles):
0 41.7 24.8 53.4 28.0 59.6 38.2 40.3 47,4
.01 to .25 37.5 13.1 27.0 23.5 27.5 12.2 45,7 35.7
.26 to ,50 5.3 3.5 8.9 12.9 3.3 5.8 7.3 7.8
.51 to 1.00 2.8 3.7 .2 11.1 7,7 8.0 3.4 6.9
Greater than 1.00 12.7 54.8 10.4 24.4 1,9 35,7 3,3 2.2
Distance to CBD center (miles) 4,1 18,2 5.2 19.9 4.7 16.6 10.2 15.2
Racial Measures
Percent customers:
Black 31.8 23.5 39.4 17.6 21,7 11.3 14.1 12.6
Hispanic 5,1 6.0 5.6 3,8 12.3 8.7 31,1 31,5
Respondent’s race:
Black 16.1 6.5 24.6 2.0 4.9 .8 5,3 7.0
Hispanic 1.8 1.4 1.4 2.2 5,5 1.0 11.3 11,0
Affirmative Action used 67.9 57.9 64.0 54.2 70.2 57.9 67.5 65,4
Perhaps surprisingly, the data indicate that firms
on average are located closer to the black residential
poptLlation than to Hispanics or whites, and they are
closer to Hispanics than to whites. This likely reflects
the greater proximity of minority residences to the
central business districts of these areas and the rela-
tively greater concentrations of white residences in
outlying suburban areas. It does not ne£.essarily imply
that distances to employment are less of a problem for
blacks than for whites, since the cost per mile traveled
to work appears to be sig~tificantly higher among
employed blacks than among whites.23 Indeed, the
23 The results of Holzer, Ihlanfeldt, and Sjoqtdst (1994) show
that the time spent per mile of travel is roughly 50 percent higher for
blacks than for whites. The observed racial differences in average
distribution of white residences likely reflects their
choices (between con-~l~ute times and housing costs)
to a much greater degree than the residences of blacks,
whose choices appear to be constrained by housing
market discrhnination.
A number of differences between firms located in
central city versus those in suburban areas are appar-
ent. Those located in central cities are more likely to
have black employees and applicants, and they pay
travel times may well understate true racial differences, since they
are based on employed workers and the distances traveled to jobs
that they have chosen. Blacks who are not employed because of
spatial reasons, such as long-distance jobs that they do not choose to
apply for, would likely exacerbate racial differences in travel costs if
they were included in these calculations.
70 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewmore to both groups of employees but especially to
whites.24
Central city firms are closer to the populations of
all groups, but they are especially close to blacks--in
other words, they are relaliz)ely as well as absolutely
doser to blacks. They are also closer to public transit,
with over 80 percent witlKn a quarter nfile of a public
ffansit stop (the co~Tesponding percentage for suburban
firms is 53 percent). The relatively higher fractions of
black applicants at these establislnnents is therefore not
sttrprising.
Firms located in central cities
are more likely to have black
employees and applicants, and
they pay more to both groups of
employees but especially to whites.
The data also suggest that central city employers
have stronger preferences for black applicants than do
suburban employers. This is seen in the higher per-
centages of central city firms that use Affirmative
Action in hiring and the higher percentages of black
customers and survey respondents at these firms.
Some confirmation of the expectation of greater pref-
erences for black applicants in central city firms is
provided by the fact that the ratios of black employees
or new hires to black applicants are higher in central
cities than suburban areas2s
Finally, we note the relatively high average skill
needs and hiring requirements of firms in newly filled
jobs. Only one-fourth of the recently filled jobs at these
firms require college diplomas; yet over two-thirds of
the jobs require daily use of arithmetic and reading/
~4 The relatively higher compensation among whites for cenh’al
city employment is consistent with their relatively longer commutes
to these jobs (since on average they live farther away) and with
greater compensation for commute times among whites than blacks
(Holzer, Ihlandfeldt, and Sjoquist 1994; Z~x 1991). Of course, these
comparisons do not control for any differences in the relative
characteristics of workers and jobs in the central cities and suburbs
between whites and blacks.
2~ See Holzer (1996a, 1996b) for more evidence and discussion
of this last finding. Although it is at least theoretically possible that
racial differences in applicant or job quality account for this, it does
not appear to be the case empirically-- as we note below, required
skills are generally higher in central-city jobs than suburban ones,
and the average educationa! attai~m3ent of blacks in tlie central cities
is relatively lower than in the suburbs.
writing of paragraph-length material, and well over
half require use of computers. Experience (both gen-
eral and specific) and references are each required at
the time of hiring in roughly two-thirds of these firms,
while previous trah~ing is required at over 40 percent.
In general, skill requirements are somewhat higher in
central city jobs than in snburban jobs;26 and manu-
facturing firms now are more likely to be located in the
suburbs, while services are more heavily concentrated
in the central cities.
Part B of Table 1 indicates the variance across the
four metropolitan areas in racial outcomes and in their
determinants27 The percentages of blacks among
employees, applicants, and customers are higher in
Atlanta and Detroit than in Boston and Los Angeles,
reflecting their fractions of the residential populations
in the former areas. The percentage-point gap between
blad< representation in central-city and suburbm~ firms is
highest h~ Detroit, apparently reflecting a relatively high
degree of residential segregation (Frey and Farley 1993).
Mass transit is relatively more available in some places
(for example, Boston) than others, while central city/
subtu’ban gaps in Los Angeles ~e generally smaller than
else~vhere h~ virtually eveW measure.
The strong parallels across MSAs between racial
populations and employment patterns in central cities
and suburbs suggest that housing market discrhnina-
tion and segregation do indeed have consequences, at
least for where blacks and whites work in metropolitan
areas, if not for whether they work or at what wage.
These restflts also suggest a need to disaggregate our
analysis by MSA at least some of the time, to allow for
potentially different effects of location, transit, and
racial variables across these areas.
Equations Explaining the Percentage of
Blacks among Employees and Applicants
Table 2 presents the results of estimated equa-
tions explaining the percentage of non-college em-
ployees at each firm who are black. The independent
variables include a set of dun-uny variables for prox-
imity (in miles) of the firm to a public transit stop and
for the firm’s distance from the black population in
:i{s MSA divided by its distance from the white popu-
26 The skills gap in central city versus suburban firms is clearer
when the sample is limited to jobs that do not require college
degrees, since this particular requirement is higher h~ the suburbs
and is correlated with all other task and hiring requirements listed.
2~ Since the skill needs and hiring requirements of employers
displayed little variation across these metropolitan areas, we did not
list these variables in part B of the table.
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Percent of Non-College Employees Who Are Black:
Estimation Results
Estimation Technique:        OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
Equation: 1 1 2 2 3 3
Transit distance (miles):
0 .052 .074 .045 ,067 .024 ,036
(.012) (.017) (.012) (.017) (.012) (.017)
.01 to .25 ,051 .067 .041 .057 .028 .039
(.013) (.018) (.013) (.018) (,013) (,019)
,26to .50 .040 .037 .035 .031 .008 -.012
(.017) (,025) (,017) (.025) (,017) (.025)
.51 to 1.00 .011 .006 .009 .003 .010 ,009
(.019) (.028) (.019) (.027) (.018) (.026)
Distance blacldDIstance white -.283 -.389 -.224 -.328 -.095 -.155
(.025) (,035) (.027) (.038) (.028) (.039)
Percent customers black .473 ,580 .465 .572 .224 .269
(multiplied by 100) (.025) (.033) (.025) (.033) (.026) (.034)
Black respondent .190 .203 .186 .199 .146 .149
(.017) (.022) (.017) (,021) (.016) (.020)
Central City .058 ,056 .058 .053
(.011) (,015) (.011) (.015)
Percent applicants black ,004 .005
(.000) (.000)
Observations 2186 2186 2186 2186 1682 1682
R2 ,499 .496 .644
Log Likelihood -484 -477 - 179
Standard errors In parentheses. All equations include dummies for Industry establishment size
whether Affirmative Action is used n recru I ng or h ring, and metropolitan area. Also included are
the percentage of non-professlonaVmanagerial employees covered by collective bargaining and a
constant term.
lation.28 A wide range of additional variables are
included to control for other potential determinants
of the employer’s relative demand for black labor.
These include the variables listed in Table I and sets of
dummies for metropolitan area, establishment size,
industry, and the percentage of employees covered by
collective bargai~ing.29
28 We use the ratio of distances to blacks and whites since the
two separate measures are highly correlated (a~.ove 0.80) across
firms. Including the two measures separately in estimated equations
generated coefficients on each that were never significantly different
from each other in absolute value. Using the arithmetic difference in
distances to blacks and whites rather than the ratio generated
virtually the same results, as the correlation between these two
measures is roughly 0.96. Relative distance to the Hispanic popula-
tion is not included here, given its high correlation with distance to
the white population (above 0.9). However, it is used in separate
equations for Los Angeles that are reported below. 29 Also estimated were equations that included the distance
Tlu’ee specifications are pre-
sented in Table 2: one includes the
variables described above; the sec-
ond adds a dummy variable for the
presence of the firm in the central
city; and the third adds a variable
for the percent of blacks among
applicants to tlie fh’m. All of these
specifications are esthnated using
both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
and Tobit.3°
The restflts show that the em-
ployer’s proximity to both public
transit and the black residential
population affects the likelihood of
hiring black employees. Being
within a quarter mile of a transit
stop (relative to being more than a
mile away) raises the probability of
hiring blacks by 5 to 7 percentage
points, and being within a quarter
to one-half mile raises the probabil-
ity by a smaller amount. A firm’s
being 10 percent closer in distance
to blacks relative to whites (or
roughly 2.2 miles closer to blacks)
raises the probability of hiring
them by about 3 to 4 percentage
points.
Controlling for the percentage
of blacks among applicants reduces
the coefficients on the transit and
poptflation measures by 50 to 60
percent. Since it is primarily
tlirougli the racial composition of
applicants to firms that we expect spatial factors to
affect the employment of blacks, these results suggest
that a large fraction of the estimated effects of prox-
imity to public transit and to blacks reflects these
spatial factors per se, rather than unobserved racial
preferences of employers. This point is also observed
in Table 3, where estimated equations are directly
comparable to those listed in tlie first four columns of
Table R, except that the dependent variable is now the
fraction of blacks among applicants rather tlian em-
from the firm to the center of the city’s Central Business District.
This variable was found to have no significant effect on the racial
composition of employment and had virtually no effect on the
estimated effects reported in Tables 2 through 4.
3o The percentage of firms with no blacks among their employ-
ees is rouglfly 30 percent, while the fraction with only blacks is
mnch smaller (roughly 5 percent).
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Percent of Job Applicants Who Are Black:
Esti~nation Results
Estimation Technique:           OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
Equation: 1 1 2 2
Transit distance (miles):
0 .103 .127 .101 .126
(.018) (.021) (.018) (.021)
.01 to .25 .080 .098 .078 .096
(.020) (.023) (.020) (.023)
.26 to .50                 .053 .073 ,051 .072
(.026) (.030) (.026) (.030)
.51 to !.00 .018 .029 .017 .028
(.028) (,032) (.028) (.032)
Distance blacWDistance white -.308 -.348 -.294 -,339
(.037) (.042) (.040) (.047)
Percent customers black .590 .639 ,589 .638
(multiplied by 100) (.035) (.040) (.035) (.040)
Black respondent °096 .097 .095 .097
(.024) (,027) (.024) (.027)
Central City .014 .008
(.016) (.018)
Observations 1682 1682 1682 1682
R2 .445 .445
Log Likelihood -441
likely to be hired by establishments with
larger numbers of employees.32
As noted above, all of these findings
likely reflect the racial preferences of
employers vis-a-vis applicants, affecting
employment results independently of lo-
cation per se. The importance of control-
ling for these factors when analyzing
spatial effects is thereby confirmed.B3
Standard errors in parentheses. All equations include dummies for industnj, establishment
size, whether A~rmative Action is used in recruiting or hidng, and metropolitan area, Also
included are the percentage of non-professional/managerial employees covered hy
collective bargaining and a constant term.
ployees. The coefficients on relative distance in Table 3
are comparable or larger than those in Table 2, while
those for proximity to h’ansit are substantially larger
than (or roughly double) those in Table 2.3~
On the other hand, a variety of other measures in
Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the racial preferences of
employers also affect their tendencies to hire blacks. In
particular, firms with black respondents to the survey
and firms with more black customers are more likely
to hire black employees. In addition, results not re-
ported in these tables suggest that blacks are more
3~ To the extent that the applicants select employers partly on
the basis of expected likelihood of being hired, the racial composi-
tion of applicants is endogenous, and therefore may be capturing
employer preferences to some extent. But the fact that various
measures of employer preference affect hiring in Table 2 even after
controlling for the racial composition of applicants suggests that this
self-selection process is limited and does not fully offset the effects of
these preferences on outcomes.
Equatio~zs Estimating the Probability
That tl~e Last Hire Is Black
Results from estimating the proba-
bility that the last employee hired by the
firm is black are presented in Tables 4
through 7. The specifications of these
equations are comparable to those pre-
sented in Tables 2 and 3, with the central
city dummy first omitted and then in-
cluded. All of the firm-specific indepen-
dent variables from those tables (except
for the fraction of applicants who are
black) are included; several more job-
specific measures are nov,, added as
-441 well, measuring daily task-performance,
idring requirements, and recruitment
methods used in filling this job.34 The
equations are estimated using a linear
probability model, with standard errors
corrected for heteroskedasticity.
Table 4 presents results for equa-
tions pooled across the four metropoli-
tan areas, with separate estimates for the
entire sample, non-college jobs, and jobs filled by
employees with high school degrees or less. But given
the very different sizes, locational patterns, and racial
compositions of the four metropolitan areas, separate
esthnates for the high school or less sample in each of the
32 The smallest establishment size category (firms with 1 to 20
employees) had 10 to 20 percentage points fewer black employees
than the largest category (>500). The use of Affirmative Action does
’;not, sig~tificantly raise the coefficient for the fraction of black
employees in our equations, although it does raise the fractions of
employees who are white females and Asians (Holzer 1996a).
33 Ou the other hand,, the relatively liigh correlations between
these variables and our distance and transit measures also suggest
the possibility that we are "overcontrolling’" by fl~cluding them,
since the racial variables may partly capture spatial effects.
a4 The applicant measure is excluded here, since spatial effects
seem to occur at least partly through this measure, and because it is
a firm-wide variable that performs more weakly in this equation for
job-specific employment outcomes.
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The Probability That the Last Worker Hired Is Black:
Estimated Equations for Pooled Sample
Non-College Last Hire Has
Total Sample Jobs High School or Less
Equation: 1 2 1 2 1 2
Transit distance (miles):
0 .081 .077 ,088" :083 .105 .098
(.021) (.021) (,022) (,022) (.029) (,029)
.01 to .25 ,078 ,071 .098 .090 .082 .071
(.023) (,023) (.025) (.025) (.033) (.033)
.26 to ,50 ,052 .047 .061 ,055 .088 .082
(.029) (.029) (.030) (,031) (.041) (.041)
,51 to 1.00 .053 .052 .072 .069 .080 .075
(,032) (.032) (.034) (.034) (.051) (.051)
Distance blacWDistance white -,243 -.195 -,251 -.198 -.354 -.293
(.043) (.045) (,045) (.047) (.061) (.064)
Percent customers black .528 ,522 ,514 ,508 .427 .414
(multiplied by 100) (.049) (.049) (,051) (.051) (.071) (.071)
Black respondent .178 .175 ,184 .180 ,182 .177
(.035) (.035) (.037) (.037) (.053) (.052)
Tasks performed daily:
Math -.063 -,062 -,060 -.058 -.066 -.065
(.017) (,017) (.018) (.018) (.024) (.024)
Computer -,026 -,027 -.032 -,032 -.044 -.044
(,016) (,016) (.017) (,017) (.024) (.024)
Talk to customers .004 .004 -,005 -.006 -.007 -,005
(.019) (.019) (,020) (.020) (.026) (.026)
Read/write -.028 -.028 -,025 -.025 -.027 -.027
(.017) (,017) (.017) (.017) (.023) (.022)
Requirements for hiring:
College diploma -.058 -,058
(.026) (,026)
High school diploma -.008 -.007 -,007 -.006 .013 .015
(.01g) (.019) (,019) (.019) (.025) (.025)
General experience -.004 -.005 -,006 -.009 -.005 -.007
(.018) (.018) (.019) (.019) (.025) (.025)
Specific experience -,019 -.020 -.013 -,015 -.017 -.019
(.018) (,018) (.018) (,018) (.024) (.024)
References -.004 -,004 .008 .008 .024 ,025
(,018) (.019) (,019) (.019) (.024) (.024)
Vocationaltraining -.032 -.032 -.045 -,045 -.050 -.050
(.016) (.016) (.017) (,017) (.023) (,023)
Central City .045 .052 .061
(.019) (.020) (.027)
Observations 2375 2375 2168 2168 1259 1259
R2 .275 .276 .279 .281 .289 .292
Standard errors In parentheses. All equations include dummies for Industry establishment size, whether
Affirmative Action Is used in recru t ng or h dng, and melropolitan area. Also included are the percentage of
non-professional/management employees covered by collective bargaining and a constant term.
fotn" are also presented, h~ Ta-
ble 5.35
The results show that
proximity to transit and prox-
imity to the black residential
population have significant
effects on the probability that
the last hired worker is black.
The magnitudes are compara-
ble to those reported in Table
2, although the transit effects
are somewhat larger (being at
a transit stop raises black em-
ployment by 0.08 relative to
being over a mile away), and
residential proximity effects
are a bit smaller. The effects of
both sets of variables rise
somewhat when the sample
is limited to less-educated
workers or to jobs not requir-
ing a college degree.
As above, the presence of
blacks among customers and
respondents raises the proba-
bility of hiring black workers,
and the effect of a central city
location is substantially re-
duced. In addition, important
effects are found for the vari-
ables measuring skill require-
merits on these jobs. For in-
stance, daily use of aritlm~etic
on the job reduces the Likeli-
hood of hirh~g blacks by 6
percentage points. Daily
reading/writing of para-
graphs and use of computers
also have marginally signifi-
cant negative effects on black
employment, with each re-
ducing such employment by
2 to 3 percentage points. Re-
quirements that individuals
have college diplomas or pre-
vious vocational training also
reduce black employment
by several percentage points
each.
On the other hand, these
skill measures are not highly
correlated with the proximity
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The Probability That the Last Worker Hired Is Black: Estimated Equations for Each Metro
Area, for Sample with High School or Less
Atlanta Detroit Boston Los Angeles
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 Equation:
Transit distance (miles):
0 .097 .086 .173 .180 .018 .019 .122 .119
(.059) (.060) (.068) (.069) (.039) (.038) (.062) (.061)
.01 to .25 .158 .145 .164 .170 .016 .024 .084 .078
(.067) (.069) (.072) (.071) (.061) (.062) (.064) (.063)
.26 to .50                   ,110 .097 .124 .139 -.019 -.019 .174 .171
(.096) (.096) (.085) (.085) (.054) (.053) (,080) (.080)
.51 to 1.00 -.012 -.024 .062 .072 .034 .040 .243 .244
(. 135) (. 135) (. 113) (. 113) (.066) (. 067) (, 103) (. 102)
Distance blacldDistance white -.460 -.397 -.592 -.474 -.092 -.144 -,183 -.186
(.146) (.167) (.129) (.166) (.094) (.116) (.103) (.104)
Distance blacldDistance Hispanic
Percent customers black           .506 .506 .434 .418 .569 .581 .343 .314
(multiplied by 100) (.127) (.126) (.136) (.136) (.133) (.135) (.160) (.158)
Percent customers Hispanic
Black respondent .057 .057 .158 .131 .189 .191 .071 .074
(.0B1) (,080) (.100) 1,104) (.178) (.176) (.103) (.101)
Hispanic respondent
Central City .048 .088 -.048 .044
(.063) (.085) (.069) (.031)
Observations 367 367 273 273 312 312 308 308

























Standard errors in parentheses. Sample restricted to jobs held by workers with a high school education or less, All equations include dummies for industry,
establishment size, whether Affirmative Action is used in recruiting or hidng, work tasks, and hiring requirements. Also included are the percentage of
non-pro~essional/managemant employees coverec~ by colleclive bargaining and a constant term.
of the firm to transit or to the minority population, and
their omission from or h~clusion in these equations
does little to change the results on those effects. Some
question36 also remains as to whether these results
represent the real skill deficiencies of black applicants
or just those suspected or perceived by employers.37
as F-tests consistently reject the eq~lity of coefficients across
the four metropolitan areas at conventional levels of statistical
significance in these equations.
3~ The requirement of specific experience becomes more signif-
icantly negative when general experience is omitted, and especially
in separate estimates for black males. See Holzer (1995).
37 , For ~nstance, statistica! discrimination models (Cain 1986)
would predict that employers’ perceptions of skills across groups
are correct on average, but that misperceptions might occur in
individual cases. Sh~ce some of these skills (such as computer use)
Nevertheless, the skill requirements of jobs must be
considered when analyzing black employment rates at
these firms.
The separate esthnates in Table 5 for each metro-
politan area show relati~ely strong effects of proximity
to transit and to black residences in Atlanta and
have grown much more important in recent years, a period of
learning may be needed, during wldch employers’ expectations
about skill Ievels across groups adjust; the actual skill gaps across
gaoups may themselves adjust over time, as relative improvements
in test scores among blacks seem to suggest (Grissmer et al. 1994).
On the other hand, these results are consistent with those found
by O’Neill (1990), Ferguson (1993), and Neal and Johnson (1994),
who find large effects of gaps in test scores on the relative wages pf
blacks.
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Accounting for Central City/Suburbs Difference in the Probability That the Last Worker
Hired Is Black
Pooled Los Angeles Los Angeles
, Sample Atlanta Detroit Boston without Hispanics with Hispanics
C6ntral City-Suburbs Difference .183 .274 .380 .170 .050 .050
Percentage Explained By:
Transit 12.7 20.6 8.3 5.6 -8.9 -9.9
Distance blacWDistance white 30.9 33.7 36.8 30.0 2.2 -.2
Percent customers black 20.6 17.7 15.9 56.8 22.2 22.2
Black respondent 7.8 1.8 8.4 5.5 -.4 -.5
Percent customers Hispanic -6.6
Hispanic respondent -.3
Distance blacWDistance Hispanic 71.1
especially Detroit, and relatively weak effects in Bos-
ton. The spatial pattern of public tTansit effects in
Atlanta and Detroit is comparable to that observed in
Table 2 with the pooled data: The effects are strongest
for firms within a quarter mile of a transit stop and
then dissipate for those more than one-half mile away.
To some extent, the relatively stronger estimated
effects in some metropolitan areas than others may
just reflect the relative concentrations of blacks in the
populations of these areas; the larger this concentra-
tion, the greater shottld be the magnitude of a given
change ha proximity (to either transit or the black
population) on the probability of employing blacks.33
Alternatively, the differences in estimates across areas
may reflect differences in factors such as the availabil-
ity of public transit or the degree of segregation across
these areas, with Detroit and Atlanta ranking rela-
tively low on the first and high on the second.
In addition to the equations presented above, an
equation was estimated for Los Angeles that included
the firm’s distance to the black population divided by
its distance to Hispanics as well as the ratio of its
distances to blacks and to whites. This specification
was lhnited to the sample of fh’ms ha Los Angeles
because that metropolitan area is the otzly one with
significant variation between the location~ of the white
and Hispanic populations. We also control for the
38 This is true because changes in outcomes are measured in
percentage points rather than percent terms (where the latter decline
as the base grows). The effects of a given change in distance on the
percentage points of black employment at a firm should be larger
when that distance involves a larger change in the number of blacks
located nearby, even though the percent effects might not be larger.
presence of Hispa~zics among customers and among
survey respondents in this equation.
The results suggest that, in Los Angeles, a firm’s
relative distances to blacks and Hispa~zics play a
greater role in determining black employment out-
comes than does its relative distance to blacks and
whites. This suggests greater substitx~tability between
black and Hispanic labor ha this area than between
blacks and whites. A greater presence of Hispanics in
the customer pool also reduces black employment
probabilities, though Hispanic respondents have a
more positive effect than whites on black employment.
To what extent do these explanatory variables
account for gross racial differences in the data, such as
the tendency of central city fh’ms to hire more blacks
than suburban firms? This question is addressed in
Table 6, where decompositions are presented of the
gross central city/suburban differences in black em-
ployment probabilities, based on the estimated coeffi-
cients from equations that include central city dum-
mies reported in Tables 4 and 5.39 In Table 6, results
are presented only for those variables that account for
lnajor fractions of the gross central city/suburban
differences,a°
~9 Decompositions were done nsing an analog of the standard
formula for omitted variable bias (see, for instance, Johnston 1972),
multiplying each coefficient from the relevant equation h~ Table 4 or
5 by the corresponding coefficient from a regression of that variable
on a central city dummy.
~0 The s’kill variables have negligible effects on the central
city/suburban difference, which would be expected from the fact
that some of these are actually higher in the central city (and would
therefore contribute negatively to this differential). Differences h~
76 May/June 1996 Nezo England Economic ReviewThe results show-that the relative distance of the
firm from the black population accounts for over 30
percent of the central-city/suburban racial employ-
ment difference in the pooled equation, while proxim-
ity to transit accotmts for roughly 13 percent. Only in
Los Angeles are these two effects negligible, with the
reJafive distances to blacks and Hispanics accounting
foi’ most of the small central city effect.
The percent of customers who are black also has
an in~portant effect on this differential, in each of the
four metropolitan areas. Also, the presence of a black
respondent in the firm has noteworthy but more
modest effects on the central city differential.41
One final consideration involves the extent to
wkich the estimated effect of relative distance varies
according to the method of recruitment used by the
~irrn.42 Since recruitment methods vary in the extent to
which they rely on local populations as sources of job
applicants, we might expect the effects of local dis-
tance to vary across these methods. Furthermore, the
pattern of variation might tell us something about the
underlying mechanisms through which distance ef-
fects operate.
Table 7 presents the coefficients (and standard
errors) on the relative black/white distance variable,
estimated separately for each recruitment method.4~
The results are presented for the entire sample and for
workers with only a high school education or less.
The resttlts show that relative distance has its
strongest negative effects on black employment when
recrttitment is done through the posting of help-
wanted signs. Similarly, the use of walk-ins results in
strong negative distance effects, especially among the
less-educated. Referrals from current employees and
from other sources are also associated with significant
negative distance effects. Referrals from various insti-
tutions (such as schools, tmions, conuntmity agencies, or
emplo3nnent services) are generally associated with neg-
ative effects of varying magnitudes and sigTtificance
levels fl~at are limited by sample sizes. In contrast, the
effects of distance when recrttiting is done through
newspapers are smaller and relatively h~significant.
industrial composition also contributed just.a few percentage points
to the locational difference in employment.
~ Including the percentage of applicants at the firm who are
black in these equations reduces the extent to which these variables,
including the percentage of blacks among customers, account for
the central city effect, but only by a few percentage points each.
4= The estimated effects of proximity to public transit did not
differ significantly by recruitment method. 4~ The results are based on an equation comparable to no. 2 in
Table 4, except that the relative distance term is now interacted with
each recruitment method.
Table 7
The Effect of Relative Distance to Blacks on
the Probability that the Last Worker Hired
Is Black: By Recruiting Method
Total Sample High School or
Distance Less Distance
Recruiting Method Coefficient Coefficient
Post help-wanted sign - .768 - 1.187
(.208) (.253)
Usted ad in newspaper -.040 -.155
(.082) (.123)
Accepted walk-in -.254 -.526
(.114) (.150)
Referrals from current -.232 -.206
employees (.077) (. 101 )
Referrals from state -.040 -.291
employment service /.293) 1.389)
Referrals from private -.214 -.028
employment service (. 171} (.318)
Referrals from community -.368 -.468
agency (.362) (.484)
Referrals from schools -.055 -.647
(.213) {.321)
Referrals from union .586 .286
(.696) (.837)
Referrals from other sources -.253 -.243
(.102} (.167)
Standard errors in parentheses.
That distance has its most negative effects on
blacks when firms recruit tln’ough walk-h~s o1" signs is
not surprising, since one would expect these methods
to generate mostly applicants who live in close prox-
hnity to the firm. The general association between
referral networks and distance is striking, and seems
to confirm that such networks are at least partly
geographically based.
In contrast, the relatively small esthnated effects
when recruiting is done through newspapers indicate
that when firms choose to use this method in recruit-
ing particular types of employees, they can overcome
the adverse effects of distance by disseminath~g ilffor-
mation over a wide geographic area.44 The role of
44 We note, however, that the choice of newspapers (or any
other recruiting mechanism) may be endogenous with respect to the
skill levels and characteristics of the workers whom the firm seeks
to hire and to the jobs they are trying to fill. Results for any
particular method might therefore not generalize to other types of
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Effect of Relative Distance to Blacks on Log Wage
A: Esti~ated~qu~ii~ns for Pooled Sample
All Workers Black Workers Non-Black Workers
Equation No.
1 .153 (.071) .329 (.147) .118 (.081)
2 .108 (.059) .237 (.125) .085 (.069)
3 ,073 (,060) .152 (. 129) .065 (.069)
4 .084 (.061) .165 (.132) .077 (.069)
Observations 2318 539 1779
B: Estimated Equations for All Workers By Metro Area
Atlanta Detroit Boston Los Angeles
Equation No.
1 .195 (. 118) .448 (,263) .261 (. 124) ,053 (. 155)
2 ,278 (.103) .333 (.213) .086 (. 110) .032 (. 139)
3 .175 (. 105) .262 (.218) .057 (.107) ,013 (. 144)
4 .196 (.109) .290 (.223) .191 (,129) -.052 (.144)
Observations 622 567 548 581
C: Estimated Equations for Black Workers By Metro Area
Atlanta Detroit Boston Los Angeles
Equation No.
1 .599 (.183) .769 (.411) -.325 (.500) -.230 (.489)
2 .392 (.163) .571 (.322) -.447 (.677) .039 (.650)
3 .295 (.170) .500 (.345) -.414 (.796) .346 (.865)
4 .315 (,176) .476 (.350) -.564 (.723) ,664 (.922)
Observations 243 175 55 66





proximity of firm to transit; age, education, gender, and race of worker; distance to center of Central Business District; metro dummies.
variables in Equation 1; job tasks and hiring requirement variables; industry and size of firm; percentage of non-professional/managerial
workers covered by collective bargaining.
variables in Equation 2; percent customers black; whether respondent is black; whether Affirmative Aclion used in hiring and recruiting.
variables in Equation 3; central city dummy.
hfformation as a mechanism through whicb spatial
effects sometimes operate is therefore suggested by
these results.
Results of Wage Equations
If firms that locate relatively far away from the
black population or from public transit= effectively shift
labor demand away from the black labor force, and
if blacks cannot offset the effects of these shifts with
their own residential relocations, then the wage levels
workers or jobs. In this sample, the distance is somewhat more
negative for newspapers when the sample is restricted to less-
educated workers, though it remains statistically insignificant at
conventional levels.
of blacks should be lower. The wages of whites who
work together with blacks (those who are comple-
ments to them in the production process) might be
affected as well.~5
Table 8 presents the results of estimated equa-
tions in which the dependent variable is the log of the
starting hotwly wage for the most recently hired em-
ploy6e. Resnlts are presented for pooled samples across
the metropolitm~ areas and across racial groups, as well
as for all workers and for black workers only h~ each area
separately. Coeffidents are presented only for the rela-
tive distance of the firm to the black popnlation.
,s Tlzis assumes, of course, that wages for these groups are not
rigid, and that labor supply among blacks is not highly elastic.
78 May/June 1996 New England Economic ReviezoFour specifications of each equation are presented
that are sinlilar to those estimated for Tables 4 and 5,
above. Unlike the earlier equations, each contains a set
of control variables for personal characteristics of the
last worker hired, such as age, education, gender, and
race (unless separate estimates are presented for
blacks). All equations also control for the distance to
The employer’s proximity to
both public transit and the
black residential population
affects the likelihood of
hiring black employees.
the center of the Central Business District, in addition
to the variables for transit and relative distance to
blacks. The various firm- and job-specific variables
(such as industry, size, collective bargaining, and the
skill/task reqttirements) are added in the second
equation, and the various other racial variables (for
customers, firm respondent, and use of Affirmative
Action) are added in the third, since these controls
may partly captttre the effects of relative distance.~6
The central city dummy is then added, in the fourth
equation.
The results show that, zohen controlling for the
firm’s distance to the Central Business District, wages for
employees rise with distance of the firm from the
black population..7 Controlling for additional charac-
teristics of firms and jobs, as well as for various racial
factors, reduces the mag~xitudes and significance lev-
els of the estimates (though most remain at least
marginally significant).4a As before, effects of distance
are generally largest in Detroit and (to a lesser extent)
46 If these firm and job characteristics are differentially distrib-
uted by location, and if the resulting differences in relative distances
to the white and black populations are the primary reasons fl~at
these characteristics differ across workers by race, then controlling
for these characteristics would reduce estimated racial differences
that really should be attributed to spatial ~actors. But if these firm
and job characteristics have major effects on who gets hired by race
independent of location, then the controls should be included.
4~ Distance of the firm to the CBD has a strong negative effect
on wages, thereby generating a fairly typical urban wage gradient.
Relative distance to the black population has insignificant effects on
wages in equations that fail to control for distance to the CBD.
4B Distance coefficients in the third and fourth specifications are
only marginally significant for blacks (that is, at the 10 percent level
in a one-tailed test) and not at all for non-blacks in the pooled
Atlanta; they are especially larger for blacks than for
non-black workers in these two areas.
The magnitudes of these effects are not trivial.
Using the smallest and largest coefficients for black
workers in Detroit and Atlanta, we find that a stan-
dard deviation increase in firms’ relative distance
from blacks (while keeping distance from the Central
Business District constant) raises the wages of their
black employees by 5 to 10 percent in Atlanta and by
9 to 14 percent in Detroit.~9
III. Discussion and Policy hnptications
In this study, we have shown that employers’
proximity to black residences and to public transit
both increase the likelihood that they will hire black
employees. It is likely that these effects occur at least
partly because of reduced black access to firms located
farther away, rather than solely because of a tendency
of discrin~inatory employers to locate away from
blacks. We also find that wages are somewhat lower
for those who work relatively close to the black
population. Both of these findings appear consistent
with the notion of spatial mismatch, in which labor
demand shifts away from black areas and labor sup-
ply adjustments among blacks are limited by housing
segregation and other factors.
The fact that employers are, on average, relatively
closer to the black populations than to the white ones
does not hnply that spatial factors play no role in the
employment and earnings disadvantages of blacks.
As we have noted above, the costs per mile of travel
are substantially higher for black workers than for
whites, and the jobs located relatively close to blacks
(that is, those in central cities) have somewhat higher
skill needs. More important, the greater distances for
whites likely reflect their freedom to trade off longer
commute times for better housing, whereas the loca-
tions of blacks are more constrained by housing mar-
ket discrimination. Eliminating these constraints (ei-
ther by reducing discrimination or providing housing
vouchers) might enable at least some blacks to locate
closer to suburban rather than central-city employers.
Furthermore, it would be incorrect to infer from
these results that both blacks and whites merely
sample. Results for Boston and Los Angeles are generally quite
weak, especially for blacks.
~ These ranges represent changes of roughly 0.14 to 0.29
standard deviations of wages for blacks in Atlanta and of 0.21 to
0.33 standard deviations for blacks in Detroit.
Mayffune 199~ New Englat~d Eco~tomic Review 79choose to work relatively close to home, without there
being any adverse effects on their employment out-
comes. Elsewhere, we have shown that the ratios
of vacant jobs to resident unemployed workers are
higher in heavily white suburbs than in central cities
and other areas with heavily black populations, thus
suggesting that relative labor demand is lower near
the residences of blacks (Ihlmffeldt 1995; Holzer 1996b).
The lower wages in areas closer to the residences
of blacks reinforce the view that the labor demand is
lower relative to supply in these areas. If wages in
these areas were lower only for blacks, one might ilffer
that those who work near theh" own communities are
merely forgoing compensation for commute times.
But we have found lower wages near black residences
not only for blacks but for non-blacks as well (though
the latter effects are smaller and less significant than
those for. blacks); and the finding in earlier work of
a relative lack of compensation for COlnmute times
among blacks suggests that this phenomenon ca~mot
explain the lower wages that we find among blacks
working closer to their residences.
Another issue of interest is whether or not the
spatial gap in relative labor demand is growing over
time. Otu" evidence is limited to the percentages of jobs
and people located in central city areas in the decen-
nial Censuses, and even this evidence is somewhat
mixed. Between 1980 and 1990, the percentages of the
metropolitan area’s employment and population lo-
cated in the central city declined in all of the areas in
our sample except Los Angeles; and percentage de-
clines in employment were greater than percentage
declines in pop~flation in the cities of Atlanta and
especially Detroit (although in Boston the declines
were more comparable),s° Thus, in the two areas
where the vast majority of blacks in our sample are
located, and where relative distance was found to
have its greatest effects on black employment and
earnings, it appears that the spatial gap in relative
demand for blacks grew worse in the 1980s, thereby
contributing to their deteriorating employment and
ear,zings rates during that time.s~
so The declines in employment and popu.!ation during the
decade ~vere roughly 7 and 6 percentage points in Atlanta and 4.5
and 3.5 percentage points in Detroit. In both areas, the fractions of
suburban residents commuting into the city for work declined quite
substantially (26 percent to 21 in Atlanta and 16 percent to 12
in Detroit), while commuting patterns of central-city residents
changed much less, again suggesting that relative distances in~-
proved for suburban workers.
~ The greater declines in employment and population in
Atlanta and Detroit than in Boston and Los Angeles are consistent
with the pattern noted by Frey and Farley (1993) in which rising
Regarding the racial preferences of employers,
our findings suggest that they do not fully account for
the fact that employers farther away fl’om blacks tend
to hire them less frequently. Nonetheless, we do find
evidence that these preferences matter; the percent-
ages of blacks among customers, the presence of black
survey respondents (who control hiring in these
firms), and establishment size all are positively related
to levels of black employment at firms, even when
controlling for the firm’s proximity to the black pop-
ulation and the presence of blacks among applicants.
Racial preferences of employers
matter; the percentages of blacks
among customers, the presence
of blacks who control hiring,
and establishment size all are
positively related to levels of
black employment at firms.
The variety of skill needs on the job also is
associated with reduced hiring of blacks. Elsewhere,
we have shown that these skill needs have grown in
magnitude over time, and that they are associated
with higher wages (Holzer 1995). Taken together,
these results imply that rising skill needs have also
contributed to the relative declines in the employment
and earnings of blacks in recent years.
Regarding the policy implications of our findings,
by specifying at least two of the mechanisms through
which spatial factors affect black employment rates,
the restflts do suggest some particular responses to the
mismatch problem. Transportation programs to gen-
erate more reverse commuting, whether implemented
in~nigrant populatious caused some central-city areas to grow
substantially wlzile white and black residents in most areas contin-
ued to’ sub~rbanize. Indeed, they note that residential segregation
among blacks declined the most in areas with substantial numbers
of im~nigrants, which is consistent with the relatively greater and
growing distance problems of blacks in Atlanta and Detroit. Kain
(1992) also argues that central-city and suburban patterns in popu-
lation growth and employment understate the rising distance
problems for blacks in many areas, since black suburbanites gener-
ally locate relatively near the central city while employers and white
suburbanites both locate farther away. The latter observation par-
abels the one made by Kasarda (1995) on the growth of "edge cities"
in many metropolitan areas.
80 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewthrough mass transit or other approaches such as
van pools, may be relatively more effective hi raising
the employment of blacks among suburban firms than
was previously thought¯ Residential mobility pro-
grams (such as Gautreaux or the more recent "Movh~g
tq Opportunity" programs), which might enable more
blacks to locate near suburban employers, also appear
to’ have some real potential for raish~g employment
rates and earnings among blacks. Our evidence on
recruiting methods suggests that efforts to better dis-
seminate h~formation about jobs distant from blacks
could have some payoff as well, especially if combined
with residential mobility or transportation programs.
Of course, the large estimated effects of employer
skill needs and racial preferences on racial hiring
patterns also suggest the importance of education and
job trah~ing policies and antidiscrimination efforts by
the government. Indeed, the spatial policies described
above should be thought of as complements to these
other approaches rather than substitutes; combinh~g
mobility programs with skill enhancement of ironer-
city minorities and government monitoring of their
prospective employers is likely to make such pro-
grams all the more effective.
Altliough a more complete appraisal of the costs
and benefits of various mobility policies is well be-
yond the scope of this paper, our findings give us at
least some hope that successful policy responses can
be developed to the adverse spatial conditions that
currently plague many blacks.
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This
paper by Harry Holzer and Keith Ihlanfeldt
is an important contribution to th,e study of
the "spatial mismatch hypothesis.’ Much of
our knowledge has come from worker surveys, and
their employer survey gives a different perspective,
with better information about types of jobs, skill
demands, and hiring reqtdrements than most worker
surveys offer. I have a number of quibbles about some
measures, but these strong findings are remarkable.
Indeed, better measures might give even stronger
restdts.
The analyses show that employer proximity to
black residences and to public transit increases the
likelihood that employers will hire black employees.
This is a strong finding, and it holds up after many
controls. Task requirements of math or computer skills
reduce black hiring, although talldng to customers
and reading/writing tasks do not. While two hiring
requirements affect black hiring (college diploma and
vocational trainh~g), others have no effect.
Recruiting method, which Holzer (1987) has sh_~d-
led elsewhere, is discussed only briefly here. Holzer
and Ihlanfeldt stress that employers using help-
wanted signs, walk-ins, and employee referrals have
strong negative distance influences on black Idring,
.especially for applicants with high school education
or less. They also fh~d that school referrals have a
strong effect (about twice its standard error), a point
we will return to later.
The authors fh~d that employers’ relative distance
from blacks increases wages. However, these effects
may largely reflect fiJ’m attributes, for they nearly
vanish after firm attTibutes are controlled in the total
model, and they are severely reduced in the equation
for blacks’ wages. The authors say that the estimated
distance effects "remain at least marginally signifi-
cant," but the table suggests that after controls, few
coefficients are twice theft" standard error, and then
mostly in one city--Atlanta. At best, the wage effects
seem ambiguous.
As is always the case with nonexperimental data,
one must wonder about some of the findings: in this
case, whether the black workers hired in white sub-
urbs are somehow distinctive individuals in ways
not captured by controls. The controls are as good
as one finds in most studies, but such doubts can
never be completely dispelled by survey methods.
Here I can provide some supportive evidence. In
Chicago’s Gautreaux residential mobility program,
low-income blacks who applied to the program were
randomly assigned to move to city or suburban areas,
creating a quasi-experimental design. We studied city
moves to predominantly black, low-income areas, and
suburban moves to predomh~antly white, middle-
income areas, scattered over 120 towns in the six
counties around Chicago. The stndy of 300 adults
found significantly l’dgher employment among those
in the suburbs than among those in the city, but
earnings and hours per week were not different, even
after extensive controls (Popkin, Rosenbaum, and
Meaden 1993). In a study of 107 children, suburban
movers were more likely to graduate from high
school, attend college, and attend fottr-year colleges.
Among those who did not attend college, suburban
movers were more likely to get jobs and to get jobs
with better pay and benefits (Kauhnan and Rosen-
baron 1992). The outcome differences between city and
suburban movers were large for adtflts and even
larger for children (Rosenbaum 1995; Rosenbaum et
al. 1991; and see my Tables 1 to 3).
The adtflt findings in that quasi-experhnental
study support Holzer and Ihlanfeldt’s findings that
Table 1
Percent of Respondents Employed
Post-Move, Classified by Pre-Move





Employed 42 13 55
(64.6%) (30.2%)
Unemployed 23 30 53
(35.4%) (69.8%)
Total 65 43 108
Suburb Post-Move
Employed 106 37 143
(73.6%) (46.2%)
Unemployed 38 43 81
(26.4%) (53.8%)
Total 144 80 224
~Numbers in parentheses are column percentages.
Source: Popkin, Rosenbaum, and Meaden (1993).
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City and Suburban Comparison on Wages
and Hours Worked
Pre-Move Post-Move
Mean Mean t p
City Movers N = 55 42
Houdy wages $5.04 $6.20 6.52 .00
Hours/VVeek 33.27 31.92 -.60 .55
Suburban Movers N = 143 106
Hourly wages $4.96 $6.00 6.50 .00
Hours/Week 33.62 33.39 -.60 .55
Source: Popkin, Rosenbaum, and Meaden (1993).
reduced distance can improve employment, but their
findings also suggest that reduced distance may not
raise adults’ wages. To inrprove adtilts’ wages, I
suspect that programs must not only get people to the
job, they must also provide people with the qualifica-
tions employers seek and with signals of those quali-
fications that employers trust. This suggests an inter-
action term--that applicants with trusted signals of
qualifications will get larger pay gains from mobility
programs than other applicants. People who lack
qualifications, or lack trusted signals of them, will
only get the same kinds of low-paid jobs in the
suburbs that are available h~ the city.
To understand ~vhy, we must consider what
qualifications employers want. According to most
employer stu:veys, the employer’s highest priority is
the worker’s personality. While scholars argue that
employers ought to stress academic skills, one cannot
ignore employers’ stated concerns. In h~terviews with
51 employers, we found that employers’ concerns
about workers’ personalities do not arise from subtle
preferences but from terrible experiences with work-
ers who do not come to work, do not do their share,
disobey supervisors, harass or fight co-workers, and
damage property (Rosenbaum and Binder 1994). Un-
fortunately, some employers feel such behaviors are
associated with urban blacks and urban public
schools, so mobility programs must’~to more than
transport black workers to an employer’s door.
What signals do employers use to infer appli-
cants’ qualifications? Many steadies show that employ-
ers do not use high school diplomas, grades, or
references in hiring (Bishop 1989; Rosenbatwn et al.
1990; Rosenbaum 1996), even though cognitive skills
predict wages six years after graduation (Murnane,
Willett, and Lexc¢ 1994). Holzer and Ihlandfeldt also
find that many hiring requirements have no effect. The
employers we interviewed suggest an explanation:
They believe that high school diplomas and good
recommendations say little about applicants’ work
habits and do not even guarantee eighth-grade math
and reading skills.
Instead of using such indicators, employers de-
vise a variety of procedures that they believe screen
out bad risks, but unforttmately their procedures are
likely to be both ineffective and discriminatory. Em-
ployers report that they expect good workers to have
a firm handshake, traditional hair styles, certain cloth-
ing styles, and so on (Rosenbaum and Binder 1994).
Some of their "tests" entail conflicting demands, like
those of the employer who expected applicants to
speak assertively but not be insolent to supervisors.
This kind of desperate quasi-rational grasping for
signals about applicants sounds a lot like statistical
discrimination. This is both bad news and good news.
It is bad news, because it indicates racial bias. But
while bias based on prejudice can be reduced only
by attih_~de change or coercive policies, statistical
discrimination can be reduced simply by giving em-
ployers better signals than the discriminatory ones
they are now using. For instance, a study of 185
employers finds that employers’ hiring practices "do
not discriminate against all black applicants, but sim-
ply against those they perceive as lower-class" and
lackh~g in certain skills (Neckerman and Kirschenman
1990, p. 20). That study also finds that ernployers
who use skill tests to discern applicants’ abilities are
Table 3
Youths’ Education and Job Outcomes:
City-Suburban Comparison
Percent City Suburb
Number of youths 39 68
Drop out of school 20 5 *
College track 24 40 **
Attend college 21 54 ***
Attend f~ur-year college 4 27 **
Employed full-time (if not in college) 41 75 ....
Pay under $3.50/hour 43 9
Pay over $6.50/hour 5 21 ....
Job benefits 23 55
aSignificance of chi-square or t-test: °p < .10, *’p < .05, ""p < .025,
.... p < .005.
Source: Rosenbaum (1995); Rosenbaum et al. (1991).
84 May/June 1996 New England Econo~nie Reviewmore likely to hire blacks than those who do not use
such tests. Apparently, if employers are reassured
about applicants’ skills, they are more likely to hire
blacks.
These considerations have important implications
fqr transportation programs, since transportation pro-
grams may have difficulty providing such informa-
ti6n, for two reasons. First, residential location, which
is usually considered a distance factor, is also a signal.
It is among the ad hoc procedm’es employers use
for assessing applicants. Many employers consider a
housing-project address, a central-city address, or
attendance at a city public school as signals of poor
workers. Transportation programs will not fix these
residential barriers.
Second, transportation programs do not help ap-
plicants present dependable information about them-
selves to employers. Indeed, they may move people
away from the informal networks that CotLld signal
their positive attributes. Studies by Granovetter (1995)
and Holzer (1987) find that hfformal contacts improve
hiring. Holzer and Ihlanfeldt show that school refer-
rals affect hiring. Bishop (1993) finds that references
from vocational teachers and previous supervisors
(particularly ones known by an employer) have sig-
nificant positive effects on worker productivity. In
contrast, more anonymous recommendations, from
previous persmmel offices and public emplo3qnent
agencies, have negative effects on productivity. (See
also Kariya and Rosenbaum 1995.)
In a detailed qualitative study of 51 employers,
we fotmd that some employers use teacher contacts as
a way of getting trusted information about students’
work habits. Moreover, these contacts are particularly
important for mh~orities. If a trusted teacher recom-
mends a black to be as good as previously recom-
mended whites, then employers are willing to take a
chance that they would not have taken otherwise
(Rosenbaum and Miller 1995; Rosenbaum and Jones
1995).
In another study, analyses of the High School and
Beyond data find that school help is an important
source of first jobs for some students. We find that
females and minorities are more likely to get their first
jobs from school help than are white males. We also
find that while white males get the largest wage
benefits from school help, black males also get signif-
icant wage benefits that they would not have gotten
without that help (Rosenbaum, Roy, and Kariya 1995).
Thus, while Holzer and Ihlanfeldt advocate both
transportation and residential mobility programs, our
analysis suggests some difficulties with transportation
programs. Wl~ile they can make distant employers
more available, they do not cotmteract employers’ use
of urban addresses as negative signals and they do not
necessarily get trustworthy information about work-
ers to employers. In contrast, residential integration
gives blacks "non-stigmatized addresses," and it may
help residents get informal signals from their church,
neighbors, or schools that employers may trust.
Of course, the strongest findings in my seudies
have been for children. The biggest gains from resi-
dential mobility appear in the second generation. I do
not know of another program for low-income black
The biggest gains f~’om residential
mobility appear in the second
generation. I do not knozo of
another program for low-income
black youth that doubles the rates
of college attendance, employment,
good pay, and job benefits.
youth that doubles the rates of college attendance,
employment, good pay, and job benefits. The employ-
merit gains came in part from hfformal contacts that
teenagers made with local employers. Obviously, chil-
dren’s gah~s cannot come from adult transportation
programs, unless we also provide school busing.
In sum, I conclude that reducing distance barriers
may be necessary, but not sufficient. For urban blacks
to get better-paid jobs, they must be able to present
credentials that reassure employers about their quali-
fications. Mobility programs will be most effective at
raish~g wages if they can certify participants. They
must reassure employers that these urban blacks differ
from employers’ stereotypes, which now create their
statistical discrhnination. Mobility programs that also
provide certification of workers’ academic skills,
school attendance and behavior, previous work expe-
rience, or previous volunteering experience will have
greater effectiveness at overcoming employers’ statis-
tical discrimination. Transportation programs may be
able to do this, but they may have greater difficulties
than residential mobility programs. To the extent that
informal networks are employers’ most trusted source
of information (as our studies imply), residential inte-
gration is more Iil<ely than transportation programs to
May/June 1996 Nezo England Economic Review 85help blacks get their qualifications communicated
¯ tlu’ough such ilfformal networks.
Interestingly, housh~g programs can also make
use of signals to overcome statistical discrimination by
landlords and neighbors. The GautreatLx program
used some selection criteria to reassure landlords that
participants had good rent payment records and did
not destroy their apartments. These were not stringent
selection criteria. They eliminated only one-third of
applicants, but they helped persuade landlords to take
participants. Cincinnati’s HOME program used simi-
lar selection criteria to win landlord support. Unfor-
tunately, a federal demonstration program to replicate
Gautreaux, Moving to Opportunity, did not clearly
state such assurances, and the city of Baltimore pan-
icked over nightmarish visions of felony criminals
sweeping tlu’ough the suburbs. Failure to deal with
statistical discrimination can undermh~e the effective-
ness of housh]g mobility programs, just as it under-
mines employment.
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T
he title of this paper refers to Equality of Educational Opportunity, a
pathbreaking study of the nation’s public schools prepared for the
U. S. Office of Education nearly 30 years ago (Coleman et al. 1966).
The most obvious similarity between the study described in this paper
and the Coleman Report, as the earlier study is popularly known, is the
extent of their data collection efforts.
Mosteller and Moynihan (1972, p. 5) describe the Coleman Report as
the "second largest social science research project in history," noting that
the survey (EEOS) it relied Upon tested "Some 570,000 school pupils" and
"some 60,000 teachers" and gathered elaborate "information on the
facilities available in some 4,000 schools." In comparison, the research on
Texas elementary schools described in this paper is based on five years of
micro panel data for more than 1.8 million children in five student cohorts
attending more than 4,500 elementary schools during the years 1990 to
1994. We have obtained results of five statewide achievement tests for
two cohorts and two tests for a third, as ~vell as extensive micro data for
more than 235,000 individuals teaching in grades pre-K through 8 during
the 1990-94 period. The measures of school inputs used in this paper are
constructed from individual data for 230,697 individuals employed by
Texas public schools in grades pre-K through 8 at any time during the
years 1990 to 1994.
In the manner of the Coleman Report, this paper examines (1) the
extent of racial segregation both among and within districts; (2) differ-
ences in achievement on standardized tests among five racial/ethnic
groups (African-Americans, Anglos (non-Hispanic Anglos), Asian-Amer-
icans, Hispanics, and Native Americans); and (3) the extent and nature
of the variation in several school quality measures within individual
school districts. The Coleman Report also estimated educational produc-
tion functions, in an effort to quantify the relationship bet~veen student
achievement and the quantity and quality of school inputs and other
factors. This paper does not, although their estimation is a major goal ofthe larger study of which tlie research described here
is a part.
Most of tlie analyses included in the Coleman
Report were for the 6th grade and above. In contrast,
our study is limited to grades pre-K through 6. This
was a deliberate decision that reflects our beliefs that
the educational disadvantage of minority children has
its origins, and must be corrected, in the early grades,
when schools all too often fail to provide them with
the basic skills they need to succeed in school and
subsequently in the workplace (Farkas et al. 1995). In
addition, we anticipated that the greater homogeneity
of elementary schools would make it more likely that
we would be successful in our efforts to distinguish
the effects of school inputs, peers, family background,
and other factors on achievement.
Principal Findings of the Coleman Report
Coleman et al. (1966) found that children attend-
ing the nation’s schools were highly segregated by
race. They also expected to fh~d large quality differ-
ences between predominantly minority and predomi-
nantly majority schools. In an interview published in
the Southern Education Report (November-December
1965), Coleman, anticipating tlie results of the Cole-
man Report, stated:
[T]he study will show the difference in the quality of
schools that the average Negro child and the average
white child are exposed to. You kno~v yourself that the
difference is going to be striking. And even though
everybody knows there is a lot of difference between
suburban and inner city schools, once the statistics are
there in black and white, they will have a lot more impact
(cited in Mosteller and Moynihan 1972, p. 8).
The expectations of Coleman and others were not
realized. Moste!ler and Moynihan (1972, p. 8), sum-
marize Coleman et al.’s (1966) findings on differences
in school inputs as follows: "[W[hile there are re-
ported differences in those available to the majority
as against the minority groups, they are surprisingly
small differences. And while on balance the differ-
ences favor the majority, it is by no means the case that
they consistently do so."
Coleman et al. (1966) did not stop with quanti-
fying the variation in school inputs among schools
with different racial and ethnic compositions. They
included school input measures and other explanatory
variables in educational production functions de-
signed to explain variations in individual student
achievement. Setting forth a view that was novel at the
time but has recently become n-tore widely accepted as
a result of Hanushek’s several survey articles (1981,
1986, and 1989), they found that variations in the
school input measures included in their analysis had
very little impact on student performance on stan-
dardized tests.
A fair amount of confusion arose in subsequent
discussions of the Coleman Report because its authors
did not classify teachers or peers as school inputs.
They did, however, include these variables in their
educational production functions. As the following
summary of the report’s findings by Mosteller and
Moynihan (1972, p. 20) reveals, Coleman et al. (1966)
also found that teachers had little effect on acliieve-
ment.
Teachers appeared to matter, at least for Negroes. A list
of variables concerning such matters as teachers’ scores
on a vocabulary test, their owu level of education, their
years of experience, showed little relation to achievement
of white students, but some for Negroes, and increasingly
with higher grade levels. Even so, none of these effects
was large; the between-school variance was so little to
begin with, dividing it up, parceling it out between this
factor and that, produced unimpressive results at best,
and demoralizing at worst.
Turning to peer effects, Coleman et al. (p. 302) stated
that "Attributes of other students account for more varia-
tion in the achievement of minority group children than do
attributes of staff" [their italics], adding that "a pupil’s
achievement is strongly related to the educational
backgrounds and aspirations of the other students in
the school" and that "children from a given family
background, when put in schools of different social
composition, will achieve at quite different levels."
The Extent of Racial/Ethnic
Segregation: Then and Now
Coleman et al. found that the nation’s schools
were highly segregated by race. Writing in 1966, they
found that 65 percent of all Negro students in the 1st
grade went to schools that were between 90 and 100
percent Negro. While it may not be true in some other
parts of the country, public schools in Texas and in
other parts of the South are now much less segregated
by race than they were at the time the Coleman Report
was completed (Welch et al. 1987). Table 1 shows the
percentages of black, black and Hispanic, and Anglo
students attending campuses with varying percent-
ages of their enrolhnents of the same racial/ethnic
mix. (Throughout this paper, blacks are defined as
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Percent of Black, Black plus Hispanic, and
Anglo Students~ by Campus Percent Black,
Black plus Hispanic, and Anglo: State of
Texas and Large Texas MSAs
(1)     (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Percent Black Percent
Percent Black + Hispanic Anglo
Campus Students Students Students
Percentage 1990 1994 1990 1994 1990 1994
Entire State
0-10 12.5 14.2 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3
11-20 15.4 17.2 5.1 5.7 1.9 2.2
21-30 13.8 13.4 8.1 8.4 3.3 3.1
31-40 10.2 10.6 9.3 10.6 5.2 5.0
41-50 7.3 10.9 9.2 11.3 8.0 7.2
51-60 7.1 6.5 10.0 10.1 9.5 10.5
61-70 5.3 4.9 8.4 8.5 12.6 14,1
71-80 5.3 5.2 7.9 8.2 17.1 16.8
81-90 6.7 6.0 7.0 8.2 23.0 24.5
>90 16.5 11.1 33.4 27.4 17.0 15.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
>50 40.8 33.6 66.7 62.4 79.2 81,2
Large MSAs
0-10 12,3 13.9 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.6
11-20 15.2 15.5 4.6 4.4 2,2 2.7
21-30 11.7 11.6 5.9 6.2 3.9 3.8
31-40 6.8 7.4 6,4 7.8 5.0 5,3
41-50 5.3 9.3 6.6 7.4 8.0 6.8
51-60 7,1 6.5 8.2 7.7 8.6 9.4
61-70 3.7 5.3 6.5 6.3 12.5 13,8
71-80 5.6 6.6 6.9 9.6 17.3 16.1
81-90 8.5 8.0 7.5 10.0 23.7 26.3
>90 23.7 16.0 46.0 39.1 17,0 14.2
All 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0
>50 48.7 42.4 75.1 72.7 70.4 70.4
aData for 1990 cover pre-K to grade 3 enrollments, 1994 data grades 3 to 7.
non-Hispanic blacks, Anglos as non-Hispanic whites,
and all Hispanics as Hispanics.) As the data in the
second column of Table I indicate, only 16.5 percent of
black children enrolled in grades pre-K through 3 in
1990 attended schools that were 90 percent or more
black. The same statistic for black students enrolled h~
grades 3 to 7 in 1994 was oxzly 11.1 percent.
Some care should be taken in readh~g Table 1
because its interpretation depends on which column
is being considered. Campus percentage (column (1))
refers to campus percent black for columns (2) and (3),
to campus percent black plus Hispanic for columns (4)
and (5), and to campus percent Anglo for colmnns (6)
and (7). Coleman and his coauthors found that 80
percent of all Anglo 1st-grade students went to
schools that were between 90 and 100 percent Anglo
in 1967. The situation is very different in Texas today;
only 17.0 percent of Anglo students in 1990 and 15.3
percent in 1994 attended schools that were more than
90 percent Anglo.
The bottom panel of Table 1 reveals that racial
concentration is much greater in the seven largest
Texas MSAs. For these areas, the percentage of black
students in the respective grades who attended public
schools that were more than 90 percent black was 23.7
in 1990 and 16.0 in 1994. While these shares are
significantly higher than the statewide figures, they
are much lower than they were nationwide in 1967.
With the rapid growth of Texas’s low-income
Hispanic population, the use of campus percent black
as the sole indicator of school racial composition
increasingly is seen as incomplete and possibly mis-
leading. The two columns labeled "Percent Black +
Hispanic Students" in Table 1 show the impact of
including both blacks and Hispanics in the definition
of the campus minority share. When this is done, the
1994 percent of black and Hispaxzic students (grades 3
to 7) who are enrolled at campuses in large MSAs that
are greater than 90 percent black plus Hispanic is seen
to be to 39.1 percent; the same statistic using a greater
than 50 percent cut-off is 72.7 percent.
Texas is a large and heterogeneous state with
great racial and ethnic diversity by region and metro-
politan area. The racial/ethnic composition of its
public schools cannot be meaningfully assessed with-
out an tmderstanding and appreciation of this diver-
sity. Table 2 gives 1994 enrollment shares (grades 3
to 7) for the state’s four largest racial/ethnic groups
for the entire state, for large and small metropolitan
areas, for non-metropolitan and rural areas, and for
the central cities and suburbs of each of the state’s
seven largest metropolitan areas. Dallas appears twice
in the MSA list. Greater Dallas combines districts in
the Dallas MSA plus 13 districts (164 campuses) in the
eastern part of the Ft. Worth MSA that many h~divid-
uals employed in Dallas view as reasonable residential
and school choices.
As these data reveal, in 1994 less than half of the
state’s grades 3 to 7 enrollment was Anglo. Hispanics,
~vith 35.1 percent of total enrollment, were the largest
minority, and Hispanics and African-Americans com-
bined slightly outnumbered Anglos. Asian-Americans
were only 2.1 percent of total state enrollment in 1994,
but their numbers are growing rapidly. Native Amer-
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Shares of Total Grades 3 to 7 School
Enrolhnents in Texas, by Race and
Ethnicity, in 1994
Black +
Area Black Hispanic Hispanic Anglo Asian
Entire State 14.1 35.1 49,3 48.4 2,1
Large MSAs 16,3 34.4 50.7 46.1 3.0
Small MSAs 12.4 39,8 52.3 46.2 1.3
Non MSAs 9,6 31.6 41.2 58.2 .4
Rural 7.1 21.2 28.4 70.2 1.1
Individual Metropolitan Areas
Austin 11.8 29,0 40.8 56.9 2.1
Corpus Christi 4,4 60.9 65.3 33.7 .7
Dallas 20.8 20.9 41.6 54.6 3.3
Greater Dallas 18.1 18.4 36.5 59.6 3.5
El Paso 3.3 80.4 83.7 15.5 ,7
Fort Worth 14.5 16,1 30.7 66.0 3.0
Houston 21.9 30,2 52.0 43.4 4.5
San Antonio 8.0 59.9 67.8 30.9 1.1
Central City Districts
Austin 18.7 37.9 56.6 41.3 1.9
Corpus Christi 6.0 66.7 72.7 26.3 .7
Dallas 43.6 40.1 83.6 14.2 1.7
El Paso 5.0 73.3 78.3 20.6 1.0
Fort Worth 33.8 33.7 67.5 30.2 2.2
Houston 35.6 49.6 85.2 12.2 2.6
San Antonio 11.3 82.6 93.8 5.7 .4
Suburban Districts
Austin 5.8 21.3 27.1 70.5 2.2
Corpus Christi 2.7 54.3 57.0 42,0 .8
Dallas 11.8 13.3 25.2 70.5 3.9
Greater Dallas 10.9 12.2 23.1 72.5 4.0
El Paso 2.0 85.8 87.8 11.6 .4
Fort Worth 7.2 9.5 16.7 79.6 3.4
Houston 16.3 22.4 38.8 55.8 5.2
San Antonio 7.0 52.8 59.7 38.8 1.3
icans, who are not included in the table, made up only
0.2 percent of the state’s population. These data also
indicate that Anglos are disproportionately found
outside of metropolitan areas and in rural areas,
where they make up 58.2 and 70.2 percent respectively
of the school population in grades 3 to 7.
African-Americans disproportionately live in
large metropolitan areas, where they accounted for
16.3 percent of total enrollments in grades 3 to 7 in
1994. Similarly, Hispanics accounted for 34.4 percent,
and in conrbination with African-Americans made up
50.7 percent of the enrollment in grades 3 to 7 in these
areas. Central city districts differ greatly in terms of
the racial composition of their public schools. The
Dallas Independent School District (ISD) has the high-
est concentration of blacks, 43.6 percent of total grades
3 to 7 enrollments, whereas E1 Paso, with only 5.0
percent black, has the smallest.
Anglo shares of central city enrollments in these
grades in 1994 varied from a low of 5.7 percent for the
San Antonio ISD to a high of 41.3 percent for the
Austin ISD. Hispanics, the fastest-growing racial/
ethnic group in Texas, comprised 33.7 percent of these
students in the Ft. Worth ISD and 73.3 percent in the
E1 Paso ISD in 1994. When the black and Hispanic
populations are combined, the combined shares vary
from 56.6 percent for the Austin ISD to 93.8 percent for
the San Antonio ISD.
The data in Table 3 provide another way of
looking at the racial composition of Texas elementary
schools. In contrast to the previous discussion, which
focused on the fractions of black, Hispanic, and Anglo
students attending schools of varying racial composi-
tions, these data show the distribution of schools
according to racial conrposition. They are arguably
more relevant to analyses of variations in school
inputs among districts and campuses, the central
research question considered in this paper.
Statistics on the fractions of schools with student
bodies of varying racial composition reveal that about
7 percent of all Texas campuses have enrolhnents that
are 50 percent or more black. For large MSAs, this
fraction increases to nearly 10 percent, while the
fraction for small MSAs (3.9 percent) is considerably
below the statewide average. Nearly one-fourth of
campuses in the seven largest central city districts,
however, have enrollments that are more than 50
percent black. High levels of Hispanic concentration
are much more common than high levels of black
concentration. Using the same 50 percent cut-off, 26.4
percent of statewide campuses were more than 50
percent Hispanic in 1994, more than three times the
rate for blacks. The figure is not much different for
campuses located in large metropolitan areas. Nearly
half (46.8 percent) of large central city campuses are
more than 50 percent Hispanic and more than one-
fourth are over 80 percent Hispanic.
The third panel in Table 3 shows the fraction of
campuses in each area that have specified shares of
black plus Hispanic students. These data reveal that
42 percent of campuses statewide, 48 percent of cam-
puses in large metropolitan areas, and nearly 87
percent of campuses in the seven largest central city
school districts have enrollments more than 50 percent
black plus Hispanic. In the suburban rings of the
90 May/June 1996 New England Economic ReviewTable 3
Racial Composition of Texas Elementary
School Campuses in 1994
Large MSAs
Entire Large Central Small
State MSAs Cities Suburbs MSAs
Percent Black
0 18.2 8.2 4.8 9.9 27.9
0-10 44.9 50.4 36.6 57.2 39.6
11-20 15.3 16.5 13.9 17.7 14.1
21-30 7.3 7.7 8.7 7.2 7.0
31-40 4.0 3.4 4.1 3.1 4.6
41-50 3.4 3.9 7.2 2.2 2.9
51-60 1.6 1.8 3.5 1.0 1.3
61-70 1.2 1.5 3.8 .4 1.0
71-80 1.1 1.5 4.0 .4 .6
81-g0 1.2 1.8 5.2 .2 .5
91-100 1.9 3.2 8.3 .8 .5
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
>50 6.9 9.9 24.8 2.7 3.9
Percent Hispanic
0 3.9 2.7 2.5 2.8 5.1
0-10 28.5 26.8 11.3 34.4 30.2
11-20 16.7 18.1 11.5 21.3 15.2
21-30 10.6 11.2 10.7 11.5 10.1
31-40 7.9 7.6 8.7 7.1 8.2
41-50 5.9 5.5 8.6 4.0 6.4
51-60 4.5 4.9 7.3 3.7 4.2
61-70 4.0 4.2 6.6 3.1 3.8
71-80 3.3 4.3 7.2 2.8 2.4
81-90 4.2 5.4 10.4 2.9 3.1
91-100 10.3 9.3 15.4 6.4 11.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
>50 26.4 28.0 46.8 18.9 24.9
Percent Black + Hispanic
0 1.9 1.5 .5 2.0 2.3
0-10 12.4 12.0 .6 17.6 12.7
11-20 13.8 12.8 2.2 18.0 14.8
21-30 11.0 10.0 2.7 13.6 12.0
31-40 9.9 8.4 3.5 10.9 11.4
41-50 8.9 7.1 3.8 8.7 10.5
51-60 7.2 6.5 7.1 6.2 7.8
61-70 6.0 5.4 6.6 4.8 6.6
71-80 5.4 6.5 9.3 5.1 4.3
81-90 6.1 7.5 14.5 4.1 4.8
91-100 17.4 22.2 49.2 9.1 12.7
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
>50 42.1 48.1 86.6 29.3 36.2
seven largest metropolitan areas, enrollments in 29
percent of campuses are more than 50 percent black
plus Hispanic.
Clearly, the levels of racial concentration in Texas
elementary schools have declined by substantial
amounts since Coleman and his coauthors completed
their research. In addition, growing numbers of mi-
nority households residing in Texas metropolitan ar-
eas have moved to communities served by suburban
school districts, particularly in the past decade. But
even though increasing numbers of African-Ameri-
cans have been moving to suburban con-ununities in
Texas, elementary school indexes of dissimilarity for
Texas metropolitan areas are still quite high. (The
index of dissimilarity compares the distributions of
particular racial or income groups.) The black versus
Anglo indexes vary fi’om a high of 79 for Laredo to a
low of 30 for Odessa, with mean values of 48 for the 21
small MSAs and 56 for the seven large MSAs. Black
versus non-black and Hispanic versus non-Hispanic
indexes of dissimilarity are somewhat lower.
Rivkin (1994) has shown that, as in other parts of
the country, the continuing high levels of school
segregation in Texas are largely due to even higher
levels of residential racial segregation. It is therefore
not particularly surprising to discover that the segre-
gation indexes for Hispanic and Asian-American res-
idents of Texas metropolitan areas, who are less
highly segregated residentially than African-Ameri-
cans, are lower as well (Farley 1993). San Antonio and
E1 Paso, where Hispanic-Anglo segregation exceeds
black-Anglo segregation by significant amounts, are
exceptions. The explanation presumably is related to
the small black and very large Hispanic population
shares that characterize these areas.
Differences in Achievement by
Race/Ethnicity and Income
As noted previously, the analyses presented in
this paper are based in part on enrollment data for
1.8 million students who attended Texas elementary
schools during the five-year period 1990 to 1994.
Enrollments by year and grade for five student cohorts
are shown in Table 4. We have obtained standardized
test results for 12 tests/years/grades for students in
cohorts 2, 3, and 4. While we did not acquire standard-
ized test data for cohorts 1 and 5, the e~ollment and
attendance data for these cohorts will enable us to
keep track of students who were retained in grade or
double-promoted and who thus moved from one of
the three central cohorts. When longitudinal samples
are created by linking individual student records for
two or more tests/years, as in Kain (1995) and Fergu-
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Cohort 5







Cohort 4 Co~ort 3 Cohort 2 Cohort 1
Kindergarten Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3    Grade 4 Grade 5




289,073    284,179 284,120 285,186 286,350 1,428,908
539,438 926,6t8 1,145,731 1,414,834 1,139,273 841,261 567,015 286,350 " 6,931,705
Grade 6 Grade 7    Total
son and Ladd (1995), such students simply disappear
from the analysis. This selective attrition may result in
seriously misleading findings about student progress.
In addition, in the absence of a student data base that
is independent of the testing program, it is difficult to
assess the apparently widespread practice of not test-
ing some children who are expected to perform poorly
on the tests (Orfield and Ashkinaze 1991).
The educational histories with multiple standard-
ized test data that we are constructing for each student
should be of great value to our efforts to determine the
connections between school inputs (including teachers
and peers) and individual student achievement. The
mean reading scores by race/ethnicity and family
income/poverty for the five statewide tests taken by
cohort 2 students, shown in Table 5, provide a glimpse
of the promise of these data. Cohort 2 students took
five statewide achievement tests, including three dif-
ferent types of tests, between 1989 and 1994; the three
tests were TEAMS (Texas Educational Assessment of
Minimum Skills), TAAS (Texas Assessment of Aca-
demic Skills), and NAPT (Norm-referenced Assess-
ment Program for Texas). NAPT is a norm-referenced
test, while TEAMS and TAAS are criterion-referenced.
The achievement test data for cohort 2 students
in Table 5 are mean scores for students taking each
test in a particular year, rather than mean scores for a
true panel of individual students.1 Because significant
numbers of students enter and leave the state, transfer
to or from private schools, or are excused from taking
these tests in one or more years, the composition of the
samples used in calculating the mean scores may vary
from one year to the next.
The top panel in Table 5 presents indexes of mean
reading scores for each of the five race/ethnicity
groups by grade/year, indexed to the statewide mean
reading score for that year. Children participating in
special education programs are omitted from these
calculations, as are significant numbers of children
who were excused from taking the examination for
other reasons in each year. The first and third grade
data also exclude the reading scores of Hispanic
children who took a Spanish language version of these
tests.
The indexes of mean reading scores in Table 5
reveal that Asian-Americans and Anglos have the
highest reading scores, followed by the relatively
small sample of Native Americans, who consistently
score at about the statewide average. Blacks and
Hispanics have the lowest scores, their relative scores
are very similar in each year, and some evidence
suggests that the achievement gaps between Asian-
Americans/Anglos and African-Americans/Hispan-
ics increase with years of school completed. While
an increasing achievement gap of this kind between
disadvantaged and advantaged groups is a widely
reported finding, it is impossible in this instance, and
very likely in many other studies that have reported
this result, to be confident about the apparent deteri-
oration of Hispanic scores, because of the widespread
1 We are still completing the difficult, time-consuming, and
frequently frustrating task of creating a multi-year linked student
data base and adding the scores and other data from the tests to
individual student records. At the time we prepared this paper, we
had matched more than 97 percent of the 1994 test records and
between 94.1 percent and 96.7 percent of the 1993 test records to the
Public Education Information Management System enrollment/
attendance records. We had less success with the five 1991 and 1992
tests; the rates of successful matches for them varied between 88.8
and 94.1 percent. A large fraction of the remaining non-matches,
particularly for 1991 and 1992, are concentrated in a small number
of districts. We are working with the Texas Education Agency in an
effort to improve the match rates for these districts.
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Indexes of Student Mean Reading Scores, by
Race/Ethnicity and Family Income/Poverty Level~:
Cohort 2, Grades 1 and 3 through 6
TEAMS    TAAS NAPT NAPT TAAS
Statewide Mean = 100 Grade 1 Grade3 Grade4 Grade5 Grade6
By Race/Ethnicity
Asian-American 107 105 111 108 110
Anglo 105 106 109 112 108
Black 94 93 87 88 89
Hispanic 94 93 88 86 91
Native American 99 101 99 100 100
All Race/Ethnicity 100 100 100 100 100
By Percent of Poverty Level
More than 185 Percent 105 105 110 110 107
135-185 Percent n.a. n.a. n.a. 97 98
Less than 135 Percent n.a. n.a. n.a. 90 94
AFDC and like programs n.a. n.a. n.a. 85 89
Less than 185 Percent 93 92 88 n.a. n.a.
By Race/Ethnicity and Poverty Level
Greater than 185% of Poverty Level
Asian-American 109 108 114 115 114
Anglo 107 107 114 115 110
African-American 98 98 94 95 94
Hispanic 100 100 99 98 99
Native American 103 105 104 109 105
Less than 185% of Poverty Level
Asian-American 100 98 95 92 101
Anglo 97 98 99 99 99
African-American 91 90 83 84 85
Hispanic 92 91 84 82 88
Native American 93 96 92 90 92
n.a. = not available.
aFamily income/poverty level derived from eligibility for the school lunch program. See the text.
practice of excusing large numbers of low-achieving
students, and particularly Hispanics, from achieve-
ment tests in the early grades.2
The family income/poverty level variables used
in Table 5 are derived from information that indicates
whether a particular child received a free or reduced-
price lunch under the federal school lunch program.
Program eligibility is based on federal definitions of
the poverty level and thus depends on both family
income and family size. To receive a free lunch, a child
must belong to a family whose annual income is
less than 135 percent of the poverty level for its size.
Similarly, to receive a reduced-price lunch, family
income must be between 135 and 185 percent of the
poverty level. Students whose families receive AFDC
benefits or who participate in a number of other
poverty programs are also eligible
for a free lunch. In subsequent dis-
cussions, we refer to students be-
longing to high-income families
(greater than 185 percent of the
poverty level), middle-income fam-
ilies (135 to 185 percent of the pov-
erty level), and low-income fami-
lies (less than 135 percent of the
poverty level).
The estimates in Table 5 are
obtained from individual test
records, and the definition of the
school lunch variable differs some-
what among the several tests. Only
two poverty/lunch categories are
available for grades 1, 3 and 4,
while three are available for grades
5 and 6. In the second panel, we
use four family income/poverty
categories for grades 5 and 6, but
only two categories for grades 1, 3
and 4. Both 5th and 6th grade read-
ing scores exhibit a consistent rela-
tionship with family income levels;
the differences are especially large
for the 5th grade scores. The read-
ing scores of 5th grade students in
the high-income category are 110
percent of the statewide average,
while the reading scores of 5th
grade students in the middle- and
low-income categories are 97 and
90 percent of the statewide aver-
age, respectively. Fifth-grade stu-
dents who qualified for a free
lunch through their participation in AFDC or other
welfare programs have a mean reading score of only
85 percent of the statewide average.
The bottom panel of Table 5 shows mean reading
scores by race/ethnicity and two family-income cate-
gories, greater than and less than 185 percent of the
poverty level. Stratification by family income level
2 Of the 233,883 3rd-grade students with a reading score, 4.7
percent took a Spanish language test. A large fraction of these
students are subsequently excused from takh~g the 4th grade test
because of limited English proficiency; they are classified as LEP
(Limited English Proficiency) in the 4th grade and thereby are
excused. Including the raw reading score for these students in the
calculations of mean reading scores changes only one number in
Table 5, the mean reading score index for Hispanic 3rd graders from
families whose incomes were less than 185 percent of the poverty
level.
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and those of African-American and Hispanic students,
but by no means eliminates them. Not too much
should be made of this result; the two-category family
income/poverty variable is only a crude index of
socioeconomic differences.
Within- and Between-School Variations
in Grade 6 Reading Scores
Mosteller and Moynihan (1972, p. 19) in their
discussion of Coleman et al.’s findings place great
emphasis on the fact that "90 percent of the variance
in student achievement was found to lie within--not
between--schools." Commenting further on this
theme, they observe:
EEO found that schools receive children who already
differ widely h~ their levels of educational aclzievement.
The schools therefore do not close the gaps between
students aggregated into ethnic/racial groups. Thh~gs
end much as the3, begin .... such findings might be
interpreted to mean that "schools don’t make any differ-
ence." This is absurd. Schools make a very great differ-
ence to children .... But given that schools have reached
their present level of quality, the observed variation in
schools was reported by EEO to have little effect upon
school acl~ievement. Tl~is actually means a large joh~t
effect owh~g to both schools and home background
(h~cluding region, degree of urbanization, socioeconomic
status, and ethnic group), little that is unique to schools
or home. They vary together.
Equation 1 in Table 6 presents the results of
regressing individual TAAS reading scores for 228,051
sixth graders in tlzis study on 16 explanatory variables
that are measures of individual and family back-
ground characteristics of these students. These vari-
ables explain 18 percent of the variance in reading
scores; they include 14 dummy variables for race/
ethnicity by family income (Anglos eligible for free
lunch is the omitted category in all three equations)
plus the sex and age of each student. In Equation 2, we
have augmented the individual student variables in-
cluded in Equation 1 by three campus-level variables
that measure parents’ education and median house-
hold income. In contrast to the individual student
variables, the percentages of each racial/ethnic group
who were college graduates or did not complete high
school and median family income for all groups are
averages for the school campus zip code. While we
plan to create more precise estimates of these family
background and community variables by aggregating
1990 census block group data to individual attendance
areas, these campus-level variables, following Fergu-
son and Ladd (1995), are based on 1990 Census
tabulations for the zip code of each campus. Adding
the three campus-level variables increases the R2 to
0.19. In Equation 3, we replace the three campus/zip
code variables with 1,986 campus dummies; the re-
sulting campus fixed-effects specification increases
the explained variance from 19 percent to 23 percent.
When only campus dummies are included, the result-
ing equation explains 16 percent of the total variance
in reading scores. In interpreting this result, it should
be understood that "campus" measures both the ef-
fects of school inputs (facilities, teachers, and peers)
and the effects of grouping children with similar
racial/etlmic and other individual and family back-
ground characteristics.
The results for the fixed-effect equations indicate
that holding the effects of campus, age, and sex
constant, the representative low-income African-
American student had 3.4 fewer right answers on the
6th grade reading test than a low-income Anglo stu-
dent. This difference falls to 1.5 points for middle-
income black students and to 1.2 points for high-
income black students. High-income Anglo students
have 2.7 more right answers than low-income Anglo
students and 3.8 more right answers than high-income
black students.
In considering the 6th-grade reading regressions,
it should be understood that nearly 20 percent of all
6th-graders are not included in the analysis. Of this
number 11.9 percent were excluded from our calcula-
tions because they were special education students
and an additional 6.9 percent were excused from the
test for a variety of other reasons, including absences
on the day the test was given, LEP (Limited English
Proficiency) exemption, ARD exception (for students
with disabilities who were not already excluded from
the sample because of their participation in special
education classes), cheating, or illness. The fractions
differ among ethnic/racial categories. More than 13
percent of Hispanics and 10.5 percent of Asian-Amer-
ican students were excused from taking the test,
mostly because they were classified as LEP. African-
Americans were SOlnewhat more likely to be in special
education classes (14.4 percent versus 11.9 percent for
all students), but were less likely to be excused from
taking the exam (4.3 percent versus 6.9 percent for all
students). These issues, wlzich deserve careful atten-
tion, will be examined after we have completed link-
ing the data.
The most obvious missing variable from the 6th-
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Grade Six TAAS Reading Score Regressions
Equation 2 Equation 3
Equation 1 Individual plus Zip Code: Individual plus Campus
Individual Characteristics Education & Income Fixed-Effects
Explanatory Variables Coefficient bstatistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
High Income
Anglo 3.35 59.19 2.91 49.60 2.70 47.60
Asian-American 4.25 35.61 2.63 19.62 3.17 26.48
Native American 2.06 5.38 1.85 4.62 1.39 3.73
Black -1.28 -16.43 -1.39 -17.21 -1.15 -14.07
Hispanic .17 2.40 .27 3.34 .15 2.16
Middle Income
Anglo 1.24 11.97 1.23 11.57 1.09 10.79
Asian-American 1.35 3.53 .48 1.23 .90 2.42
Black - 1.69 - 11.10 -1.62 - 10.37 - 1.54 - 10.25
Hispanic - 1.01 - 10.06 -.72 -6.51 -.89 -8.80
Native American -.36 -.35 - 1.21 - 1.09 -. 10 -. 10
Low Income
Asian-American .54 2.80 -.23 - 1.13 .57 2.96
Black -3.95 -54.76 -3.75 -50.74 -3.40 -44.53
Hispanic -3.00 -49.55 -2.58 -33.26 -2.53 -38.50
Native American -2.05 -3.91 - 1.27 -2.30 - 1.55 -3.03
Other Individual Characteristics
Male                           -.62 -22.70 -.63 -22.11 -.61 -22.93
Age - 1.38 -60.18 - 1.37 -57.81 - 1.28 -56.80
Campus Mean by Race/Ethnicity
Percent College Grad 7.80 22.10
Percent Less than High School .18 1.05
Campus Mean, All Households
Median Income .04 22.61
Campus F-star. (1,986 225,914) = 9.07
Constant 45.73 164.11 44.08 150.92 44.63 163.57
Observations 228,051 212,601 227,917
Variables 16 19 2,002
R2 .18 .19 .23
Note: Anglos with low-income families is the omitted category for the race/ethnicity by family income!poverty level variables in the first three panels.
grade reading score regressions is any measure of each
student’s cognitive abilities or earlier educational ex-
periences. Because we have not finished linking the
test and enrollment data, we were unable to include
these critical control variables. In an earlier explor-
atory analysis of TAAS reading scores for individual
4th-graders, however, Kain (1995, p. 44) found that the
same student’s 3rd-grade reading score by itself ex-
plained 44 percent of the variation in 4th-grade read-
ing scores. Adding a large number of individual
student and school input measures increased the
explained variance by only an additional 5 percentage
points to 50 percent, and these same variables witliout
the lagged reading score explained about 28 percent
of the total variance in individual 4tli-grade reading
scores.
Variations in School Quality Measures
Educational production function studies, includ-
ing the Coleman Report, have had modest success at
best in their efforts to quantify the relationship be-
tween school inputs and student achievement. At least
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Coleman findings, public schools may not vary much
in terms of those variables that affect student achieve-
ment on standardized tests. Or second, as Hanushek
and Kain (1972, p. 117) argued in their critique of the
Coleman Report, there may be important differences,
but the crude measures that Coleman and his col-
leagues used in their analyses (and have been used in
most subsequent educational production function
studies) may not adequately account for these differ-
ences. This second possibility, which seems to us to be
a very real one, was one of the reasons we decided to
undertake this study.
Educational production function
studies have had modest success
at best in their efforts to
quantif~:/ the relationship between
school inputs and student
achievement. This failure may
be due to inadequate school-
input quality measures.
The view that the failure of most studies of
educational production functions to find significant
school h~put effects may be due to inadequate school
quality measures finds support in Hanushek’s survey
of 147 published "separately estimated educational
production functions," which begins by observing
that "’Teachers and schools differ" dramatically in their
effectiveness" [his italics]. Hanushek (1986, p. 1159)
then argues that the "very different impressions ...
left by the Coleman Report and indeed by a number
of subsequent studies.., have primarily resulted froln
... the difficulty in explicitly measuring components
of effectiveness," adding that "existing measures of
characteristics of teachers and schools are seriously
flawed and thus they are poor indicators of the true
effects of schools." Fh~ally, he suggests that "when
these measurement errors are corrected, schools are
seen to have hnportant effects on student perfor-
mance."
When it comes to assessing the evidence concern-
ing the relationship between particular school h~put
measures and student achievement, however, Ha-
nushek becomes lnuch lnore negative. Commenting
on the findings of his most recent survey of educa-
tional production function estimates, Hanushek con-
cludes, based on his examination of 187 studies, that
"the results are startlingly consistent in fhading no
strong evidence that teacher-student ratios, teacher
education, or teacher experience have the expected
positive effect on student achievement" (1989, p. 46).
Hanushek’s negative conclusions about the effect
of various school input variables on achievelnent have
been strongly disputed by Ferguson (1991) in an
influential paper that presents educational production
function estimates obtained ush~g aggregate (district-
level) data for nearly 900 Texas school districts.3 In
both his Texas analysis and a more recent paper with
Ladd based on both micro and aggregate campus-
level data for Alabama, Ferguson suggests that differ-
ences in mean teacher test scores, average class size,
the fraction of teachers with master’s degrees, and
per pupil expenditttres account for a large part of the
variation among districts and campuses in student
achievement levels (Ferguson 1991; Ferguson and
Ladd 1995). Ferguson’s (1991) educational production
function estimates for Texas schools obviously are
highly relevant to our research.
Our review of earlier educational production
function studies has made it clear to us that we should
begh~ by makh~g every effort to develop better school
input measures than have been used in most earlier
studies. Part of this effort entails a careful assessment
of the extent of the variation among districts and
campuses and, in particular, among campuses with
different racial/ethnic and socioeconomic makeups.
The selection of school input measures to be consid-
ered h~ this paper was determh~ed by data processing
considerations and by the fh~dings of earlier educa-
tional production function studies. In the following
sections, we examine the within-district variation of
four types of school inputs by campuses of varying
race/ethnic and income composition: (1) teacher
scores on standardized tests, (2) the percentage of
teachers with advanced degrees, (3) teacher experi-
ence, and (4) class size. We begin this analysis with
composite reading and writing scores for Texas teach-
ers, obtained by combining h~dividual test results
from seven different teacher certification exams.
3 Ferguson’s study used district-level aggregate data for all
Texas school districts with complete data except the Dallas and
Houston Independent School Districts, which he excluded because
"the weighting scheme in the estimating procedure would have
given these two cities too much influence over the results" (Fergu-
son 1991, p. 470).
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Several educational production function stttdies
have found that teacher verbal ability and high scores
on other standardized tests had a significant effect on
student achievement (Hanushek 1971 and 1972; Fer-
guson 1991; Ferguson and Ladd 1995; and Murnane
1975). Moreover, Hanushek (1986, p. 1164) has ob-
served that "The closest thing to a consistent finding
among the studies is that ’smarter’ teachers, ones who
perform well on verbal ability tests, do better in the
classroom"; he adds, however, that "even for that, the
evidence is not very strong."
Teacher verbal ability and high
scores on other standardized
tests have been found to
have a significant effect
on student achievement.
Ferguson (1991, p. 475) in his study of Texas
school districts similarly found that "Teachers’ lan-
guage skills as measured by the TECAT score is the
most important school input for both math and read-
ing," and that "After the first grade, teacher scores on
TECAT account for about one-fifth to one-quarter of
all variation across districts in students’ average scores
on the TEAMS exam.’’4 In addition, Ferguson and
Ladd (1995, p. 35), in their study of Alabama schools,
found that "The skills of teachers as measured by their
test scores exert consistently strong and positive ef-
fects on student learning despite the fact that the data
are limited and test scores are an imperfect measure of
teacher skills.’’5
The educational production function esthnates
published by Ferguson in his 1991 paper were for the
1985-86 school year. By using TEAMS data for that
year, Ferguson was able to take advantage of a feature
of reform legislation implemented two years earlier
that required all Texas public school teachers to pass
the Texas Examination of Current Administrators
and Teachers (TECAT), which the Texas Education
Agency began using in 1986 to recertify existing
teachers. Since nearly 97 percent of those who took the
exam in March 1986 passed, TECAT was obviously
not a very difficult hurdle. Furthermore, those who
failed were allowed to retake the exam as many times
as they wished and nearly all passed eventually.
Given TECAT’s low level of difficulty, the small vari-
ance of district averages, and the fact that Ferguson
used average scores for all teachers in each district,
it is quite surprising that TECAT scores were such a
po~verful predictor of student achievement in his
regressions.
The Texas Education Agency was never happy
with TECAT, and at the first opportunity it imple-
mented a new and more demanding teacher certifica-
tion system. With few exceptions, the Agency now
requires new teachers, or teachers seeking certificates
to teach in various special areas, to take one or more
ExCET (Examinafion for the Certification of Educators
in Texas) exams. In addition, all persons applying to
teacher preparation programs in Texas are required to
take and pass TASP, a general skills test, before they
are admitted to these programs. TASP replaced an
earlier skills test, PPST (Pre-Professional Skills Test)
that served a similar purpose.
While the Texas Education Agency’s decision
to replace TECAT with a more complex system may
have been good policy, it greatly complicated our
research task. When ~ve first began this research, we
thought we might be able to use the TECAT data
Ferguson had obtained from National Computer Sys-
tem (NCS). We found, however, that the individual
teachers on Ferguson’s tape could not be assigned to
individual campuses and that only 59 percent of the
206,780 individuals who taught in Texas schools
(grades pre-K to 8) during the 1990-94 period had
taken TECAT.
In order to develop comparable ability measures
for the 41 percent of teachers in our teacher data base
who did not take TECAT, we obtained individual
scores from the Texas Education Agency for TECAT
and nearly 70 other teacher certification tests. Using
4 Fergnson notes that "Primary school teachers appear to be
particularly important for establishing the reading foundation upon
which students depend in later years," adding that their "passing
rates on the TECAT have three times the impact of secondary school
teachers’ passing rates for predicting eleventh graders’ passing rates
on the TEAMS reading exam" (Ferguson 1991, p. 476). Ferguson
used district-wide passing rates rather than average scores for this part
of the analysis because the mean district TECAT scores he used in
his analysis were for elementary and secondary school teachers
combined. His analyses of TECAT’s impact on student achievement
for primary and secondary school teachers separately relied on
district-wide TECAT passing rates.
s Summers and Wolfe (1977, p. 644-45) in their careful study of
627 6th-grade students attending 103 Plliladelphia elementary
schools found a "perverse (negative) relationship bet~veen the
National Teacher Exam score and learning," but also found that
"Teachers who received BAs from higher-rated colleges were asso-
ciated with students whose learning rate was greater."
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Linear Specifications of Fixed-Effects Regressions of Campus Mean Teacher TECAT
Reading Scores
All Districts All MSAs Large MSAs Greater Dallas .... Houston San Antonio
Variable Coefficient t-star. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat.
Campus Percenta
Black -2.44 -15.6 -2.37 -14.6 -2.54 -13.5 -2.03 -8.2 -3.43 -7.9
Hispanic -1.41 -9.4 -1.30 -8.3 -1.30 -7.1 -1.04 -3.7 -1.80 -4.5
High-income -.13 -.9 .00 .0 .00 .0 .18 .8 -.18 -.5
Black*High-Income 1.15 4.2 1.12 4.1 1.38 4.4 .77 1.8 2.00 3.3
Hispanic*High-income 1.30 6.4 1.29 6.2 1.14 4.6 2.16 4.6 1.05 1.8
District Fixed Effect (F-stat.) 3.4 5.5 5.9 4.5 8.3
Constant 52.68 458.3 52.56 410.4 52.63 348.5 52.53 276.6 52.80 148.8
R2 .73 .73 .71 .74 .77
No. Observations 4,839 3,449 2,354 763 706
No. Districts 1,046 382 203 72 41
Mean 52.0 51.9 52.0 52.3 51.7



















aPercent of students enrolled in grades 3 to 7.
data for seven subsamples of teachers who took both
TECAT and one or more of the other tests, we esti-
mated explanatory models that explained TECAT
reading and writing scores.6 These equations, which
we used to predict TECAT reading and writing scores
for all teachers who had not taken TECAT, included as
explanatory variables teacher race, sex, scores on the
"other" exam, and several dun’uny variables that
served as controls for different test achnh~istration dates.
Table 7 contains six fixed-effects regressions of
mean TECAT reading scores of teachers of grades 3
to 7 on several explanatory variables that describe
the campus percentages of students enrolled in grades
3 to 7 who are African-American, Hispanic, or from
high-income families. These equations are for six
geographic areas: the entire state, all metropolitan
areas, large metropolitan areas, and, individually, the
Greater Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio metropoli-
6 Of the 217,481 persons teaching in 1994 at the campuses
included in this analysis, 79,425 had not taken TECAT. All but 166
of them, however, had taken at least one of the seven other teacher
certification tests with sufficiently large samples of persons taking
both it and TECAT to permit estimation of TECAT prediction
equations. These tests and the number of TECAT reading and
writing scores that were predicted with each equation are: Excet2
(Professional Development--Elementary) 46,691; Excet3 (Profes-
sional Development--Secondary) 17,579; Excetl (Professional De-
velopment-All Level) 7,073; TASP 3,753; Excet4 (Elementary Com-
prehensive) 3,753; PPST 648; and TOPT81 387. Mean TECAT scores
by race/etlmicity and highest degree earned were used to predict
TECAT scores for the 166 persons who took none of the above tests.
tan areas.7 The means and standard deviations of all
six dependent variables and six independent variables
used in the analyses of witKin-district, campus varia-
tions in school inputs are shown in Table 8 for the six
areas. Since sample membership differs slightly de-
pending on which dependent variable is being consid-
ered, the means of the independent variables also
differ slightly by the dependent variable being used.
The means and standard deviations of the five explan-
atory variables in Table 8 are for the sample used in
estimating the TECAT reading score regressions.
Not surprisingly, the 1,046 district dummy vari-
ables have a large impact on the explanatory power of
the TECAT reading equations shown in Table 7. The
R2 for the Large MSA equation, for example, increased
from 0.55 to 0.71 when the district dummies were
added to the equation. The inclusion of dummy vari-
ables in these fixed-effect equations holds constant the
influence of school district policies and other factors
that produce differences in mean TECAT scores
among districts. Campus-level variables in turn quan-
tify the average effect of differences in race/ethnicity
and family income on TECAT reading scores and
7 We also prepared estimates of the six equations in Tables 9 to
13 with squared terms for percent black, percent Hispanic, and
percent high-income. The squared terms were added to test for
nonlh~earities in the campus race/ethnicity composition and in-
come variables. Interested readers may obtain copies of these tables
from the authors.
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Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent and
Independent Variables
All All Large Greater San
Districts MSAs MSAs Dallas Houston Antonio
Dependent Variables
TECAT Reading Score 52.0 51.9 52.0 52.3 51.7 51.9
(1.1) (1.1) (1.1) (.9) (1.4) (.9)
TECAT Writing Score 27.0 27.0 27.0 27.3 26.7 26.9
(.9) (.9) (1.0) (.8) (1.2) (.8)
% Advanced Degrees 24.5 25.6 27.8 32.4 27.5 27.4
(15.1) (14.8) (14.8) (15.4) (13.2) (15.3)
% 0-3 Years 24.8 25.0 24.9 24.3 26.5 22.5
Experience (14.0) (8.2) (13.4) (13.4) (13.4) (12.5)
% 20+ Years 15.9 15.6 15.8 16.5 14.5 17.5
Experience (10.4) {9.8) (9.9) (10.1) (9.0) (10.5)
Class Size 19.1 19.5
(4.2) (4.1)
Independent Variables
Campus % Black 13.7 15.9 17.0 18.9 23.1 8.4
(.2) (.2) (.2) [.2) (.3) (.1)
Campus % Hispanic 33.3 35.3 34.4 17.8 30.8 63.4
(.3) (.3) (.3) (.2) (.3) (.3)
Campus % High-Income 50.0 50.4 52.0 61.5 53.9 33.9
(.3) (.3) (.3) (.3) (.3) (.3)
% Black*% High-Income 5.6 6.3 6.6 7.5 9.4 2.6
(.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.0)
% Hispanic*% High- 11.0 11.0 11.4 7.3 11.6 14.6
Income (.I) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1)
document the within-district allocation of teachers
with different levels of verbal ability among campuses
according to the fractions of students at each campus
who are black, Hispanic, and from high-h~come fam-
ilies. The estimates in Table 7 document a clear sorting
of teacher ability by schools of differing racial/ethnic
and income composition. There is also a sorting of
teachers among districts, but the nature of this sorting
is not quantified in this analysis.8
The tendency of teachers’ mean TECAT reading
scores to decrease as the campus shares of black and
Hispanic students increase is clearly evident in Table
7. All 12 coefficients (campus percent black and cam-
pus percent Hispanic times six areas) are negative. The
coefficient for campus percentage black in the Large
MSA equation, which is -2.54, is highly significant
statistically and quantitatively hnportant (as it is for
all districts and all MSAs). Since the standard devia-
tion of the mean TECAT reading
score is only 1.1, this result implies
that the mean TECAT reading
score for a 100 percent black school
would, holding the effect of all
other variables constant, be
roughly 2.5 standard deviations
less than the same score for a
school that is zero percentblack.
The coefficient for campus percent
Hispanic is also highly significant
statistically, but it is only about half
as large as the coefficient for cam-
pus percent black. The coefficient
for campus percent high-income is
essentially zero, but the coefficients
for the two interaction variables are
positive and highly significant sta-
tistically. The impacts of these in-
teraction effects will be examined
further in the concluding secfion.
The results obtained for the
TECAT writing regressions, shown
in Table 9, are very similar to those
obtained for the TECAT reading
scores. They also indicate that per-
sons teaching at schools with
higher fractions of black and His-
panic students and fewer students
from high-income families tend to
have lower TECAT scores, h~ this
case on the writing portion.
While the analyses of varia-
tions in mean TECAT reading and
writing scores presented in this section are based on
estimated campus means for all grades (3 to 7) in 1994,
we also esthnated these equations for grades 3 and 6.
The two most obvious changes, relative to the results
discussed above, are a significant reduction in overall
explanatory power and a decrease in sample size.
Using the Large MSA equation as an example, the
s In an earlier version of this paper, given at Harvard’s Urban
Economics seminar, we presented equations that included both
campus and district shares of total enrollment by race/ethnicity and
family income in an effort to quantify the variations of school inputs
among both districts and campuses with varying percentages of
black, Hispanic, and high-income students. High correlations be-
tween the district and campus-level variables defeated this effort.
The specifications used in this paper finesse this problem by limiting
the assessment to the effects of within-district variations in campus
racial/eth~ic and income composition. We would like to acknowl-
edge the very lielpful suggestions on this issue by several seminar
participants.
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Black -2.30 -16.3 -2.15 -14.9 -2.20 -13.3 -2.02 -8.7
Hispanic -1.64 -12.1 -1.46 -10.4 -1.35 -8.4 -1.25 -4.8
High-Income -.40 -3.2 -.19 -1.4 -.06 -.4 -.01 .0
Black*High-Income .66 2.7 .67 2.7 .87 3.1 1.10 2.7
Hispanic* High-Income 1.03 5.6 1.03 5.6 .77 3.6 1.47 3.4
District Fixed Effect (F-stat.) 2.9 4.6 5.4 3.79
Constant 27.95 268.9 27.77 243.3 27.69 208.7 27.70 156.2
R2 .68 .69 .69 .69
No. Observations 4,839 3,449 2,354 763
No. Districts 1,046 382 203 72
Mean 27.04 26.98 26.97 27.30
Standard Deviation .91 .94 .96 .82
Teacher TECAT
All Districts All MSAs Large MSAs Greater Dallas Houston San Antonio
Coef[icient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat.
-2.33 -6.2 -2.28 -3.5
-1.39 -4.0 -1.81 -3.2
.09 .3 -.54 -1.0
.54 1.0 2.65 1.6
.68 1.3 .68 1.0
7.88 1.41






~’Percent of students enrolled in grades 3 to 7.
percent of variance explained is 43 percent for grade 3
and 46 percent for grade 6, as contrasted with 69
percent for all grades. The 6th grade Large MSA
sample has 891 observations, the 3rd grade one has
1,612, and the all-grades sample has 2,354 observa-
tions. These differences in sample size result from the
fact that many campuses do not have both 3rd and 6th
grades and schools serving only the lower grades tend
to be smaller (fewer students per grade).
Percent of Teachers zeifh Advanced Degrees
In contrast to most other educational production
function studies that have found no relationship be-
tween teachers’ years of education and the perfor-
mance of their students on standardized tests, Fergu-
son (1991, p. 477) in his study of Texas schools fotmd
that "Master’s degrees produce moderately higher scores
in grades one through seven" [his italics] and that "The
percentage of teachers who have master’s degrees
accounts for about five percent of the variation in
student scores across districts for grades one through
seven." This findh~g also finds support in Ferguson
and Ladd (1995, p. 35) who found that "additional
education for teachers, as measured by the proportion
of teachers with master’s degrees, also appears to
increase student learning, but by a lesser amount"
(relative to teachers’ test scores).
Table 10 contains fixed-effects esthnates for the
campus percentage of teachers with advanced degrees
for the same six geographic areas used h~ the analysis
of mean TECAT scores.9 The sign patterns for the All
Districts, All MSAs, Large MSAs, and Greater Dallas
equations are identical. In all four equations, the
percentage of teachers with advanced degrees de-
clh~es as the campus percentages of black, Hispanic,
and lzigh-h~come students increases; it rises with in-
creases h~ both the race/ethnicity-h~come interaction
variables. At first glance the results for Houston and
San Antonio appear to be very different, but the
individual coefficient estimates have very low levels of
statistical sig~dficance, a result that appears to be due
to high levels of multicollinearity among a number of
the explanatory variables.
In contrast to the TECAT regressions, where the
campus percent black coefficient was much larger (in
absolute value) than the campus percent Hispanic
coefficient, these two coefficients are very similar in
the first four equations (those with statistically signif-
9 Including district dummies has a much larger impact on the
overall explanatory power of these equations than was true for the
TECAT reading or writing regressions. For the six equations with-
out district dummies, the highest fraction of explained variance is
only 16 percent (the San Antonio equation). Adding the district
dummy variables to the San Antonio equation increases the ex-
plained variauce to 26 percent. The largest increase in overall
explanatory power from adding the district dunnnies is obtaiued for
the All-District equation; the fLxed-effects equation boosts the total
explained variance from 6 percent to 50 percent.
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Linear Specifications of Fixed-Effects Regressions of Campus Fraction of Teachers with
Advanced Degrees
All Districts All MSAs Large MSAs Greater Dallas ~louston San Antonio
Variable Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-star. ~oefficient t-star. Coefficient t-star. Coefficient t-star.
Campus Percent~
Black -.14 -5.2 -.12 -4.4 -.12 -3.5 -.16 -3.0 .13 2.1 -.09
Hispanic -.15 -5.9 -.13 -5.1 -.12 -3.8 -.17 -2.8 -.03 -.5 .13
High-Income -.13 -5.7 -.11 -4.5 -.12 -3.9 -.10 -2.2 .04 .7 -.01
Black*High-Income .20 4.5 .19 4.3 .19 3.6 .28 2.9 -.06 -.7 -.21
Hispanic*High-Income .04 1.2 .01 .3 -.02 -.5 .17 1.6 .01 .1 -.22
District Fixed Effect (F-stat,) 3.4 5.7 5.6 7.3 4.1
Constant .36 19.6 .36 17.4 .39 15.3 .41 10.4 .24 5.0 .25
R2 .50 .44 .35 .44 .26 .26
NO. Observations 5,015 3,592 2,464 791 720 318
No. Districts 1,046 382 203 72 41 19
Mean .25 .26 .28 .32 .28 .27






~Percent of students enrolled in grades 3 to 7.
icant coefficients). Somewhat more surprising, the
campus percent of teachers with advanced degrees
declines as the fraction of high-income students in-
creases, in all four equations. At the same time, the
coefficient of the percent black and percent high-
income interaction term is positive, indicating that
increases in the high-income share reduce the negative
impact of higher fractions of black students on the
percentage of teachers with advanced degrees. Of the
ttzree individual metropolitan area equations, only
the Greater Dallas estimates closely conform to the
estimates obtained for the more comprehensive sam-
ples; the overall explanatory power of this equation
is also considerably larger than those of the other
two metropolitan areas. The within-district sorting of
teachers with advanced degrees, moreover, appears to
be more pronounced h~ Greater Dallas than in the
other two individual metropolitan areas or in either
All MSAs or Large MSAs.
Overall, the results in Table 10 provide strong
evidence that, in Texas at least, teachers employed in
schools with large fractions of Hispanic and African-
American children, and particularly the latter, and
also in schools with high fractions of children from
lo~v-income families, have fewer years of education.
This evidence relating to systematic within-district
variations in teachers’ years of schooling by campus
racial and income composition may not matter much,
if Hanushek and others are right about the unimpor-
tance of years of teacher education as a determinant of
student achievement. However, if Ferguson (1991)
and Ferguson and Ladd (1995) are correct in their
opposh~g vie~v, this evidence could be quite hnportva~t.
Teacher Experience
Ferguson (1991, p. 475-76) found that after teach-
ers’ language skill, as measured by the TECAT score,
"the next most important school characteristic is
teacher experience," and that teacher "experience ac-
counts for a bit more than ten percent of the inter-
district variation in student test scores." Even Ha-
nushek relents a bit when it comes to teacher
experience. Referring to his 1989 survey of educationa!
production function estimates, Hanushek (1989, p. 47)
observes that "Teacher experience is possibly differ-
ent," since "At least a clear majority of estimated
coefficients point in the expected direction, and ahnost
30% of the esthnated coefficients are statistically sig-
nificant by conventional standards." He then returns
to form by adding the following qualifications:
But these results are hardly overwhelmh~g; they appear
strong only relative to the other schoo! inputs. More-
over, because of possible selection effects, they are sub-
ject to additional h~terpretive questions. In particular,
these positive correlations may result from senior teach-
ers being permitted to select schools and classrooms
with better students. In other words, causation may run
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around.
A few educational production function studies
have suggested that an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship may be present between teacher experience and
student achievement. In this regard, the evidence that
"inexperienced" teachers are less effective and that
students taught by them do less well on standardized
tests is more extensive than the evidence suggesting
that teacher performance deteriorates beyond a certain
point. Nonetheless, some basis exists for believing that
there may be too much of a good thing when it comes
to teacher experience, or perhaps age, and that the
Some basis exists for believing
that there may be too much of a
good thing when it comes to
teacher experience, or perhaps age,
and that the teachers with the
most experience, generally older
ones, are less effective than
younger teachers with somewhat
less experience.
teachers with the most experience, generally older
ones, are less effective than younger teachers with
somewhat less experience. Some support for this
proposition is provided by exploratory educational
production functions for Texas elementary schools
completed by Kah~ (1995).
Because the relationship between teacher experi-
ence and student achievement may be an inverted U
shape, we have used two dependent variables to
quantify experience, the campus proportions of teach-
ers with zero to three years of experience and those
with 20 or more. Like the analyses of TECAT scores
and advanced degrees, the dependent variables in
these equations are for the entire campus, although, as
was true of the TECAT analysis, we estimated expe-
rience equations for 3rd and 6th grade teachers as
well. The results for the 3rd and 6th grade are very
similar to those for the entire campus except that the
equations generally explah~ed a smaller fraction of the
variance in the several dependent variables.
The teacher experience regressions, shown in
Tables 11 and 12, include the same explanatory vari-
ables and have the same structure as those described
above for the regressions for TECAT scores and for
percent of teachers with higher degrees in Tables 7, 9,
and 10. The fractions of inexperienced and very expe-
rienced teachers in particular districts presumably are
s~rongly affected by district demographics. Rapidly
growh~g districts are likely to have proportionately
more inexperienced teachers, although this tendency
may be offset by policies that favor the recruitment
and hiring of experienced teachers. Districts with
declining enrollments similarly are likely to have large
numbers of very experienced teachers and these dis-
trict-wide tendencies will be felt at the campus level.
The district dummy variables included in the fixed-
effects equations account for district-to-district differ-
ences of this kind.~°
Three of the five coefficients (excluding the con-
stant term) for the Large MSA fixed-effects equation
for inexperienced teachers have t-statistics of 2.8 or
greater. The t-statistics for the remaining two are - 1.4
for the coefficient for the percent black-percent high-
income h~teraction and a mh~uscule 0.3 for the campus
percent of high-income students. The coefficients for
percent black and percent HispaMc are very sin61ar in
magnitude and indicate that increases h~ either are
associated with a higher fraction of inexperienced
teachers. The coefficient for the campus percent high-
income is zero, suggesting that campus h~come has
little effect on the mix of teachers.
The regression equations for the campus percent-
age of inexperienced teachers (those with 0-3 years
of teaching experience) provide strong evidence that
schools with higher percentages of black or Hispanic
students have disproportionate numbers of inexperi-
enced teachers. According to the estimates h~ Table 11,
differences in the campus percentage of high-income
students affect the allocation of inexperienced teachers
only through an interaction with either campus per-
cent black or campus percent Hispanic. In addition,
these interaction effects are opposite in sign. Holding
the campus percent black constant, increases in the
campus percentage of high-h~come students reduces
~0 The large increase in overall explained variance with the
addition of the district dummies suggests these district-level effects
have major impacts on the campus fractions of inexperienced and
very experienced teachers. When district dummies are not included
in the six equations shown in Table 11, the fraction of explained
variance varies from a low of 3 to a high of 14 percent; when district
dummies are included, the R2s of these equations vary from 28 to 40
percent.
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Linear Specifications of Fixed-Effects Regressions of Ca~npus Fraction of Teachers with
Zero to Three Years of Experience
All Districts All MSAs Large MSAs Greater Dallas Houston San Antonio
Variable Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat.
Campus Percenta
Black .20 6.8 .20 6.4 .19 5.4 .27 4.8 .18 2.5 -.28 -2.3
Hispanic .21 7.4 .20 6.7 .20 5.9 .24 3.7 .32 4.9 -.32 -3.0
High-Income .02 .7 .01 .3 .01 .3 .05 1.0 .05 .8 -.42 -4.2
Black*High-Income -.06 -1.1 -.11 -2.0 -.08 -1.4 -.21 -2.1 .00 .0 .65 2.1
Hispanic’High-Income .05 1.3 .07 1.6 .13 2.8 .37 3.5 -.11 - 1.1 .48 4.0
District Fixed Effect (F-stat.) 2.3 3.1 3.8 3.6 3.6 5.2
Constant .14 6.3 .14 5.7 .13 4.7 .11 2.4 .11 1.9 .51 5.5
R2 .40 .30 .28 .30 .30 .33
No. Observations 4,842 3,451 2,355 761 706 291
No. Districts 1,046 382 203 72 41 19
Mean .25 .25 .25 .24 .27 .23
Standard Deviation .14 .08 .13 .13 .13 .13
~Percent of students enrolled in grades 3 to 7.
the fraction of inexperienced teachers. In the case of
Hispanic students, the opposite result is seen.
The within-district allocation of inexperienced
teachers among schools with varying racial, ethnic,
and income composition documented by the inexpe-
rienced teachers equations is no doubt due to the
well-known "MFK" effect,u This effect refers to school
district policies that permit teachers with more senior-
ity to choose more desirable schools and the absence
of any incentives or rewards for teaching in less
desirable schools. The campus percentages of black,
Hispanic, and high-income students are proxies for a
larger number of school characteristics that determine
the attractiveness of individual campuses to teachers.
Since we know the teaching assignments of all teach-
ers during the five-year period 1990-94, we should in
the future be able to explicitly model this process.
The coefficient estimates obtained for the Greater
Dallas and Houston inexperienced teachers equations
are fairly similar to those obtained for All Districts, All
MSAs, and Large MSAs. The results for San Antonio
could not be more different. All five coefficients have
t-statistics of more than 2.0 and the sign pattern, which
is generally the opposite of that obtained for the other
fLxed-effects equations, indicates that the percentage of
inexperienced teachers declines as the percentages of
black, Hispanic, and high-income students increase
and rises with increases in both black and Hispanic
high-income interaction variables.
The results for teachers with 20 or more years of
experience, shown in Table 12, exhibit a pattern con-
sistent with the sorting mechanism described above
for inexperienced teachers. Teachers with the most
tenure tend to be underrepresented in campuses with
11 This reference to the MFK effect refers to the experience of
the senior author’s wife, Mary Fan Kain, during the first year of
their marriage when she took a job teaching in a overwhehningly
black junior high school in Oakland, California. Mary Fan did not
come to teach in this school because of a commitment to teach
disadvantaged children and she had no special preparation (she did
her practice teaching in a small rural school in Ohio near Denison
University, where she was a student). She took the Hoover Junior
High School job because when she arrived in late August in
Berkeley, where John was to attend graduate school, only two jobs
were left iu the East Bay in her areas of specialization (junior high
school social studies and English). Both were in inner-city, over-
whehningly black schools, and she took the job closest to Berkeley.
Hoover Junior High School was not a bad school by today’s
standards, and she found the kids ~vere, for the most part "good
kids." However, she was totally unequipped to deal with the
problems she encountered, which included 7th graders who
couldn’t read and high rates of turnover. There were three kinds of
teachers at Hoover Junior High School. About a third were com-
pletely tmprepared first-year teachers like Mary Fan who came to
teach at Hoover Junior High for the same reason she did--jobs in
inner-city schools were the only ones available to beginning teach-
ers. Another third were somewhat older, but still fairly young,
dedicated black teachers, and the last third were older white
teachers, who, with few exceptions, had lost interest in teaching and
prided themselves on maintaining order and discipline and quiet
classrooms. It is unclear whether any more learning went on in
Mary Fan’s classroom than in other classrooms, but we do know
that her students had more fun and that her classroom was much
less qttiet.
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Linear Specifications of Fixed-Effects Regressions of Campus Fraction of Teachers with
20 or More Years of Experience
All Districts      All MSAs      Large MSAs Greater Dallas     Rouston      San Antonio
Variable Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-star. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat.
Campus Percenta
Black -.10 -4.8 -.11 -5.0 -.10 -4.1 -.18 -4.3 -.02 -.4 -.15 -1.4
Hispanic -.14 -6.9 -.14 -6.7 -.15 -6.3 -.24 -5.0 -.17 -3.7 -.13 -1.3
HigMncome -.06 -3.2 -.06 -3.2 -.07 -2.9 -.09 -2.5 -.08 -1.8 -.09 -1.1
Black*High-Income .11 2.9 .13 3.4 .09 2.1 .21 2.9 -.08 -1.1 -.17 -.6
Hispanic’High-Income .07 2.3 .06 2.1 .05 1.4 .12 1.5 .15 2.2 .10 .9
District Fixed Effect (F-stat.) 2.5 3.9 4.3 3.5 4.1 3.7
Constant .24 14.9 .24 14.0 .25 12.4 .27 8.4 .23 5.8 .29 3.5
R2 .42 .35 .32 .33 .28 .26
No. Observations 4,842 3,451 2,355 763 706 291
No. Districts 1,046 382 203 72 41 19
Mean .16 .16 .16 .I7 .15 .18
Standard Deviation .10 .10 .10 .10 .09 .11
~Percent of students enrolled in grades 3 to 7.
large fractions of minorities and overrepresented in
campuses with higher fractions of students from more
well-to-do families. If the previously mentioned in-
verted U-shaped fl_mction between teacher experience
and student achievement exists, the fh~ding that teach-
ers with more than 20 years are underrepresented
among the faculties of campuses with large high
percentages of disadvantaged minorities wonld work
to these stndents’ advantage. In contrast to the results
for the inexperienced teachers equations, the San
Antonio sign pattern is generally the same as the
pattern obtained for the other five equations. None of
the five coefficients in the San Antonio equation are
significantly different from zero, however.
Class Size/Student Teacher Ratios
Ferguson (1991, p. 477) found that class size had a
measurable impact on reading scores and placed great
emphasis on the role of thresholds, indicating that
"reducing the number of ’students per teacher’ is
important only when it exceeds eighteen .... Each
additional student over eighteen causes the district
average score to fall by between one-tenth and one-
fifth of a standard deviation h~ the inter-district distri-
bution of test scores for grades one through seven."
Once again, Hanushek’s survey articles offer little
support for the notion that smaller classes have a
significant effect on student achievement. Of the 187
educational production function studies that Hanu-
shek reviewed for his 1989 survey article, 152 included
the teacher-student ratio as an explanatory variable.
Only 14 of these 152 studies obtained positive and
statistically significant coefficients for the teacher-stu-
dent ratio and nearly as many (13) found a negative
and statistically significant relationship with student
achievement (Hanushek 1989, p. 47).
The precision and certainty of Ferguson’s (1991)
conclusions about the effects of class size and thresh-
old effects, particularly given the crudeness of his
data, are stm~ing. Moreover, his fh~dings about the
effects of class size on achievement for Texas schools
are further supported by his and Ladd’s recent study
of Alabama schools. In discussing their results, Fergu-
son and Ladd (1995, p. 35) observe that "the basic
conclusion that class size matters for student learning
emerges clearly and consistently, especially for math.’’~2
Because Ferguson’s (1991, p. 472) Texas study
~2 Summers and Wolfe (1977, p. 645) provide some support for
the view that students in smaller classes have larger achievement
gains, indicating that their analyses provide fairly strong evidence
that smaller classes tended to increase the achievement gains for
both low-achieving and high-achieving students, but had no effect
on average students. In addition, they briefly describe the results of
a survey of 85 earlier studies of the effect of class size on achieve-
ment, contained in an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by Blake
(1954), who found that 35 studies determined smaller classes were
more effective, 18 determined that larger classes were more effec-
tive, and 32 were inconclusive.
104 May/June 1996 Nero England Economic Reviewrelied on aggregate (district-level) data, he had to use
students-per-teacher for the entire district as his mea-
sure of class size "because a direct measure of average
class size is unavailable." Elaborating on this point, he
observes:
This study (and most others) lacks a direct measure of
average class size. It does, however, have a measure of
the number of students per teacher in the district. Aver-
age class size will be larger than "students per teacher"
because some teachers are specialists who do not teach
regular classes and because most teachers get periods off
during the day. The results here show that reducing the
number of "students per teacher" is important only when
it exceeds eighteen. (Tests show that at least in this data
set, the tlu’eshold is indeed at eighteen and not at
seventeen or nineteen.) ... This is among the stronger
effects for any variable in the study. However, it is an
effect that is clearly restricted to the primary grades.
In contrast to Ferguson’s and most other studies,
we have been able to use data for individual teachers
to construct a "direct measttre of average class size"
for each campus and grade. The class size data come
from what we have termed "teacher time cards."
These time cards provide a detailed description of
each teacher’s workweek by grade and subject taught,
days of the week, the fraction of total time spent on
each class, and the number and type (regular, special
education, gifted and talented, and so on) of students
who are enrolled in each of their classes.
Analysis of the teacher time cards revealed that
most elementary school teachers offer instruction in
only one grade and to one student population (Regu-
lar, ESL, Gifted and Talented, Colnpensatory/Reme-
dial, Bilingual, or Special Education) and that most
persons teaching in kindergarten through 5th grade
have only one teaching assignment, presumably a
stand-alone classroom.~3 This analysis further indi-
cates that the mean number of assignments (time
cards) increases from 1.3 cards per teacher in kinder-
garten to 1.9 cards per teacher in the 5th grade.
Starting h~ 6th grade, the instructional technology
clearly changes, as shown by a sharp increase in the
number of teaching assignments from 1.9 per teacher
in the 5th grade to 4.0 in the 6th; the mean numbers
are even higher for those teaching regular 7th- and
8th-grade students (4.8 and 4.6 per teacher). Special-
education teachers, who average 6.5 to 9.8 thne cards,
have the most assignments.
13 This analysis is based on data for 139,565 classroom teachers
in 1994, excludh~g only those teaching physical education or fine
arts. These teachers reported a total of 389,491 different teaching
assignments for an average of 2.8 assignments (cards) per teacher.
Texas’ school reform legislation also required that
all public elementary schools have 22 or fewer stu-
dents per classroom through the 4th grade. Districts
were given four years to fully implement the rule. The
normalized frequency distributions of mean class size
by campus for all grades (3 to 7) and for the 3rd and
6th grades in 1994, shown h~ Figure 1, make it clear
this regulation has had a significant impact on class
sizes.~4
Because mean classroom size varies substantially
by grade, we present equations for all grades (3 to 7),
grade 3, and grade 6 for all MSAs and for large MSAs
in Table 13. In contrast to the results obtained for other
school inputs, the class size all-grades equation does
not have a higher R2 than either the 3rd- or 6th-grade
equations. Instead, no doubt reflecting the 22-student
cap, the 3rd-grade equation has much less variance
and a higher R~- than the all-grades equation. The R2
for the 6th-grade equation is also larger than that for
the all-grades equation,is
Only two of the five coefficients h~ the all-grades,
all MSAs regressions are significantly different from
zero. The coefficients for campus percent high-income
indicate that average classroom size iucreases with
percent high-income, while the sign for the percent
black and high-income interaction variable h~dicates
that average classroom size declines as both the cam-
pus percent black and the campus percent ltigh-
h~come increase.
The 3rd-grade class size regression has only one
coefficient that is significantly different from zero at
the 5 percent level, a negative coefficient for the
campus percent black, suggesth~g that average class
size decreases as the percent black increases. In the
6th-grade regression, average class size increases as
14 There are also large differences in class size by population
served. Mean class sizes by population served h~ the 3rd grade are:
Bilingual (16.8 students per class), Compensatory/Remedial (13.1
students per class), ESL (16.6 students per class), Gifted and
Talented (17.3 students per class), Regular (19.3 students per class),
and Special Education (3.8 students per class). If students remained
in the same classroom for all of their classes and had the same
number of classmates for every class, the use of these data would be
straightforward. We know, however, that students can be enrolled
in more than one of these programs and it is possible that some, or
even most, of these special classes are "pull-outs" from regular
classrooms. In those cases, students enrolled h~ these programs may
have taken the larger part of their course work h~ regular class-
rooms. Worse yet, these practices presumably differ from one
district (or campus) to another.
~s Using the Large MSA regressions as an example, the fraction
of explained variance varies from 2 to 4 percent for the six equations
without district dun-tmies. When district dummies are added to the
equations, the level increases to between 29 and 47 percent of the
total variance.
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the campus percent black increases and as the campus
percentage of high-income students increases, and
decreases as the product of campus percent black and
high-income h~creases.
Predfcted Variations in School Inputs by
Campus Race/Ethnicity and Income
To make it somewhat easier to understand the
way in wl~ich each of the six school inputs examined
in this paper is affected by differences in campus
racial, ethnic, and income composition, we have used
the Greater Dallas equations to carry out a parametric
analysis of the way in which the several school inputs
vary with representative levels of these campus-level
variables. We use the Greater Dallas equation rather
than the All District or the All MSAs because a single
metropolitan area provides a more meaningful indi-
cation of the residential and public schooling choices
available to households.
The predictions in Table 14 show how the esti-
mated levels of each school input vary with specified
changes in the percentages of black and Hispanic and
high-income students for hypothetical Greater Dallas
campuses.~6 These estimates are obtained using the
input coefficients shown in previous tables, an arbi-
trary value for campus percent Hispanic of 10 percent
for all cases, and quintile means of campus percent-
ages black (colunm 3), and percentages high-income
(shown in parentheses at the top of the table)J7
While the analyses use the actual mean percent-
ages of black and high-income students for each
quintile, the quintiles themselves are defined by equal
intervals of percent black and percent high-income
from zero to one hundred. As column 2 (number of
campuses) reveals, Greater Dallas has many more
campuses in the interval zero to 20 percent black than
in any of the remaining quintiles. Indeed, nearly
three-fourths (73.8 percent) of all Greater Dallas cam-
puses belong to this interval; the fourth quintile,
~s An analogous analysis of the way in which the levels of these
school inputs vary with changes in campus percent Hispanic and
campus percent high-income is available from the authors.
~7 The actual mean Hispanic shares vary from a low of 6.5
percent for the fifth quintile to a high of 25.8 percent (column four
in Table 14). We considered using the actual mean percent Hispanic
for each quintile for these simulations, rather than a constant value
of 10 percent Hispanic, but ultimately decided that using actual
percent Hispanic confuses the respective contributions of campus
percent black and campus percent Hispanic.
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Linear Specifications of Fixed-Effects Regressions of Campus Mean Class Size, All Grades,















All MSAs Large MSAs
All Grades (3 to 7) Grade 3 Grade 6 All Grades (3 to 7) Grade 3 Grade 6
Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-star. Coefficient t-star. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-star. Coefficient t-stat.
-.7 -1.78 -2.0 5.63 2.3 .77 .7 -1.59 -1.7 5.99 2.1
-2.0 -1.70 -1.9 3.07 1.3 -.58 -.6 -1.16 -1.2 3.27 1.2
3.1 .26 .3 7.90 3.4 3.95 4.0 1.07 1.2 9.34 3.5
-1.9 2.21 1.4 -10.65 -2.7 -5.73 -3.2 2.01 1.2 -12.70 -3.0
1.8 1.12 1.0 -2.78 -.9 .42 .3 -.41 -.3 -4.92 -1.3
3.9 3.7 2.1 3.9 4.1 2.4
25.0 19.25 26.6 16.54 8.2 17.88 20.5 19.13 24.1 16.58 7.1
.43 .47 .29 .38 .43
2,350 1,344 2,353 1,621 908
374 379 203 202 203
18.73 21.54 19.53 19.09 22.16
3.40 6.55 4.08 3.09 6.65
aPercent of students enrolled in grades 3 to 7.
which is 61 to 80 percent black, by contrast includes
oltly 1.9 percent of all campuses and the quintile 81 to
100 percent black includes only 6.6 percent of all
Greater Dallas campuses. The bottom two rows of
Table 14, which give the number and percentage of
campuses in each income quintile, reveal that Greater
Dallas campuses tend to be concentrated in the upper
end of the income distribution. The 81 to 100 percent
high-income quintile contains nearly a third of all
Greater Dallas campuses, while the zero to 20 percent
category contains only 13 percent.
The hypothetical calculations by campus percent-
age black and by campus percentage high-income
shown in Table 14 raise the question of how well these
categories represent the actual distribution of elemen-
tary schools in Greater Dallas by racial, ethnic, and
income composition. As just noted, most (73.8 percent)
Greater Dallas campuses are less than 20 percent
black. At same time, the 26 percent of campuses that
are more than 20 percent black served 69 percent of
Greater Dallas African-American students enrolled in
grades 3 to 7 in 1994. It is also the case that very few
(five) campuses are more than 50 percent black and
more than 50 percent high-income. While only 10.6
percent of Greater Dallas campuses are more than 50
percent black, 94 percent of these campuses have
low-income percentages in excess of 50 percent. While
campuses with very high percentages of black stu-
dents are disproportionately concentrated in the cells
defined by low shares of high-income s~dents, the
distribution of campuses by racial composition alone
(percent black) is surprisingly uniform. In particttlar,
only 49 (6.2 percent) of the 791 elementary schools in
Greater Dallas in 1994 had no African-American stu-
dents enrolled in grades 3 to 7 in 1994.
The predicted values of TECAT teacher reading
and ~vriting scores in Table 14 decline as the campus
percentage of black students rises, and they increase
as the campus percentage of high-income students
increases. To give an example, for campuses with only
9.5 percent high-income students, the predicted differ-
ence in TECAT reading scores is 1.6 points between
campuses that are 6.9 percent black and 92.2 percent
black. Reading the table the other way, for campuses
that are 6.9 percent black, predicted TECAT reading
scores are 0.4 points less for campuses with only 9.5
percent high-income students than for campuses that
are 91.2 percent high-income. Similarly, for campuses
that are mostly black (92.2 percent black), the pre-
dicted teacher TECAT reading scores are 0.9 points
higher for those in the highest income category (91.2
percent high-income) than for those in the lowest (9.5
percent high-income). No Greater Dallas campuses
are 90 to 100 percent black and 90 to 100 percent
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Estimated Relationship of School Inputs to Percentages of Black and Hispanic Students and
Percentages of High-Income Students, on Greater Dallas Campuses~
Actual Mean Campus % High-Income
Campus Number of % 95 Assumed 0-20% 21-40% 41-60% 61-80% 81-100%
% Black Campuses Black Hispanic % Hispanic (9.5%) (29.9%) (50.9%) (70.9%) (91.2%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Predicted Teachers’ TECAT Reading Score
0-20 584 6.9 16.9 10.0 52.3 52.4 52.5 52.6 52.7
21-40 101 28.4 22.8 10.0 51.9 52.0 52.2 52.3 52.4
41-60 39 49.0 25.8 10.0 51.5 51.7 51.8 52.0 52.1
61-80 15 70.0 22.1 10.0 51.1 51.3 51.5 51.7 51.9
81-100 52 92.2 6.5 10.0 50.7 50.9 51.1 51.3 51.6
Predicted Teachers’ TECAT Writing Score
0-20 584 6.9 16.9 10.0 27.5 27.5 27.5 27.6 27.6
21-40 101 28.4 22.8 10.0 27.0 27.1 27.2 27.3 27.4
41-60 39 49.0 25.8 10.0 26.6 26.8 26.9 27.1 27.2
61-80 15 70.0 22.1 10.0 26.2 26.4 26.6 26.8 27.0
81-100 52 92.2 6.5 10.0 25.8 26.1 26.3 26.5 26.8
Predicted Class Size
0-20 584 6.9 16.9 10.0 18.5 19.2 19.9 20.5 21.2
21-40 101 28.4 22.8 10.0 18.8 19.1 19.5 19.8 20.1
41-60 39 49.0 25.8 10.0 19.1 19.1 19.1 19.1 19.1
60-80 15 70.0 22.1 10.0 19.3 19.0 18.6 18.3 18.0
81-100 52 92.2 6.5 10.0 19.6 18.9 18.2 17.5 16.9
Predicted % Teachers with Advanced Degree
6.9 16.9 10.0 37.7 36.4 35.1 33.9 32.6
28.4 22.8 10.0 34.9 34.8 34.7 34.7 34.6
49.0 25.8 10.0 32.1 33.2 34.4 35.4 36.5
70.0 22.1 10.0 29.3 31.6 34.0 36.2 38.5
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0-20 584 6.9 16.9
21-40 101 28.4 22.8
41-60 39 49.0 25.8
61-80 15 70.0 22.1
81-100 52 92.2 6.5
0-20 584 6.9 16.9
21-40 101 28.4 22.8
41-60 39 49.0 25.8
61-80 15 70.0 22.1
81-100 52 92.2 6,5
Number of Campuses in Income Quintile
Percent of Campuses in Income Quintile
aPercent of students enrolled in grades 3 to 7.
Predicted % Teachers with 0 to 3 Years’ Experience
10.0 15.7 17.2 18.7 20.2 21.6
10.0 21.1 21.7 22.3 22.9 23.5
10.0 26.4 26,1 25.8 25.6 25.3
10.0 31.7 30.6 29.4 28.3 27.1
10.0 37.4 35.3 33.2 31.1 29.0
Predicted % Teachers with 20 or More Years’ Experience
10.0 22.9 21.6 20.3 19.0 17.7
10.0 19.5 19,1 18.7 18.4 18.0
10.0 16.1 16,7 17.3 17.8 18.4
10.0 12.8 14,3 15.8 17,2 18.7
10.0 9.2 11.7 14.2 16.6 19.0
103 85 130 213 260
13.0% 10,7% 16.4% 26.9% 32.9%
high-incon~e. The largest predicted difference in
teacher reading scores, 2.0 points, is between a cam-
pus that is 92.2 percent black and 9.5 percent high-
h~come and a campus that is 6.9 percent black and 91.2
percent high-income. The Greater Dallas area has a
fair number of both of these types of campuses. In
108 May/June 1996 Nezo England Economic Revie~oassessing the predicted TECAT scores and subsequent
predictions of school inputs for campuses of varying
percent black and high income, it should be remem-
bered that all of the predictions assume a uniform
campus 10 percent Hispanic.
The results obtained for predicted TECAT teacher
writing scores are very similar to those obtained for
TECAT reading scores. In contrast, the class size
results are more complex. For campuses with few
high-income students (9.5 percent), class size increases
as campus percent black increases, from 18.5 stndents
per teacher (campus percent black 6.9 percent) to 19.6
students per teacher (campus percent black 92.2 per-
cent). For campuses with 91.2 percent high-income
students (the top qttintile), exactly the opposite result
The results for Greater Dallas
provide strong evidence of
systematic and large differences in




in the same district.
occurs; class size declines from 21.2 students per
teacher when the percentage of black students is 6.9 to
18.9 students per teacher when 92.2 percent of the
students are black.
The same kind of twist appears in the predicted
fractions of teachers with advanced degrees. For the
lowest income category, the percentage of teachers
with advanced degrees declines from 37.7 percent for
campuses that are 6.9 percent black to 26.4 percent for
campuses that are 92.2 percent black. These results
provide strong evidence of systematic and large dif-
ferences in the fraction of teachers with advanced
degrees between low-income, minority and high-in-
come, majority campuses in the same district. As
noted earlier, the importance of this result depends on
whether teachers with advanced degrees are more
effective teachers, something about which there is
considerable disagreement.
The results for inexperienced (0 to 3 years’ expe-
rience) teachers indicate very large differences in the
fractions of inexperienced teachers between very low-
income schools with relatively few black students and
very low-income schools that are predominantly
black. For campuses with the fewest (9.5 percent)
high-income students, the fraction of teachers with
limited experience increases froln 15.7 percent for
schools that are 6.9 percent black to 37.4 percent for
schools that are 92.2 percent black. Smaller differences
by campus percent black appear for schools with
larger fractions of high-income students.
The results for teachers with 20 or more years of
experience provide strong evidence that teachers with
greater seniority avoid schools with high fractions of
low-income black students. This result disappears for
campuses in the top income quintile, however, where
the predicted fraction of very experienced teachers in
schools with 92.2 percent black students, 19 percent, is
slightly liiglier than the percent for schools with only
6.9 percent black students, 17.7 percent.
Smnmamd and Conclusions
Significant changes have taken place in the edu-
cational landscape since the Coleman Report was
published nearly 30 years ago. As this paper demon-
strates, the most obvious change in Texas has been
substantial reductions in the extent of racial/ethnic
segregation in the public schools. While Coleman and
his colleagues (1966) found high levels of school
segregation, data for Texas elementary schools pre-
sented in this paper show that in 1994 fewer than 16
percent of Anglo students attended schools that were
greater than 90 percent Anglo. Additional measures of
campus-level concentration for African-American,
Hispanic, and Anglo students reveal relatively few
campuses throughout the state where students attend
schools composed solely of their own ethnic/racial
group. Racial concentration continues to be higher in
Texas’s largest metropolitan areas. Nonetheless, the
levels of racial/ethnic concentration today are much
lower than the levels found 30 years ago.
In spite of significant declines in racial/ethnic
concentrations, the large gaps in mean achievement
identified by Coleman persist; analyses of mean read-
ing scores for a synthetic cohort of students attending
Texas elementary schools during the period 1989
(grade 1) through 1994 (grade 6) reveal that mean
reading scores of African-American and Hispanic chil-
dren in grade 1 are only 94 percent of the statewide
average, while mean reading scores for Asian-Ameri-
can and Anglo 1st graders are 107 and 106 percent of
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for Hispanics exclnde significant numbers of children
who take the reading exam in Spanish or are excused
from taking the exam because of limited English
proficiency. Crude adjustments for differences in fam-
ily income levels narrow, but do not eliminate, differ-
ences in the mean reading scores of Texas’s major
racial/ethnic groups.
Analyses presented in this paper also provide
some support for the widely reported fh~ding that
racial/ethnic gaps in student achievement tend to
increase as years of schooling increase. A final judg-
ment on this finding should be reserved, however,
until we have completed the linking of test and
student records, repeated the same analyses for true
cohorts, and more carefully evaluated the role of the
1st- and 3rd-grade Spanish language tests and non-
test-taking by low-achieving students.
While the findings summarized above are impor-
tant, this paper has been principally concerned with
quantifying within-district variations in selected
school h~puts by campus racial/ethnic and family
income composition. In contrast to Coleman et al.’s
(1966) finding of no consistent differences in the quan-
tity and quality of school inputs for predominantly
majority and minority schools, the analyses presented
in this paper reveal substantial within-district varia-
tions in four types of school inputs: teacher test scores,
years of education, and experience, and class size
(student-teacher ratios). The statistical models pre-
sented in this paper document a sorting of school
inputs based on campus racial/ethnic and socioeco-
nomic composition. In particular, the models suggest
that teacher ability, as measured by verbal and written
proficiency scores, decreases as the campus percent-
age of black and Hispanic students increases; mea-
sured teacher ability increases with the campus per-
centage of high-income students. Estimates of the
variations in other school input measures provide
strong evidence that, in Texas, teachers employed in
schools with high fractions of disadvantaged minority
students have fewer years of education and less expe-
rience; they also have more students in their classes¯
While the findings presented in this paper are
important in their own right, they also have important
implicafions for the larger study of which this paper
is a part, and particularly for the careful estimation
of the determinants of educational achievement, a
major goal of the larger study. In the past, educational
production function studies have had only modest
success in quantifying the relationship between school
inputs and student aclzievement. As Hanushek and
Kain (1971) argued a quarter of a century ago, the
failure of earlier educational production function
studies to obtain more consistent results may be
attributable to hnprecise measurement of school in-
puts. The results h~ this paper are a first step toward
the goal of obtaining more reliable estimates of the
relationship between school inputs and student
achievement. The analyses reported in this paper of
within-district variation in school h~put measures re-
veal that schools differ significantly in the level of
inputs they provide and in the instructional technol-
ogy that they employ. By creating a linked sample of
student achievement scores combined with these and
other precise measures of school inputs, we hope to
deterlnine how the variations in school h~put mea-
sures affect student achievement and the gaps that
persist between disadvantaged minorities and more
prosperous members of other racial/etlmic groups.
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T
his is the right line of research at the right time.
The fortieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of
Education just passed and the thirtieth anniver-
sary of the Coleman Report (Coleman et al. 1966) is
arriving; the time has come for a serious reconsidera-
tion of race, segregation, and schooling. Over the past
decades, a wide variety of desegregation and compen-
satory programs have been introduced, so that their
effects should now be evident. Additionally, there is a
new willingness (perhaps overwillingness) to consider
major restructuring and even elimination of programs.
Thus, it would be nice to have evidence about what is
and is not important in student achievement. Toward
this end, John F. Kain and Kraig Singleton are creating
a truly unique data set that will permit investigation of
some of the key questions that have almost completely
eluded educational researchers. And of course Kain,
an early interpreter of the Coleman Report and one of
the nation’s premier researchers into the nexus of race
and space, is uniquely prepared to undertake this
investigation.
Given the local basis of education and the pat-
terns of local control of educational decisions, a dis-
cussion of education is inherently a discussion of the
spatial distribution of opportunities. In terms of this
conference, the spatial structure of schooling provides
clear linkages between today and the future. So it is of
some importance to understand how schooling oppor-
tunities interact with school attendance patterns and
racial disparities in educational quality.
Race and Schooling
The motivation for the Coleman Report, a study
mandated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was to
investigate the "lack of availability of equality of
May/June 1996 New England Economic Review 111educational opportunity for individuals by reason of
race, color, religion, or national origin." This report
and the follow-on by the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights (1967), entitled Racial Isolation in the Public
Schools, focused attention on one of the most obvious
characteristics of the schools of the mid-1960s, their
separation by race of the students. While not in their
direct charge, these studies also began to provide
information that could be used to evaluate the
achievement effects of what is one of the largest and
most long-running social programs in our nation’s
history--the effort to desegregate the schools of both
The time has come for a serious
reconsideration of race,
segregation, and schooling.
the Old Confederacy and the rest of the Union. Given
this backdrop, it is useful to begin with a quick
summary of what we know about race and schooling
from these original studies and intervening studies.
My overall summary is as follows:
1. Large disparities by race exist in school perfor-
mance (measured, say, by the National Assessment of
Educational Progress), although the gaps have closed
some over the past 10 to 15 years.
2. The racial composition of schools has changed
in fairly complicated ways related to the imposition of
desegregation policies (voluntary or otherwise), to the
development of housing patterns within cities, and to
the general decentralization of the population. None-
theless, while the patterns vary across regions, the
amount of racial contact in the schools has increased
over the past decades (Welch and Light 1987).
3. The racial composition of the schools has min-
imal effects on student test performance, other thh~gs
being equal.
4. Quality of the schools may be correlated with
racial composition, although this is not particularly
well documented.
5. Limited progress has been made in addressing
the important issues of how school policies interact
with racial disparities in performance, largely because
the data available for analysis have not been at all
adequate.
Kain and Singleton have embarked on a data
construction effort in the state of Texas that directly
addresses point 5 and holds promise for filling in the
details on points 3 and 4. Their data set, which is still
under construction, could become the richest data set
ever compiled to address central issues of educational
policy, particularly as related to race and space. Until
now, the largest and most comprehensive data base
has been the one for the original Coleman Report,
even though it has a number of serious flaws for the
investigations of interest here. The Kain and Singleton
data set will clearly leapfrog that data base. Without
repeating their description, the key features include
the extraordinarily large samples, the ability to follow
individual students over time, and the ability to link
school resources rather closely to individual students.
The Kain-Singleton Analysis
The analysis in this paper largely concentrates on
a series of very important descriptive issues. While
this analysis considers only a small part of what they
can eventually exploit, the authors begh~ to provide
important insights that motivate analyses yet to come.
The basic starting point is a findiug that clear and
systematic differences exist in student test perfor-
mance by race and ethnic backgrotmd. While not
surprising in light of other data, this finding sets the
scene for the central analysis. An important point,
however, is that the differences are larger for low-
income blacks and Hispanics. This interaction be-
tween income and race is less well known or docu-
mented in past work.
Most of the new analytical efforts within this
paper are devoted to understanding the distribution
of school resources across schools in Texas. Before
doing this, however, they present what I believe is the
key table for interpreting all of the results--their Table
6. Table 6 presents the only estimates in the paper of
the determinants of student performance. These 6th-
grade results are clearly prelhninary and subject to
modification with further refinements. Nonetheless,
they are rather remarkable. The first column presents
estimates of achievement models that employ just
income-race interactions (plus student gender and
age). The fifth column presents estimates of this same
model with individual school fixed effects, that is, a
dummy variable for each of the about 2,000 separate
campuses. At least at the visual level, the estimated
differences in performance by race appear independent
of school level inputs. In other words, the racial differ-
ences are not affected by differences in school level
resources.
112 May/June 1996 New England Economic ReviewThis finding does not particularly surprise me,
because I have long held that school quality is not
closely related to expenditure or conventional school
inputs (Hanushek 1986). But it does provide a some-
what different interpretation of much of the Kain-
Singleton analysis.
The focus of attention of their study is how school
resources vary by race of the school. They examine
scores on teachers’ tests (TECAT), master’s degrees,
teaching experience (novice or old), and class size. The
analysis is very clever and delnonstrates the power
that comes from their data set. They investigate how
resources differ by race, holding constant overall dis-
trict factors through the use of district fixed effects.
The general form of the regressions calls for regressing
each of the school resource measures on percent black,
percent Hispanic, and interactions with income along
with a district fixed-effect term.
Several aspects of these analyses stand out. First,
and most important, these resources consistently are
distributed such that more resources go to schools
with low minority populations. Schools with high
proportions of blacks and Hispanics shnply get less of
each of these resources.
Second, and somewhat unexpected, the pattern
and the magnitude of these race effects are very
shnilar across districts. Large MSAs as a group or
individual large districts look quite similar to all
districts in the state. (Again, these conclusions are not
based on formal statistical tests but instead on quali-
tative summaries of the estimated models.) The appar-
ent uniformity belies conventional views that such
race effects are larger and more intense in the big
urban centers.
Third, their careful consideration of the measure-
ment of inputs is admirable. They ~vork hard at
constructing solid estimates of teacher test scores.
They also provide an interesting supplemental analy-
sis of how class size varies widely by type of instruc-
tion and grade level, adding a real catttion about
inherent conceptual difficulties in measttring class
sizes for districts. Average class size for a district, for
example, will be a very poor measure of potential
performance effects if there are nonlinearities in how
class sizes affect performance.1
1 Some people, beginning with Glass and Smith (1979), argue
that class sizes above some level have little effect on performance
but have significant effects below a cut-off--roughly 15 students per
teacher in the Glass and Smith analysis. Ferguson (1991) argues
from Texas data that class size effects become more important when
pupil-teacher ratios rise above a threshold. Specifically, "the num-
ber of ’students per teacher’ is important only when it exceeds
As mentioned, the interpretation by many people
of these resource variations is that they indicate dis-
parities in the quality of schooling received by stu-
dents. My interpretation is different, because the evi-
dence on resources indicates that master’s degrees and
class size are not closely related to student perfor-
mance. For example, in 277 separate estimates of the
effects of teacher-pupil ratios on student outcomes, 15
percent find statistically significant positive effects
while 13 percent find statistically significant negative
effects (Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor 1995). The re-
maining 72 percent are statistically insignificant; that
is, we are not very confident that student outcomes are
Kain and Singleton’s data set
could become the richest ever
constructed to address central
issues of educational policy,
particularly as related to
race and space.
affected by teacher-pupil ratios. Teacher experience
shows somewhat stronger effects but, as Kain and
Singleton point out, causality is not well sorted out.
The evidence on test scores tends to be stronger: 26
of the 36 studies with estimated effects on student
achievement are positive and 15 of those are statisti-
cally significant.2 Thus, past work might suggest tak-
ing the TECAT variations more seriously in terms of
potential effects on student outcomes.
But remember Table 6. That table suggests that
schooMevel differences do not affect racial differences
in student performance. By implication this supports a
finding of "no effect" of these factors, because we
know that these factors are themselves distributed in a
systematic maimer by race and ethnicity.
The overall patterns of resource variations remain
inherently interesting. If these hold up to further
refinement of the data and analyses, they suggest
eighteen" (p. 477). Both of these studies imply nonlinear responses
to variations in class size, and suggest that aggregation across
grades and schools within districts will lead to significant biases.
2 This summary omits the five studies that report statistically
insignificant effects but do not report the sign of the estimated
relationship.
May/June 1996 New England Economic Review 113systematic discrimination in the operation of schools.
Resources that are conventionally thought to affect
student achievement are systematically distributed
toward the majority whites in Texas and away from
the blacks and Hispanics. We can thus be thankful that
these resources in reality do not appear to have much
to do with student perforlnance.
Finally, I must conclude with a statement of
anticipation. Kain and Singleton have constructed a
data base that is likely to become the source of much
new knowledge about schooling. Issues ranging from
the effects of school desegregation to the impacts of
student migration to the effects of special education
and other disth~ct programs all can be brought under
the spotlight of their data. They should be encouraged
to work faster, so we can have the answers sooner.
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emand for college-graduate workers was strong during the 1980s
I (Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman 1989; Katz and Murphy 1990;
Kosters 1989; Freeman 1991). Their relative wage rose, and the
share of 18- to 24-year-olds attending college rose in response. Have the
demand and technology shocks that produced this result now run their
course? Is the supply response large enough to stop or reverse the 1980s
escalation of the relative wages of college graduates?
Read superficially, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) projections
appear to suggest that the answer to these questions is ’%es." In the most
recent BLS report, the growing supply of college graduates was projected
to outstrip growth in demand by 330,000 am~ually (Shelley 1994). An
even larger gap between supply and demand had been projected in 1992
(Shelley 1992). Looking at earlier projections, some in the press even
reported that the college graduate labor market was about to go bust. New
York Times reporter Louis Uchitelle, for example, led off an article titled
"Surplus of College Graduates Dims Job Outlook for Others" with the
following:
Hundreds of thousands of jobs, once performed creditably without a college
degree, are today going to college graduates as employers take advantage of
an oversupply .... At roughly 25 percent of the work force--higher than in
any other industrial nation--college graduates outstrip the demand for their
skills, the Labor Department reports (June 18, 1990, p. 1).
Most economists, however, do not believe a surplus of college
graduates and other skilled workers exists now or is likely to develop
anytime soon. The Secretary of Labor and the Chief Economist’s office
within the U.S. Department of Labor apparently give little credence to the
BLS projections of a college graduate surplus. Skills shortages are a
common theme of Secretary Robert Reich’s speeches and of policy
initiatives of the department.
Who is right? Is a bust of the college graduate labor market on thehorizon? In fact, a closer reading of the latest BLS
projections suggests that it is not. The future is pre-
dicted to be much like the past. Since the recent past
has been characterized by low unemployment and
rising relative wages for college graduates, the BLS
data can also be interpreted as predicting more of the
same.
Past BLS projections have not been particularly
successful in predicting changes in the market for
college graduates. The BLS projected a strong market
for college graduates in 1970, just prior to the bust of
the 1970s. The BLS projected a weak market in 1980,
just prior to the 1980s boom. Moreover, the task of
projecting the number of jobs "requiring a college
degree" into the future is essentially impossible. The
methods used to make the projections are not well
adapted to the task. BLS projections published in 1981,
1983, and 1985 underestimated the gro~vth of mana-
gerial and professional jobs and overestimated the
growth of lower-skill jobs. The methods used to
project occupational employment inevitably miss an
hnportant portion of the rise in skills that is under way
in our economy.
Findings about skill differentials
suggest that we should raise high-
school standards, increase student
financial aid, make tuition tax-
deductible, and stop increasing
tuition at public colleges.
An alternate methodology for projecting occupa-
tional employment is available. Regressions predict-
ing occupational employment shares with a trend,
unemployment, the trade deficit, and the share of
workers using personal computers did a better job
projecting the early 1990s than the BLS. Both methods,
however, missed predicting the slowdowns in the
growth of clerical, technical, and craft jobs.
The updated model projects that professional,
technical, and managerial jobs will account for 60
percent of job growth between 1990 and 2005. Skill
differentials between college-level jobs and other jobs
continue to expand, even in the most recent data. And
because the college-age population cohort is small, the
increase in the share of the cohort attending school
has not produced a substantial increase in the ratio of
new BAs to total employment. Rates of college com-
pletion are not high enough to flood the college
graduate market, and U.S. youth are not overeducated
relative to those of other nations, as has been claimed.
In fact, young Europeans and East Asians spend more
years in school than young Americans.
These findings have important policy implica-
tions. They suggest that we should raise high school
standards, increase student financial aid, make tuition
tax-deductible, and stop increasing tuition at public
colleges.
What Do the 1994 BLS Projections
of Supply and Demand for
Graduates Really Imply?
Let us begin by examining the projections of
supply and demand made by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics in 1992 and 1994. The 1992 report states that
"estimates of available entrants to the college graduate
labor force (supply) will average... 406,000 more than
demand" (Shelley 1992, p. 16). The 1994 report pre-
dicts that "nearly 25 percent of new entrants are
expected to settle for jobs that do not require a college
degree" (Shelley 1994, p. 9). Both sound quite negative
about the future demand for college graduates. Table
1 presents the numbers. In 1992, BLS projected a
significant deterioration of the supply-demand bal-
ance during the 1990s. The annual increase in the
number of "underemployed" graduates was projected
to be equal to 31 percent of the annual flow of BAs into
the labor force (both immigrants and new graduates)
during the period. The share of underemployed col-
lege graduates was projected to increase from 19.9
percent in 1990 to 25.9 percent in 2000.
However, when later projections were made, pre-
dictions of employment growth in professional jobs
~vere revised upward, from the 340,500 per year of the
1991 projections to 477,000 per year in the 1993 pro-
jections and to 461,000 in the 1995 projections (Silvestri
and Lukasiewicz 1991; Silvestri 1993; BLS 1996). This
has improved BLS’s projected outlook for college
graduates. Consequently, in the most recent report,
the gap between supply and delnand is expected to
grow only slightly, from 22 percent of the gross
increase in the supply of BAs to 24 percent after 1992.
The BLS also projects that the growth of the "under-
employment" share will accelerate somewhat after
1992.
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College Graduates Entering the Labor Force and College-
Level lob Openings, Past and Projected to 2005
Annual Averages, in Thousands
1992 Projections    1994 Projections
Are the BLS Estimates of
Jobs "’Requiring" a




1984-    1990-    1984-    1992-
1990     2005     1992     2005
Supply coming from:
New graduates (National Center for
Educational Statistics projections) 974 1106 1000 1180
Other entrants (immigration) 214 214 200 200
Increase in supply of BAs in labor
force 1188 1320 1200 1380
Demand coming from:
Growth of occupations normally
"requiring" a BA 459 311 593 562
Growth due to upgrading 308 291 157 168
Replacement demand--due to
retirements 197 312 190 320
Increase in college-level jobs held
by BAs 964 914 940 1050
Yearly increase in graduates not in
college-level jobs 224 406 260 330
Ratio of this supply-demand gap to
growth of BAs in labor force 18.9% 30.8% 21.7% 23.9%
Annual change in the share of BAs
underemployed .16% .61% .35% .50%
These projections can be interpreted in two very
different ways. Many reporters have interpreted them
as implying tliat tlie market for college graduates is
about to deteriorate. This interpretation comes from
focusing on projected gaps between demand and
supply in the future. Focusing instead on how the
future is expected to differ from the recent past, one
arrives at a different conclusion. The 1994 report
projects that the supply-demand balance for college
graduate workers for the 1992-2005 period will be
rather similar to the conditions that prevailed dur-
ing the previous eight years. Since unemployment
rates of college graduates remained low and relative
wage rates grew substantially from 1984 to 1992,
the BLS projections really predict a continuation of
the strong labor market for college graduates that
characterized the 1980s. They also point out, quite
correctly, tliat a strong market for college graduates
does not imply that all college graduates will liave
professional, technical, managerial, or sales represen-
tative jobs.
The BLS assesses the current
demand-supply balance for college
graduates by defining a set of jobs
that "require" a college degree and
then counting up the number of
college graduates who do not have
one of these jobs. The workers be-
ing categorized are not asked
whether they believe a college de-
gree is required or useful in their
job. The classification is based on
the match between reported educa-
tion and reported occupation.
Workers with fewer than 16 years
of schooling are automatically
com~ted as having jobs that do not
require a college degree. Workers
with 16 or more years of schooling
are classified as "tmderemployed"
when the reported occupation ap-
pears not to "require" a college
degree.
This classification of occupa-
tions is inherently arbitrary and
idiosyncratic to the analyst. When Sargent and Pflee-
ger (1990) did the analysis, the BLS concluded there
were 18.1 million college-level jobs in 1988. When
Hecker (1992) reestimated the number two years later,
he found 21.8 million college-level jobs (a 20 percent
increase). Yet the validity of the whole effort to mea-
sure "underemployment" depends on this classifica-
tion being done correctly in every detail, not ol~ly for
the present but also for up to 15 years in the future.
This is essentially impossible.
First, the occupational coding system used by the
Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Census is
not reliable and comprehensive enougli to allow accu-
rate measurement of a concept like "underemploy-
ment." Census Bureau studies have found that be-
tween 18.3 and 27.3 percent of the individuals
recorded as professionals, technicians, or managers in
one interview are recorded in a less skilled occupation
in a subsequent interview four to seven months later
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972).
Substantial errors also occur in measuring educa-
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spondents recorded as having more than 16 years of
schooling in one interview are recorded as having
fewer than 16 years of schooling in a later interview. If
errors in reporting occupation and schooling are un-
correlated with each other, measurement error raises
the esthnated "underemployment" share by as much
as 12 to 18 percentage points.1
Consequently, reporth~g and coding errors are
responsible for many of the apparent mismatches
bet~veen an individual’s occupation and his or her
education. Ho~v else can one explain the 9.6 percent of
college teachers and the 5.4 to 6.5 percent of lawyers,
physicians, and secondary school teachers who claim
not to have completed 16 years of schooling (BLS 1990,
Table F-3)? The unreliability of individual measures of
occupation and education means that counts of mis-
matches between schooling and occupation derived
from micro CPS data have little validity. True mis-
matches between education and occupation are a lot
less common than these statistics suggest.
The second problem is the lack of symmetry in
the handling of possible mismatches between educa-
tional qualifications and occupation. Large numbers of
workers without college degrees say they occupy jobs
that most people would agree "require" at least a
four-year degree. In 1988, 44,000 la~vyers, 42,000 social
scientists, 46,000 natural scientists, 33,000 physicians,
61,000 college teachers, 143,000 elementary and sec-
ondary school teachers, and 363,000 engineers said
they had not completed four or more years of college
(BLS 1990, Table F-3). The BLS does not classify these
individuals as "undereducated." By ruling out the
possibility of undereducation, the conceptual frame-
work makes inevitable a conclusion that there are too
many college graduates.
The third problem is the great heterogeneity of
the college graduate category. Ten percent of college
graduates cannot write a brief letter explaining an
error made on a credit card bill or determine the
discount frown an oil bill for early payment (National
~ Let us make the standard assumption that measurement error
is random (that is, uncorrelated over time and uncorrelated across
questions). Then, 18.3 to 27.3 percent of respondents reporting a
PTM occupation in one interview reporting a non-PTM occupation
in another interview implies that 0.8526 to 0.9039 of the individuals
who are truly in a PTM occupation report themselves h~ a PTM
occupation {(1 - .273).5 = .8526}. The esthnated proportion of true
college graduates who report haviug less than a college degree is
0.9539 to 0.9721 {(1 - .09)~= .9539}. Thus, the estimated proportion
of true college graduates with PTiVl jobs who underreport either
their occupation or schooling ranges between 0.1213 and 0.1867
{.1867 = (1 - .8526 * .9539)}.
Table 2
Occupations of College Graduates by
Degree of Prose Literacy









1    2 3 4
11.2 7.3 7.5 4.6
5 Total
2.3 5.5
46 56 64 75 83 71
1.6 7.8 30 42 16.8 100
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) 1995a, pp. 38,
40, 66). As one can see h~ Table 2, these graduates are
less likely to have professional, technical, or manage-
rial jobs and much more likely to have service or
laborer jobs (NCES 1995a, p. 95).
More than 40 percent of young adults with asso-
ciate or bachelor’s degrees cannot calculate change
from a menu. Seventeen percent of young college
graduates read at a level below the typical eleventh-
grader (Kitsch and Jungeblut 1986). How can someone
with high-school or lower reading and math levels
be considered "underemployed" or "overeducated"
in a secretarial, carpentry, or retail sales job? For such
individuals, the problem is "undereducation," not
"underemployment."~
The fourth problem is that for most occupations,
the question "Does it require a college degree?" does
not have a "yes" or "no" answer. It is a matter of
degree. Some employers structure their management
jobs in ways that make the skills normally developed
in college absolutely essential; at other employers such
skills are very helpful, and at still others the skills are
of little advantage. The magnitude of the college
graduate productivity advantage also depends on the
quality of the alternative labor supply. If the compe-
tence of those who ended their schoolbag with high
school deteriorates, as it did during the 1970s (Bishop
1991), the demand for college graduates will increase.
The correct answer to the question of ~vhether a
x Robst’s (1995) analysis of PSID data indicates that the prestige
ranking of the college one attends also has large effects on the
probability of being "underemployed." Those who attended col-
leges in the bottom fifth of the prestige ranking had twice the
likelihood of being counted as "tmderemployed" of those who
attended colleges in the top quartile.
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college degree is required is "It depends." It depends
on circumstances that analysts and researchers have
little knowledge of and no ability to forecast a decade
ahead.
The BLS projection exercise apparently assumes
that occupations have specific educational or basic
skill "requirements." This job requirements view of
the world is illustrated in Figure 1. Job A requires a
basic skill level of at least M1 while job B requires basic
skills at or above M2. Exceeding these skill thresholds,
however, very quickly yields no further increases in
productivity. Once the threshold is reached, dhninish-
ing returns set in with a vengeance. People working in
job A who have an M2 skill level are classified as
"underemployed." Is this ho~v basic skills influence
job performance? Let us test the job requirements
hypothesis.
The job requirements view predicts that everyone
in job A will have at least the M~ skill level, and that
as a result of diminishing returns, the steep produc-
tivity increase near the M1 skill level quickly becomes
a very gentle slope as the individual’s skill increases.
In other words, the relationship between test scores
and job performance should have a convex shape (a
large negative second derivative). The job require-
ments view also implies that the impact of basic skills
tests on job performance should diminish as schooling
increases.
Data collected by the U.S. Department of Labor’s
Employment Service to validate the General Aptitude
Test Battery were used to test these hypotheses. This
data set contains data on job performance, the ~zine
GATB "aptitudes," and background data on 36,614
individuals in 159 different occupations. Professional,
managerial, and high-level sales occupations were not
studied but the sample is quite representative of the
71.1 million workers in the rest of the occupational
distribution. It ranges from drafters and laboratory
testers to hotel clerks and knitting-machine operators.
A total of 3,052 employers participated. (See Box 1,
"Description of the Job Performance Study," below.)
The results are presented in Figure 2 and Table 3.B
3 Selection effects generate a negative bias in coefficients on
years of schooling. In a selected sample like accepted job applicants
or job incumbents, one cannot argue that these omitted unobserv-
able variables are uncorrelated with the included variables that
were used to make initial hh’ing decisions and, therefore, that
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A Test of the Job Requirements Model~
General Mean of
General Academic GAA When Psychomotor R2/ General Psycho-
Academic Ability Schooling Psychomotor Ability Years of Number of Academic motor
Ability Squared over 12 Years Ability Squared Schooling Observations Ability Ability
All Workers .227*** -.0096 .057*** .122*** -.017*** -.017*** .1329 .00 .00
(.009) (.007) (.014) (.007) (.005) (.004) 31,399
Occupational Groups
Technicians    .265 .... .033      .030        .116 .... .018       .030*      .1188       .49      .19
(.043) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.017) (.016) 2,384
High-Skill .223*** .012 .033 .112*** .003 .022 .1611 .53 .42
Clerical (.037) (.028) (.046) (.030) (.017) (.017) 2,570
Low-Skill .323"** .013 .024 .115 .... .019 -.010 .1354 .21 .18
Clerical (.028) (.021) (.039) (.020) (.015) (.012) 4,122
Plant .181"** -.030 .062 .135"** -.032 .003 .2063 .30 -.16
Operators (.066) (.043) (.098) (.048) (.027) (.031) 651
Craft Workers .236 .....007 .018 .098"** -.010 -.011 .1481 .12 -.11
(.016) (.012) (.026) (.013) (.008) (.007) 10,061
Operatives     .177*** -.002 .050 .168 .... .019* -.032*** .1433 -.38 -.03
(.017) (.013) (.036) (.014) (.010) (.008) 8,167
Service .340"** .005 .070 .148"** -.032* -.021 .1559 -.31 -.24
Workers (.037) (.026) (.063) (.028) (.019) (.017) 1,927
SalesClerks .175" -.173"* .109 .197"** -.070" -.015 .1172 .19 .08
(.090) (.063) (.129) (.066) (.042) (.037) 416
*Probability less than .10 on a two tail test.
**Probability less than .05 on a two tail test.
***Probability less than .01 on a two tail test.
aThe other variables included in the models but not shown were age, age squared, occupational experience, occupational experience squared, plant
expedance, plant experience squared, and dummies for female, black and Hispanic. Standard errors are in parentheses under the coefficient.
Source: Analysis of GATB Revaiidation Data in the U.S. Employment Semice’s Individual Data file.
For general academic ability, the hypothesis of dimin-
ishing returns was rejected ha seven of the eight
occupation groups. The exception was sales clerks,
coefficients on included variables are tmbiased. When someone with
10 years of formal schooling is hired for a job that normally requires
12 years of schooling, there is probably a reason for that decision.
The employer saw something positive in that job applicant (maybe
the applicant received particularly strong recommendations from
previous employers) that led to the decision to make an exception to
the rule that new hires should have 12 years of schooling. The
analyst is unaware of the positive recommendations, does not
include them in the job performance model and, as a result, the
coefficient on schooling is biased toward zero. This phenomenon
also causes the estimated effects of other worker traits used to select
workers for the job such as previous relevant work experience to be
biased toward zero. Consequently, the results presented should not
be viewed as estimates of the structural effect of schooling on
worker productivity. The test score results are not similarly biased,
however, because firms using aptitude tests similar to the GATB for
selecting new hires ~vere excluded from the regression.
where the squared term on general academic ability
was sig~fificantly negative and general academic abil-
ity had a positive effect on performance only when the
test scores were no more than one-half a standard
deviation above the mean.
For psychomotor skills, however, the hypothesis
of diminishhag returns was accepted at the 10 percent
level for operatives, service workers and sales work-
ers, and for all workers combined. The second deriv-
atives are not so large, however, that the sign of the
relationship reverses within the range of actual data.
For all workers and for operatives, the derivative of
performance with respect to the psychomotor test
scores at one standard deviation above the mean of the
test is 52 to 57 percent of the derivative when test
scores are one standard deviation below the mean. For
service workers, the derivative one standard deviation
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Description of the Job Performance Study
The workers in the study were given the GATB
test battery and asked to supply information on
theh" age, education, plant experience, and total
experience. Plant experience was defined as years
working in that occupation for the current em-
ployer. Total experience was defined as years work-
ing in the occupation for all employers. The depen-
dent variable was an average of two ratings
(generally two weeks apart) supplied by the work-
er’s immediate supervisor. The Standard Descrip-
tive Rath~g Scale obtains supervisory ratings of five
aspects of job performance (quantity, quality, accu-
racy, job knowledge, and job x~ersatility) as well as
an "all-around" perforlnance rating. Firms with
only one employee in the job classification were
excluded, as were individuals whose reported work
experience was inconsistent with their age.
Because wage rates, average productivity levels,
and the standards used to rate employees vary
from plant to plant, mean differences in ratings
across establishments have no real meaning. There-
fore, normalized ratings deviations were predicted
by deviations from the job/establishment’s mean
for gender, race, Hispanic, age, age squared, plant
experience, plant experience squared, total occupa-
tional experience, total occupational experience
squared, schooling, and test composites.
Deviations of rated performance (RI]~ - Rp~) from
the mean for the establishment (Rp~) were analyzed,
where the subscript i refers to the individual and
j refers to the job and establishment combination.
The variance of the job performance distribution
was also standardized across establishments by
dividing (RIj~ - RI~) by the standard deviation
of rated performance, SDj(Ri~), calculated for that
firm. Separate models were estimated for each
major occupation. They were specified as follows:
1) Ri~ - Rp~ - /30 + !31(Vij- Tj) +/32(Tij- Vj)2
SDj(Ri~~)
q~ /33(Sij - Sj) q- /34(Xij - Xj) q- ]35(Dij - Dj) + v2
where Rij = rating standardized to have a zero






a vector of test score composites--general
academic ability and psychomotor ability.
years of schooling.
a vector of age and experience variables--
age, age squared, total occupational experi-
ence, total occupational experience
squared, plant experience and plant expe-
rience squared.
a vector of dummy variables for black,
Hispanic, and female.
Xi and Dj are the lneans of test composites,
schooling, experience variables, and race
and gender dummies for the job/establish-
ment combh~ation.
General Academic Ability was constructed by
averaging the GATB’s G and N composites. Conse-
quently, it is a weighted average of four subtests: a
timed arithmetic computation test with a weight of
0.25, an arithmetic reasoning test with a weight
of 0.41, a vocabulary test with a weight of 0.17, and
a spatial relations test with a weight of 0.17.
Squared terms and an h~teraction with schooling
greater than 12 were included in the model to test
for ceiling effects and other nonlinearities.
above the mean is 37 percent of the derivative at one
standard deviation below the mean.
These results suggest that the job requirements
model has some validity for psychomotor skills but
not for the basic academic skills that are the primary
objective of schoolbag. Both this analysis and studies
conducted by others have found that the underlying
relationship between basic academic skills and perfor-
mance in a specific job is smooth, continuous, and
close to linear (Hunter 1983).
The Record of BLS Projections of the
Demand and Supply for College Graduates
Despite the difficulties, since 1970 the BLS has
published biennial projections of the supply-demand
balance. The starting point of its projections are its
forecasts of occupational employment growth. It then
projects changes h~ the proportion of particular occu-
pations that "require a college degree," the number of
bachelor’s degrees to be awarded per year, and the
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BLS Projections of the Supply/Demand for College Graduates and Subsequent Changes in
the College Wage Pre~nium
Projected Growth in                                                           Actual Change
Underemployed College Graduates Implied Predicted in CG/HSG
Annual 10-Year % Actual lO-Year % Underemployed Change in Wage Ratio
Date Projection Average Change in Share Growth of Share College Grad CG/HSG (Percentage
Published Period (000s) Underemployed Underemployed % Share~BLS Wage Ratio Points)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1970 1968-80 8 -4.2 6.7 10.6 Rise -6.7
1972 1970-80 20 -4.3 7.3 11.3 Rise -7.6
1974 1972-85 62 -3.5 5.3 14.4 Rise + 14.2
1976 1974-85 86 -2.9 3.7 15.4 Rise +18.9
1978 1976-85 300 5.5 1.7 17.7 Decline +23.2
1980 1978-90 275 3.5 2.2 17.3 Decline +26.5
1982 1980-90 300 4.1 1.3 18.6 Decline +23.6
1984 1982-95 300 4.2 .3 19.7 Decline
1986 1984-95 200 1.2 19.1 Small Decline
1988 1986-2000 100 -2.3 19.4 Small Rise
1990 1988-2000 150 -.5 19.5 Stable
1992 1990-2005 406 6,1 19.9 Big Decline
1994 1992-2005 330 5.0 20.0 Decline
Source: The record of past BLS forecasts of the supply-demand balance is taken from an unpublished BLS memorandum and from Shelley (1992; 1994).
Columns 4 and 5 are the projected and actual growth over the succeeding 10-year period of the share of college graduates who are "underemployed." The
BLS estimates of the share of college graduates underemployed given in column 6 are taken from Hecker (1992). They are for the year that begins the
projection period. For occupations outside the professional, technical, managerial, and sales representative category, worker reports of qualifying training
requirements from the 1983 survey of training received were used to estimate the proportion of jobs in the occupation that required a college degree. The
data on subsequent changes in the ratio of college and high school wages for workers with one to five years of experience are taken from Katz and Murphy
(1990).
annual rates of flow into and out of jobs by workers
with a college degree. Comparisons are then made
between the projected number of job openings "re-
quiring a college degree" and the projected flow of
college graduates seeking work, producing estimates
of the number of "underemployed" college graduates.
Column 3 of Table 4 presents BLS’s projection of the
annual increase in the number of "underemployed"
college graduates during the projection period. Col-
umn 4 presents the projected 10-year change in the
share of college graduates who are "underemployed."
Quite clearly the BLS effort to project the supply-
demand balance for college graduates has been a
failure. Compare the predicted changes in the share of
college graduates underemployed (Column 4) to the
actual changes (Column 5). At the beginning of the
1970s, BLS projected a decline in the share of college
graduates who were underemployed during the sub-
sequent decade. Instead, the share underemployed
grew substantially. Changes in the relative wage of
young college graduates provide an additional ex post
criterion for evaluating the accuracy of BLS’s projec-
tions of supply-demand balance (Columns 7 and 8). If
the projection had been correct, the relative wage of
college graduates should have also risen during the
period. Instead, the college premium fell 6.7 to 7.6
percentage points by 1980 (Column 8).
At the end of the 1970s, BLS was projecting large
surpluses of college graduates during the 1980s. Ac-
cording to the projection made in 1978, the surplus of
college graduates was going to grow at a rate equal to
30 percent of the annual flow of bachelor’s degrees
awarded and the "underemployment" share was go-
ing to rise 5.5 percentage points by the end of the
decade. The rise in the "underemployment" share was
instead only 1.7 percent. If the projections had been
correct, relative wages of college graduates should
have fallen; instead they rose by 23 to 26 percentage
points.
In reality, demand responds to supply and supply
responds, with a lag, to demand. An increase in the
supply of college graduates with computer science
degrees, for example, lowers wages for the group, and
this allows some companies to undertake projects not
feasible before and it induces other companies to keep
development work in the United States rather than
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ties influence enrolhnent decisions and choice of ma-
jor, so supply responds to demand. Getting "college-
level" jobs also depends on personal qualities--
initiative, work habits, and the like--of the graduates.
The BLS projection model has oscillated between
predicting large decreases and large increases in the
share of college graduates who are "underemployed"
because it omits feedback loops and other key deter-
minants of employment patterns. If one wants to
project shares of college graduates in "non-college"
jobs, a better approach is to estimate a historical model
(or system of equations) using variables that can be
forecasted h~to the future.
The evidence suggests that the BLS’s lnethods of
translating occupational projections into projections of
the demand-supply balance for college graduates are
seriously flawed. But the problelns are not limited to
the way in which occupational employment distribu-
tions are translated into numbers of college-level jobs.
The BLS’s occupational projections are also seriously
flawed. The BLS systematically under-projects the
growth of skilled jobs and over-projects the growth of
unskilled jobs.
Biases in BLS Projections of the Growth
of Managerial and Professional Jobs
A myth is abroad h~ the land that job growth is
coming (or will come) primarily from low-skill jobs
("McJobs"). In 1987, Levin and Rumberger, for exam-
ple, stated:
In summary, the evidence suggests that new tecln~ologies
are unlikely to have a profound effect in upgrading the
education and skill requirements of jobs, and that most
new jobs or job openings will be h~ occupations that
require relatively low skills and education (1987, p. 344).
In 1990, Mishel and Teixeira predicted:
Growth in skill levels from occupational upgrading will
actually slow down in the 1990s. In fact, future growth
rates in skill levels are likely to be only one-fourth to
one-third as fast as those h~ the recent past (1990, p. 1).
In 1995, Basil Whiting, a former deputy assistant
secretary in the Department of Labor, wrote:
Labor Department projections show that most new jobs
in the economy at the turn of the century will not be those
of technicians bnt rather in the more prosaic and lower-
paid fields of hospitality, retail sales, clerical work, jani-
toring and other service occupations (Whiting and Sayer
1995, p. 11).
All of these writers based their forecasts on BLS
occupational projections. Levin and Rumberger justi-
fied their reliance on BLS projections, as follows:
On the basis of their past record they are still likely to
provide a better indication of how the overall job market
will look in the future than generalizations from a few
casual observations, guesswork, or simple extrapolations
of past trends. The point is that none of the latter devices
has come close to the accuracy of the BLS forecasts iu a
world where--by their nature--no forecasts will be per-
fect (1987, p. 338).
How good is the past record of BLS projections of
job growth? BLS projected in 1981 that professional,
technical, and managerial jobs, which were 24.9 per-
cent of the nation’s jobs in 1978, would account for 28
percent of employment growth between 1978 and
1990 (see Table 5, line 3). Operatives, laborers, farm
laborers, and service workers, 37 percent of employ-
ment in 1978, had been projected to account for 35.4
percent of employment growth durh~g the period.
Columns 4 and 6 of Table 5 tell us what actually
happened: Professional, technical, and managerial
jobs accounted for 53.6 percent of 1978-90 job growth
and operative, laborer, and service jobs accotmted for
only 8.7 percent of the growth.
The passage of time has produced two additional
opportunities to compare projected growth to actual
growth: BLS’s 1983 and 1985 projections of occupa-
tional employment growth through 1995. BLS pro-
jected in 1983 that professional, technical, and mana-
gerial jobs (PT&M) would account for 30.7 percent of
job growth from 1982 to 1995. In fact, PT&M jobs
accounted for 53 percent of employment growth.
Operative, laborer, and service jobs (OL&S) were
projected to account for 30.8 percent of job growth, but
h~ reality accounted for only 15.7 percent of job
growth.
For the 1984 to 1995 period, BLS projected that
PT&M employment would account for 38.8 percent of
employment growth and that OL&S would account
for 28.7 percent of growth. Here again, they were far
off the mark. For the 1984 to 1995 period, PT&M
accounted for 58.3 percent of job growth, and OL&S
accounted for 15.9 percent (row 5 of Table 5). Figure 3
presents a comparison of projected and actual growth
by broad occupational category (rather than occupa-
tional shares of total growth, as in Table 5) for the
1984-95 period. As before, modest growth (22 percent
over 11 years) was projected for professional and
managerial jobs. Actual growth rates were much larg-
er: 35 percent for professional jobs and 51 percent for
managerial jobs. The BLS projection for technical jobs
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Grozoth Shares of High-Skill and Low-Skill Jobs:
Projections Compared to Subsequent Changes
Percent Professional- Percent Operative-
When Projection Technical-Managerial Laborer-Service
Published Period Projected    Actual Projected Actual





1. 1969 28.9 23.1
2. 1971 28.4 20.1
Bureau of Labor Statistics Revised Projection Method
3. 1981 1978-90 28.0 53.6 35.4 8.7
4. 1983 1982-95 30.7 53.0 30.8 15.7
5. 1985 1984-95 38.8 58.3 28.7 15.9
6. 1987 1986-2000 37.9 63.7* 27.8 15.7"
7. 1989 1988-2000 40.8 70.1" 24.6 11.0"
8. 1991 1990-2005 40.9 74.2* 27.1 10.5"
9. 1993 1992-2005 40.6 58.1" 31.6 16.2"
10. 1995 1994-2005 45.9 -- 30.2 --
Bishop/Carter Logit Regressions--1990-2000
11. Model: Time-Unemp-Trade-
PCShare 69.8 74.2* 1.9 10.5"
Bishop Linear Regressions--1990-2005
12. M1--Time-Unemp-Trade-
PCShare 68.1 74.2* .3 10.5*
13. M2--Tirne-Unernp-Trade 57.2 74.2* 10.6 10.5*
14. M3~Tirne-Unernp. 52.5 74.2* 6.1 10.5"
15. Bishop---Table 6 Model--
1995-2005 61.4 -- 12.1 --
Source: The record of the 1960-75 and 1970-80 BLS projections of occupational shares and
actual outcomes is taken from Carey (1980) and Carey and Kasunic (1982). Later projections
come from Carey (1981); Silvestri, Lucasiewicz and Einstein (1983); Silvestd and Lucasiewicz
(1985, 1987, 1989, 1991); Silvestri (1993) and BLS (1996). They are based on Occupational
Employment Survey estimates of occupational shares in the initial year. CPS data on occupational
employment from January issues of Employment and Earnings and Klein (1984) are used to
estimate actual growth shares. Estimates of the level of high-skill employment are higher in CPS
data and this accounts for about 5 percentage points of the difference between projected and
actual growth shares. For projection periods ending after 1995, an "actual" growth share (indicated
by an as.terisk) is reported for the shorter pedod from the baseline year up to August 1995. The Iogit
regression model is from Bishop and Carter 1991b, Table 2. The linear regression predictions of
employment growth are from Bishop (1992b). The projection in the bottom row uses the
regressions in Table 6 and assumes that in 2005 the unemployment rate is 5.5 percent, the trade
deficit equals 1.4 percent of GDP, and PC use is 80 percent above its 1990 value.
matched the actual growth of 29 percent, however. For
the operative, laborer, and service categories, each
component was overestimated.
Why Have BLS Projections Been
So Far Off the Mark?
value-added shares. For example,
unanticipated changes in the fed-
eral deficit and exchange rates
made export and import shares
of industry output particularly dif-
ficult to predict in the 1980s. Indus-
try-specific productixdty growth may
also be in error, resulting in incor-
rect predictions of industry em-
ployment.
Substantial changes also have
occurred in the occupational com-
position of specific industries, and
this has often been a major source
of error in occupational projec-
tions. BLS derives occupational
employment demand by multiply-
ing projected industry employ-
ment totals by an assumed, in-
dustry-specific, occupational share
vector. Adjustments are made to
these vectors when BLS studies of
the introduction of new technology
indicate that changes can be antic-
ipated by the end of the forecast
period.4 Since studies cannot be
funded for every industry and for
every technological innovation,
and the effects of these changes are
difficult to foresee 10 years in ad-
vance, many of the changes that
will occur in the composition of
occupational demand within in-
dustries are missed by BLS projec-
tions.
The BLS obtah~s its estimates
of the occupational composifion of
employment in specific industries
from a survey of establishments,
the Occupational Employment Sta-
tistics (OES). When the BLS made
the projections of 1990 occupational employment h~
1981, only one wave of OES survey data was available
for most states and industries. The projections for the
1984-95 period were made more difficult by a 1982-83
change in the occupational classification system. Com-
parability over thne is also threatened by the periodic
BLS occupational projections contain many pos-
sible sources of error. Projections of final demand
shares may be ~vrong. The input-output matrix is often
quite old, and this contributes to errors in projecth~g
4 This characterization of ho;v occupational staffing patterns
were projected is based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook
of Methods, Bulletin 2134-1, 1982, p. 143, and conversations with Ron
Kutscher, Associate Commissioner responsible for projections.
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changes in the industry-specific list of occupations
that respondents receive on their questiormaire. The
Handbook of Methods describes what is done when data
are thought to be of doubtful comparability: "When
an occupation is added, deleted or changed in defini-
tion from one OES survey to the next, extrapolated
trends are not developed: the current-year ratios for
these occupations are held constant in the preliminary
projected matrix" (BLS 1982, p. 143).
Given these data problems and BLS’s focus on
projecting over 500 different occupations, it is easy to
see why BLS chose not to systematically extrapolate
past trends in occupational staffing ratios derived
from OES or other data into the future, but rather to
rely on the judgment of analysts who can take data
quality problems into account. Systems that rely on
the judgment of analysts are inherently conservative,
however. Unfortunately, occupational staffing ratios
are seldom stable over periods of’10 years or more,
and it is better to start with an assumption that trends
are stable than that the ratios themselves are stable.
It does not appear that problems in extrapolath~g
changes in occupational staffing ratios have become
less serious as experience with the OES survey has
accumulated. The PT&M share of projected job
gro~vth has not increased much in later projections,
and the 1987 and 1989 projections seem as wide of the
mark as the 1985 projection (Table 5). With 64 percent
of the projection period already completed, the actual
PT&M share of job growth is running 25.8 percentage
points above the share projected in 1987. With 58
percent of the projection period already completed,
the actual PT&M sliare is running 29.3 percentage
points above the share projected in 1989.
Can Other Projection Methods Succeed
Where the BLS Method Has Failed?
Ron Kutscher, the Associate Commissioner at BLS
responsible for projections, has said "One could never
hope that a projection of the future is entirely accu-
rate" (1991, p. 253). A natural response to the criti-
cisms of BLS methods is to ask, "Can one do better?"
Shani Carter and I attempted to do better in a 1991
paper. We showed that both a simple linear extrapo-
lation of occupational share trends for the 1972-80
period and a regression-based projection did a better
job of predicting 1990 shares than the BLS (Bishop and
Carter 1991b).
Hindsight is always better than foresight, how-
ever. A projection constructed by someone with
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knowledge of the actual outcome will generally be
better than projections developed without such
knowledge. Probably the only really fair test of the
validity of alternative forecasting methodologies is to
look back at projections published in the past and
compare results.
This section of the paper offers such a test. The
1991 regression-based projections of Bishop and
Carter are compared to the BLS projections published
in the same year.5 Summary results on the high-skill
and low-skill shares of projected and actual job
growth are presented ha rows 8 and 11 of Table 5.
Projected shares of job growth through 2000 will be
compared to shares of actual job growth through 1995.
Professional, tectmical, and managerial jobs actually
accounted for 74 percent of job growth between 1990
and 1995. Operatives, laborers, and service workers
accounted for 10.5 percent. Bishop and Carter’s (B&C)
projections clearly come closer to the 1990-95 reality
than the BLS projections. B&C projected a 70 percent
5 The regression equations used for this exercise are found in
Table B2 of Bishop and Carter (1991a).
PT&M share of job growth and a OL&S share of 2
percent. BLS by contrast projected a PT&M share of 41
percent (46 percent when translated into CPS data)
and an OL&S share of 27 percent.
In a paper published in early 1992, Bishop pre-
sented projections based on a variety of linear speci-
fications, rather than a logit specification (Bishop
1992b). Summary results for these projections are
shown in rows 12 through 14 of Table 5. These
projections also outperform the BLS projections. The
best of the projections for the professional, technical,
and managerial category have the same four variables
on the right-hand side as the preferred model of
Bishop and Carter (1991a). In this preferred model,
occupational shares are a function of a time trend, the
unemployment rate, the merchandise trade balance as
a share of GDP, and the share of workers with
computers on their desks.
Let us take a more disaggregated look at how the
projections are doing, one-third of the way through
the 15-year projection period. Which occupations were
accurately projected by both methodologies? Which
occupations surprised both B&C and BLS? Figure 4
126 May/June 1996 Nezo England Economic Reviewcompares actual growth during the 1990-95 period to
projected growth. (The 15-year projections were sized
to a five-year period by the simple expedient of
dividing percentage growth projections by 3.) Both
projections missed three important developments:
sharp slowdowns in the growth of craft jobs, clerical
jobs, and technical jobs. In areas of disagreement
about growth rates--for managers, professionals, op-
eratives and laborers, and service workers--the B&C
methodology produced more accurate predictions.
For a description of the B&C model and its stability,
see Box 2.
Are the Wage Premiums Paid for
Skill Continuing to Rise?
The wage differential between college graduates
and high school graduates grew more slowly after
the mid to late 1980s than it did in the preceding
decade. It still appears to be growing, however. In
Katz and Murphy’s (1990) data, the weekly wage
differential for workers with one to five years of work
experience stabilized at a high level beghn~ing around
1985, but the differential for workers of all other
experience levels continued to grow through 1990, the
latest year of their data series (Murphy and Welch
1993). In Mishel and Bernstein’s (1992) data, the dif-
ferential for workers of all experience levels rose 7.8
percent between 1987 and 1990 and then fell 2.9
percent in 1991. Figure 5 presents the most recent data
on the wage premium received by those with four or
more years of college. For males, the wage premium
rose from 57 percent in 1989 to 64 percent in 1992 and
71 percent in 1993. For females, the premium rose
from 63 percent in 1989 to 68 percent in both 1992 and
1993.
The 1991-92 recession caused many companies to
cut back their l~iring of college graduates. The unem-
ployment rate among managers and professionals, 2.0
percent in the fh’st quarter of 1989, rose to 3.5 percent
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May/June 1996 New England Economic Review 127Box 2: Bishop and Carter’s Model of Occupational Employment Growth
It is assumed that the growth of occupational
employment shares follows a logistic growth path.
B&C assumed that the logistic function had a
ceiling of 20 percent. The logit was assumed to have
a ceiling in order to build in a slowdown in the rate
of growth for three large, fast-growing occupa-
tions-managers, professionals, and sales workers.
The ceiling was set at 20 percent because that fit the
data slightly better than higher ceilings. In the
preferred model, the log of the ratio of the jth
occupation’s share of employment in year t to 0.2
minus that same occupational share, [Sjt/(.2 - Sit)],
is assumed to depend on the year (Tt), the unem-
ployment rate (Ut), and one or more structural
variables, (Xt), intended to capture the influence of
the economic changes that have occurred in the
1980s. The independent variables have been de-
fined relative to their projected value in the year
2005.
2) log[Sit/(.20 - Sit)] = a0 + a~(Tt - 2005) +
a2(Ut - .055) q- a3(Xt -- X2005) t = 1972 ... 1989
For the three smallest occupations, farm workers,
protective service workers, and private household
workers, Xt is a trend shift variable for the years
after 1980. For the other 10 occupations, the X
variables were the ratio of the merchandise trade
deficit to GNP (TRADEFt) and the ratio of personal
computers used in business to civilian employment
(PCUSEt).6 The advantage of deviating all indepen-
dent variables from their projected level in the year
2005 is that the intercept term, a0, then provides an
esfimate of the forecasted logit of 5 times the jth
occupation’s share of employment in the year 2005.7
Bishop and Carter’s regression model of employ-
ment growth was estimated on data on employ-
ment shares from 1972 to 1989 (Bishop and Carter
1991a). Most of the estimated parameters were
1994. This setback was not the beginning of a crash in
the market demand for college graduates; it was a
temporary effect of the recession. Blue-collar workers
were hurt much more by the recession than managers
and professionals. The unemployment rate of opera-
tives and laborers, which was 7.7 percent in the first
quarter of 1989, rose to 11.4 percent in July 1992 and
was still 9.0 percent during 1994. BLS data on median
~veekly earnings can also be brought to bear on the
6 The estimates of the number of PCs in use in business ~vere
made by Future Computing/Datapro Inc. and can be found in Table
1340 of The Statistical Abstract, p. 179. They are derived by cumu-
lating the numbers of machines sold. A very low scrap rate of 3.4 to
6 percent, depending on the year, was assumed. Where possible,
vendor reports were used to allocate sales of computers between
categories of end user--business, education, and home. Quite often,
however, rules of thumb were used to make these allocations.
Future Computing is no longer in business so more detailed
information on how the series was constructed and data for 1989 are
not available. CPS surveys in 1989 and 1993 provide data on the
proportion of workers who use computers at work (NCES 1993c, p.
434, and 1994, p. 439). The proportionate growth rate produced by
comparing the two surveys was applied to the 1989 value of the PC
use variable from Future Computing. Projections of PC use for
succeeding years were made by extrapolation. Projections ;vere
based on an assumption that the unemployment rate in 2005 would
be 5.5 percent and the merchandise trade deficit would be 1.4
percent of GDP.
issue of recent trends in wage premiums for skill.
Between the second quarter of 1991 and the second
quarter of 1995, the annual rate of increase of nominal
wages was 1.4 percent for operatives and laborers, 1.6
percent for service workers, 1.7 percent for craft work-
ers, 1.2 percent for clerical workers, 3.3 percent for
technicians, 2.9 percent for managers and 3.7 percent
for professionals. In summary, the very latest data on
trends in occupational wage differentials suggest that
skill differentials continue to widen.
The latest data on employment growth have
similar implications. Between October 1994 and Octo-
ber 1995, professional jobs grew by 753,000 and lnan-
agerial jobs by 837,000, while service jobs rose by only
31,000 and all other jobs declined by 346,000.
7 B&C estimated a number of alternative models in order to test
the sensitivity of results to changes in functional form and specifi-
cation and in the scenario projected for the year 2000. Such tests
were needed because only 18 years of data were available on which
to estimate the forecasting model, and theory did not yield only one
plausible specification. The results of some of these tests are detailed
in Bishop and Carter (1990). Wllile specification and scenario did
affect projected occupational shares, all of the specifications yielded
substantially larger increases in skilled jobs than the BLS projec-
tions. Other findings were robust with respect to specification and
scenario as well.
128 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewremarkably stable when six additional years were
added to the analysis.8 Coefficients on the time
trend hardly changed at all. All of the changes in
coefficients on unemployment and trade deficit
were within the estimated one-standard-error con-
fidence interval. The intercept coefficients changed
the most. The right-hand-side variables have been
defined in such a ~vay that the intercept term
provides an estimate of the projected occupational
share in the year 2005 under an assumption of 5.5
percent unemployment, a zero trade deficit, and an
80 percent higher share of workers using PCs than
in 1990. By comparing these intercept coefficients,
we can get a rough idea about how the new data
have changed the forecast for 2005. For some occu-
pafions--professionals, craft, transportation opera-
tives, protective service workers--the updated fore-
cast for 2005 is the same as the old forecast.
Compared to B&C’s 1991 forecast, the revised fore-
cast predicts more rapid growth for farm workers
(6.7 percent), factory operatives (9.6 percent), other
service workers (2.7 percent), and laborers (5.5
percent). The revised forecast predicts 3.8 percent
less gro;vth for managers, 4.9 percent less growth
for sales workers, and 3.3 percent less growth for
clerical workers.9
The updated regressions predict slower growth
for managerial and technical employment than the
1991 B&C regressions and faster growth of opera-
tives, laborers, and service workers. This means
that instead of predicting that PT&M will account
for 70 percent of employment growth to 2005, the
updated projections now forecast that PT&M will
account for 60 percent of job growth. The updated
model projects that the operative, laborer, and
service worker share of 1990-2005 job growth will
be 12 percent, up from the 2 percent of the 1991
projection. The new estimates imply a slower rise
in skills than before, but they still imply a faster
rise in skills than BLS projections. Predictions of
the growth of professional jobs are now compar-
able with BLS’s 1993 and 1995 projections. For
managerial jobs, however, there is a big difference.
The updated projections of managerial job growth
are about 4.5 million greater than BLS’s 1993 pro-
jection.
Is the Supply Response Large Enough to
Flood the Market with New BAs?
The one event that could invalidate my prediction
of continued high wage premiums for college gradu-
ates is a massive increase in the number of college
graduates trained in well-paid fields like science,
engineering, and business. How likely is such a flood?
The high economic payoffs to college during the
late 1980s and the 1990s have increased enrolhnent in
college and the proportion of high school graduates
who complete at least one year of college (Figure 6).
Non-completion rates have remained high, however,
so enrolhnent increases during the 1980s have had
only a modest effect on the share of 25- to 29-year-old
high school graduates who have completed a four-
year degree or more. Many adults have gone back to
school and completed their degree, however, and this
has resulted in a substantial increase in the ratio of
BAs awarded to the number of 22-year-olds--from
22.5 percent in 1980 to 31.0 percent in 1992 (Figure 7).
This ratio is projected to increase further to 35.3
The estimates are available from the author upon request.
percent in the year 2000, a 57 percent increase over
1980 (NCES January 1995b).
The proportionate increase in the total number of
BAs awarded, however, is much smaller because the
low birth rates of the 1960s and ’70s mean that fewer
individuals are in the 20- to 30-year-old age cohort
that typically receives most of the BAs. As a result, the
9 The addition of 1990-95 data significantly changed the pro-
jections of employment in 2005 for tl~ree key occnpations. Manage-
rial Workers: In the 1991 paper the growing use of PCs appeared to
be the primary explanation of the accelerating growth of managerial
jobs during the 1980s. Despite the continued rise in PC use, the
recession of the early 1990s caused a larger than expected slowdown
in the growth of managerial jobs. B&C forecasts overpredicted
managerial jobs by 2 to 4 percent between 1990 and 1993 but then
got back on track when unemployment fell to 5.5 percent in 1994
and 1995. The updated estimate of the model gives unemployrnent
a more important role and PC use a less important role in the
determination of managerial jobs. Clerical Workers: The 1991 B&C
model overpredicted the growth of clerical jobs in the early 1990s,
underestimating the negative effect of the PC revolntion. The
updated regression reflects this by giving PC use a bigger role in the
determination of clerical employment. Facto~jl Operatives: In the 1991
B&C model PC use had a large, statistically significant, negative
effect on operative employment. Operative jobs did not decline
nearly as ranch as the model predicted, so the updated regression
model assigns less weight to PC use and the result is an increase in
projected employment of factory operatives.
May/June 1996 New England Economic Review 129number of BAs awarded as a percentage of total
employment fell from 1.09 percent in 1974 to 0.95
percent in 1980 and 0.96 percent in 1992. It is projected
to fall even further, to 0.88 percent in 2000 and 0.86
percent in 2005. Relative to the stock of college grad-
uates, the number of new BAs has declined even more
precipitously. Thus, despite the technology-driven
shift in employer demand in favor of college-educated
workers, the ratio of new graduates to total employ-
ment has not risen.
To make matters worse, the number of college
graduates retiring from the labor force is increasing
every year, as the veterans who went to college under
the GI bill retire from the work force. As a result, the
ratio of workers with a college degree to those with
a high school degree or less is projected to grow no
more rapidly in the 1990s than it did during the 1980s
(Bishop 1992b, Table 4).
Is the Rapid Growth of College-Level
Jobs since 1970 an Aberration?
Still another way to test the reasonableness of our
projections of continued strong growth of demand for
college graduates is to look at trends in managerial
and professional jobs abroad and in the supply of
well-educated workers in other industrialized nations.
Let us define the rate of increase in skills as the
difference between the growth rate of professional,
technical, and managerial (PT&M) jobs and the
growth rate of manual jobs (service, craft, operative,
laborer, and farm occupations). For the United States,
the rate of skill increase was 1.6 percent per year
during the first half of the twentieth century, 1.9
percent per year between 1950 and 1970, 2.8 percent
per year between 1970 and 1981 and 2.5 percent per
year during the 1980s.
The rise in skills is proceeding even more rapidly
in Europe and East Asia (Table 6). The Japanese rate
was 4.3 percent per year in the 1970s and 3.3 percent
per year in the 1980s, the German rate ~vas 3.7 percent
per year in the 1970s and 2.5 percent in the 1980s.
Finland’s rate was 6.4 percent per year in the 1970s
and 5.1 percent per year in the 1980s, Korea’s 4.2
percent per year in the 1970s and 6.0 percent per year
in the 1980s. Three countries--Canada, Norway, and
the United Kingdom--now have proportionately more
professional, teclmical, and managerial workers than the
Ul~ited States, and other cotmtries are close belched.
The supply of college-educated workers has been
increasing rapidly all over the ~vorld. During the 1970s
Figure 6
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and 1980s, the share of the population of working age
who were university graduates grew at an annual rate
of 3.3 percent in the United States, 3.6 percent in Japan,
2.8 percent in Germany, 5.6 to 5.8 percent in Sweden
and Norway, 3.1 percent in Belgium and 4.0 percent in
Canada (OECD 1989).
The share of the work force that has graduated
from university is higher in the United States than
in any other country (columns 4 and 5 of Table 6).
But many Europeans would argue that the bachelor’s
degrees awarded at the second- and third-rank Amer-
ican colleges and universities that educate the vast
bulk of students reflect a lower standard than the
French licence or the Dutch Doctoraal examen. High
school graduation standards are also higher in Europe
and Asia. Completing secondary school requires 14
years rather than 13 years of attendance in some
countries. In others, high standards result in many
students having to repeat grades. In many cases, the
material Americans study in the freshman year of
college is taught to Asians and Europeans in second-
ary school.
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Any U.S. lead in the share of the work force with
college education is also a legacy of policy initiatives
that are 30 to 50 years old. The share of 25- to
29-year-olds who have graduated from college is no
l~igher now than it was 17 years ago. In terms of
flows--that is, numbers currently in school--the na-
tions of Northern Europe and East Asia ’have either
caught up or surged ahead. Using age-specific school
enrolhnent rates, the OECD has calculated the ex-
pected number of full-time equivalent years of school-
ing (K to 12 or post-secondary) received between ages
five and 29. These estimates are presented in the last
column of Table 6. For the United States, the figure is
14.8 years. The comparable figure is 15.9 in West
Germany and France, 15.8 in Belgium, 15.4 in Canada
and Finland, 15.6 in Norway and Denmark, and 16 in
the Netherlemds.
In sum, the rapid growth of college-trained work-
ers and of college-level jobs is not uniquely American.
American youth are neither more nor better educated
than their cmmterparts in Japan and Northern Europe.
Thus, the "America is so well educated, much of it
must be unnecessary" argument offered by Louis
Uchitelle and others is based on a premise that is no
longer valid, if it ever was.
Policy hnplications of These Findings
Professional, teclmical, managerial, and high-
level sales workers currently (October 1995) account
for 38.4 percent of United States employment, 42.2
percent of hours ~vorked, and about 59 percent of the
earnings received by all workers.~° By comparison,
craft workers, operatives, and laborers outside of
~o Employment and Earnings (November 1995, pp. 27, 34). High-
skill sales workers h~clude sales representatives outside of retail and
services and proprietors and supervisors in the retail and service
h~dustry. The median weekly wage for full-time managerial and
professional workers is 46 percent above the overall median.
High-skill sales workers’ wages are 30 percent above and techni-
cians’ wages 14 percent above the overall average. These ratios are
multiplied by the occupation’s share of hours worked to calculate
the share of earnings going to these high-skill occupations.
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Occupational Upskilling in OECD Countries
Annuai Rate by Which
Professional -Technical-
Managerial Grew More Rapidly Professional-Technical-
than Manual Workers Managerial
Share in 1990
1970-1981 b 1981-1990c (Percent)
Austria 2.3 2.0 24.0
Belgium 3.9 3.1 25.8
Canada 3.5 3.9 30.2
Denmark 6.6 2.5 28.0
Finland 6.4 5.1 28.6
France -- -- --
(West) Germany 3.7 2.5 19.9
Greece 6.1 3.8 14.3
Ireland 6.0 2.1 20.3
Japan 4.3 3.3 14.9
Korea 4.2 6.0 8.7
Malaysia -- 3.0 9.5
Netherlands 4.5 4.3 28.1
Norway 5.5 3.9 30.0
Singapore 3.8 4.8 20.3
Spain 3.3 5.9 12.8
Sweden 3.0 -- --
United Kingdomd 3.3 3.9 31.5
United Statese 2.8 2.5 29.3
Percent 25- to 64-Year
Oldsa in 1992 with
Years of School
NonUniv/ Expected at















aOECD, Education at a Glance, 1995, pp. 20, 127. The OECD calculates expected years in school by summing, from age 5 through age 29, age-specific
school or college attendance rates (full-time equivalents) taken from national census or household surveys. Since the calculation stads with age 5,
kindergarten and nursery school attendance is counted as a year in school.
bManual occupations include farming, fisheries, craft, operatives, laborers and service workers. Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics for 1971,1976, 1981
and 1991, International Labour Organization, Table 2B and Table 3C. Data availability problems resulted in somewhat different time periods being used
for Belgium--1970-83, Canada--1971-81, Denmark 1965-81, Greece--1961-81, Ireland--1966-83, Japan--1970-80, Germany--1970- 82, and
Netherlands--1971-81.
CSource: ILO, 7991 Handbook of Labour Statistics, Table 3. Absent data meant that shorter time periods were used for some countries: Austda 1984-89,
Belgium 1983-89, Federal Republic of Germany 1982-89, Greece 1981-88, Ireland 1983-88, and Malaysia 1981-87.
dGrowth rates were calculated for 1971 to 1978 and 1978 to 1989. Source: MSC Manpower Report 1980, p. 8 and Labour Force Survey 1988 and 1989,
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Table 5.11.
eSource: Deborah Klein, "Occupational Employment Statistics for 1972-82," Employment and Earnings. Jan. 1984. 13-16; and later January issues of
Employment and Earnings. Because of a change in occupational coding in 1972, the trend was calculated for the 1972-81 period.
construction receive only about 19 percent of the
compensation paid in the economy. The competitive-
ness of the American ~vork force is in reality more a
ftmction of the cost and quality of managerial, profes-
sional, and technical workers than it is of the blue-
collar factory workers ~vho are normally the focus of
discussions of competitiveness.
The short-run consequence of a shortage of higttly
qualified workers is higher wage pren-dums for the
skilled. The long-run consequence may be loss of
comparative advantage in industries that make heavy
use of managerial, professional, and technical work-
ers. The high cost of hiring managerial and profes-
sional workers in the United States is already inducing
firms to look elsewhere for these skills. For example,
many software companies now economize on expen-
sive American programmers and systems analysts by
contracting with subsidiaries in Bulgaria, Russia, and
India to develop code for new programs.
In 1991, Hewlett-Packard picked a Frenchman to
head its troubled PC division and moved the divi-
sion’s headquarters to his home town of Grenoble,
France. Since then, HP has staged a dramatic come-
back in the PC market. Manufacturing time was cut,
pricing became more aggressive and, as a result, HP
moved from fourteenth to sixth largest PC producer in
the world. Production, which had been spread across
12 plants, was concentrated into just two, one of which
is in Grenoble (The Economist 1993). Hewlett-Packard
is not alone. In 1991 and 1992, Du Pont moved the
132 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewheadquarters of its electronics division to Tokyo and
its agricultural products division and part of its fiber
and polymer business to Switzerland. IBM moved its
networking systems division headquarters to the
United Kingdom (Lublin 1992). Is this the start of a
trend?
During the 1980s, 18- to 64-year-old college grad-
uates with a business major earned nearly three times
what high school graduates of the same gender earned
(Kominski and Sutterlin 1992). Since social rates of
return to college are now at postwar highs, substantial
increases in supply are desirable. This would simulta-
neously reduce the supply of unskilled workers, so
The competitiveness of the
American work force is in reality
more a function of the cost and
quality of managerial,
professional, and technical
workers than it is of the blue-
collar factory workers who are
normally the focus of discussions
of competitiveness.
skill premiums should fall and unskilled wages
should rise. It would not be a tragedy if a major
h~crease in college completion rates lowered the wage
premium paid business B.A.s over high school grad-
uates to only 100 percent rather than 200 percent.
Indeed, competitiveness would improve and income
inequality would decline.
Substantial increases have already occurred in the
proportion of young people getting college degrees,
but these have not been sufficient to stop the seem-
ingly inexorable rise iu the college wage premium.
Still bigger increases in college enrollments have been
prevented by a rapid escalation of tuition charges at
public colleges and the limited availability of need-
based financial aid (Bishop 1992a). Durh~g the 1980s,
tuition charges rose 48 percent more than student
ability to pay out of current earnings.
Legislators and college presidents often justify the
escalation of college tuition as only fair, given the high
wages graduates receive as adults. Setting tuition high
is claimed to be a way of helping those who cannot
afford college at the expense of rich college graduates.
This is a myth. The promised increases in financial
aid are never sufficient to hold college students
from low-income families harmless. The primary out-
comes are fewer students, fewer graduates, and higher
wages for those who complete college. College enroll-
ment and graduation rates are highly responsive to
tuition levels. Regression models (Bishop 1992a) imply
that raising public college tuition by 50 percent ($893
per year) would lower the enrollment of 18- to 19-
year-old women by 16 percent, lower the enrolhnent
of 20- to 24-year-old women by 21 percent, and lower
the number of B.A.s awarded to women by 11.8
percent.~
Elasticities of demand for and supply of college
graduates are such that a 12 percent reduction in the
supply of college graduates increases their wage rela-
tive to that of l~igh school graduates by about 5.8
percent, or $1886 per year in 1992 dollars.~ In the new
long-run equilibrium that results, the present dis-
~ Average public college tuition charges were $1787 in 1992-93
(NCES 1993c, p. 309). A regression predicting the ratio of BAs
awarded to women divided by the mean number of high school
diplomas received by womeu 4 to 10 years previously was used to
predict the impact of a 50 percent increase in public college tuition
from its 1988 level (Bishop 1991). The ratio of tuition to the forgone
earnings of female college students (the wage of female high school
gradnates with 1 to 5 years of work experience times .75) was
assumed to be .1355, its actual level iu 1988. The higher tuition
policy is assumed to increase this permanently to .20325. The
proportionate change in BA awards was calculated by multiplying
(.20325 - .1355) × (the coefficient on the tuition variable) × (1 minus
the ratio of BAs to high school diplomas in 1989) = (.06775) ×
(-2.72) × (1 - .362) = 11.75 percent.
~ The relative supply of college graduates is defined as In-
[(BAs/HSG)/(1 - BAs/HSG)] = In[BAs/(HSG - BAs)] = E~. The
effect of the 50 percent hacrease in tuition on E~, TP, is -.1843 =
.06775 × (-2.72). Using a logarithmic approximation of the model
predicting E~ in Bishop (1991), we have a formula for the relative
supply curve: E~ = .89 × ln(Wc~/WHsc)/.75 + TP + S, where S
captures the effect on supply of other exogenons variables. Follow-
ing Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1989), I assume an elasticity of
relative demand of -2, so the relative demand curve is Ed = --2.0 ×
ln(Wc~/WHs~) + D, where D is a variable reflecting other influ-
ences on relative demand for college ~aduates. Setting Ed = Es, and
reorganizing terms to get an expression for tbe relative wage, we
have hI(WcG/WHsG) = (TP + S - D)/(-2.0 - .89/.75) = (TP + S -
D)/3.19. The long-run ilnpact of the tuition increase on relative
wages is (-.18428)/(3.19) = .0578 or 6 percent. If the elasticity of
relative demand bad been assumed to be -4, the equilibrium
increase in relative wages would have been 3.55 percent. Even with
this very high elasticity of substitution, the long-run effect of a high
tuition policy is to help college graduates and hurt those who do not
go to college. Since a 12 percent change in the flow of new BAs takes
many years to have comparable effects on the stock of BAs,
short-run effects on relative wages would be small, so when the
policy is introduced the first fe~v cohorts of college graduates lose
out initially, because the wage increase starts out being small: After
eight years or so, however, college graduates benefit from the policy
change.
May/June 1996 New England Economic Review 133counted value of after-tax earnings over the conrse of
the graduate’s career goes np $23,100, much more
than the $3574 of additional tuition payments.13 Those
who graduate from college gah~ from a high-tuition
policy. Two groups lose: those who are prevented
from attending and graduating from college and those
who never planned to go to college in the first place.
They suffer a decline in their real wage because the
la I seek to calculate the long-run impact of the policy of raising
public college tuition charges by 50 percent and keeping them high.
Mean earnings of college graduates were $32,629 in 1992, so a 5.8
percent increase is $1886 per year. The marginal tax rate (netting out
deductions) on these earnings is assumed to be 35 percent, so at a 5
percent real rate of discount, the PDV at age 21 is $1886. × .65 ×
17.89 = $21,931 where 17.89 ~ (1/.05)(I - e~S9 because the
individual is assumed to work continuously until age 66.
number of high school graduates competing for the
limited number of low- and medium-skilled jobs has
gone up.
The implication of this discussion is that low
tuition levels in public colleges (and tax deductions
for college tuition) are both an effective and a fair way
of increasing the supply of college graduates. Other
ways of increasing the supply of college graduates
are expanded financial aid; higher academic standards
in high school, to reduce college drop-out rates; ex-
pansion of advanced placement programs, so as to
shorten the time required to earn a degree; and
preference for immigrants with high-level scientific
and technical trainh~g over immigrants with little
education and few skills.
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I
agree with the basic argument of John Bishop’s
paper, that college will continue to be a good
investment in the years to come. I would like to
address four questions raised by his paper. The first
three might be asked by readers of media reports
about hard times for college graduates. Many of these
reports, as Bishop points out, are based on projections
made by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. My
responses to the questions posed by hypothetical
readers are based on a paper that John Tyler, Frank
Levy, and I recently published. The questions are as
follows:
¯ Why are so many college graduates anxious
about their economic positions, given that they
are faring so much better than high school grad-
uates?
¯ Is there any group of college graduates whose
labor market experiences durh~g the 1980s fit the
gloomy prediction of the BLS?
¯ How can John Bishop’s optimistic picture of the
attractiveness of investing in college be recon-
ciled with everyone’s experience of knowing a
college graduate from the class of 1994 or 1995
who is working at a coffee bar?
¯ How can states most effectively help low-income
high school graduates pay for college?
Why Are Recent College Graduates
(Especially Males) Anxious?
The first line of Table 1 lists the median earnings
for 25- to 34-year-old male college graduates in the
years 1979, 1989, and 1993, all in 1993 dollars. The
second line lists comparable information for 25- to
34-year-old male high school graduates. The third line
lists the college graduate/high school graduate earn-
ings ratio, showing clearly the growth in the educa-
tion-related earnings premium. However, another
look at the top line sho~vs that the median earnings of
young male college graduates grew only 2 percent
between 1979 and 1989 and fell by 4 percent during
the subsequent four years.
As the figures in the second line make clear, the
education-related earnings differential rose because of
the dramatic decline in the earnings of high school
graduates. The median income of 25- to 34-year-old
high school graduates in 1993 was $20,000; this is less
than three-fourths of the median earnings (in 1993
dollars) for the comparable group in 1979. Thus, while
young college graduates are certainly better off rela-
tive to high school graduates today than was the case
in 1979, young male college graduates do not have
significantly higher incomes today than their counter-
parts did 15 years ago. This is one factor that contrib-
utes to their anxiety. Another is that most have larger
college debt burdens than did their counterparts 15
years ago. This is a consequence of the rapid tuition
increases, particularly at public colleges, that Bishop
describes in his paper.
Is There Any Group of College Graduates
Whose Labor Market Experiences Fit the
Stories of the Media Jeremiads?
Table 2 lists two indicators of economic well-
being in 1979 and 1989 for four groups of college
graduates: 25- to 34-year-old women, 25- to 34-year-
old males, 45- to 54-year-old women, and 45- to 54-
year-old males. The two indicators are median earn-
ings (in 1993 dollars) and the percentage of the group
holding jobs classified as "high school jobs" by econ-
omists at the BLS. As the numbers make clear, young
Table 1
Median Earnings of 25- to 34-Year-Old
Males and Females, in 1993 Dollars
1979     1989     1993
Males    College Graduates $31,579 $32,336 $31,000
High School
Graduates $27,427 $22,791 $20,000
Earnings Ratio:
Coll. Grad/
H.S. Grad 1.15 1.42 1.55
Females College Graduates $19,593 $24,252 $24,340
High School
Graduates $13,719 $13,858 $14,000
Earnings Ratio:
Coll. Grad/
H.S. Grad 1.43 1.75 1.74
Source: The 1979 and 1989 earnings figures were calculated from the
1980 and 1990 Public Use Microdata 1 Percent Samples of the U.S.
Census of Population and Housing. The 1993 earnings figures were
calculated from the March 1994 Current Population Survey.
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Indicators of Economic Well-Being in 1979
and 1989 for Four Groups of Four-Year
College Graduates
Percent
Cohort 1979 1989 Change
Young Women (25 to 34)
Median Earnings (1993 $) $19,593 $24,252 23.8
Percent in Jobs Requiring
High School Education 28.2 25.2 -3.0a
Young Men (25 to 34)
Median Earnings $31,579 $32,336 2.4
Percent in Jobs Requiring
High School Education 25.0 23.2 -1.8a
Older Women (45 to 54)
Median Earnings $21,552 $26,56I 23.2
Percent in Jobs Requiring
High School Education 27.6 23.6 -4.0a
Older Men (45 to 54)
Median Earnings $52,886 $50,814 -4.1
Percent in Jobs Requiring
School Education 14.5 17.9 3.4a
~ln percentage points.
Note: Data are for college graduates who worked at least one week during
1979 or 1989. All statistics reported in this table were calculated from the
1980 and 1990 Public Use Microdata 1 Percent Samples of the U.S.
Census of Population and Housing.
from the ages of 22 to 30, in 1989 and in 1993. The very
low median earnings for college graduates at age 22
and 23 are consistent with everyone’s anecdotes about
college graduates working in coffee bars. But the
earnings at age 30 are consistent with the earnings
figures reported earlier. So the story is that it does take
many college graduates a couple of years to find their
way into jobs that have career potential. But it does
The deterioration in the earnings
of male high school graduates that
took place during the 1980s has
continued into the 1990s.
happen. Moreover, it happened in 1993 as well as in
1989. In fact, the projected earnings profiles for college
graduates in the two years are remarkably similar.
In contrast, the charted earnings profiles for male
l~gh school graduates are much more shallo~v, illus-
trating that not only do they have low earnings at age
women improved their position over the decade of the
1980s; young men held their own; older women im-
proved their position. The one group in a worse
average economic position in 1989 than the compara-
ble group in 1979 is the 45- to 54-year-old men. As
Bishop explains in his paper, there are reasons to be
cautious in interpreting changes over time in the
percentage of a group employed in what the BLS
refers to as "high school jobs." But the decline over the
1980s in the median real earnings of older male college
graduates is unequivocal. The difference between the
declining economic position during the 1980s of older
men and the stable or improving position for other
groups of college graduates is missing from most BLS
studies, because they tend to group all college gradu-
ates together in their analyses.
What about the College Graduates
Working in Coffee Bars?
Figure 1 displays the median earnings of male
high school graduates and male college graduates
Figure 1
"Coffee Bars Story" for Males
High School vs. College Graduates, 1989 and 1993
Median Earnings in
Thousands of 1993 Dollars
35
30 ~ College M~
~igh School Males ’93
10 ~College Males ’93 ~
5
22 24 26 28 30
Age
May/June 1996 New England Economic Review 13722, they also have quite low earnings at age 30. Note
also that at each age level, the median earnings of male
high school graduates are lower in 1993 than in 1989,
illustrating that the deterioration in the earnings of
male high school gradttates that took place during the
1980s has continued into the 1990s.
How Can States Most Effectively
Help Low-Income High School
Graduates Pay for College?
In closing, I would like to comment on Bishop’s
argument that the escalation of tuitions at public
colleges and universities should stop because it is
keeping many students from college, especially stu-
dents from low-income families, who could benefit
from this investment. I share his concern with the
problem. However, I wonder whether a better re-
sponse than argtting for tuition rollbacks might not be
found. Currently, the states contribute about $40 bil-
lion to public post-secondary education. Over 90 per-
cent is used to subsidize tuition rates. Given the fiscal
situations in most states, this amount is unlikely to
increase over the coming years, which means that it
will be difficult even to maintain current tuition levels,
never mind reduce them.
It seems to me that a better policy would be to
allow tuitions to increase and use a significant part
of the increased revenue for need-based financial aid,
targeted to low-income students, whose enrolhnent
decisions are especially sensitive to costs. This will
work only if the availability of such aid is well
publicized, and if significant steps are taken to sim-
plify the application process for student aid. But these
steps seem manageable, and targeting more of state
financial assistance to low-income students seems
important to do, given the tight fiscal situation.
Re~erence
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T
he concept of skill reflects the capacities and human capital that
workers bring to jobs--what psychologists refer to as "kaaowledge,
skills, and abilities"--and tlie specific demands that individual
jobs make on workers who occupy them. Whether the demand for skills
is changing is a vitally important question for public policy. Such changes
help determine the distribution of income and the extent of technological
unemployment; they also help determine whether relative skill shortages
exist that may lead to a lack of competitiveness, especially in relation to other
economies that possess the valued skills in more abundance.
An extensive literature has examined the causes of technological
change and its effects on the demand for skills and the structure of wages.
This article begins by reviewing this literature, which spans economics,
sociology, and other social science disciplines that examine industrial
behavior. It then makes use of an extensive establishment-level survey to
examine the effects of organizational structure and investment activity on
wages. The study finds that establishments that adopt new technologies
pay production workers more than those that do not, and also pay them
more relative to the pay of supervisors. Thus, the results suggest that
recent changes in workplaces are increasing skill requirements for
production workers. The article concludes with some comments on how
this trend will play out in terms of labor market adjustments.
Factors Shaping Changes in Skill
The demand for skill in the economy is derived from the objective
requirements associated with jobs. Changes in the demand for skill are
the result of changes either in the requirements associated with individ-
ual jobs or in the distribution of employment across jobs that have
different skill requirements. A vast literature in the social sciences, most
prominently in sociology, argues that technology drives skill require-ments. This literatnre uses the word technology to
refer to broad changes h~ production systems, such as
the industrial revolution or the adoption of the factory
system.
One tradition argues that technological change
has tended to increase skill requirements by eliminat-
ing noxious physical labor. The focus here is often on
technological changes so massive and inexorable that
their effects on employment can be treated as exoge-
nous.1 Many of the more contemporary studies in this
area begin with the analysis from Workforce 2000,
which concludes that the distribution of employment
across occupations and industries in the United States
is shifting toward higher-skilled work (U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor 1987). Examinations of Census occupa-
tional data over time suggest, however, that the rate
The "upskilling" tradition tends
to rely on forces external to the
organization for its explanations
and changes in the distribution of
employment; the "deskilling"
tradition relies on forces internal
to the firm and changes within
individual jobs.
at which this shift has occurred has slowed from the
1960s to the 1980s (Howell and Wolff 1991). And
further reanalysis of the data used in Workforce 2000
indicates that the anticipated shifts in the future will
not in fact increase skill demands by much (Mishel
and Teixeira 1991).
Another and perhaps equally long tradition sees
technological change operating to reduce the breadth
of skills required from workers and, in particular, their
control over the way jobs are performed.2 The
"deskilling" research argued that the types of technol-
ogies used and the way they were implemented were
choice variables that management could exercise in
ways that depended on the circumstances. Marglin
(1974), for example, argued that deskilling was a
conscious management decision taken to increase con-
trol over workers and make the management process
easier. This thesis reached its best-known form in the
work of Braverman (1974), who extended it to clerical
and other nonproduction jobs.3 Growing worker dis-
satisfaction with production jobs in the 1970s led to
explicit public policy acknowledgments that narrow,
deskilled jobs were part of the cause. For an example,
see Work in America (U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare 1973).
The "upskilliug" tradition tends to rely on forces
external to the organization for its explanations and
changes in the distribution of employment for evi-
dence. The deskilling tradition relies on forces internal
to the firm (management strategy) and changes within
individual jobs for its explanations. (See Attewell 1990
for a review of this literature.)
The third research approach is more empirically
driven and asserts explicitly that technology is a
choice variable and that the effect on skill may vary.
Spenner (1983) described this research as the "mixed
effects" position in terms of the net change it predicts
in skill.4 This middle position assumes that situational
factors sttch as labor costs or employee bargaining
power are important in determining the utility of any
technology or system of work organization.
~ Arguments about the benefits to workers of technology began
with Adam Smith, then with the scientific socialists, and continued
in studies of economic development. Kerr and coworkers (1960), for
example, saw h~dustrialization as liberating production workers by
leading to more skilled jobs. Students of industrial technology such
as Woodward (1965) argued that assembly line work was only a
stop on the road toward automated, "conth~uous production"
factories where workers would be freed from machine-paced tasks.
Blauner (1964) argued that such technologies would actually lead to
an increase in skill, for example, as workers performed a broader
range of monitoring tasks. This thesis reaches its high point with
Bell’s (1973) arguments that knowledge-based jobs would replace
production work in the economy of the future. 2 Adam Smith’s observations about the increasing division of
labor and the narrowing of jobs that results can also be seen as part
of the beginning of the deskilling argnment. Durkheim (1893),
Veblen (1914), and others were concerned about the dehumanizing
effects of automation and factory production and the broader effects
it would bave on society. Scientific management as a theoretical
argument for deskilling and assembly line production methods in
basic industries led to widespread acceptance of the deskilling
argument supported by research findings (Walker and Guest 1952;
Bright 1966) and to a shift in research to examine the consequences of
deskilled jobs (for example, Blauner 1964).
3 In particular, Braverman (1974) argued that the shift in the
distribution of occupations toward administrative and white collar
jobs was not an indication that overall skill levels are rising, but
instead was simply a manifestation of deskilled production work
where the "mental" aspects bad been removed.
4 Most of these studies are cases, and man~/- are historical.
Hobsbawm (1964) describes, for example, how craft workers were
able to use the techniques of organized labor (for example, control-
ling supply) to resist management efforts to deskill jobs. Edwards,
Reich, and Gordon (1979) suggest that changes in skill have been the
result of a complex process of bargaining between management and
labor. Flynn’s (1988) survey of hundreds of case studies of tech-
nological change finds considerable variance in the effects on
employment and skill levels, lending support to the "mixed effects"
hypothesis.
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looked beyond technology for their explanations. For
example, Piore and Sabel (1984) argue that the satura-
tion of industrial markets and greater international
competition have forced employers to find smaller
market niches that demand quicker reactions to
changh~g markets and, in turn, a more flexible work-
place where jobs are defined more broadly and work-
ers have greater control over them. The result is to
create jobs with more skill, broadly defined. In other
words, changing product markets have made a form
of work organization that was always available sud-
denly much more effective. Cappelli and Sherer (1989)
find a broadening of responsibilities in such a firm,
Outside of production, little
evidence is seen of high-
performance work systems, even
in organizations that have
production-like aspects.
and Loveman (1988) finds evidence of a shift in
manufacturing occupations toward greater skill that is
consistent with the "flexible-specialized" hypothesis.~
Measuring Changes in Skill
Exactly ho~v one should attempt to measure skill
changes has been a vexing problem for the research
efforts described above. Studies sometimes attempt to
use measures of worker characteristics, such as aver-
age education levels, to assess whether skill require-
ments have changed. The problem with this approach
is the considerable evidence that such worker charac-
teristics vary independently from the demands of jobs
(Berg 1970). One approach is to ask workers directly
about the requirements of their jobs (Mueller et al.
1969), but an individual’s perceptions of job charac-
teristics do not necessarily relate well to actual job
characteristics (Roberts and Glick 1981). Myles and
Eno (1989) found that workers’ self-reports of skill
requirements in their jobs differed substantially from
those provided by expert raters.
A popular data source for measuring the skill
requirements of jobs has been the U.S. Department of
Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), now in
its fourth edition, which is compiled by government
job analysts who provide detailed descriptions of
some 12,000 job titles. By examining changes in these
titles in subsequent editions, one can measure changes
in job requirements (for example, Horowitz and
Herrstadt 1966; Spenner 1979). But serious drawbacks
are associated with using the DOT in this manner, in
addition to the fact that it is not updated regularly.6
An alternative approach is to estimate skill
changes by examining shifts in the composition of
occupations in the economy, the approach followed
by Workforce 2000 and discussed above.7 The problem
with all such studies is the difficulty h~ controlling for
the content of jobs. It is not obvious that the respon-
dents are really using common definitions and that the
results are reliable. The current questions used for
gathering information about jobs are far from ideal.
The Current Population Survey, the source of data for
many of these studies, asks respondents about their
business or industry, the kind of work they do, and
5 Other studies in this period continued to emphasize the
relationship between technology and skill. Hirsl’d~orn (1984) sug-
gests an argument similar to Bell’s (1973) that new automated
teclmologies will require higher-order mental and social skills from
workers. Studies of the introduction of numerically controlled
production machinery have suggested that the introduction of these
machines is designed to reduce workers’ skill (Noble 1977). Further,
even where the mix of skills associated with numerically controlled
jobs appears to grow, the changes may simply add more boring
tasks and leave the content of the jobs degraded (Adler 1986).
Again, studies in the "mixed result/it depends" tradition report a
variety of changes in skill across situations, depending typically on
contextual issues. (See the papers in Hyman and Streek (1988) and
Zuboff (1988) for case-based examples and Kelley (1989) for a
survey-based argument.) Overall, a National Academy of Sciences
study (Cyert and Mowery 1987) concluded that changing technol-
ogy was unlikely to increase skill requirements during the imme-
diate future. See Levin, Rumberger, and Finnan (1990) for a similar
conclusion.
6 It is not dear that all of the entries were actually reanalyzed
in subsequent editions, and there may have been a bias toward
making the reports consistent over time. Further, by itself the DOT
measure tells only what is happening to the content of specific jobs,
not what is happening to average skill across a work force or an
organization. For example, a given job such as drafting can be
substantially deskilled by new technology while at the same time
the composition of the design work force in a firm shifts from
drafting jobs to higher-skilled engineering jobs. The overall skill
level of the design function may rise because of this shift in its
composition, even though the skill associated with some individual
jobs is declining.
z Perhaps the best data source for compositional studies is the
Occupational Employment Statistics Survey assembled by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS). This survey examines 150 occupations in
each industry with establishment-level surveys and reports the shift
in employment across those occupations. The survey is actually
conducted separately by each state, under the general guidance of,
but not the control of, the BLS. The BLS takes the data from the
states with little opportunity to check the reliability of the results or
the methods used.
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small amount of information by which to measure
skills. Classification clerks then take these responses
and code them into occupations. A number of tests are
made for the reliability of the coding but not for the
validity of the original responses. In about half the
cases, employees believe that their occupation is some-
thing different than does their employer (Mellow and
Snider 1985). At least half the tin~e, then, one of the
parties--employer or employee--is wrong in labeling
an occupation.
Perhaps the most important problem with occu-
pational data is that job titles do not always accurately
reflect changes in skill requirements. Employees in
less rigid organizations are sometimes rewarded with
"promotions" and given higher job titles, even though
their duties remain unchanged. Managers may also
arrange such promotions to secure grade-based salary
increases, especially when general salary increases are
being restrained. (The practice is sometimes known in
the compensation literature as "grade drift.") And as
jobs get broader in scope, it becomes more difficult to
match tasks and skills with specific job titles.
Finally, compositional studies do not indicate
whether changes have been made in skill require-
ments within individual jobs, the reverse of the prob-
lem noted above in using the DOT. For example, the
decline in aggregate skill levels associated with a shift
in work force composition from quality control to
assembly jobs may be offset if substantial upskilling of
assembly jobs has occurred.
Spelmer (1988; 1990) reviewed the research that
has been based on aggregate data and concluded that
the results have been mixed, at least through the
1980s--perhaps a small upgrading of content in the
form of complexity, equivocal results for content in
the form of autonomy, and not much change in
composition. His conclusions suggest that "the pov-
erty of quality data" (Spenner 1983) may be the main
obstacle to obtaining better estimates of skill changes.
My own study of changes in skill requirements
used a different set of data on 56,000 production
workers over an eight-year period and found signifi-
cant upskilling across the board for production jobs as
measured by changes in Hay points, the job evaluation
metric introduced by Hay Associates to measure job
requirements. Some of the upskilling seems due to the
fact that tasks associated with quality control and
housekeeping have been pushed onto all the remain-
ing jobs (the decline of employment in quality and
housekeeping jobs is consistent with this interpreta-
tion). That is, not only has each job experienced
upskilling but the overall distribution of production
jobs has shifted away from less skilled and toward
more skilled positions (Cappelli 1993).
Econo~nic-Based Arguments
A different research stream has developed in
economics on the question of skill levels. This research
also focuses on the role of technology in driving skill
changes. Here "technology" refers not to system or
economywide developments but to firm-level deci-
sions of the kind associated with production func-
tions. In most cases, the analysis focuses on the effects
of broad production decisions such as the level or type
of capital spending. And, in contrast with the research
cited above, the goal is less to assess skill changes than
to explain where they occur and their effects on other
aspects of operations.
Perhaps the most intriguing
aspect of arguments about
changing technology and
skill requirements is their
use in explaining changes
in the wage structure.
One set of research in this tradition focuses on the
complementarity between skills and firm production
choices. For example, Barrel and Lichtenberg (1987)
find that operations with more educated ~vorkers
adopt new technologies sooner and that the decision
to adopt new systems then increases further the de-
mand for skill. Historical research finds that as early as
the 1920s, more technologically sophisticated firms
hired more educated workers (Goldin and Katz 1995).
Other recent work (Bartel and Sicherman 1995) finds
similar results for training, in that technological
change increases training.
Still other research relies on changes in the distri-
bution of employees across occupations to estimate
changes in skill levels. Berndt and Morrison (1991)
find that investments in certain kinds of physical
capital (mainly office equipment) are associated with
increased education among production workers and a
shift toward presumably more higlily skilled nonpro-
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argue that a measure of the level and rate of change in
computer investments for manufacturing firms is a
good proxy for the firms’ overall technological change
and explains the shift toward higher-skilled workers
in some operations.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of arguments
about changing technology and skill requirements is
their use in explaining changes in the wage structure.
The research on changes in wage structures, especially
the rise in the returns to education, is too voluminous
to review in detail here. Levy and Murnane (1992)
survey it and conclude that "the most striking evi-
dence of change in the demand for skill is the increase
in the premium associated with formal education."
Wallace and Kalleberg (1982), Davis and Haltiwanger
(1990), and others find rising wage differentials be-
tween occupations and an increase in the premium for
skill.
Several studies have attempted to see how these
technology choices, broadly defined, affect wage out-
comes. Mincer (1991) offers one of the first studies to
argue that technology explains some of the increase in
the returns to education over time. Botmd and John-
son (1992) compare different explanations for changes
in the overall structure of wages in the 1980s using
changes in education levels of workers as a proxy for
technology. They conclude that technological change
was the most important factor in explaining changes
in wage premiums in this period. Krueger (1993) finds
that workers who use computers on the job, other
things equal, earn about 10 to 15 percent more and
that computer use may explain as much as half of the
increase in the rate of return to education in the late
1980s. Dum~e and Schmitz (1995) find that the use of
advanced production technologies in manufacturing
is associated with higher wages for both production
and nonproduction workers.
Mishel and Bernstein (1994) question whether the
conclusion can really be drawn that technological
change, however defined, can explain changes in
wage differentials during the 1980s. They argue that
research showing relationships between technology
and wages--that is, between levels--does not explain
changes in wage differentials. In order to do this, one
needs to show that there has been a change in tech-
nology, specifically, that the rate of introduction of
technology was somehow greater in the 1980s. And,
as noted earlier, the evidence does not suggest that
this was the case. Indeed, the pace of change may
even have declined somewhat (Howell and Wolff
1991).
Further, as the "mixed effects" research in sociol-
ogy suggests, the introduction of specific pieces of
technology may not have an obvious effect on skill
levels. Some of the clerical occupations that have
been subject to innovations in office equipment of the
kind emphasized by Berndt and Morrison (1991), for
example, have been deskilled (for example, typists,
following word processing) while others have been
upskilled (bank tellers after the introduction of auto-
mated teller machines, Cappelli 1993). And as Kelley
(1986) demonstrated with programmable automation,
the introduction of a given technology may have very
different effects on the skills of the workers using it
across establishments, depending on factors like the
power of unions in those establishments. Finally, it is
worth asking, as Mishel and Bernstein (1994) do,
whether the assumption that average education levels
are a good proxy for skill levels, used in much of this
research, is adequate.
Work O~xanization Studies
Yet another approach to the issue of changing
skill requirements looks neither at systemwide
changes nor at production function choices associated
with capital decisions. This approach focuses on "tech-
nology" in the sense of management technology and,
in particular, decisions about how work might be
organized within individual jobs. The common theme
in models of new work systems is that they represent
a contrast to Tayloristic work systems associated with
scientific management. These changes in the organi-
zation of work alter the hierarchy and internal orga-
nization of jobs.
The contemporary debate about these new mod-
els of work in the United States began by identifying
"high performance" (HP) work systems in the context
of new production systems: High performance pro-
duction systems were identified based on productivity
outcomes, and the work systems demanded by them
were identified, by definition, as high performance
work. These production systems are most clearly
associated with Japanese manufacturing and include
techniques such as statistical process control, just-in-
time (JIT) inventory systems, continuous improve-
ment, and total quality management (TQM). This
approach is, not surprisingly, the one taken by re-
search projects that focus on production, such as
MIT’s World Motor Vehicle Project (MacDuffie and
Krafcik 1992) or the study of manufacturing con-
ducted by the National Academy of Sciences (1986).
May/June 1996 Nero England Economic Review 143The models of "lean" production basically argue
that increased quality, productivity, and flexibility can
be obtained by making better use of employees. In
particular, responsibility and decision-making are
transferred from administrative structures directly to
employees or to their teams. These arrangements
demand significantly more from employees than do
work systems associated with scientific management,
where tasks are narrowed and virtually all decision-
making is in the hands of management.
These new work systems are associated with a
series of specific work practices such as employee
empowerment and participation in decision-making,
where employees take over some tasks previously
performed by supervisors, engineers, and staff special-
ists; teamwork, where autonomous or semi-autono-
mous teams take over some direct supervision and
The models of "lean" production
basically argue that increased
quality, productivity, and
flexibility can be obtained by
making better use of employees.
substitute for formal management structures; and
job rotation/cross-training, where employees within
teams swap tasks and become more interchangeable.
Measuring the incidence of these work practices
is yet another way to proxy whether skill require-
ments are rising. The important question here is how
to define those practices--is it a set of practices or
individual ones? liow extensive should they be to
count? and so on. Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford’s
(1992) study of Fortune 1,000 firms in 1987 and again
in 1990 provides extensive breakdowns of practices.
Twenty-five percent have no employees involved in
job redesign; 13 percent have a majority of the work
force in quality circles, and 22 percent in some other
participation group; 12 percent have a majority of
employees receiving team-based incentive pay; and 68
percent have more than a majority of employees
involved in cross-training.
Osterman’s 1992 survey (1994) reports that about
one-third of firms have some significant level of the
practices associated above with high performance
work. Forty percent have a majority of the workers in
the "core" of their production process in teams and 26
percent h~ job rotation. Bassi’s (1992) survey finds that
one-half of non-manufacturing firms and three-quar-
ters of manufacturing firms have undergone some
reorganization of work along the lines of these prac-
tices, although very few had made substantial changes
yet. A just-released survey conducted by the Census
for the National Center on the Educational Quality of
the Workforce (EQW) finds that between 20 and 30
percent of establishments surveyed had some combi-
nation of these practices (EQW 1995).
Work Organization Outside of Production
By definition, the techniques of high performance
production systems are associated with production
work, and not all of these techniques apply directly to
other industries. The equivalent study to the one
noted above ush~g Hay data for clerical jobs finds no
consistent pattern; some clerical occupations show
increases in skill while others experienced decreases
(Cappelli 1993).
One important attribute of these high perfor-
mance systems is the increased flexibility needed to
handle variations in products. Situations that do not
demand change--indeed, may punish it--may not
make great use of these techniques. HP production
techniques are used little in industries like transpor-
tation, distribution, or public utilities, perhaps because
reliability and consistency are the prime consider-
ations there. Indeed, the work systems in these indus-
tries are often referred to as "high reliability" systems.
One of the more curious findings, however, is that
little evidence is seen of work practices associated
with high performance production systems even in
organizations that have production-like aspects. The
processing of transactions in the back offices of finan-
cial services and related industries, for example, looks
very much like an asselnbly line, and in fact more
people are employed in these industries than in man-
ufacturing. Yet there appears to be little, if any,
evidence that HP production practices or even specific
HP work practices are being used in these operations.
Indeed, the management focus in these facilities seems
to be quite strongly in the opposite direction--to
automate employees out of the process altogether.~
It is not obvious that there is a common trend in
service jobs. In health care, for example, anecdotal
evidence suggests that the biggest development has
s Prelin6nary findings from a study of transaction processing
at the Wharton School’s Financial Services Center finds virtually no
evidence of HP production practices.
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ism: Many of the simple tasks traditionally performed
by nurses are now being transferred to lower-skilled
workers. In customer contact jobs in retailing and
hospitality, some efforts are being made to "empower"
workers by giving them more authority to solve
problems. Overall, there appears to be a clear trend
toward high performance work in production-ori-
ented jobs because it is associated with a new produc-
tion process. It is not clear that this movement will
make equal progress elsewhere.
Do These Arrangements Raise Skills?
Whether these new models of work organization
are changing skills--and if so, in what way--is a
central issue in a number of public policy arguments.
Advocates assume that they raise skill requirements
substantially and that the introduction of these sys-
tems may well require significant upgrading of work
force skills (National Center on Education and the
Economy 1990; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment 1990). Closer inspection suggests that the
changes in skill demands may not be so obvious.
Consider, for example, the issue of individual worker
autonomy, a key concept of participative work sys-
tems thought to raise skill demands. As Klein (1989)
observes, just-in-time inventory systems that elimi-
nate buffers of materials or intermediate products
between work groups make those groups highly in-
terdependent. Changes in the production arrange-
ments within any individual group can change their
work pace, causing either shortages or pileups of
material downstream. Because the overall flow of
work across all teams in the assembly process must be
absolutely consistent, the autonomy that any individ-
ual team has to make changes in work organization is
tightly constrained.
As Adler (1993) discovered at the New United
Motor’s (NUMMI) joint venture between Toyota and
General Motors, the principle of continuous improve-
ment requires that the performance of individual tasks
be completely routinized, so that the work teams can
discover whether minute changes in tasks lead to an
improvement in performance. In this sense, continu-
ous improvement in work processes is like a labora-
tory experiment where everything is held constant
except the one change being investigated. For employ-
ees, individual tasks appear to be every bit as rigidly
defined as under scientific management. They do not
have the individual autonomy that demands higher
skills.
Lean production essentially eliminates SOlne jobs
and pushes their tasks onto production workers. Some
of those tasks, such as housekeeping, make few de-
mands on skills. Other tasks such as coordinating job
design changes across teams demand considerably
higher skills, especially behavioral skills such as com-
munication and negotiation, and group dynamics
skills. Adler notes that many of the tasks previously
performed by industrial engineers, such as job analy-
sis and redesign, are now being pushed down to the
production teams.9
Research Questions
The literature from various fields reviewed above
points toward several important issues under the
general heading of skills and the economy. Perhaps
the most fundamental question is, what factors deter-
mine why skill requirements appear to be rising in
some sectors or establishments? Answers to this ques-
tion may help address the more general issue as to
whether some average trend in skill levels exists in
the economy as a whole or in broad sectors within it,
a trend that might require a response either from
public policy or from the private sector. And the final
question, which follows from the above, is whether
changes in skill requirements might help explain some
of the changes in the structure of wages--particularly,
rising wage differentials for skilled versus less skilled
workers--in the economy as a whole.
The EQW National Employer Smv;ey
A recent establishment-level survey of employ-
ment practices conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the
Census for the National Center on the Educational
Quality of the Workforce (EQW) may help address
some of the above questions. The EQW National
Employers Survey (designed by Lisa Lynch in collab-
oration with EQW Co-Directors Robert Zemsky and
Peter Cappelli) was administered by the U.S. Bureau
of the Census as a telephone survey in August and
September 1994 to a nationally representative sample
of private establishments with more than 20 employ-
ees. The survey represents a unique source of infor-
mation on how employers recruit workers, organize
9 It is also important to remember that while these skill require-
ments are rising for production workers, they often start at a low
base. It is certah~ly possible, therefore, that workers already have the
skills to meet the increasing skill demands represented by these new
systems.
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and training investments. It is structured to provide
information on all categories of incumbent workers,
not just new hires or those in core occupations.
The survey oversampled establishments in the
mantffacturing sector and establishments with over
100 employees. Public sector employees, not-for-profit
institutions, and corporate headquarters were ex-
cluded from the sample. Although the survey ex-
cluded establishments with fewer than 20 employees
(which represent approximately 85 percent of all es-
tablishments in the United States), the sampling frame
represents establishments that employ approximately
Research suggests several factors
that might be contributing to
rising skill requirements at the
establishment level: management
structure, union coverage,
computer use, R&D investment,
and new zoork systems like TQM.
75 percent of all workers. This is because while most
establishments are small (fewer than five employees),
most workers are employed in larger establisltments.
We concentrated on those establishments employing
the most employees. The target respondent in the
manufacturing sector was the plant manager and in
the nonmanufacturing sector was the local business
site manager. The survey was designed to allow for
multiple respondents so that information could be
obtained from establishments that kept financial infor-
mation, for example, in a separate office--typically
at corporate headquarters, for multi-establishment en-
terprises. Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing
(CATI) was used to administer each survey, which
took approximately 28 minutes to complete.
The sampling frame for the survey, was the Cen-
sus Bureau’s SSEL file, one of the most comprehensive
and up-to-date listings of establishments in the United
States. Of the 4,633 eligible establishments contacted
by Census, 1,275 refused to participate in the survey.
This represents a 72 percent response rate, which is
substantially higher than that of many similar estab-
lishment surveys. The usual reason given by employ-
ers for not participating ;vas that they did not partic-
ipate in voluntary surveys or they were too busy to
participate. Probit analysis (described in Lynch and
Black 1995) of the characteristics of nonrespondents
indicates no significant pattern at the 2-digit industry
level in the likelihood of participating in the survey.
The only businesses more likely not to participate
were manufacturing establishments with more than
1,000 employees, which represent 0.1 percent of the
sample. Of the 3,358 establishments that participated
in the survey, not all respondents completed all parts
of the survey by the interview cutoff date of October 1,
1994. The final number of surveys in ~vhich all parts
of the survey were completed was 1,621 for estab-
lishments in the manufacturing sector and 1,324 es-
tablishments in the nonmanufacturing sector. This
represents a 64 percent overall "completed" survey
response rate. The results presented below refer to this
final sample of 2,945 establishments. (See the Appen-
dix for more details on the response rates, the distri-
bution of establisinnents by industry, and the distribu-
tion of establishments by employer size, weighted and
unweighted.)
The National Employers Survey (NES) is used
below to examine the factors that predict whether skill
requirements are increasing for production workers at
the establishment level and then to explore how the
characteristics associated with rising skill require-
ments affect the wages of production workers and
their supervisors, the first level of management in
most organizations. The research reviewed above sug-
gests several possible factors that might be contribut-
ing to rising skill requirements at the establishment
level. From the sociological traditions, especially the
"mixed effects" approach, come arguments about
management structure and union coverage (raising
skills), and arguments about size and structure affect-
ing skills. From the economics-based research on skills
complementarity comes the argument that innova-
tion should be higher when education levels in the
work force are higher, further increasing skill de-
mands. From the production-function-oriented re-
search comes the argument that computer use and
research and development investments are raising
skill levels. And from the work organization research
come arguments about how new work systems that
involve programs like total quality management
(TQM) and employee participation raise skill require-
ments.
The NES asks a very simple and straightforward
question of each establishment: Have the skills re-
quired to perform production jobs adequately risen
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about perceptions, it is subject to all kinds of error at
the level of the individual respondent; the criteria that
respondents use to aggregate the different changes
going on in the workplace into an overall conclusion
about skill changes will surely differ across individu-
als. But it is difficult to see a priori how errors of this
kind would vary with establishment characteristics.
And it is worth noting that other measures of skill
change, such as occupational titles, have their own
measurement problems, as noted above.
The fact that the question asks about a change in
skill levels suggests that ideally we would like to have
information about changes in establishment practices,
data that we do not have, unfortunately. On the other
hand, many of these practices are essentially new;
widespread computer use among regular employees,
for example, is quite a recent phenomenon, as are
most of the work systems examined here.
We begin the analysis with an equally straight-
forward logit model examining the responses as to
whether skill requirements have risen. Controls are
included for industry at the 2-digit level, establish-
ment size, whether it is part of a multi-establist~nent
operation, and the percentage of the work force ac-
counted for by production and supervisory employ-
ees. (Appendix Table A-4 contains summary statistics
for all variables included in the regressions.)
In particular, we are interested in seeing whether
skill requirements have risen where the education
levels of production and supervisory employees (the
groups most directly affected by technology changes
of the kind described here) have risen; whether the
use of computers, the presence of research and devel-
opment operations, and capital lead to rising skill
requirements; whether skill requirements are rising
where TQM programs and self-managed teams are
in place, where the ratio of production workers to
supervisors is greater, and where the organization is
"flatter"--as measured by the number of levels of
management.~° The argument concerning the latter
two variables is that they measure changes that essen-
tially push tasks down onto the more ntunerous,
lower-level employees, raising the skill requirements
of their jobs.
Hypotheses concerning the influence of union
representation are more alnbiguous. The "mixed ef-
fects" literature suggests that unions may help lower-
level employees prevent their jobs from being de-
Supervisors are defined as the first level of management.
Table 1
Logit Results for Establishments Reporting





TQM Program .15 .03
Percent of Nonmanagerial Workers in
Self-Management Teams .001 .006
Ratio of Employees to Their Supervisors .0002 .0007
Number of Management Levels -.008 .010
Log Capital Stock/Total Sales .03 .009
R&D Center Present .12 .03
Percent of Managers Using Computers .0007 .0005
Percent of Nonmanagerial Employees
Using Computers .001 .0005
Percent of Employees with Less than
One Year of Tenure -.0005 .0009
Education of Production Workers
(years) - .025 .018
Education of Supervisors (years) .02 .01




Prob > F = .0001
skilled. But employers also appear to treat unionized
establishments very differently, for example, underin-
vesting in the kinds of new techniques that might
other~vise raise skills.
The results presented in Table 1 are generally
supportive of the hypotheses. For example, computer
use is associated with rising skill requirements (not
quite approaching conventional significance levels for
managerial computer use) as are capital levels and
research and development operations. TQM programs
and self-managed teams also raise skill requirements.
The presence of unions seems to lower skill require-
ments, although the effect is very small and estimated
imprecisely. Perhaps the most surprising result is that
while skills are rising where supervisors are more
educated, they appear to be rising more where educa-
tion levels of production workers are lower.
Part of the complication in understanding these
education results is that the dependent variable mea-
sures only whether skill requirements are rising, not
whether they are high or low, in contrast to the skills
complementarity research, which attempts to measure
levels of technology. So, for example, the skill levels at
May/June 1996 Nezo England Economic Review 147establishments with uneducated production workers
could be rising very quickly, precisely because they
start from a low base. In other words, these establish-
ments are playing catch-up with more sophisticated
establishments. The relationship between rising skills
and higher education levels of supervisors is perhaps
easieff to see. Given that supervisors serve important
training and teaching functions, it is important that
they be more educated when efforts are under way to
raise the skill requirements of the workers they super-
vise. Interpreting the magnitude of these relationships
in a practical way is difficult, given the categorical
nature of the dependent variable.
The next issue to examine is how some of these
same factors that raise skills might affect the structure
of wages in these establishments. One way to think
For production workers, wages
are higher where teams and
TQM are used and where
organizations are flatter, and
where capital is more intensive.
about this relationship is as a system of equations,
where establislunent practices with respect to technol-
ogy, broadly defined, drive increases in skill require-
ments and, in turn, wages. But there are several
reasons for examining the reduced form, where poten-
tial relationships between practices and wages are
considered directly. First, the average level of skill
requirements is more likely to be related to wage
levels than is the increase in skills, the dependent
variable examined above, and we do not have a
measure of average skill levels. Second, the establish-
ment practices considered here may have effects on
wages other than through skill levels. They may
demand more effort, for example, or generate stress
that requires commensurate compensation. The vari-
able measuring skill increases is included in the anal-
ysis, however, to see how rising skill requirements
affect wages.
Another potential issue is that wage levels may
affect the choice of practices. This is perhaps most
obvious with capital decisions like computer pur-
chases, where capital could be substituted for labor,
depending on relative prices. It is less obvious for
these other practices, where the effects on labor are not
at all clear. For example, does a TQM program in-
crease or decrease total labor requirements or change
the mix of ~vorkers by skill? Where wages affect the
choice of practices, the relationship may well be recur-
sive, as Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) argue in a
similar context--practices drive ~vages, which then
affect the choice of practices, and so on. In that case,
more straightforward, single-equation ordinary least
squares techniques may be sufficient.~
Simple OLS estimates relating establishment
practices to wages are presented for production work-
ers, for supervisors, and for the differential between
the two. The same set of independent variables is used
as in the skill requirements equation, and for similar
reasons--practices that demand more from employees
should lead to higher wages for production workers.
The one exception is that we also include the variable
measuring whether skills have risen for production
workers in the equation.
Given that the work organization practices in
particular are aimed primarily at production workers,
we might expect their effect on supervisors to be
different from the effect for production workers. The
complication in framing hypotheses about supervisors
is that they often serve two very different roles. On
the one hand, they are teachers and monitors of
employees, serving as a substitute for lower-quality
workers; on the other, they also serve as lead workers,
contributing side-by-side with production employees
and ftmctioning as complements when the ability of
their workers increases. To illustrate, having more
educated production workers may reduce the moni-
toring tasks of supervisors but may increase the stan-
dards to which supervisors have to perform in their
own tasks.
An interesting question is the extent to which the
practices measured by the independent variables
demand more of the skills and abilities that trade in
labor markets, suggesting that higher-quality workers
should be needed, or require greater effort and atten-
tion of the kind that commands higher wages as a
compensating differential. Traditional wage equations
~ The kind of practices outlined here may be associated with
better organizational performance, ~vhich in turn makes it possible
to pay higher wages through some kind of rent-sharing model.
These practices may generate such performance themselves, or
better performance produced through some other means may
provide resources that make possible both these practices and
higher ~vages. We hope to estimate the extent to which rent-sharing
is involved in these results in subsequent models by including
controls for establishment performance.
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Regression Results for Log Average





TQM Program .05 .02
Percent of Nonmanagerial Workers in
Self-Management Teams .001 .0004
Ratio of Employees to Their
Supervisors -.0005 .0005
Number of Management Levels -.01 .006
Log Capital Stock/Total Sales .01 .006
R&D Center Present .02 .02
Percent of Managers Using Computers .0008 .0003
Percent of Nonmanagerial Employees
Using Computers .0006 .0003
Percent of Employees with Less than
One Year of Tenure -.005 .0006
Education of Production Workers
(years) .05 .01
Education of Supervisors (years) ,008 .007
Percent of Employees Unionized .002 .0003




Prob > F = .0001
of the kind presented here that control for education
may well ignore effects on wages caused by demand-
ing more skilled workers.
The results for the wage equations are generally
stronger than for the skills regression (Table 2). For
production workers, wages are higher where teams
and TQM are used and where organizations are
"flatter" (that is, have fewer management levels).
Wages are also higher where capital is more intensive,
but having an R&D operation seems to have little
effect. The use of computers by both production work-
ers and managers is associated with higher wages for
production workers. The magnitude of these effects is
much smaller than Krueger’s (1993) finding, however,
and management’s use of computers appears to have
a somewhat larger effect on production worker wages
than does computer use by production workers. It
may well be that when supervisors are working di-
rectly with computers, they have less time to serve as
monitors and teachers, and higher-skilled production
workers are required as a result.
The results are some~vhat different for supervi-
sory wages (Table 3). Despite the fact that teams in
production work generally transfer tasks from super-
visors to employees, the presence of teamwork among
production workers appears to raise supervisor
wages. The new role that supervisors play in such
settings (for example, "coach," not "boss") may be
stffficiently challenging to command greater pay. Flat-
tening the organization also raises supervisor pay,
presumably because it pushes more tasks down to
supervisors. But a wider span of control (the produc-
tion worker to supervisor ratio) has no effect, suggest-
ing that the monitoring function traditionally proxied
by the span of control may not be all that important in
determining supervisor pay.
Perhaps the most interesting results are that su-
pervisor pay is higher when production workers are
more educated and make greater use of computers.
These results also seem to suggest that supervisors
may serve more as complements for the skills of
production workers than as substitutes.
The estimates of the ratio of production to super-
visory pay withh~ the same establishment speak more
directly to issues of inequality, at least inside organi-
Table 3
Regression Results for Log Average




Percent of Nonmanagerial Workers in
Self-Management Teams .0009 .0004
Ratio of Employees to Their Supervisors -.0003 .0004
Number of Management Levels -.01 .006
Log Capital Stock/Total Sales .007 .005
R&D Center Present -.008 .02
Percent of Managers Using Computers .0003 .0003
Percent of Nonmanagerial Employees
Using Computers .0007 .0003
Percent of Employees with Less than
One Year of Tenure -.004 .0006
Education of Production Workers
(years) .02 .01
Education of Supervisors (years) .02 .007
Percent of Employees Unionized .001 .0003
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Regression Results for Log of Ratio of
Average Annual Pay for Production




Log Capital Stock/Total Sales
Percent of Managers Using
Computers
Percent of Employees with Less
than One Year of Tenure
Education of Production Workers
(years)
Education of Supervisors (years)
Percent of Employees Unionized
















zations. Because supervisors earn more than produc-
tion workers on average, an increase in the ratio of
production to supervisory pay can be seen as reduc-
ing the wage differential between the two occupations.
We might expect that work practices like TQM would
reduce pay inequality, because they raise the skill
requirements of production workers--and their pay
--more than they raise those of supervisors.
The results in Table 4 suggest that TQM programs
reduce the differential between production and super-
visory employees.12 Perhaps the most interesting find-
ing, however, is that increased computer use by man-
agement reduces the differential in pay between
production and supervisory employees. Again, such
computer use appears to identify working arrange-
ments where the supervisors are serving as comple-
ments for skilled production workers. Among the
control variables reported here, the average education
level for production workers has the expected effects
on the ratio, although the positive relationship with
supervisor education is a surprise. Unions, which
represent production workers but not supervisors,
reduce the wage differential, while worker turnover
increases the gap between production and supervi-
sory pay. Together, the results in Table 2 and 3 might
suggest that the introduction of computers and new
work practices may increase inequality within occu-
pations (comparing establishments that use them with
those that do not) but reduce inequality between
occupations within establishments where they are
introduced.
Conclusions
The results described above suggest that technol-
ogy has an important impact on changes in skill
requirements ~vithin establishments and on the struc-
ture of wages within those establishments. Manage-
ment practices--especially decisions on work organi-
zation-may be as much a source of that ilffluence as
are capital spending, computer use, and R&D.
Overall, these results seem to support the general
argument that changes in the ~vorkplace are increasing
skill requirements, at least for production workers.
But the conclusions about the structure of wages may
be somewhat different from those of previous studies,
at least in part because there are many different
dimensions on which to evaluate whether wage struc-
tures have changed. Specifically, many of the practices
associated with new workplace technology, broadly
defined, do lead to higher wages for production
workers. These practices may well increase the in-
equality of wages between production ~vorkers in
establishments that have these practices and workers
in establishments that do not. On the other hand, at
least some of these practices seem to reduce the wage
differential between production workers and supervi-
sors within the same establishments.
A movement toward workplace practices that
raise skill requirements and wages will benefit work-
ers, but it may also create a new equilibrium in the
labor market with some potentially undesirable con-
sequences for employers--delays in filling positions
and increased wages for skilled jobs that may damage
an establishment’s competitiveness.13 As with most
12 Other insignificant coefficients from the regressions are not
reported here but are available upon request. 13 Workforce 2000 (U.S. Department of Labor 1987) focused the
attention of both employers and policymakers on the issue of a
potential rn~,smatch between the skills of the labor force and the
demands of employers in the years ahead. Complaints by employ-
ers of difficulties in finding workers with adequate basic skills,
despite a plentiful supply of applicants, was one of the major forces
that led to another U.S. Department of Labor investigation, the
Secretary of Labor’s Conm~ission on Workforce Quality and Labor
Market Efficiency (1989). A recent report by the U.S. Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment (1990) also argues that a mismatch
between the existing labor force and skill requirements will occur as
manufacturing, in particular, shifts to the flexible-specialized pro-
duction techniques described by Piore and Sabel (1984).
150 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewdevelopments, however, it is difficult to guess at the
precise general equilibrium effects of such changes on
the economy as a whole. For example, the changes in
the distribution of employment across occupations
that might result could alter the income distribution in
other ways. Employers might respond to higher
wages by substituting capital for labor and redesign-
ing jobs to have lower skill requirements. This should
expand the supply of applicants and address the
relative shortage of skilled workers in the long run,
but it may also create less challenging jobs that pay
14 Tbe rising wage differentials associated witb skill and edu-
cation noted above suggest that deskilling must not be the dominant
trend in tbe economy, altbough it may be particularly important in
less. The National Center on Education and the Econ-
omy (1990) and Kane and Meltzer (1990) both con-
clude from interviews that many employers have
responded to a relative shortfall/rising wages for
skilled workers by "deskilling" jobs.~4 Studies like the
one by the Office of Technology Assessment present
the worrisome possibility that the products of these
deskilled production systems will not be of the quality
necessary to compete internationally. The potential
consequences of rising skill requirements are therefore
complex, and it may not be obvious how best to
accommodate them.
some sectors and may in part offset what would otherwise be even
greater increases in skill differentials.
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Appendix
Appendix Table A-1
EQW National Employer Survey Response
Rates~
Number of
Percentage    Cases
Manufacturing Sector
Completed + All Partialsu 75.0 1,831
Completed + Workplace Partials 70.4 1,728
Completed Interviews 66.0 1,621
Nonmanufacturing Sector
Completed + All Partialsu 69.4 1,516
Completed + Workplace Partials 66.2 1,445
Completed Interviews 60.6 1,324
aEmpirical analysis of the determinants of the probability of refusing to
participate in the survey showed no significant impact of establishment
size or industry on the probability of responding for the nonmanufacturing
sector. For manufacturing, establishments in the largest size category
(1,000 employees or more) were slightly more likely to refuse to participate
in the survey than establishments in all other size categories.
~Since all interviews had to be completed by the end of September 1994,
some of the surveys were not completed. The survey allowed for multiple
respondents and was divided into two main sections: establishments’
sales and financial information, and employment practices. The bulk of
the survey’s questions were contained in the employment practices
section of the survey. Therefore, the final sample includes some partial
interviews. Our analysis focuses on both the completed and the work-
place partial inte~ews.
Source: The EQW Nalional Employer Survey, The National Center on the
Educational Quality of the Workforce.
Appendix Table A-3
Distribution of Sample by Establishment
Size
Number of Employees Unweighted Weighted
at Establishment Percentage Percentage




1,000 or more 20 2
Total unweighted observations = 3,173
Source: The EQW National Employer Survey, The National Center on the
Educational Quality of the Workforce.
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Food and Tobacco (SIC 20, 21) 5
Textile and Apparel (SIC 22, 23) 4
Lumber and Paper (SIC 24, 26) 6
Printing and Publishing (SIC 27) 5
Chemicals and Petroleum
(SIC 28, 29) 6
Primary Metals (SIC 33) 6
Fabricated Metals (SIC 34) 5
Machinery & Computers, Elec.
Machinery, and Instruments
(SIC 35, 36, 38) 6
Transportation Equip. (SIC 37) 6
Misc. (SIC 25, 30, 31,32, 39) 6
Nonmanufactudng
Construction (SIC 15-17) 5
Transportation (SIC 42, 45) 4
Communication (SIC 48) 2
Utilities (SIC 49) 4
Wholesale Trade (SIC 50, 51) 5
Retail Trade (SIC 52-59) 4
Finance (SIC 60-62) 4
Insurance (SIC 63, 64) 4
Hotels (SIC 70) 5
Business Services (SIC 73) 4
Health Services (SIC 80) 4






















Source: The EQW National Employer Survey, The National Center on the
Educational Quality of the Workforce.
Appendix Table A-4
Means and Standard Deviations of





Percent of Managers Using Computers 75.2 30.4
Percent of Nonmanagerial Employees
Using Computers 37.5 34.3
Percent of Nonmanagedal Workers in
Self-Management Teams 12.9 25.9
Number of Management Levels 2.6 1.6
TQM Program? (1 = yes) .55 .50
Ratio of Employees to Their
Supervisors 18.6 20.6
Percent Supervisors 8.9 5.5
Percent Production Workers 58.6 22.6
Firm Size:




Multi-Establishment Firm? (1 = yes) .67 .47
Log of Capital Stock/Total Sales -1.4 1.7
R&D Center Present? (1 = yes) .58 .49
Skill Rising for Production Jobs?
( 1 = yes) .66 .47
Education of Production Workers
(years) 12.1 .9
Education of Supervisors (years) 13.3 1.5
Percent of Employees with Less than
One Year of Tenure 13.9 14.9
Percent of Employees Unionized 20.3 32.6
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I
would like to begin by reviewing what I think we
know and do not know about technological
change and its implications for the structure of
wages. I will then go on to discuss the specific research
reported in Peter Cappelli’s paper.
I believe it is fair to say that we know with
reasonable certainty that, over the past two decades,
technological changes have raised skill requirements
and that, as such, technological change has been an
important contributor to the growing gap in wages
between skilled and less skilled workers. In his review
of the direct evidence on skill requirements, Cappelli
emphasizes that such evidence is open to various
interpretations, largely because of data limitations. I
basically agree with this point. However, the most
compelling evidence on the nature of the technological
change over the past two decades comes, I believe,
from indirect evidence. Despite the fact that the rela-
tive cost of skilled labor has been rising, relative
utilization has also been rising (Bound and Johnson
1992; Katz and Murphy 1992; Murphy and Welch
1993). Tttis is true whether one looks at the educa-
tional or the occupational distribution of the work
force. Most of the sttifts towards higher skills appear
to occur witkin an industry (Berman, Bound, and
Griliches 1994) and even within a plant (Bernard and
Jensen 1994). The shifts are occurring not just in
manufacturing, where foreign outsourcing might ex-
plain them, but in all sectors of the economy (Murphy
and Welch 1993). From a neoclassical perspective, it is
easy to explain such shifts as a result of technological
change, but it is hard to explain them as a result of
other factors.
I do not intend to claim that technological change
will always be "biased" towards more skilled labor.
Both history and the recent past offer clear examples of
the opposite. For example, computer technology has
led to a decrease in the demand for skilled draftsmen.
However, the evidence mentioned above suggests
that, certainly within the last few decades and proba-
bly for most of tiffs century, on net, technological
change has favored the more skilled.
We know with reasonable
certainty that technological
change has been an important
contributor to the growing
gap in wages between skilled
and less skilled workers.
While we can be reasonably certain that techno-
logical change has increased the skill requirements in
the overall economy, there is a lot we do not know. We
do not know much about the nature of the innovations
involved or the nature of changes in the skill require-
ments of jobs. What is more, I do not believe that we
will learn much about the nature of the changes using
the kinds of data sets that have been used successfully
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Population Survey (CPS) has asked questions of indi-
viduals about computer utilization on the job, while
the Census of Manufactures asks questions about
computer investments, but such data are too crude to
give us much insight into the actual nature of the
changes that are occurring.
If we are to learn more, we need to turn to a
combination of case studies and special surveys, Case
studies can be extremely informative and interesting,
and they are the best way to find out about what has
been occurring in the context of specific industries.
However, the obvious limitation of case studies is that
We do not know much about the
nature of the innovations involved
in technological change or the
nature of changes in the skill
requirements of jobs.
one can never be sure how representative they are.
This is where the special survey can be useful. It is
from this perspective that I read Cappelli’s paper.
Cappelli’s tabulations are based on a new survey of
the workplace, the Educational Quality of the Work-
force (EQW) National Employers Survey. The data,
containing information on recruitment strategies,
workplace organization, and skill requirements, are
representative of private establishments nationwide
with more than 20 workers.
In his analysis of the EQW data, Cappelli reports
on the association between various explanatory fac-
tors and changes in both the skill requirements for
production jobs and the wages of production workers
and their immediate supervisors. While other inter-
pretations of the wage equations are possible, I sus-
pect that the right way to explain them is to assume
that they reflect variation across establishments in
terms of the skill level of the workers. More direct
measures of skills would have been useful; but in lieu
of such measures, I think it reasonable to assume that,
in the context of a reasonably high degree of mobility
across establishments and industries, higher wages
are closely associated with higher skills.
It is tempting, but mistaken, to use Cappelli’s
wage equation results to make ilfferences about the
effects of various factors on the distribution of wages
in the overall economy. It is easiest to make this point
within the context of a specific example. Cappelli finds
that computer utilization is associated with higher
wages among production workers. More specifically,
the wages for production workers tend to be higher
in establishments where the utilization of computers
is the norm. However, this result says nothing about
the overall effect of computers on production worker
wages. In fact, it is entirely possible that while those
who work with computers are paid a premium, the
introduction of computers (more broadly, the micro
chip) has led to a substitution of machines for humans,
a declh~e in the demand for production labor, and, as
a result, a decline overall in the wages of production
workers.
It is worth noting that by limiting his analysis to
production workers and their immediate supervisors,
Cappelli is missing an important part of the action.
The fraction of the work force in production or non-
supervisory jobs has been declining dramatically, and
this shift away from production or nonsupervisory
work is a very important part of the skill upgrading
that has been occurring in the U.S. economy. This
comment should not be seen as a criticism of what
Cappelli has done. Others, including myself, have
focused on the shift away from production work but
have largely ignored changes in the nature of produc-
tion work itself. Thus, Cappelli’s work should be seen
as complementary to the tabulations that others have
done. It is important, however, to bear in mind the
limited focus of Cappelli’s tabulations when interpret-
ing them.
I will not review Cappelli’s findings in any great
detail, but do want to comment on a few of them. He
finds that the use of computers is associated with
higher wages or skills. This result mirrors other re-
sults in the literature, although here Cappelli finds
this result for production, nonsupervisory workers.
Krueger (1993), using the CPS, found an association
between the use of computers and wages, but his
sample included all workers. In my own work (Ber-
man, Bound, and Griliches 1994), I have found invest-
ments in computers to be positively associated with
the shift away from production work, but that study
ignored changes that were occurring in production
work itself. Thus, Cappelli’s finding is newer than it
might appear from a superficial reading of the litera-
ture.
The EQW includes a variety of measures reflect-
ing the organization of the workplace (for example,
Total Quality Management or TQM). A variety of
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organization of the work place are likely to have
increased the skill requirements of the typical produc-
tion or nonsupervisory job. The tabulations Cappelli
reports represent the first statistical evidence support-
ing this notion that I know of.
While Cappelli is interested in studying changing
skill requirements, the EQW data are not ideal for this
purpose, being cross-sectional rather than longitudi-
nal. Thus, for example, we find out that computer
utilization and TQM are associated with higher wages,
but we cannot be sure that changes in either were
associated with increases in wages or skill require-
ments. Cappelli can do little about this problem within
the context of the EQW data; and before having much
confidence in his findings, he cautions, we need to
have them confirmed with longitudinal data.
Perhaps most discouraging to me about Cappel-
li’s paper is the fact that, despite the focus of the EQW
employers’ survey, the variables he uses continue to
be very much "black boxes." What was it about the
introduction of computers or TQM into the workplace
that entailed enhanced skill requirements among pro-
duction ;vorkers? To a large extent this lhnitation may
characterize any survey, though narrowly targeted
surveys (for example, the Census "Survey of Ad-
vanced Technologies" in selected manufacturing in-
dustries) may suffer less from this problem. However,
I suspect that a better understanding of the effect of
human resources management practices or advanced
technology on skill requirements may necessitate de-
tailed longitudinal case studies of the sort recently
COlnpleted by Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1995)
on the steel industry.
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M
’ost explanations of tlie decline in the real ean~ings of American
workers and of the rise in earnings inequality here in the 1980s
.and 1990s focns on factors that shift the demand for and the
supply of labor. On the demand side, the favorite shifters are technical
change, notably computerization, and trade, especially trade with less
developed countries, both of which can contribute to deindustrialization
of employment (an earlier favorite shifter). On the supply side, the
favorites are the decelerated growth in the number of college graduates
relative to less educated workers, and the influx of low-skill immigrants.
The influx of women into the work force has been mentioned as an
additional possible factor.
Each of the popular causes of change has its supportive evidence; for
a summary, see Levy and Murnane (1992). Each also has its evidentiary
problems.
¯ If our labor market problems are due to technical change, why has
productivity growth been so modest, and why has that growth not
translated into higher real wages, as in the past?
¯ If the cause of inequality is exclusively imports from less developed
countries, how does a mere 2 to 3 percent of the economy dominate
wage-setting, and why have women, who disproportionately work
in industries that compete with LDC imports, not suffered the huge
losses of real wages that hit men? Why has the proportion of skilled
workers risen in all sectors, despite the contraction of low-skill-
intensive, import-competing sectors that displace low-skill labor to
other parts of the economy?
¯ If the 1980s’ decelerated growth in the supply of college graduates
was so important, why has the accelerated gro~vth of the 1990s not
reduced the college/high school earnings gap?
¯ If immigration harms native workers, why have natives in immi-
grant-intensive cities not suffered huge wage or employment losses?
¯ Finally, if the cause is any or all of these, why has pay inequalityrisen within all detailed occupations--among
waiters, laborers, carpenters, mathematicians--
groups subject to technical change and trade,
groups not so subject, and so on? Why have
earnings differentials increased within all deciles
of the earnings distribution?
Explaining a major economic change is no easy
matter. The argument in this paper is not that the
usual suspects are innocent. I believe that they have
contributed to the rise in inequality and that some of
the preceding questions can be answered satisfacto-
rily. Rather, my argument is that the shortcomings
noted above (and others) show that, even taken to-
gether, the suspects fall short of offering a full expla-
nation of the extraordinary rise in inequality. This
suggests that we should widen the range of suspects.
My cm~didates for additional suspects are changes
in labor market institutions, notably the decline in
Candidates for additional causes
of the rise in income inequality
are changes in labor market
institutions, notably the decline
in collective bargaining, and
the reduction of the government
role in the job market.
collective bargaining, and the reduction of the govern-
ment role in the job market, evinced, for instance, in
the reduced real value of the minimum wage. Changes
in labor market institutions have, I arg~e, contributed
to the rise in inequality overall and to the increase in
inequality within groups that other factors cannot
readily explain. My claim is not that institutions are
everything. Rather, my claim is that changes in the
institutional structure are a contributing factor to the
earnings problem, and that the evidence for their
effects is at least as strong and arguably stronger than
the evidence for the other proposed causal factors. I
leave it to others to speculate why many economists
and goverlm~ent officials give short shrift to institu-
tions in explaining the failure of the U.S. economy to
reward workers in the past two decades.1
My claim rests on three bodies of evidence:
1) Cross-country evidence that labor market insti-
tutions largely explain the difference in earnings in-
equality between the United States and other ad-
vanced countries. A factor that explains cross-country
differences in inequality merits serious attention as
an explanatory factor of changes over time.
2) Shift-share calculations that show declining
union representation to account for at least one-fifth of
the rise in earnings differentials and dispersion of pay
within groups.
3) Evidence from analyses of the shape of earn-
ings distributions that the declh~ing real minimum
wage has contributed to the rise in inequality, to which I
would add the cotmterfactual assessment that the failure
of the govermnent to lean against the market wind has
also played a role in the observed trend.
Some may object to the theme of this paper on the
grounds that institutions are mere epiphenomena--
the smokescreen through which market forces oper-
ate. If the labor market of the past two decades had
been at full employment and competitive pressures
put every firm on the knife-edge of existence, with no
discretion in pay policy, I would take this objection to
heart. But a wide body of research has shown that
industries and firms have scope for independent pay
policies, be it because they have economic rents or
because they can strike innovative, efficiency-wage
contracts. And it is difficult to characterize the past
two decades of sluggish economic growth and rates
of joblessness as full employment. Displaced workers
cannot readily obtain jobs at their previous pay, and
even huge wage reductions have left jobless large
proportions of the less-skilled. In a world with rents
and pay discretion, and with labor market slack,
institutions have greater scope to affect outcomes than
in tight job markets.
h~ any case, the evidence provides a compelling
set of facts to add to the story of this epoch of in-
creased inequality.
Claim 1: Labor Market Institutions Explain
the U.S. Lead in Earnings Inequality
First, for the fact: the United States leads the
industrialized world in earnings inequality. Figure
1A, based on OECD data, makes this clear. The ratio of
the earnings of the top decile of American full-time
~ The 1994 Economic Report of the President notes that several
studies conclude that the decline of unionization accounts for about
20 percent of the increase in inequality, but this point did not gain
much attention (Council of Economic Advisers 1994, p. 120).
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May/June 1996                                                                                     New England Economic Review 159male earners to the earnings of those in the bottom
decile is far greater here than h~ other countries. A
major reason for this is the low pay of Americans in
the lower income deciles. Figure 1B shows that work-
ers in the bottom decile earn just 37 percent of the
median wage in the United States, compared to 60 to
76 percent of the median in most other countries.
Since, on average, Americans earn only moderately
more than Europeans in purchasing power parity of
pay (we earn a lot less at current exchange rates than
workers in several other countries), the disparity in
The United States leads the
industrialized world in
earnings inequality.
earnings at the bottom translates into markedly lower
real earnings for poorer Americans. A full-time Amer-
ican worker in the bottom decile of our earnings
distribution earns per hour, for instance, less than half
of what a comparable German worker earns, and
three-quarters as much as a comparable British worker
(Freeman 1994).
The position of the United States as the industri-
alized world’s leader in earnh~gs inequality is not
unique to these earnings distribution data. During
the 1980s and 1990s, educational differentials widened
in the United States to create exceptionally large
premia for the more educated. In the 1960s and 1970s,
industrial wage differentials widened to produce an
exceptionally wide interh~dustry wage structure. The
United States also has large size-of-firm pay differen-
tials and large differentials in pay by age (Japan has
sizable differentials here, too). Differentials among
women are exceptionally large here (although the
male advantage in pay has dropped), and so too are
differentials among young workers just entering the
job market (although the age or experience premium
has risen). Moreover, data on frh~ge benefits--pen-
sions, medical insurance, and the like--show that
low-paid U.S. workers have fewer benefits than high-
paid U.S. workers, adding to the inequality in money
compensation. Finally, data on family incomes, be-
fore-tax or after-tax, show this country at or near the
top in overall income inequality. And, we are far
ahead of comparable countries h~ child poverty,
whether measured in relative terms or, as I prefer, in
absolute family earnh~gs adjusted for purchasing
power parity. At the other end of the spectrum, the
United States rewards its CEOs more relative to em-
ployees than do other countries; academic economists,
bankers, and rap singers also do fine, thank you.
The facts on inequality are clear and beyond
dispute. Even before the rise in h~equality h~ the 1980s
and 1990s, the United States had a more dispersed
distribution of pay than other countries. Before trying
to explain the rise of inequality h~ the United States
over time, it will be frt~itful to see what tmderlies the
greater inequality here at any point in time.
People or Wage-Setting h~stitutions?
Two possible explanations can be offered for high
earnings inequality in the United States. One possibil-
ity is that this inequality reflects our diversity: the
not-quite-complete mixing of ethnic groups. After all,
unlike homogeneous Sweden or Germany or Japan, or
the Netherlands, or Italy, we are a diverse people with
differing cultures, education, ethnic backgrounds, liv-
ing in diverse regions on a large continent. Surely,
a diverse society can be expected to generate more
inequality in pay.
A second possibility is that U.S. inequality reflects
the way pay is determined here~our great reliance on
market forces compared to labor market institutions,
versus other advanced countries. Unlike most of
OECD-Europe, we have a "thh~" structure of labor
market institutions: We do little to regulate pay by
statute, we have no employer federations to speak of,
and we use collective bargainh~g less than virtually
every other country.
Is it the people or is it the wage-setting institu-
tions that produce h~equality, at U.S. levels? To find
out, I proposed the following experiment. From a
population of babies from an advanced European
country, randomly select a few and move them to the
United States. Then watch those babies grow up and
reach workh~g age. Compare their distribution of
earnings to that of a "control group" of brothers or
sisters in the old country. If inequality is in the people,
we will find no difference in the spread of earnings
between the experimental and control groups. If in-
equality is in pay-setting, we will find large differ-
ences. Now, reverse the experiment with American
babies: Take a sample, send them overseas, and watch
as the babies grow up, enter the job market, earn a
living. Will the American babies have as great an
inequality in earnings overseas as h~ the United States?
Is inequality h~ us, or is it in wage-setting and other
social institutions?
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dation discouraged my undertaking this experiment,2
so I will report to you the results of the closest
approximation I could make using nonexperimental
data--a pseudo-experiment. My pseudo-experiment
compares the distribution of earnings of U.S.-born
men of Swedish descent working in the United States
with the distribution of earnings of men of Swedish
descent working in Sweden. By looking at the descen-
dents of Swedish immigrants rather than at immi-
grants, I eliminate the danger that the data ~vill be
driven by the selectivity of immigrants.3
To identify persons of Swedish background in the
United States, I used the "ancestry" question in the
U.S. Census of Population. In 1990 the question was:
"What is this person’s ancestry or ethnic origin?" The
coding allows persons to report two ancestry groups
(for example, German-Irish). I extracted from the 1990
Census the record of all men who listed Swedish
ancestry and obtained a sample of 53,468 observa-
tions. For comparison, I also extracted a random
sample of 98,181 Americans of whatever ancestry.
These samples are sufficiently large to provide reason-
ably accurate measures of earnings and incomes dis-
tributions.
On the Swedish side, my co-worker, Anders
Bjorklund, extracted a sample of persons with Swed-
ish parentage who grew up in Sweden (which elhni-
nates immigrants and the children of immigrants)
from the leading socioeconomic survey of individuals
for that country.~ The number of observations is
considerably smaller than those in the U.S. samples,
but still sufficient for the pseudo-experiment (Bjork-
lund and Freeman 1996).
Table 1 presents the results of this analysis in
terms of the 90/10 and 10/50 percentiles of hourly
earnings ratios for male workers. The line labeled all
U.S. men gives the distributional measures for Amer-
icans, regardless of ancestry. The line labeled U.S. men
of Swedish ancestry gives the same statistics for per-
2 My suspicion is that the National Science Foundation felt the
study team should have had M.D.s or Ph.D. biologists rather than
economists on it.
3 This leaves the dangers of selectivity among the immigrant
parents (which the}, pass on to their children through genes and
home environment), and of possible differences as to which parents
have children, between Swedes in Sweden and in the United States.
My suspicion is that selectivity among immigrant parents would
produce a less dispersed distribution of children here than in
Sweden, as immigrants usually come from one social group rather
than being a random sample of persons in the sending country. I
have no idea about the differential behavior of Swedes h~ Sweden
and of Swedish immigrants in the United States.
4 This is the LNU survey, or the Survey of Living Conditions.
Table 1
Hourly Earnings Differentials for Men,
Sweden and United States, 1989 to 1991
Ratio of Earnings, Ratio of Earnings,
90lh Percentile to 10th Percentile to
10th (90/10) Median (10/50)
All U.S. Men 5.53 .39






Source: Bjorklund and Freeman (1996).
sons of full Swedish descent in the United States. The
line labeled Swedish men in S~veden refers to persons
of Swedish ancestry working in Sweden, while the line
labeled non-Nordic men in Sweden refers to persons
of non-Nordic ancestry working in Sweden.
When we first conceived these calculations, I
anticipated that the men of Swedish descent in the
United States would have a distribution of earnings
narrower than that of other Americans but wider
than that of Swedes in Sweden. They were, after all,
more homogeneous than the "average" American. I
planned to use the differences to calculate a kind of
heritability (both genetic and environmental) coeffi-
cient for earnings dispersion. But, as you can see, such
an analysis would have no point: Persons of Swedish
descent living in the United States have a dispersion of
earnings similar to that of other Americans--a distri-
bution utterly unlike that of Swedes in Sweden.
Too few descendents of American immigrants
live in Sweden to permit the reverse experiment, but
Bjorklund noted that we could examine how adults
born of all immigrants fare in Sweden. Contrary to
the image of homogeneous Sweden, 15 percent of
Swedish residents aged 20 to 64 reported in 1991 that
one or both their parents were not Swedish citizens
at birth; many said that the language at home
was something other than Swedish; and half of them
said it was a non-Nordic language (Bjorklund and
Freeman 1996). We tabulated the hourly earnings
distribution for all 20- to 64-year-old adults who
reported that at least one parent was not Swedish and
that the language at home was neither Swedish nor
another Nordic tongue. The 90/10 and 10/50 ratios
of earnings for these descendents of immigrants are
May/June 1996 New England Economic Review 161comparable to those for persons with parents born
in Sweden. The Swedish system of wage determina-
tion produces a dispersion of earnings among those
with foreign parentage comparable to that of other
Swedes.
Sweden is, to be sure, more committed to egali-
tarianism than other capitalist countries. The most
conservative Swedes are "off the map" of American
political life by their desire to give the poor a decent
living standard. But while Sweden is at the top of the
scale in reducing pay differentials (Figure 1), it is not
an outlier. Its distribution of earnings is comparable to
that of other advanced European countries; it is in its
tax and transfer policies that Sweden differs from
other European Union countries. The United States is
Americans have unequal earnings
because we have a wage-setting
system that produces inequality.
The earnings distribution
resides in the institutions
that set pay in our country.
the outlier. If we performed the same "pseudo-exper-
iment" comparing Americans of French, or German,
or Italian or whatever parentage with their peers born
in the old country, I predict that the results would
mimic those for Swedish-Americans. Americans have
unequal earnings because we have a wage-setting
system that produces inequality. The earnings distri-
bution is not "in us" nor "in our stars" but resides in
the institutions that set pay in our country.
What Are Those h~stitutions?
In the United States, pay in the private sector is
largely determined by companies subject to market
constraints. Only a modest proportion of workers
have their pay set by collective bargaining, and few
have their pay set by industrywide bargaining with an
employers’ federation that covers all firms. Govern-
mental pay rules, such as minimum wages or manda-
tory extension of collective bargaining (whereby the
government extends the terms of a collective bargain
to firms and workers not party to the bargain), also
affect only a small number of U.S. employees. And the
proportion of the work force in the public sector is
less than in most other countries.
We are not the only country that relies on the
decentralized market to determine pay. The United
Kingdom and Canada also rely heavily on markets,
although they have larger union movements and
greater public sector employment than we do. With a
modestly sized and declining firm-based union move-
merit, Japan might also fit into this grouping, but
perhaps not: Japan’s Shunto Offensive for wage-set-
ting and in general the Japan, Inc. corporate behavior
have led some analysts to classify it with Europe’s
more centralized labor systems. All of these coun-
tries-the United States, the United Kingdom, Can-
ada, and Japan--are among the top five in inequality
in Figure 1, although Japan is comparable to OECD-
European countries in having a fairly moderate differ-
ential between the median worker and the 10th decile
worker.
By contrast, in Western Europe (save the United
Kingdom and Ireland), most pay setting is by labor
market institutions. Collective bargaining sets the pay
of 92 percent of workers in France, of 68 percent in
Spain, of 95 percent in Finland, of 90 percent in
Germany (OECD 1994, Table 5.8). In some countries,
bargaining takes place at a national level, though tl~is
is declining in importance. In most cotmtries, it occurs
at an industry or industry-region level. In France,
minimum wages are also important, since the govern-
ment has set the basic minimtm~ at about 60 percent of
the average pay (compared to a U.S. minimum of
about 35 percent of hourly earnings in manufacturing
in recent years). Finally, government employment
tends to be large in many European countries, so that
public pay policies affect national wage determination
to a substantial extent. Katz and Krueger (1991) show
that, in the United States at least, public sector pay is
less dispersed thaa~ private sector pay and pay in-
equality increased much less in the public sector than
in the private sector in the 1980s.
Institutional pay-setting reduces inequality by
three mechanisms. First, institutional determination
compresses pay within a firm. Unions, in particular,
seek to establish pay by rules rather than by manage-
ment discretion. As a result, pay differences among
union workers are smaller than pay differences among
otherwise comparable nonunion workers in all coun-
tries for which we have data (Freeman 1982).
Second, institutional wage determination, espe-
cially industry bargaining with mandatory extension
of collective bargaining agreements, reduces differ-
ences in pay among establislm~ents. As a result of such
162 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewextensions, union/nonunion differentials in European
countries are modest compared to the differentials in
the United States (Blanchflower and Freeman 1992).
Third, for ;vhatever reason, institutional pay-
setting reduces industry differentials. The United States
and other decentralized wage-setting cotmtries have
greater differences in pay across industries compared to
cotmtries that rely on institutions to set pay, including
those that make extensive use of industry bargaining.
The "deeper" reason that underlies all of these
relations is that institutions operate on averages; they
Institutions operate on averages;
they represent average workers or
firms, whereas markets operate on
margins; they represent the
pressure of supply and demand on
the marginal firm or employee.
represent average workers or firms, whereas markets
operate on margins; they represent the pressure of
supply and demand on the marginal firm/employee.
Institutions are insurance mechanisms for employees
and firms; they may reject changes that reduce the
well-being of the average employee/firm even though
this change fits with the marginal calculus.
The 1980s and 1990s were a good period to assess
the difference in market and institutional pay-setting.
When supply and demand operate to reduce inequal-
ity, market and institutional ~vage-setting produce
changes in the same direction (as in the 1950s and
1960s), and it takes a subtle analyst to discern their
relative importance. When, by contrast, supply and
demand operate to increase differentials (as in the
1980s and 1990s), markets move rapidly in that direc-
tion, while institutions "lean against the wind."
Claim 2: Declining Unionization Is a
Big Cause of Rising Inequality
Unionization declined precipitously in the U.S.
private sector from the 1970s through the 1990s. In
most advanced countries, unionization grew in the
1970s as workers sought protection from inflation,
then fell in the 1980s and 1990s, though only to levels
at or above those in the 1960s. Here the decline was
continuotts, with the private sector fall overwhelming
a rise in public sector unionization in the aggregate.
As a result, the United States was fttrther from the
OECD mean unionization rate in the 1990s than in
earlier decades.
But changes in union density have different con-
sequences for collective bargaining among countries.
As the United States does not rely on industry-level
bargaining nor extend collective bargaining contracts
within an industry,5 the decline in density translates
into a decline in coverage and thus in institutional
wage-setting. By contrast, even in European countries
where union density dropped sharply, such as the
Netherlands, the percentage of workers covered by
collective bargaining barely clianged. Why? One rea-
son is that firms remained part of their sector’s em-
ployers’ association, which obligated them to follow
the contract the association bargained ~vith the union.
A second reason is that mandatory extension la~vs
required firms that were not members to abide by the
conditions of the contract in their sector. The bottom
line is that declh~ing unionization had a much greater
effect on earnings outcomes in the United States than
in European countries.
How much of the increase in earnings inequality
here might we attribute to the decline in collective
bargaining coverage? One way to ans~ver this ques-
tion is to conduct a shift/share analysis, weighting
observed changes in coverage by estimates of the
effect of coverage on pay outcomes. In the U.S. private
sector, collective bargaining produces higher wages
for blue-collar employees and reduces white-collar/
blue-collar pay differences, by roughly the same
amount. From 1973 to 1993 union coverage fell by
roughly 20 points. Assume that the union wage dif-
ferential was 25 percent and that union ~vage gains did
not spill over to other employees. Then, a 20-point
drop in coverage would lower the pay of blue-collar
workers by 5 percentage points (= 20 × .25). This
is about one-half of the increased white-collar/blue-
collar differential among men (Freeman 1992). Since
college and high school graduates are found in both
white-collar and blue-collar jobs, the power of the
decline in unionization to explain the rise in the
college/high school wage premimn is smaller: it ac-
counts for about one quarter of that change (Black-
burn, Bloom, and Freeman 1990; Freeman 1992).
5 Save for the Davis-Bacon Act, which the government inter-
prets as requiring that federal contractors pay going union wages in
most cases.
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bargaining coverage is also associated with lower
dispersion of earnings among covered workers. Re-
duced collective coverage thus offers one possible
explanation for the increase in within-group inequal-
ity. Multiplying the 20-point drop in collective cover-
age by the esthnated effect of ul~ionization on disper-
sion of pay within sectors (measured by the standard
deviation of the logarithm of wages), I esthnate that
about 20 percent of the rise in overall dispersion can
be attributed to the drop in unionization. Note that
this is only a rough estin~ate of the determinants of the
rise in dispersion within groups. More sophisticated
estimates (Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman 1990; Free-
man 1992; Card 1992; DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux
1994) give comparable results. Bell and Pitt (1995)
have reported a similar finding for the United King-
dora. The uniformity of the estimates is impressive: It
is rare in economics for different techniques applied
by different analysts ha different countries to come up
with approximately the same estimate.
The 20 percent estimate is, however, almost cer-
tainly an underestimate of the true effect of declining
union density on inequality. It is, after all, based on a
A rough estimate is that about
20 percent of the rise in
within-group inequality of pay
can be attributed to the drop
in unionization in the
U.S. private sector.
simple counterfactual--that the decline of unioniza-
tion affects inequality only by reducing the share of
the less dispersed or higher-paid blue-collar work
force in employment. But it is higlily likely that such a
decline has "spillover" effects to other workers as
well. Consider how the U.S. job market might operate
if the percentage of private sector workers covered
were two or three or four times the 1995 level of 10.5
percent. With private sector union density of 20 per-
cent (the level in the mid-1970s), or 30 percent (early
1960s), or 40 percent (mid-1950s), I would expect
union wage agreelnents that reduce dispersion to spill
over to nonunion firms. In the 1950s and 1960s, many
nonunion firms paid union rates or introduced union-
style pay structures in order to remain nonunion. The
smaller dispersion in pay within union workplaces
would thus be extended to nonunion workplaces, at
least to some extent. The hard question is to obtain a
valid and robust estimate of how big that "to some
extent" would be now.
One way to measure the possible "full" effect of
labor market institutions on pay inequality is to com-
pare collective bargaining coverage/unionization and
measures of inequality across countries, using a re-
gression analysis. Given estimates of the effect of labor
market institutions on inequality, one can--bravely
--use the coefficients to infer how much lower U.S.
earnings inequality might be if we had higher levels
of collective bargaining coverage. Since many things
differ between countries, and collective bargaining
coverage means something different in different set-
tings, such an analysis will be at best indicative. Still,
for the purpose of gauging the possible effects of labor
market institutions on economy-wide earnings distri-
butions, a cross-country exercise will at least be pro-
vocative. If one believes that entire economies are the
right units of observation, there is not much else one
can do in any case to get the "full impact" of labor
market institutions.
Table 2 gives levels of collective bargaining cov-
erage and union densities6 and the two measures of
inequality from Figure 1. There is a positive relation-
ship between coverage and the nearness of the 10th
decile to the median, and between coverage and the
ratio of the earnings of the 90th to 10th deciles, but
there are also clear divergencies: Japan has the second
lowest collective bargaining coverage, but a "Europe-
an" distribution of low pay; Sweden has less inequal-
ity than Germany, which has higher coverage, and
so on. There is also a relationship between the two
measures of inequality and unionization. The regres-
sions at the bottom of the table summarize these
patterns: They show that collective bargaining cover-
age is more closely linked to the level of inequality
than is unionization per se.
The regressions provide one indicator of the po-
tential effect of differences in national coverage and
union density on differences in inequality. Consider,
for example, the difference in inequality between the
United States and Germany. In the early 1990s, collec-
6 The reader will note that in Japan collective coverage is
slightly below the unionization rate. One possible explanation for
this is that it reflects the crudeness of the data. But it could also be
a real phenomenon, as some unions may have membership that is
not large enough to produce collective contracts.
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Collective Bargaining Coverage,
Unionization, and Earnings Inequality,
by Country
Earnings Ratio
Country Coverage Unionization 90/10 10/50
United States .18 .16 5.65 .37
Japan .23 .25 2.74 .61
Canada .38 .36 4.00 .42
United Kingdom .47 .39 3.05 .62
Netherlands .71 .26 2.15 .76
Norway .75 .56 2.16 .69
Portugal .79 .32 2.57 .70
Australia .80 .40 2.15 .71
Sweden .83 .83 1.96 .76
Germany .90 .33 2.30 .71
Belgium .90 .51 2.39 .73
Austria .98 .46 2.70 .61
Summar~ Regressions (standard error in parentheses)
90/10 differential = 4.95 -2,03 coverage -1.89 union
(.85)        (1.23)
10/50 differential = .39 +.29 coverage +.13 union
(.to)        (.15)
Source: OECD 1993; 1994.
R2 = .55
R2 = .55
tive bargaining coverage was 0.18 compared to 0.90,
and unionization was 0.16 versus 0.33. Taking the
regression coefficients from the equations, I estimate
that much of the U.S.-German difference in inequality
is due to differences in pay-setting institutions. The
U.S.-German difference in the 90th/10th decile of
earnings is 3.35 points; the regression suggests that
1.79 points of this difference is due to the differences in
coverage and unionization--a bit over one-half. Sim-
ilarly, the U.S.-German difference in the 10th decile/
median of earnings is 0.34; the regression suggests that
0.23 points of the observed difference between the
countries is due to differences in collective bargaining
coverage and unionization--about two-thirds. While
these data are limited to one period7 and do not cover
all the OECD countries, they are consistent with the
notion that a significant portion of the U.S.-European
gap in inequality is associated ~vith differences in
wage-setting institutions. On the other hand, the re-
gression does not account for the U.S.-Japanese differ-
ence in inequality. Whether this is because the cover-
age variable incorrectly specifies Japanese institutions
7 I carmot readily analyze earlier periods because tlie source for
collective bargaining coverage, the OECD Employment Outlook for
1994, does not provide figures for earlier periods.
(nearly all Japanese firms raise pay by nearly the same
percentage amounts, after the Shunto Offensive) or for
other reasons I am not prepared to say.
But the issue of concern is whether declines in
collective bargaining coverage are associated with
rising inequality. Table 3 summarizes the limited
available data in terms of the change in coverage and
the absolute and percentage increases in the 90th/10th
decile earnings ratios. The countries with the largest
declines in density of collective bargaining coverage
had the largest increases in inequality in absolute and
percentage terms; countries with modest declines had
modest changes in inequality; while those with little
change or an increase averaged even smaller growth
in inequality. But the country variation in these
groups is substantial: The U.S.-Canada comparison
shows that Canada had as substantial a percentage
increase in inequality as the United States, with essen-
tially no change in density, whereas the decline in
density in the United Kingdom is associated with a
large increase in inequality. The overall pattern is in
the expected direction, but here we clearly need more
data over more time periods, and perhaps a more
careful look at the U.S. and Canadian contrast. Card
and Freeman (1993) and ensuing work suggest that
Canada did not have as large an increase in inequality
as the United States, contrary to the picture given by
the OECD figures on which my table relies.
These diverse calculations show that while the
U.S. might or might not have a more effective econ-
omy if union density were higher, it would surely be
a less unequal society.
Claim 3: Government Interventions
Affect Inequality
The United States govermnent might have inter-
vened in the labor market in various ways to lean
against the winds of inequality in the 1980s and 1990s.
It could have directly intervened in wage-setting,
through increases in the minhnum wage. It could have
provided greater support for job training or higher
education. It could have offered public sector employ-
ment or wage subsidies to employers for lower-paid
employees. Going beyond the labor market, the gov-
er~m~ent could have acted to offset the effects of rising
labor market inequality on disposable incomes by
redistributive tax and transfer policies. Note, however,
that cuts in the income tax for the low-paid or in-
creases in the earned income tax credit might poten-
tially raise before-tax inequality (assuming that they
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Changes in Collective Bargaining Coverage and in
Measures o~ h~equality, 1980s~
Change in Change in
Coverage 90/10 Ratio






United Kingdom - 23 .95 40 -. 10 - 14
Australia -8 .27 14 - .04 -5
United States -8 .92 15 -.03 -7
Countries with Modest
Drops in Coverage
Japan -5 .25 10 -.02 -3
Netherlands - 5 .05 2 -.04 - 5




- 1        -.08       -4        .04         6
1 .50 14 - .04 - 10
~The years covered are 1979 to 1991 or to the latest year available (U.S. to 1989, Canada 1981
through 1990). See OECD (1993, Table 5.2).
have an incidence similar to payroll taxes), requiring
us to look as well at after-tax earnings patterns, h~ any
case, the range of possibilities is substantial, and
beyond the scope of this study. I consider the one that
has recently attracted considerable attention: the min-
imum wage.
Studies have estimated the effect of maintaining
the real value of the minimtun wage on the distribu-
tion of earnings, usually under the assumption that
such a change in policy would have little or no effect
on employment. As estimates of the effect of higher
minima on employment invariably yield modest elas-
ticities-the most reliable "large" elasticity is -0.24
(Neumark and Wascher 1995)--this is a tenable initial
assumption. For men aged 25 to 64, few of whom are
paid the minimum, Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman
(1990) simulated that maintaining a minimum wage at
its 1979 real level throughout the 1980s would have
had only a modest effect on the earnings of less skilled
workers, but these estimates appear to be overly
conservative. Using a more sophisticated simulation
methodology, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1994)
estimate that failure to maintain the minimum wage at
its 1979 real value accounts for 10 percent of the
increase h~ the standard deviation of adult male wages
over the period and for 30 percent of the increase
among adult women workers. Card and Kreuger
(1995) compare earnings inequality and the propor-
tion of workers covered by rabbi-
mum wages across states and come
up with a 30 percent estimate of the
contribution of the decreased real
minimum to the inequality among
all workers. Mishel and Bernstein
(1994) come up with the biggest
estimates. Their simulations sug-
gest that had the minhnum wage
been maintained at its 1979 real
value, the growth of the 90/10
earnings differential inequality
among adult men would have been
some 50 percent lower in 1993 than
it actually was, and the growth of
the differential among women
would have been two-thirds lower.
Without endorsing any of these fig-
ures, this line of research can be
seen as showing that maintaining
the minimum wage at historically
plausible levels relative to the av-
erage would have helped limit the
near free-fall in wages at the bot-
tom of the earnings distribution that characterized the
U.S. job market in this period.
A second possible set of government activities is
on the quantity side of the market. Inequality in pay is
less evident in the public sector than in the private
sector. As noted, Katz and Krueger (1991) show that
inequality was lower and increased less in the 1980s in
the public sector than in the private sector. But the
change in public sector employment was modest and
between 1980 and 1993 the public sector share of
nonagrictiltural employment fell from 18 percent to
17 percent, so that this change could not have contrib-
uted much to the change in overall inequality. Still, a
more active government policy that used the public
sector to hire low-skill workers directly or to subsidize
the employment of low-paid workers, say through
reductions in payroll taxes, might have reduced in-
equality. Such policies would raise the employment
of the low-skilled, but not necessarily their pay, in the
short run; but over time, earnings consequences
would follow as the low-paid would accrue greater
job experience, the number of jobless would decline,
and so forth. I have not estimated the possible impact
of such a program on the earnings of the low-paid and
on inequality, nor whether its benefits would exceed
its costs. My suspicion is that a reasonably sized,
targeted employment program would have at least
modest effects on inequality.
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Assume that you accept the evidence and argu-
mentation in this paper that you calmot tell the
economic history of the rise in inequality and fall ha
real earnings in the United States in the latter decades
of the twentieth century without bringing labor mar-
ket institutions into the story. Does this mean you
should run out and demand that your favorite politi-
cal candidate copy FDR and declare "As President, I
want workers to join unions?" (Do it, guys --it may
not be popular but it’s right!) Or that you should risk
your job by trying to organize your fellow employees
into a union? Or try to organize your fellow employers
into a European-style employers’ federation?
Not necessarily. The causes and cures of problems
are not necessarily linked. We cure myopia (a largely
genetic disease) with glasses and contact lenses. We
develop new genetic strains of animals or plants to
deal with environmental diseases or rusts that
threaten those anhnals or plants. Similarly, the best
cure to the problem of falling real earnings and rising
inequality may be unrelated to the factors that caused
the problem. If you believe that trade is the cause of
rising inequality, you can still reject protectionism, on
the grounds that the potentially large costs to trade
barriers outweigh any benefits in the form of reduced
inequality. Or, if you believe that technology has
impoverished low-skill workers, I suggest you do not
trash your computer or march on M.I.T. The costs of
stopping the advance of technology (were it possible)
far outweigh any benefits in the form of reduced
inequality.
You can logically look instead in other directions
for cures. Maybe the most efficacious solution to rising
inequality is a more progressive tax and transfer
system or greater expenditures on public goods,
which the poor consume equally with the rich. Or
maybe it is providing laptops for every poor child, so
that they become more adept at dealing with modern
teclmology.
In the case at hand, I believe that institutional
interventions in pay-setting have potential costs, some
substantial. These costs have exercised Europeans for
some time. Europe has not had much job growth.
OECD-Europe has lower employment/population
rates than the United States. OECD-Europe has long
spells of joblessness. I am not convinced that the
"right" institutional pay-setting necessarily lowers
employment by enough to worry about in a country
whose problem is not job creation but earnings in-
equality. The workers whose pay has fallen in the
United States have also experienced loss of time
worked, and the minimum wage studies suggest that
elasticities of demand for the low-skilled are small.
Still, I would not dismiss the potential cost of labor
market institutions in employment.
At the same time, labor market institutions bring
benefits beyond lower inequality--the voice benefits
of democracy in workplaces--that must be factored
into any overall assessment of those institutions. A
society in which bosses boss and workers obey--
where workers have no independent say in the deci-
sions that affect their working lives ("if you don’t like
the way the company does it, leave")--is likely to miss
out in efficiency (see Freeman and Lazear 1995) as well
as in fairness and decent treatment of all. An assess-
ment of any scheme to rebuild American labor insti-
tutions must take account of the full spectrum of costs
and benefits of those institutions.
The message of this paper is not that the best or
only cure to inequality and impoverishment of work-
ers is increased institutional wage-setting. For what it
is worth (full disclosure of biases and all that) I believe
that greater reliance on labor institutions is a plausible
cure to rising inequality and is probably a necessary
part of any solution. But this is belief, not evidence.
The message of the paper is that institutions are
important in distributing earnings, and that institu-
tional developments in the United States in the past
several decades have contributed to our earnings
problem. To ignore the role of unions and government
policies is to ignore part of the real world --not a wise
strategy for understanding what happens in the econ-
omy nor for devising policy solutions to improve
outcomes. Rising inequality is too serious a national
problem for us to exclude from discourse any set of
potential candidates for cause or cures.
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I
n this paper Richard Freeman has put the best case
forward for the importance of labor market insti-
tutions in explaining the level and trend in earn-
ings inequality. Motivated by his broad reading of
the literature and unhindered by any fear of going
too far out on a limb, Freeman offers us what is
probably an upper bound on the importance of labor
market institutions. Many will wince at his willing-
ness to draw broad conclusions from bivariate rela-
tionships. However, as is usually the case, many of his
observations show real insight.
I view my role as the sympathetic yet cautious
observer ~vho enjoys seeing the daring of others, while
at the same time wanting to bring a mild dose of
caution to this endeavor. My hope is that my more
restrained case for the importance of labor market
institutions will strike the proper balance.
Do institutions matter? The answer is obviously
"Yes." One sin~ply cannot believe that market forces
have been so consistently different in the Nordic and
Northern European countries than in the United States
and the United Kingdom as to generate such wide
and persistent differences in earnings inequality. So
the question is not whether institutions matter, but
how much they matter. This raises the question, "How
much compared to what?" If there is going to be a
horse race, one needs to have at least one other horse
on the track. The most obvious competition is between
the importance of market forces and that of institu-
tional forces.
Conceptual Issues
Before moving to the empirical evidence, let me
raise three conceptual issues. The first focuses on the
difference between explanations for changes in earn-
ings inequality that focus on levels and on changes in
institutions. Conceptually, nothing is wrong with
thinking that both levels and changes may matter.
Institutional constraints may provide an imperfect
screen limiting changes in the wage distribution. The
tighter the screen, the slower the growth in inequality.
Therefore, levels may matter. Likewise, tightening the
screen may reduce the growth in inequality. There-
fore, changes in institutions may matter.
While nothing is conceptually wrong with using
both the level and the change in institutions to explain
trends in inequality, this gives the institutional expla-
nations a great deal of latitude. If a country has tightly
regulated labor markets which are then weakened
(as was the case in many countries during the 1980s),
then one can explain either increases or decreases in
inequality. If inequality did not rise, it was because of
the level of institutional constraints. If inequality rose,
it was because of the changes in constraints.
The pattern of large increases in
inequality in countries zoith the
more decentralized labor markets
forms the core of the argument for
the importance of institutions.
This degree of latitude, of course, can be limited
by imposing some structure on the data. In principle,
nothing stops us from including more than one ex-
planatory variable h~ a regression with changes in
inequality as the dependent variable. But this raises
the second issue. Any cross-national comparison is
limited by the very small number of countries. Most
studies compare just two or three countries. Ten
countries is a large sample. To ask these data to
distinguish between the effects of levels and trends in
institutions while holding other relevant factors con-
stant (changes in relative supply, change in interna-
tional trade, and the like) is asking a lot.
The tlzird conceptual issue is that a full ans~ver to
the question of the relative importance of institutional
and market forces would have to take account of
feedback between the two. Inasmuch as institutional
changes are caused by changes in market forces, one
would need to allocate this endogenous change to
market forces, not to changes in institutions. The most
obvious example is the decline in unionization, which
was certainly caused in part by increased foreign
competition that weakened the bargaining power of
workers. But causation does not go only from markets
to institutions. For example, the downsizing of gov-
eriunent, which is clearly an institutional change,
results in a change in relative demand for skilled
~vorkers as long as the public and private sectors differ
in skill intensity. I mention this endogeneity problem
not because it is solvable at this stage, but only to
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in. As a practical matter, my guess is that endogeneity
is small potatoes compared to the other empirical
problems.
Empirical Evidence
With these preliminaries out of the way, let me
turn to the empirical evidence presented in Freeman’s
paper. The first claim is that institutional differences
explain much of the differences in levels and trends in
inequality. I will focus my comments on changes in
inequality over time, since this is what has preoccu-
pied the profession recently and because I have little
doubt about the importance of institutional differences
in explaining levels of inequality. (Differences in mar-
ket forces could not be large enough to explain the
substantial cross-national differences in the levels of
inequality that have persisted over decades.)
The strongest case for the importance of institu-
tions comes from the simple correlation between al-
most any ranking of countries by the degree of cen-
tralization of wage setting and by increases in
earnings inequality. Finland, Sweden, and the Neth-
erlands experienced small increases in inequality, fol-
lowed closely by Israel and France. These are all
countries tliat have either strong union coverage or
other forms of centralized wage setting. The sole
exception is France, Which has fairly decentralized
labor markets but has a widely applied and rising real
minimum wage. At the other extreme are the United
States and the United Kingdom, which experienced
large increases in inequality and have very decentral-
ized labor markets. This pattern of large increases in
inequality in countries with the more decentralized
labor markets forms the core of the argument for the
importance of institutions.
It is, however, instructive to go behind these
aggregate measures of h~equality and to look at
changes in inequality between and within groups. The
large increase in overall inequality in the United States
and the United Kingdom reflected increases in the
education premium, increases in the experience pre-
mium, and increases in inequality within groups. The
pattern is not nearly as uniform for countries that
experienced little or no increase in inequality. The
small changes in inequality in Sweden and Finland
reflect a decline in the age premium matched by an
increase in the education premium. In the Nether-
lands, the pattern is just the opposite, with the age
premium rising but the education premium falling.
So the first question to ask is whether market-based
or institutional-based explanations fit these within-
country differences better.
Two additional sources of information can help
inform the debate. If changes in relative supplies of
factors are consistent with changes in relative wages
between education or experience groups, then tliis is
clearly consistent with a market-based explanation.
On the other hand, if institutional rigidities kept
wages from falling to market-clearing levels, then one
should observe a change in the relative employment
rates of the least skilled.1 My claim is not that changes
in relative supplies or changes in relative unemploy-
ment rates provide conclusive evidence for market-
based or institutional explanations, but rather that
they provide additional evidence which helps get us
beyond the simple cross-country correlations between
changes in overall inequality and levels of institutional
barriers.
France and Sweden provide the strongest case for
the importance of institutional constraints.2 In France,
the minimum wage (the SMIC) increased faster than
the average wage during the first half of the 1980s,
then slowed later in the decade. These changes in the
minimum wage closely parallel the relative stability
of inequality tltrough the mid-1980s followed by a
mild increase in inequality during the late 1980s and
early 1990s. If the minimum wage was a binding
constraint, then we should observe an increase in the
relative unemployment rates of the young and less-
educated workers. This is exactly what we observe.
Likewise, the patterns of changes in relative un-
employment rates are consistent with an institutional
explanation for the change in inequality between
experience groups in Sweden. During the 1980s, the
earnhags of young workers actually rose faster than
the earnings of older workers. This was mirrored by
an increase in the relative unemployment rates of
young workers in Sweden, strongly suggesting that
institutional constraints were propping up the wages
of the young while demand for their skills was falling.
The Netherlands and Finland also have institu-
tions that potentially could have limited the rise in
inequality. The evidence on changes in relative supply
and unemployment rates suggests, however, that
these constraints were not binding. Recall that in the
Netherlands, the small increase in overall inequality
~ Unemployment would not rise if demand were totally inelas-
tic, an assumption that Freeman rejects implicitly when he writes
about the cost of institutional interventions in pay setting as taking
the form of lower employment/population rates.
2 Change in returns to skills, relative supplies, and relative
unemployment rates are from Gottschalk and Joyce (1995).
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education premium dropped considerably, while the
age premium increased. The drop in the education
premium does not seem to be the result of institutional
constraints on wages of the least educated. Rather, a
substantial increase occurred in the relative supply of
college-educated workers in the Netherlands during
the 1980s. This market-driven force offset the increase
in demand for educated workers, with the result that
wages of college-educated workers actually fell rela-
tive to wages of less-educated workers. The impor-
tance of institutional factors is fnrther undermined by
the fact that the relative unemployment rates of less-
skilled workers did not increase.
The only policy that I would add
to Freeman’s list is changes in the
earned income tax credit. This
seems to be a straightforward way
of dealing with changes in the
earnings distribution.
The pattern in Finland is similarly consistent with
a market-driven explanation. Here, the small overall
increase in inequality reflects an increase in the edu-
cation premium countered by a decline in the age
premium. But the increase in the relative wages of
younger workers is consistent with a market explana-
tion, since the relative supply of younger workers also
decreased in Finland. Furthermore, changes in relative
unemployment rates again do not point to binding
constraints on wages of young workers, even in this
country with centralized labor market institutions.
In summary, the raw correlation between the
level of institutionalized wage settings and changes in
earnings inequality gives an incomplete picture. In
essence, it shows only one horse in the race. When we
look behind these numbers at changes in relative
supplies, we find that roughly half of the countries
~vith centralized wage-setting institutions also experi-
enced changes in relative supplies that are consistent
with the data. In essence, the raw correlations tell us
only about the potential for binding constraints, not
whether these constraints were binding. It should
come as no surprise that in some countries constraints
were binding, while in other countries they were not.
The second claim in Freeman’s paper is that
declining unionism was a big cause of the rise in
inequality. He provides two types of evidence. The
first is a summary of studies of the United States that
have tried to estimate the impact of changes in union-
ism on inequality. As he points out, all but one of these
studies come to similar conclusions. Roughly 20 per-
cent of the increase in inequality came from the
decline in unionization. I have no quibble with this
body of research, other than to point out that changes
in unionization may have partially reflected changes
in market forces. But as a purely accounting statement,
the number 20 percent seems reasonable. Whether 20
percent is large or small is clearly in the eye of the
beholder. One can make equally strong statements
about the importance of foreign trade, computeriza-
tion, or other factors that explain part, but by no
means all, of the change in inequality.
The second body of evidence provided by Free-
man (his Table 3) uses cross-national comparisons to
try to tease out the importance of declines in union-
ization. This is one of those cases where his creative
imagination may have taken him a bit too far. While
the correlation between changes in inequality and
overall measures of centralization of wage setting is
fairly strong, the relationship between changes in this
specific institution and changes in inequality is far
from overwhelming. When these data are plotted, one
sees that the negative relationship is almost totally
driven by the United Kingdom. Even if one were to
draw conclusions from simple correlations like this,
one would not want to bet on the institutional horse,
based on these weak patterns. In my opinion, this
cross-national comparison does little to strengthen the
case for the importance of institutions.
The third claim is that government interventions
can affect inequality. I have no objection to this claim.
As Freeman himself points out, the causes and cures
of problems are not necessarily linked. The United
States could have done substantially more than it did
to offset the changes in the labor market, even if
changes in institutions were not an important cause
for the increase in inequality.
The only policy that I would add to Freeman’s list
is changes in the earned income tax credit. In 1993, a
low-income worker with children was eligible for a
19.5 percent tax credit on earnings. This was supposed
to be raised to 40 percent by 1996. While one can argue
about the incentive effects of the EITC and the diffi-
culty of administering a program that encourages
people to overstate their earnings, this seems to be a
very straightforward way of dealing with changes in
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changes in government policy can offset increases in
inequality, but whether the nation wants to offset the
declines in earnings of persons who, through no fatflt
of their own, were born during a century when wages
of less-skilled workers plummeted.
In summary, I come away from this paper with
the conclusion that institutions can and, at times, do
matter. What Freeman has offered us is an upper
bound on the importance of institutions. Even if one
moderates his conclusions, one is left with the impres-
sion that institutions provide binding constraints in
some countries in some periods. Furthermore, the
United States could have done a great deal more than
it has done to offset changes in labor markets.
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l
" ~vill begin with two general comments and then
summarize the possible policy implications that
.flow from today’s papers.
Defining the Problem
To my mind, an important issue remains that we
have not discussed, and should: the fact that we are all
here because we agree that existing inequalities are too
great. We have not really demonstrated that such
inequalities are so terrible, however, and we need to
lay out the welfare function explicitly. It is not clear
that the current Congress has the same welfare func-
tion in mind as the one that seems to prevail here.
The biggest divisions about what is the right
amount of inequality can be described as follows. One
way of thinking would support some sort of safety net
that would protect medical care, housing, and educa-
tion at a minimal level, while leaving the rest up to the
market. The other way of thinking about inequality
argues that we should allow the market to operate
sufficiently to ensure that such programs maintain an
efficient purpose in society. The United States now has
such a large group relying on our safety net precisely
because we have not done so, according to this point
of view. Some statement about the actual level and
reasons for concern about earnings inequality should
accompany any policy discussion.
My second general comment relates to the deci-
sion, in this conference, to focus on both spatial and
labor market contributions to earnings inequality.
Spatial inequality analysis usually emphasizes the
group with the lowest level of income, the bottom
decile, the underclass. We have concentrations of the
poor, and growing disparities between the city and
the suburbs in income and many related socioeco-
nomic measures. Policies derived from spatial in-
equality studies emphasize improved mobility of res-
idential location, and improved ability of people
living in one place to get to employment in another.
Such policies assume that if the poor were more
dispersed, we would have fewer problems.
Labor market inequality analysis, on the other
hand, looks at the whole range of the income distri-
bution. A researcher may compare the lowest income
group to the highest, or measure the difference be-
tween the second and the eighth deciles. Such studies
are interested in ho~v the market rewards skills in
relation to productivity, and in wage determination as
it is related to the demand for and supply of labor. The
focus on the lowest income group, in some labor
market studies, overlaps the similar focus of most
studies of spatial distribution. The policies flowing
from these studies are directed to education, training,
the minimum wage, and the role of internal private
sector management.
Mobility and Neighborhoods
The spatial papers--the overview paper by
Mayer, and the papers by O’Regan and Quigley, and
Holzer and Ihlanfeldt--point strongly and clearly to
both the role of transportation and the role of neigh-
borhood effects in the spatial reinforcement of earn-
ings inequality. Such papers provoke much discussion
and interest here, because we operate at the margin in
determining which is more important: neighborhood
effects or transportation effects. As empirical social
scientists, however, we must understand the tension
that exists between the partial equilibrium or individ-
ual questions that drive our research and the general
equilibrium reality in which both transportation and
neighborhood play an important role.
Over the past quarter century, one of the great
flaws in public policy has been to use single-pronged
policy programs to aid those at the lowest end of the
income distribution, rather than to use the more
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search have helped to drive that misguided policy
approach. We identify one or another input as a
significant coefficient in our regressions and tend to
design policies accordingly. Much of the current
thinking in research circles and in the experimentation
fnnded by large foundations has shifted to ways to
assist low-income families by addressing many areas
simultaneously. While specific research projects may
point to one approach, effective results will reqttire
combining the knowledge from all our research efforts
into a comprehensive policy program.





The research results on transportation and neigh-
borhood effects discussed today combine in the fol-
lowing questions: Can an individual freely choose
where to live, given the income constraints? Does
every geographic area provide a supply of residential
locations for whoever wants to live there? And can
people get to the places where the jobs are located?
The papers presented today said that mobility mat-
ters and that neighborhoods do have effects on earn-
ings.
So what are the policies to think about? In our
policy discussions, we must take into account the
devolution of pouter that is taking place in this coun-
try. How much, and in what form, we may not know
yet, but some devolution surely will take place. One
tool to implement devolution is block grants to state
and local governments. Although block grants have
received much support, little attention is being paid
to just how they will be distributed--not even by big
city mayors, who will certainly be among those most
affected. This is clearly a case where it is all in the
details! There is a well-known example from the 1970s
of the need to understand the details. The formula for
the distribution of Community Development Block
Grants used the log of the unemployment rate to
calculate funding. How could big city mayors have
allowed the log to get in, rather than the level? The
question is whether states, with their increased power,
will regard spatial and labor market inequalities as a
major concern. And the question is also whether the
federal government will use the block grant formulas
to give incentives for them to do so.
How much will be spent on increasing mobility
by tailoring transportation to provide access to jobs?
Will there be constant legal pressure for the availabil-
ity of housing for all who can pay? Much of the
current inm~obility comes from a certain fixity, or even
expansion, in the size of the underclass, the poorest
group. We have not been successful in breaking
through that fixity, and it is not clear that transporta-
tion will change it, either. Marginal effects are impor-
tant, so we should ensure that transportation is avail-
able, but we should think about them as marginal
effects.
When thinking about neighborhood effects, it is
important to focus on the dispersion of poverty. No
systematic study has been done on what happens to
income inequality if neighborhoods are changed by a
reduction in the spatial concentration of poverty. In
New Jersey, for example, the latest Mt. Laurel decision
was interpreted to mean suburbs could "pay" or
"play"--either contribute financially or build low-
income housing--and all opted to pay. If the decision
had been to put low-income housing in many of these
suburbs, rather than sharing only fiscally, this would
have been a good case study for the effect of disper-
sion policies. That is the only such court decision I
know of that has gone so far in trying to alter the
poverty concentration--and legal scholars differ as
to whether that decision will, in fact, have wide
implications.
A few years ago, I organized a conference that
took place in that great urban setting, Bellagio on Lake
Como, comparing urban economic development in
Western Europe and the United States. A major con-
clusion emerging from the comparison was that Euro-
pean cities are healthier than U.S. cities for two
reasons. First, the poor are much more dispersed in
Europe than in the United States; lower-income fam-
ilies tend to live around the periphery of major cities,
not in the center, as in the United States. Second, most
European cities receive centralized funding. Their
state of well-being is nowhere near as dependent on
the local tax base as that of cities in the United States.
So, I encourage thh~king about deconcent~ation policies.
The Kain-Singleton paper suggests that spatial
inequality translates into fewer resources going to
schools in poor and minority communities than to
schools in more affluent areas. We still do not know
whether these resources matter. If they do, we need
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resources that in fact have an irnpact on education. If
resources do not matter, then we are left thinking
about policies that do not necessarily involve re-
sources but, rather, involve a major restructuring of
the organization and incentives of our educational
system.
Labor Market Issues
What are the real labor market issues in connec-
tion with earnings inequality for those at this confer-
ence? If they are not primarily issues about those at
the bottom, then what is there to worry about? We
might worry about those unemployed who have a
temporary skills mismatch for labor market needs,
who need help with mobility or retraining. We might
worry about today’s middle class that has less income
Immigration policy has strong
spatial implications, as well
as general implications
for the labor force as a whole.
In the past decade, most
of the new immigrants
ended up concentrated
in the central cities.
ferent roles. I do not see any significant public policies
about income inequality arising from the activities of
internal management, although the notion of an inde-
pendent role for internal management in lessening
earnings inequality is quite interesting--profit-driven
training programs and educational standards for hir-
ing, for example.
Richard Freeman’s policy recommendations were
based on a reexamination of a number of institutions
that affect earnings. I agree with Peter Gottschalk that
such institutions are largely endogenous. They obvi-
ously have been supported by laws, but on the whole,
they emerged from our society endogenously rather
than exogenously.
So to address inequality in the general distribu-
tion of earnings and income, the list of non-spatial
public policies would include changing tax policies,
raising the minimum wage, improving training and
higher education opportunities for low-income indi-
viduals, and changing immigration policy. Immigra-
tion policy, of course, has strong spatial implications,
as well as general implications for the U.S. labor force
as a whole. Five metropolitan areas in the United
States received 58 percent of all new immigrants in the
past decade, with Los Angeles accounting for 24
percent. Most of the new immigrants ended up con-
centrated in the central cities. Although immigration
policy is set nationally, the effects are concentrated in
a limited number of metropolitan areas. In the central
cities of those areas, the fiscal impact of that concen-
tration affects the local governments’ abilities to pro-
vide services to those at the bottom of the income
distribution.
than its predecessors. To my mind, this does not seem
to be such a worrisome thing to contemplate. We
might worry about international competitiveness, in
which case we want to ensure that international
markets are freed up, leaving it to the market to
translate those changes into the labor market. It is the
group at the bottom, however, that warrants most of
the attention from public policies--a view that prob-
ably reflects the social welfare function of the partici-
pants in this conference.
Peter Cappelli and Richard Freeman see some
possible solutions in the private sector. Cappelli ar-
gues that managers influence the wage structure; but
if you believe in markets, then presumably they man-
age the wage structure so as to maximize profits. It is
difficult to think of managers of private companies as
the guardians of more equality; they have quite dif-
Cities Are Special
As we look ahead, new policy options will
emerge as power devolves from the federal govern-
ment, largely in the form of block grants to states.
These grants offer a new opportunity to build in
incentives that would encourage state and local gov-
ernments to reduce the inequality of income by reduc-
ing the spatial concentration of poverty. We do not
know now how policymakers will choose to structure
these block grants, but they certainly open up the
possibility of establishing incentives to change the
spatial distribution of the poor within a state, to
change the minimum wage, and to alter tax policy. It
is a big challenge to our current thinking to focus our
concerns about income inequality on the roles of state
and local governments. In the past, based on very
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cies were activated on the federal level. Now, we will
have 50 political arenas to consider. This certainly
suggests that spatial inequality will not be addressed
in a uniform way, and that we will have to concern
ourselves, increasingly, with the effects of competition
among the states in welfare reform--who will spend
the least?
This should leave us worried about one of Amer-
ica’s greatest problems--our large old cities, where
the biggest inequalities of income are found. Within
the states with these large cities, the vote counts of the
suburbanites plus the rural areas exceed the vote of
the cities. That is not grounds for optimism about the
likelihood of reducing income inequality in the United
States!
dren. These were also the groups who experienced
declining incomes.
Panelist Ann B. Schnare
Vice President for Housing Economics,
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
I was asked to address the hnpact the mortgage
market may be having on income inequality. I find
that a difficult hypothesis to address and have decided
to turn it around a bit. I will discuss the impact that
income trends are having on the housing market and
the pressures they are putting on the mortgage indus-
try as well as on the housing programs that serve the
poor, such as those run by the Depart3nent of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD).
Let me begin with a few words on how the effects
of earnings inequality have played out in the housing
market historically. Enormous and rapid improve-
ments occurred in the homeownership rate after
World War II. We went from a nation of renters to a
nation of owners. But in the early 1970s, homeowner-
ship rates began to decline and continued to do so
until last year. Many feared that the American Dream
of homeownership was being threatened.
If you look at the numbers, much of the decline in
the homeownership rate can be explained by demo-
graphic trends, for example, the rise of single-person
households. But more important, in my view, are the
income trends we have examined today. Younger,
middle-class households between 25 and 35 years old,
the classic first-time homebuyers, have experienced
stagnating or even declining wages. Homeownership
rose among younger households without children,
both singles and married couples, but it fell signifi-
cantly for both single and married parents with chil-
Poverty in the Cities
The middle class certainly has been affected, as
the stagnation in wages put pressure on homeowner-
ship rates, but the big impact has been on the rental
market, as both relative and real incomes fell for those
at the bottom of the income distribution, the people
who traditionally have been renters. As a result, there
is a large and growing gap between what it costs to
operate an apartment building and the rents house-
holds can afford to pay. This has led to two problems,
Not only are individuals pulling
apart, so are neighborhoods
and communities. Increasingly,
the poor are concentrated in
highly impacted neighborhoods
within the city.
the physical decay we see in urban areas and an
increased demand for government subsidies. And
HUD has been severely hit by reductions in the
resources put into low-income programs, a trend that
will only intensify in the future, in my opinion.
These are individual effects, in a way. But the
papers we discussed earlier make clear that not only
are individuals pulling apart, so are neighborhoods
and communities. Increasingly, the poor are concen-
trated in highly impacted neighborhoods within the
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These changes are having a growing impact in turn on
the fiscal health of cities and their ability to pay
for essential services. And city fiscal difficulties may
in turn intensify some of the negative neighborhood
effects that we have discussed today. The problems of
urban areas are now linked intrinsically to problems
of income distribution. To what extent they are con-
tributing to or causing such problems is a matter for
debate, but income distribution problems certainly are
affecting the future viability of urban areas.
Implications for the Mortgage Industry
What does this mean for the mortgage industry?
Certainly there is a lot of concern about the ability of
low- and moderate-income households, especially mi-
norities, to get access to the mortgage market. Follow-
ing the Boston Fed study, as well as other work on
mortgage flows in low-income and minority neighbor-
hoods, the response by the mortgage industry has
been fairly dramatic as we reexamined our underwrit-
ing criteria to see if we had unnecessary barriers to
getting credit to inner-city neighborhoods.
This reexamination has led to a lot of experimen-
tation, which has intensified in recent years. Unfortu-
nately, the initial results are not very comforting. The
mortgage industry has seen a real decline in credit
quality, due in part to a drop-off in loan origination
volumes. Mortgage originators were staffed up, and
then they saw the refinancing market go away. Thus,
there has been increasing economic pressure to pre-
serve volume as well as political pressure.
At Freddie Mac we have found it important to
distinguish between the performance of special pro-
grams and that of mainstream programs as they relate
to the income of the borrower. In our special programs
designed to lift certain underwriting guidelines, the
record is not very good. These programs are relatively
ne~v, but as the data begin to come in, they are
showing significantly higher default and foreclosure
rates. These are low-equity loans, where only 2 per-
cent of the money comes from the borrower’s equity,
and often even this is paid by or borrowed from the
bank. Other aspects of risk are typically involved as
well; in fact, layering of risk appears to be a significant
problem. In my opinion, it is bad public policy to
put individuals into houses they cannot afford to
support. Some of the biggest abuses of government
programs occurred in FHA during the early 1970s,
when neighborhoods were blown away by bad under-
writing.
If one examines mainstream programs, in partic-
ular the relationship between loan performance, bor-
rower income, and neighborhood income, some inter-
esting results appear that we do not fully understand
yet but that relate to spatial effects. We have found, for
example, that low-income loans perform the same
way as high-income loans, with not much difference
between the two groups. The important factor seems
to be, rather, neighborhood income, which may mean
that neighborhood income is picking up something
more fundamental about permanent income than is
revealed by examining only the current income of the
borrower.
In looking at Freddie Mac’s own mortgage pur-
chases, we have found again that credit quality is not
related to the borrower’s income but rather to neigh-
borhood income. This gets at the fact that serving
distressed inner-city neighborhoods does involve
more risk, that these are very difficult loans to do. The
lending industry has much to learn. It is doing a lot
of experimentation but concern remains about how far
to go.
People versus Places
Shifting the focus now from Freddie Mac to HUD,
one issue HUD has always been unsure about is
whether it should subsidize people or places, rely on
supply-side programs or on voucher programs. HUD
has tried to serve both pt~rposes with the same set of
programs. Over time, as HUD monies dried up, they
have increasingly targeted their subsidies to the poor-
est of the poor. The problem is that they locate such
households in precisely the neighborhoods they are
trying to upgrade. While housing programs may im-
prove individuals’ bricks and mortar, public housing
has consistently reduced the quality of the neighbor-
hoods people are living in, compared to equally poor
households not involved in housing programs--a
pretty serious indictment. These findings suggest sev-
eral policy recommendations: One is to increasingly
regard vouchers and mixed-income developments as
solutions; another, more fundamental, is to break the
link between trying to provide assistance to the poor
and doing community development. Trying to do
both together simply has not worked.
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Daniel Rose Professor of Urban Economics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
What is the effect of inequality on growth? In
particular, will growing income inequality retard
growth? The answer, I think, is mixed. In the long run,
increasing inequality may limit the national rate of
growth, for reasons I discuss below.
In the short run, I think the causality works in
exactly the opposite way. The h~equality we now see is
a by-product of enormous industrial restructuring that
began in manufacturing h~ the early 1980s and spread
to the services sector by the end of the decade. On the
one hand, this restructuring is responsible for raising
the rate of productivity growth across the economy.
On the other hand, this same restructuring has sharply
reduced the demand for semi-skilled labor, and their
falling wages have significantly increased earnings
inequality.
The inequality we see now is a
by-product of enormous industrial
restructuring that began in
manufacturing and spread
to the services sector.
The underlying problem is that labor demand can
shift much faster than labor supply. In this case, the
demand for semi-skilled labor can fall much faster
than semi-skilled labor can acquire new skills. The
issue is much bigger than minority communities in
central cities. Median earnings for 25- to 34-year-old
men with a high school diploma or a GED is now
$20,500. This is a big decline; 15 years ago, similar
men earned about $28,000 in today’s dollars. The
number is particularly significant because 40 to 45
percent of all 30-year-old men have not gone beyond
high school. A plausible connection can be made
between these wage numbers and the "angry white
males" we hear about in political argument. A lot is
at stake. We need short-run policies to address how
we can get through this period without atomizing our
society. We need longer-run policies to help us get out
of this situation.
In the short term, I would recommend that we
treat the situation as an unanticipated natural disas-
ter-like a flood or a hurricane. In response, we might
expand our safety net to ensure that, say, health care is
not linked to jobs, since the trends that are pushing
down wages also reduce fringe benefits. In addition,
we could expand or at least strengthen the earned-
income tax credit. In all of this, we must recognize that
for a large part of the population who played by the
rules, the rules have changed in the middle of the
game, leaving people in economic jeopardy when it
may be too late to alter their choices. In this regard, we
know from training studies that it is difficult for
workers to pick up new skills at the age of 35 or 40.
Special Role of Schools
As for the future, the major issue is education and
the provision of human capital; this is where the
spatial aspect of these problems comes in. Schools, in
particular our public schools, run on routines, like
most organizations. In the 1970s, the established rou-
tines were perfectly adequate because high school
graduates still could get decent jobs. The labor market
has changed quite fast since then, but it is hard to get
schools to change their routines h~ response. The highly
decentralized structure of our schooling system makes
it doubly hard. Local schools operate within their
state’s context. And states have become something of
a deregulated industry themselves, with the federal
budget playing a much smaller role in supporting
state budgets. This leaves the states in very intense
competition for jobs, putting pressure on resources.
Within states, schools are governed in fairly income-
homogeneous local districts. So the schools and com-
munities that have been hit hardest must make the
biggest adjustments. The towns where all the parents
are highly educated have fine schools to begin with,
and their taxpayers are also doing pretty well. But
poorer working-class communities that have been hit
harder by economic restructuring are also the places
that need to make the biggest changes in their schools.
As John Bishop noted, kids make decisions early
that have a kind of path-dependence in terms of which
classes or tracks they are put in. The issue of their
access to information about what is out there for them
is very hnportant. Programs such as apprenticeships
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ProTech here in Boston, change the information on
which kids are acting.
But more than that, we must keep saying that
states should be upgrading educational standards and
imposing minimum requirements, even though it may
run against their short-run interests. These standards
and measures should give parents some sense of what
their kids are learning. In a period when we need to
upgrade standards and increase the provision of hu-
man capital, providing more information externally to
the school district is crucial.
The Migration Question
I will close with one final issue, migration, that
wish had been discussed more this morning. Massa-
chusetts, for example, recently flirted with zero pop-
ulation growth. During the "Massachusetts Miracle"
of the 1980s, the wage structure got pushed much
higher than national wages because of a lack of
in-migration. The loss of manufacturing jobs here was
masked by a construction boom, then the construc-
tion boom ended. Anecdotally we hear that fewer
decent jobs remain for less-educated people, although
well-educated people have few problems. Is zero
population growth being pushed by the out-migration
of less-educated or more-educated workers? A more
general question is, to what extent is migration affect-
ing the distribution of human capital around the
states and the underlying issue of earnings inequal-
ity? I hope this issue will be discussed more in the
future.
Panelist Lazorence F. Katz
Professor of Economics, Harvard University.
The presentations at this excellent conference
have shed further light on rising inequality, one of the
truly big stories in American economic life over the
last 20 years. The enormous disparities in the fortunes
of American families in recent years have largely been
associated with labor market changes that have in-
creased overall wage inequality and shifted wage
and employment opportunities in favor of the more-
educated and more-skilled. Less-educated young men
have suffered unprecedented losses in real earnings
and are at greater risk of nonemployment than in
years past, both in absolute terms and relative to
more-skilled workers. In short, the U.S. labor market
has experienced a massive twist against "disadvan-
taged" workers--those with limited education or
skills or from impoverished families and neighbor-
hoods--that has diminished their earnings prospects
and made it more difficult for them to keep their
families out of poverty and intact.
Many analysts believe a key driving force behind
these changes has been a strong shift in relative labor
demand against the less-educated and those doing
more routinized tasks and toward more-educated
workers and those with problem-solving skills.
Changes over time in wage inequality can be thought
of as being the outcome of a footrace between tech-
nology (the demand for skills) on the one side and the
supply of educated labor on the other side. It is clear
that the technology and demand side has been win-
ning the footrace, outstripping supply and stretching
out the wage structure during most of the past two
decades. These demand shifts favoring the more-
skilled have been reinforced by changes in pay-setting
norms, increased competition in many product mar-
kets, increased immigration of less-educated workers,
and the weakening of institutions that have protected
non-college workers (for example, the decline of
unions and the erosion of the real value of the mini-
mum wage). While much debate exists concerning the
relative importance of these different underlying
causes of rising inequality and increased returns to
skill, none of the suspected factors show any apparent
signs of abatement.
The Role of Macro Policy
Strong macroeconomic performance traditionally
has been a crucial factor in improving the labor market
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ences of the long boom of the mid and late 1980s and
the current U.S. expansion suggest that sustained
economic growth by itself, unassisted by specific ini-
tiatives to deal with increased structural labor market
barriers facing the less-skilled, is unlikely to be suffi-
cient to reverse recent trends in inequality or to
overcome increased labor market barriers facing the
disadvantaged in America’s inner cities.
Market incentives for increased individual educa-
tional investments and skills upgrading can play some
role in alleviating growing inequality in the United
States. The large increase in the college wage premium
in the 1980s has been associated with an increase in
college enrollment rates from 49 percent of high
school graduates in 1980 to more than 60 percent in
the early 1990s. Evidence from U.So time series and
cross-country studies strongly suggests that rapid
expansion of the supply of more-educated workers
narrows earnings differentials and improves the labor
Rapid expansion of the supply of
more-educated workers narrows
earnings differentials and
improves the labor market
position of the less-skilled.
But the process of supply
adjustment can take many years.
market position of the less-skilled. But the process of
supply adjustment can take many years, and many
disadvantaged individuals face financial and informa-
tional barriers to pursuing further education and
training. Furthermore, the overall supply of college
graduates has not grown very rapidly in recent years,
as John Bishop showed, becanse the current baby bust
cohort is quite small. Not many 40-year-olds return to
college when the college premium expands.
These facts suggest a number of different strate-
gies. First, we could try to improve the supply side of
the labor market, as Frank Levy discussed. Obviously,
primary and secondary education is key to that,
although access to higher education is important as
well. Second, we could try to affect the demand side of
the labor market. We are not going to shut dowu the
borders to trade; that would be foolhardy. But we
could undertake some form of targeted demand poli-
cies, such as employer-side wage subsidies for eco-
nomically disadvantaged workers, based either on
people or on place. Third, government could play a
better role in trying to make work pay, through an
expanded earned income tax credit, possibly a higher
minimum wage, or even doing more with the tax
system. Fourth, we could do more to match up jobs
and people who have very little connection to the
labor market, such as welfare recipients and disadvan-
taged youth. Given that a lot of state and local
governments will be making these decisions, we
should draw lessons from the past on which ap-
proaches work best.
Choosing Policies That Work
Our 30 years of experimenting since the Great
Society with training and wage subsidies and location-
based assistance policies have given us a menu of
options from wldch government can make its current
decisions. We have had a number of negative mes-
sages, but this is probably the one area in the govern-
ment budget where we have the most random-assign-
ment evidence on which programs actually might
work. So from this menu of options, policymakers
such as state governors could make better-informed
decisions than those made in the past.
The first thing we have learned on the negative
side is that it is extremely hard to turn around the lives
of people who have become disconnected from the
mainstream educational system and dropped out of
high school. Countless programs have attempted to
help disadvantaged youth who have dropped out of
high school and, aside from the Job Corps, a very
expensive residential program, almost all have shown
very little return. On the other hand, a number of
recent demonstration projects suggest we can be more
successful by starting earlier to work to keep kids in
high school and prevent dropouts. The Quantum
Opportunities program is a good private sector exam-
ple, and the Department of Education has run a
number of very successful demonstration projects: not
traditional programs that help a 16-year-old get a
summer job and do not last very long, but rather
programs that start at age 14 or earlier and set up an
inexpensive infrastructure with extra tutoring, to-
gether with a group at school responsible for helping
kids make connections to the labor market. Some of
the best examples, like the "I Have a Dream" pro-
grams, also guarantee some financial assistance for
180 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewcollege. A number of these programs have had sub-
stantial effects on high school dropout rates and col-
lege attendance rates, and certainly they seem like
potentially good uses of the funds that states will have
available.
The second thing we have learned is that the
returns to getting more education, such as attending
college, are particularly high for those from disadvan-
taged backgrounds. Thus, the limited response of this
group is not because they themselves do not generally
experience high returns. When we have seen interven-
tions such as increasing access to college or cutting
tuition levels and studied them as natural experiments
for estimating the rates of return to schooling, people
Access to education combined
with information seems to have a
very high return for low-income
people with high abilities.
from lower-income households have been the most
affected. These are people on the margin who decide
whether or not to go to school when you change access
or tuition levels. When you estimate their rates of
return, as David Card did in a recent survey, they look
higher than the average difference in earnings be-
tween college- and high-school-educated workers,
which suggests that capital market constraints are
important. That does not mean that we know exactly
the right ways to reduce the cost of education. But
access to education combined with information seems
to have a very high return for low-income people with
high abilities. Policies to prevent dropouts and in-
crease access to college do not work complete mira-
cles, but they are also not that expensive when tar-
geted to those at the margin, for example, in inner
cities.
In another area, we have learned from the Gau-
treaux program and from a number of other quasi-
experimental programs that neighborhoods, and the
spatial concentration of the poor, do seem to matter.
There is no chance in the world that the public will
agree to huge residential dispersion policies, as the
Baltimore experience with the Moving to Opportunity
(MTO) program and the Mt. Laurel decision indicate.
Small-scale attempts have a role, however, as shown
in the current MTO program that, despite Baltimore
talk radio disparagement, is in operation in the Balti-
more metropolitan area as well as in Boston, Chicago,
New York, and Los Angeles.
A striking characteristic of this program is that
the majority of those who agree to participate in it
say that the primary reason they want to move out of
their neighborhood is because of problems with crime
and worry for their children, but they lack the re-
sources to leave public housing. Most claim to have
been victimized by crime within the previous six
months. In terms of transportation, 87 percent of them
do not have cars, and the vast majority do not have
driver’s licenses. It is, therefore, plausible that these
people are not choosing a place to live after evaluat-
ing neighborhood and transportation possibilities,
but rather that public housing is the one place ~vhere
they can get a subsidized living situation. Disper-
sion policies could accomplish a bit here, and what I
call place-based people policies could do a lot more.
This would not be subsidizing employers with tax
breaks for setting up warehouses in enterprise zones,
but rather targeting training and human resources
funds towards areas with greater needs. Such pro-
grams may be less stigmatizing than those based on
individuals’ characteristics, such as the targeted jobs
tax credit.
Finally, good returns may come from greater
investments in improving information for kids. A
number of mentoring programs provide such connec-
tions. Project Strive in Harlem is a good example: It
provides training and two years of follow-up services
for youth, where they try to make connections with
and help resolve problems with employers. States and
localities can do a lot to break down the barriers
between the offices of central-city Job Training Part-
nership Act agencies and suburban employers, pro-
vidh~g co~mections beyond just the transportation lh~k.
In conclusion, massive increases in human capital
investments would be required to overcome the
changes of the past 15 years, increases in the $100-
billion-a-year range for a decade, based on some
estimates by Jim Heckman. We are certainly not going
to embark on such an investment. But in a limited "cut
and invest" budget situation, we cotfld probably tar-
get our money better. States and localities should be
looking at the research on what has worked and what
has not, to determine how to use possible future block
grants and their current resources. Also, these policies
will be more effective in an environment of tighter
labor markets.












Is Bank Lending hnportant for the Transmission of Monetary Policy?, the
proceedings of a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston in June 1995, is now available. The conference brought together
central bankers, policymakers, academics, and economists to review
the role of bank lending as an important transmission mechanism for
monetary policy. The group, representing academia and the public and
private sectors, also considered such questions as the relationship of bank
lending to output, and the experience both from this country and abroad
concerning the effects of financial constraints on firms’ decisions.
The proceedings include all the papers presented at the conference
and the prepared comments of the discussants, along with an overview
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Transmission of Monetmy Policy?, may be obtained without charge upon
request to the Research Library--D, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, P.O.
Box 2076, Boston, MA 02106-2076. Or telephone (617) 973-3397.
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